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Foreword
As outlined in the new Security Union Strategy, protection and resilience of critical
infrastructures remains among the top priorities of the European Union.
European critical infrastructure sectors find themselves in the midst of rapid
digitization that is accelerated by the growth of technologies like cyber-physical
systems (CPS), the Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI). Besides
this, critical infrastructure operators today are confronted with different types of
risks in both the cyber- and physical domain. Notable attacks like the “Wannacry”
ransomware and the “Mirai” botnet cyber-attacks, which affected critical infras-
tructure operations across different Member States and in multiple sectors, remind
us of the risks that we face. This situation calls for innovative security concepts that
take us beyond conventional policies that have been addressing either the physical
or cyber-security domain. Currently, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic shows us
the vital role that digital critical infrastructure play in keeping different sectors like
telecommunications, finance, energy, and health care running in the time of crisis.
The European Commission (EC) is supporting the Member States to protect and
ensure the resilience of critical infrastructures. It has adopted an integrated frame-
work based on both strong physical and cyber-security measures. Key pillars of this
framework include the Directive on security of network and information systems
NIS Directive), the Directive on protecting European Critical Infrastructures, the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Cybersecurity Act Regula-
tion. Furthermore, under the Commission’s new digital strategy, additional actions
are being considered. The EC is emphasizing the consistency and complementar-
ity of these and other ongoing initiatives, including the revision of the EUs overall
approach to critical infrastructure protection and resilience, notably the European
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). A package of measures
will be put forward during the fall of 2020.
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xvi Foreword
Besides policy development, the EC supports research and innovation projects
under Horizon 2020 looking for innovative approaches to the protection and
resilience in different sectors. Calls for proposals have been developed and
financed jointly between the ECs Directorates-General for Migration and Home
Affairs (HOME) and Communications Networks, Content and Technology
(CNECT). This cooperation reflects our commitment to an integrated cyber-
physical approach, reflected also in the projects’ outcomes.
It is important to underline that research plays a vital strategic role for security
policy in the EU. In this respect, the EC has encouraged and supported the cluster-
ing between projects, as a means of boosting their cooperation. As such, we welcome
the creation of the European Cluster for Securing Critical infrastructures (ECSCI),
which seeks to bring the many projects working to improve critical infrastructure
protection and resilience together.
Based on results that have been achieved in EU-funded projects, this book
describes innovative approaches to enhancing the protection of critical infrastruc-
tures. It also presents approaches that reduce fragmentation in security operations
and improve the implementation of existing European regulation. The book pro-
vides insights of relevance to policy makers, researchers and practitioners who are
working to ensure the functioning of digitally-enabled critical infrastructures that
our societies rely on.
Brussels, Belgium, June 2020
Monique Pariat
Director General
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European Commission
Preface
At the dawn of the fourth industrial revolution, governments and enterprises are
increasingly deploying Cyber-physical Systems (CPS) as part of their critical infras-
tructures. CPS systems blur the boundaries between the physical and digital worlds
and enable digital control of physical processes in sectors like healthcare, finance,
energy, and industry. CPS systems are a core element of the popular Internet of
Things (IoT) paradigm, which has a transformational impact on the critical infras-
tructures that support the functioning of our societies and economies. Based on
CPS and IoT systems, critical infrastructures operators leverage large amounts of
field data in order to optimize business processes and decisions associated with the
operation of their infrastructures. Furthermore, the rapid digitalization of critical
infrastructures facilitates their interconnection and the seamless exchange of infor-
mation across different stakeholders and value chains.
Along with these benefits, the expanded deployment of CPS and IoT tech-
nologies within critical infrastructures introduces various cybersecurity challenges,
which add up to conventional physical security issues. This is evident in some of the
recent large-scale security incidents against critical infrastructures, which include
attacks against both cyber and physical assets. In several cases, adversaries exploit
vulnerabilities in the digital parts of the infrastructures in order to attack their phys-
ical parts and vice versa. Therefore, critical infrastructures security must be imple-
mented based on a holistic, integrated approach that protects cyber and physical
assets at the same time. This is increasingly acknowledged by critical infrastruc-
tures operators and supported by recent regulatory efforts as well. As a prominent
example, in Europe, the NIS Directive (EU 2016/1148) underlines the importance
of cybersecurity for critical market operators and instructs EU Member states to
supervise cybersecurity for the critical infrastructures of key sectors (e.g., telecom-
munications, finance, energy, healthcare, transport) in their country.
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xviii Preface
Overall, critical infrastructures security is currently redefined in order to address
cyber and physical aspects in an integrated way. Cyber and physical security func-
tions are no longer “siloed,” but rather combined in the scope of integrated security
policies. This integration introduces new requirements such as the need to model
security knowledge in an unified way, the need to address cascading effects between
the two different types of attacks (i.e. cyber and physical attacks), as well as the need
to integrate solutions for cybersecurity and physical security within commonly used
security platforms. Likewise, integrated platforms for critical infrastructures secu-
rity must provide functionalities for preventing, detecting, and responding to secu-
rity incidents in a proactive and cost-effective manner. Moreover, they should pro-
vide the means for sharing information across security stakeholders [e.g. Security
Teams, First Responders, Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT)] to facil-
itate their effective collaboration.
The above-listed requirements are common to the critical infrastructures of the
different sectors of the economy (e.g., finance, healthcare, energy, and transport).
Nevertheless, there are also sector-specific security requirements, stemming from
the different devices, control processes, and business operations of the various sec-
tors. Moreover, installations in different sectors are interconnected in different ways
and are subject to diverse sets of cascading effects.
In this context, the present book is dedicated to presenting novel solutions for
integrated security of critical infrastructures, with emphasis on solutions in four sec-
tors, namely finance, healthcare, energy, and communications. The book presents
various technologies and building blocks for integrated security, along with sector-
specific solutions for each one of the above four sectors. The presented security
technologies cover a wide range of functionalities such as security knowledge mod-
eling, risk assessment, information sharing for stakeholders’ collaboration, Security
Information and Event Management (SIEM), CPS systems and IoT devices secu-
rity, regulatory compliance auditing solutions, and more.
The book is structured in five parts. The first four parts are dedicated to present-
ing solutions for each one of the above listed four sectors, i.e., finance, healthcare,
energy, and communications, respectively. The fifth part comprises sector agnostic
solutions including technologies and best practices that are applicable to critical
infrastructures regardless of their sector. Specifically:
The first part of the book is titled: “Securing Critical Infrastructures of the
Financial Sector” and consists of the following chapters:
• Chapter 1 “Security Challenges for the Critical Infrastructures of the
Financial Sector” introduces the main challenges that are associated with
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physical security and cybersecurity for the critical infrastructures of the finan-
cial sector. The chapter presents recent security incidents against financial
institutions as a main motivation behind integrated security. Moreover, it
also outlines the main building blocks of integrated security solutions for the
financial sector.
• Chapter 2 “A Reference Architecture for Securing Infrastructures in the
Finance Sector” presents a Reference Architecture (RA) for integrated (i.e.,
cyber and physical) security in the financial sector. The chapter illustrates the
main building blocks of the RA, as well as their technical specifications and
the interfaces between them. Furthermore, it illustrates how the RA aligns to
recommendations of security agencies and standards development organiza-
tions.
• Chapter 3 “FINSTIX: A Security Knowledge Base for the Finance Sector”
introduces the importance of security knowledge modeling for securing crit-
ical infrastructures. It also presents relevant knowledge modeling standards
and vulnerability knowledge bases. Accordingly, the chapter details the FIN-
STIX model, which has been introduced in the scope of the European Com-
mission (EC) funded FINSEC project towards modeling security knowledge
in the finance sector. The chapter presents the use of FINSTIX in different
scenarios and use cases.
• Chapter 4 “Artificial Intelligence Gateway for Cyber-physical Security
in Critical Infrastructure and Finance” presents an intelligent system for
Cyber and Physical Security of critical infrastructures. The system collects
and processes information from different security systems installed within a
site or a perimeter (e.g., intrusion detection, access control, fire detection,
technical alarms, etc.), including data and events from a video surveillance
system. Accordingly, it processes this information towards identifying threats
and events before they become critical. The module can, therefore, analyze
security events and situations, allow the integration of cybersecurity concepts,
and support the monitoring of risks associated with critical installations.
• Chapter 5 “Information Sharing and Stakeholders’ Collaboration for
Stronger Security in Financial Sector Supply Chains: A Blockchain
Approach” describes a novel blockchain-based solution for sharing security
data in the scope of the financial sector supply chains. It explains the ratio-
nale behind adopting and using a decentralized blockchain-based solution
for information sharing, including its merits and advantages over conven-
tional centralized solutions. A relevant prototype implementation based on a
permissioned blockchain is also presented.
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• Chapter 6 “Automated Assistance to the Security Assessment of APIs
for Financial Services” introduces the need for security assessment and
automated synthesis of mitigation measures towards securing Open Bak-
ing services in the context of the new Payment Services Directive (PSD2).
Accordingly, it provides an overview of innovative approaches to address-
ing these challenges, based on: (i)Automated identification and mitigation
of security misconfigurations underlying Transport Layer Security (TLS) ses-
sions; and (ii) Automated pen-testing and synthesis of mitigations for both
business (e.g. payments) and security (e.g. authentication or authorization)
functionalities provided by the APIs.
• Chapter 7 “Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection for Security of
Critical Financial Infrastructures and Services” describes an adaptive and
intelligent data collection and monitoring system. The system provides intel-
ligent, resilient, automated, efficient, secure, and timely collection and anal-
ysis of security-related data towards protecting cyber-physical infrastructures
and services of the financial sector. It also enables security teams to gain
insights on how: (i) the nature and quality of collected data affects the effi-
ciency and accuracy of methods of attack detection and defense; (ii) the detec-
tion capability can be improved by correlating wide-ranging data sources
and predictive analytics; (iii) the rate of the data collection at the various
monitoring probes is tuned by managing the appropriate levels and types of
intelligence and adaptability of security monitoring; (iv) the optimization of
bandwidth and storage of security information can be achieved by render-
ing adaptiveness and intelligence and by integrating adaptive strategies and
rules, and (v) increased automation can be achieved through a feedback loop
of collection, detection, and prevention.
The second part of the book is titled: “Securing Critical Infrastructures of the
Health Sector” and consists of the following chapters:
• Chapter 8 “Security Challenges for the Critical Infrastructures of the
Healthcare Sector” introduces the main challenges that are associated with
physical and cyber security for the critical infrastructures of the healthcare sec-
tor. It presents recent security incidents against healthcare institutions, such
as the WannaCry ransomware. It also outlines the rationale for new integrated
security system in the healthcare sector, including systems that support risk
assessments and various threat scenarios.
• Chapter 9 “Security Systems in the Healthcare Sector” presents how a
video management system, an access control system, a fire detection system,
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SCADA, ICS, and smart building sensors, as well as a cybersecurity protec-
tion system can work together to increase the security and resilience of health-
care systems and processes.
• Chapter 10 “Integrated Cyber-physical Security Approach for Health-
care Sector” explains how an integrated cyber-physical security system will
be developed and why this is the optimal solution for the future security of
healthcare systems. It also describes the architecture of the security platform
of the EC-funded SAFECARE project, along with its main building blocks
and the interfaces between them.
• Chapter 11 “Vulnerability and Incident Propagation in Cyber-physical
Systems” provides a focused view on how to handle incidents and their prop-
agation from an asset’s point of view in a healthcare environment. It also
presents an overview of relevant work conducted within the SAFECARE
project.
• Chapter 12 “Innovative Toolkit to Assess and Mitigate Cyber Threats in
the Healthcare Sector” presents a novel Cyber Security Toolkit for health-
care systems. Specifically, the toolkit provides the IT personnel at hospitals
and care centers with highly comprehensive visual analytics that depict the
cybersecurity situation on a near real-time basis, in an intuitive and user-
friendly way. One of the merits of the presented Toolkit is that it is fully
adaptable to the individual user’s profile characteristics.
The third part of the book is titled: “Securing Critical Infrastructures of the
Energy Sector” and includes the following chapters:
• Chapter 13 “Security Challenges for the Critical Infrastructures of the
Energy Sector” discusses the major security challenges, along with the meth-
ods adopted to identify and describe new threats against Critical Energy
infrastructures (CEI). It also outlines methods for evaluating and assessing
risks associated with these threats.
• Chapter 14 “Securing CEI By-Design” focuses on the CEI Security “by-
design” solutions implemented in the EC-funded DEFENDER project.
These solutions include Double Virtualization (Resilience), Fault-Location
and Restoration (Self-healing), as well as Cryptography and Blockchain (Data
Protection) solutions.
• Chapter 15 “Securing CEI By-Innovation” describes the CEI Security “by-
innovation” solutions developed in the DEFENDER project, including CEI
Incidents Detection & Mitigation and the CEI Security Control Centre solu-
tions.
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The fourth part of the book is titled: “Securing Critical Infrastructures of the
Communications Sector” and consists of the following chapters:
• Chapter 16 “Security and Resilience Challenges for the Critical Infras-
tructures of the Communications Sector” introduces the main challenges
for the critical infrastructures in the communication sector. Specifically, it
reviews the current threats that arise as a result of the inter-connection of
cyber and physical systems. It also presents security strategies that exploit the
features and dual (i.e., cyber and physical) nature of the critical infrastructures
of the communication sector.
• Chapter 17 “Resilience Enhancement and Risk Control Platform for
Communication Infrastructure Operators” introduces the platform of the
EC-funded RESISTO project, as an innovative solution for communication
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) situation awareness and enhanced resilience.
The platform integrates two control loops both running on top of the Com-
munication Infrastructure and interlinked with each other, namely a Long
Term Control Loop (LTCL) and a Short Term Control Loop (STCL), which
are both presented in the chapter. Moreover, the chapter illustrates the cyber/-
physical threat detectors of the project, which take advantage of state-of-
the art technologies such as Machine Learning, IoT security, airborne threat
detection, and audio-video analytics.
• Chapter 18 “Managed Security on 5G Communication Networks: The
Software Defined Security Paradigm” is devoted to the description of the
interaction between the new communication system (i.e., the 5G framework)
and the emerging security paradigm, known as Software Defined Security
(SDS). SDS is considered as a new security model that is applied for the man-
agement of communication networks, in which security aspects are imple-
mented, controlled, and managed at software level. The main objective is the
decoupling of the control part and the operational part of a security system
by exploiting the virtualization of security techniques. In addition to dis-
cussing the SDS paradigm, the chapter illustrates its application to IoT and
5G networks.
The fifth part of the book is titled: “Sector Agnostic Issues in Critical Infras-
tructures Protection” and consists of the following chapters:
• Chapter 19 “Detection of Innovative Low-rate Denial of Service Attacks
Against Critical Infrastructures” analyzes the functioning of low-rate
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks targeting network services, with emphasis
on web protocols. It presents novel intrusion detection methods to identify
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last-generation threats that make use of low bandwidth to target network ser-
vices.
• Chapter 20 “Resilience Analysis and Quantification for Critical Infras-
tructures” presents resilience analysis methods developed and performed
in the scope of the EC-funded RESISTO project, notably methods that
follow an enhanced risk and resilience management process based on the
ISO-31000 standard. The chapter discusses the main inputs needed for the
resilience quantification, which are gathered at separate steps of the man-
agement process. It also provides details about how the resilience quantifi-
cation is performed, including information about the network simulation
tool used.
• Chapter 21 “CISIApro Critical Infrastructures Modeling Technique for
an Effective Decision-making Support” presents CISIApro 2.0, an agent-
based simulator, that assesses the consequences of negative events on inter-
connected infrastructures. The output of CISIApro 2.0 is the set of possible
devices and services that are affected by an event. This output is exploited by
Decision Support Systems that mimic the operator decision processes.
• Chapter 22 “Modern Innovative Detectors of Physical Threats for Critical
Infrastructures” starts with an overview of the current situation in Critical
Infrastructures in terms of detecting physical threats, attacks, and hazards.
Accordingly, it introduces novel threat detection techniques that cover a wider
range of threats.
• Chapter 23 “The Ethical Aspects of Critical Infrastructure Protection”
introduces the ethical challenges of critical infrastructure protection, includ-
ing ethical issues associated with both cyber and physical security. It also out-
lines applicable rules and regulations, along with tools and techniques for
ensuring compliance to them.
Most of the sector-specific solutions that are described in the book have been
developed and validated in the scope of four EC co-funded projects on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP), which focus on the four sectors addressed in the
book. These projects include:
• The H2020 FINSEC project, which focuses on integrated security solutions
for the infrastructures of the financial sector, such as infrastructures that
support ATM networks, payment networks, trading/investment, and wealth
management infrastructures and more.
• The H2020 SAFECARE project, which provides solutions that improve
physical and cybersecurity of healthcare infrastructures in a seamless and
cost-effective way. It integrates advanced technologies from the physical and
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cybersecurity spheres, in order to deliver high-quality, innovative, and cost-
effective security solutions in healthcare settings.
• The H2020 DEFENDER project, which provides integrated (i.e., cyber
and physical) security solutions for Critical Energy Infrastructures (CEI). It
addresses distributed, complex, and large-scale Cyber-physical Systems that
need proactive protection and fast restoration to mitigate physical or cyber
incidents or attacks. Moreover, it provides the means to address the even more
challenging combined cyber-physical attacks against CEIs.
• The H2020 RESISTO project, which develops innovative solutions for
Communication Critical Infrastructures, including solutions for holistic situ-
ation awareness and enhanced resilience. The project is developed based on an
Integrated Risk and Resilience analysis management and improvement pro-
cess availing all resilience cycle phases (i.e., prepare, prevent, detect, absorb,
etc.) and technical resilience capabilities (i.e., sense, model, infer, act, adopt).
Also, one of the chapters of the book has been contributed by the H2020
SPHINX project, which focuses on cybersecurity protection for Healthcare IT
infrastructures. Specifically, it provides solutions for cyber protection, data privacy,
and integrity, while proactively assessing and mitigating cybersecurity threats. It
also evaluates and verifies new medical devices and services, while offering certi-
fication and near real-time vulnerability assessment services in the Healthcare IT
ecosystem.
The target audience of the book includes:
• Researchers in the area of security and, more specifically, in cyber and/or phys-
ical security for critical infrastructures protection, who wish to be updated
about latest and emerging security solutions.
• Critical Infrastructures owners and operators, with an interest in adopting,
deploying, and fully leveraging next-generation security solutions for their
infrastructures, including solutions for securing Cyber-physical systems and
processes.
• Practitioners and providers of security solutions, which are interested in the
implementation of use cases for the protection of their cyber and/or physical
assets.
• Managers wishing to understand modern, integrated security approaches for
industrial systems and critical infrastructures in their sectors, with emphasis
on the finance, healthcare, energy, and communication sectors.
The book is made available as an Open Access publication, which could make
it broadly and freely available to the Critical Infrastructure Protection and Security
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communities. We would like to thank now Publishers for the opportunity and their
collaboration in making this happen. Most importantly, we take the chance to
thank the contributing projects for their valuable inputs and contributions. Spe-
cial thanks to Prof. Federica Battisti (Assistant professor at Università degli Studi
Roma) for her supporting in the collection and editing of the chapters contributed
to the book by the RESISTO project. Finally, we would also like to acknowledge
funding and support from the European Commission as part of the H2020 FIN-
SEC, SAFECARE, DEFENDER, RESISTO, and SPHINX projects, which made
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Security Challenges for the Critical
Infrastructures of the Financial Sector
By Ernesto Troiano, Maurizio Ferraris and John Soldatos
This chapter is an introduction to the first part of the book, which deals with secu-
rity technologies for the infrastructures of the financial sector. It motivates the need
for strong security based on recent security incidents that affected financial institu-
tions. Accordingly, it presents some of the main security challenges for the finan-
cial sector, where is also highlights the need for cyber-physical threat intelligence.
Furthermore, the chapter presents state-of-the-art technologies that can help con-
fronting the presented challenges. Some of the presented technologies are elabo-
rated in subsequent chapters of the first part of the book.
1.1 Introduction
In the era of globalization, the financial sector comprises some of the most critical
infrastructures that underpin our societies and the global economy. In recent years,
the critical infrastructures of the financial sector have become more digitalized and
interconnected than ever before. Advances in leading edge ICT technologies like
Big Data, Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intelligence (AI), and blockchains,
2
Introduction 3
coupled with a wave of Financial Technology (FinTech) innovations, has resulted in
an explosion of the number of financial transactions. Furthermore, the critical assets
of financial institutions are no longer only physical (e.g., bank branches, buildings,
ATM machines, computer rooms), but rather comprise many different types of
cyber assets (e.g., computers, networks, IoT devices) as well.
The increased digitization and sophistication of the critical infrastructures of the
financial sector has also raised the importance of cybersecurity in the financial sec-
tor. Nevertheless, despite significant investments in cybersecurity, recent large-scale
incidents demonstrate that financial organizations remain vulnerable against cyber-
attacks. As a prominent example, the fraudulent SWIFT (Society for Worldwide
Interbank Financial Telecommunication) transactions cyberattack back in Febru-
ary 2016 resulted in $81 million being stolen from the Bangladesh Central Bank.
Likewise, the famous “WannaCry” ransomware attacked financial institutions and
had a significant adverse impact on Russian and Ukrainian banks. Another major
attack took place in 2017, when a data breach at Equifax created a turmoil in the
global markets and affected more than 140 million consumers.
In addition to these major incidents, smaller scale attacks against financial insti-
tutions happen daily. While most of them are confronted, there are still many cases
where these attacks affect the operations of banks and financial institutions, as well
as their customers. For instance, back in February 2019, Metro bank was named as
a victim of a cyberattack that targeted the codes sent via text messages to customers,
as part of the transactions’ verification process. A small number of customers of the
bank were potentially affected, while the bank reported the issue to relevant secu-
rity authorities [1]. During the same month, the Bank of Valletta had to shut down
all its operations after hackers broke into its systems and moved e13 million into
foreign accounts. Specially, the bank shut down all the bank’s functions, including
branches, ATMs, mobile banking, as well as email services and the website of the
bank [2].
In general, the financial sector suffers from security attacks (notably cybersecu-
rity attacks) more than other sectors. During 2016, financial services customers
suffered over 60% more cyberattacks than customers in any other sector, while
cyberattacks against financial services firms increased by over 70% in 2017. More-
over, a 2018 analysis from the IMF (International Monetary Fund) estimated that
emerging cyberattacks could put at risk a significant percentage of the financial
institutions’ profits, which ranges from 9% to even 50% in worst-case scenarios [3].
In response to the rising number of attacks against financial institutions and their
cyber assets, financial sector organizations are allocating more money and effort
in increasing their cyber resilience. According to Netscribes, the global cybersecu-
rity market for in financial services is expected to expand at a CAGR (Compound
Annual Growth Rate) of 9.81%, leading to a global revenue of USD 42.66 billion
by 2023. Other studies reflect a similar estimation, e.g., a Compound Annual
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Growth Rate (CAGR) of 10.2% during 2018–2023 and a cybersecurity market
growth from USD 152.71 billion in 2018 to USD 248.26 billion by 2023 [4].
1.2 Financial Sector Security Challenges
Through their security investments, financial organizations are striving to confront
the challenges described in the following paragraphs. The importance of these chal-
lenges has been demonstrated during some of the above-listed security incidents.
1.2.1 Limited Integration Between Physical Security
and Cybersecurity
Even though the critical infrastructures of the financial sector comprise both phys-
ical and cyber assets, physical security and cybersecurity are still handled in isola-
tion from one another. Specifically, cybersecurity and physical security processes
in financial organizations remain “siloed” and fragmented. The latter fragmenta-
tion concerns both the technical and the organizational levels, i.e., physical and
cybersecurity are handled by different security technologies and different security
teams. For instance, physical security systems such as CCTV (Closed Circuit Televi-
sion) systems, intelligent visual surveillance, security lighting, alarms, access control
systems, and biometric authentication are not integrated with cybersecurity plat-
forms like SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) and IDS (Intru-
sion Detection Systems). Likewise, processes like vulnerability assessment, threat
analysis, risk mitigation, and response activities are carried out separately by phys-
ical security officers and cybersecurity teams.
This “siloed” nature of systems and process leads to several inefficiencies,
including:
• Inefficient security measures that consider the state of the cyber or the phys-
ical assets alone, instead of considering the global security context. There are
specific types of security attacks (e.g., ATM Network attacks), where security
processes like risk assessment and mitigation should consider the status of
both types of assets.
• Inability to cope with combined cyber/physical attacks, which are set to pro-
liferate in the years to come. For example, a physical security attack (e.g.,
unauthorized access to a device or data center) is nowadays one of the best
ways to gain access to internal resources and launch a cybersecurity attack
as an insider. Indeed, the recent cyberattack against the Bangladesh Central
Bank exploited access to physical assets of the bank like SWIFT computing
devices.
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• Increased costs as several processes are duplicated and overlapping. In this
context, an integrated approach to security could help financial organizations
streamline their cyber and physical security resources and processes, towards
achieving greater efficiencies at a lower cost.
1.2.2 Poor Stakeholders’ Collaboration in Securing Financial
Services
In an era where financial infrastructures are more connected than ever before, their
vulnerabilities are likely to impact other infrastructures and systems in the finan-
cial chain, having cascading effects. In this context, stakeholders’ collaboration can
be a key towards identifying and alleviating issues in a timely manner. However,
collaboration is currently limited to exchanging data as required by relevant secu-
rity regulations and do not extend to join security processes like (collaborative) risk
assessment and mitigation.
Information sharing between stakeholders of the financial supply chain is a first
and prerequisite step to their collaboration in security issues. In the financial sector,
the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) has been
established, as an industry forum for sharing data about critical cybersecurity threats
in the financial services industry. FS-ISAC provides its members with access to
threat reports with tactical, operational, and strategic levels of analysis for a greater
understanding of the tools, methods, and actors targeting the sector. This allows
them to better mitigate risk.
Information sharing (e.g., as implemented by FS-ISAC) is a foundation for col-
laboration in security processes like joint risk scoring for assets and services that
are part of the financial services supply chain. Such IT-supported collaborative
workflows have been demonstrated in many sectors, including the financial sector.
Nevertheless, there are still trust barriers to information sharing and collaboration,
especially when data must be shared across private enterprises. Recent advances in
IT technologies like blockchain and cloud computing could facilitate the sharing
of information and the implementation of collaborative security functionalities.
1.2.3 Compliance to Stringent Regulatory Requirements
and Directives
Financial institutions are nowadays faced with a need of complying with a host of
regulations, which has a severe impact on their security strategies. For example:
• The Second Payment Services Directive (PSD2): Compliance to the 2nd Pay-
ment Services Directive (PSD) demands for banks to be able to interact with
multiple Payments Services Providers (PSPs) in the scope of an API-based
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Open Banking approach. This raises more cybersecurity concerns and asks
for strong security measures like pentesting and vulnerability assessment on
the APIs.
• The General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR): As of May 2018, finan-
cial organizations have to comply with the General Data Privacy Regulation
(GDPR), which asks for stricter and effective security measures for all assets
where personal data are managed and exchanged. Note that GDPR foresees
significant penalties for cases of non-compliance, which is one of the rea-
sons why financial organizations are heavily investing in security systems and
measures that boost their compliance.
• The Network Information Systems (NIS) Directive [i.e., Directive (EU)
2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July
2016] [5]: The NIS Directive prescribes security measures for the resilience
of the IT systems and networks that support Europe’s critical infrastruc-
tures, including infrastructures in the financial sector. The prescribed mea-
sures include the establishment of risk-driven security polices, as well as the
collaboration between security teams (including CERTs (Computer Emer-
gency Response Teams) and CSIRTs (Computer Security Incident Response
Teams) at national and international level. The directive defines entities in
the Financial services as 2 of the 7 critical sectors and called the member
states upon actions to protect and guarantee the availability of their services.
Financial organizations are therefore investing in the implementation of the
NIS Directive’s mandates.
• The EU legislative framework for electronic communications (EU Direc-
tive 2009/140/EC) was reformed in 2009 and Article 13a introduced into
the Framework directive (Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive
2009/140/EC). Article 13a concerns security and integrity of electronic com-
munications networks and services. The first part of Article 13a requires that
providers of networks and services manage security risks and take appropri-
ate security measures to guarantee the security (paragraph 1) and integrity
(paragraph 2) of these networks and services. The second part of Article 13a
(paragraph 3) requires providers to report significant security breaches and
losses of integrity to competent national authorities, who should report about
these security incidents to ENISA and the European Commission annually.
1.2.4 The Need for Continuous Monitoring of Transaction
and Limited Automation
Financial organizations are nowadays required to secure their infrastructures in a
fast moving and volatile environment, which is characterized by a proliferating
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number of threats and vulnerabilities that are likely to emerge and affect crit-
ical infrastructures. Hackers and adversaries are continually taking advantage of
leading-edge technologies in order to exploit the rising number of vulnerabilities
of the physical and cyber assets of the critical infrastructures. Therefore, it is not
practical, and in several cases not possible, to manually carry out all security and
protection tasks such as detection, monitoring, patching, reporting, and security
policy enforcement activities.
In this context, one of the main challenges faced by the security officers of finan-
cial organizations is the poor automation of security functions. To confront this
challenge, there is a need for solutions that offer immediate mitigation actions,
as well as (semi)automated enforcement of security policies. To this end, financial
organizations can take advantage of recent advances in technologies like Artificial
Intelligence, Machine Learning and automated orchestration of security functions.
The lack of significant automation is also a setback to fulfilling one of the
main security requirements of the financial institutions, which is the ability to
monitor transactions without interruptions, i.e. on a 24×7 basis. This is chal-
lenging as it requires significant amounts of human resources, including cyber-
security experts and members of security teams. However, it is an essential
requirement given that adversarial attacks can happen at any time during the
day. Some of the recent attacks against the SWIFT system might have been
avoided should a close 24×7 monitoring of transactions and security events was
in place.
1.2.5 Lack of Flexibility in Coping with a Proliferating
and Dynamic Number of Threats
In addition to automation, security officers of financial organizations are very keen
on being flexible when dealing with the proliferating number of threats, including
the emergence of several new cyber threats every year. Hence, security departments
must be able to deploy new security functions (such as patches or protection poli-
cies) very frequently, e.g., daily or even several times per day. In this direction, finan-
cial organizations could benefit from latest developments in software engineering
practices and methodologies such as the DevOps (Development and Operations)
paradigm. Recent research initiatives are exploring the use of DevOps in security
systems engineering, which is sometimes called DevSecOps.
1.2.6 Digital Culture and Education
The human factor plays a significant role in alleviating cybersecurity attacks. Proper
digital culture and education can provide a sound basis for complying with the
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mandates of security policies, while avoiding mistakes that could open backdoors
to malicious parties. Nevertheless, there is currently a proclaimed gap in digital
knowledge in general and specifically in cybersecurity. This holds true for phys-
ical security teams as well. Hence, the cybersecurity knowledge gap hinders the
implementation of integrated security strategies, while being a setback to the cyber
resilience of modern financial institutions.
1.3 Solution Guidelines
With these challenges in mind, the following paragraphs provide solution guide-
lines and recommendations about securing modern financial organizations. The
presented solutions are empowered by advanced security technologies and include
the technologies presented in subsequent chapters of this first part of the book.
1.3.1 Structuring and Developing Integrated Security Systems
For over a decade, financial organizations have been deploying and using systems
that process and analyze digital information towards implementing cyber defense
strategies. Prominent examples include network monitoring and analysis probes,
SIEM systems, vulnerability scanners, and more. However, these systems cannot
adequately support the definition and implementation of integrated security poli-
cies, i.e., policies addressing cyber and physical aspects at the same time. Therefore,
there is a need for designing and implementing more integrated systems that will
be able to combine cybersecurity aspects with information about physical secu-
rity, such as information derived from CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) cameras,
access control systems, biometric systems, and more.
The design and implementation of integrated security policies requires
rethinking of the architecture of the various security platforms, to a direction that
considers physical information and devices. Thus, there is a need for new secu-
rity architectures. The latter can take advantage of the recent advances in Indus-
try 4.0 and the Industrial IoT, including relevant reference architectures such as the
Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) of the Industrial Internet Consor-
tium [6]. In this context, Chapter 2 introduces the Reference Architecture (RA) of
the FINSEC project, which is destined to facilitate the development of data-driven
security systems for the financial sector, including systems that address the cyber-
physical nature of modern cyber physical infrastructures. As outlined in Chapter 2,
the FINSEC RA is implemented based on modern microservices-based approach
and can be used to support DevSecOps methodologies in building software systems
for security.
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1.3.2 Integrated Security Knowledge Modeling
Integrated (i.e., cyber and physical) security systems must deal with data for both
cyber and physical threats. Likewise, they should capture and maintain knowledge
about both cyberattacks and physical attacks, including combined cyber/physical
attacks. Thus, there is need for extending existing security models and format, with
constructs that enable them to represent integrated security knowledge. State-of-
the-art knowledge bases for cybersecurity consolidate several sources of knowledge
for Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), such as:
• CPE (Common Platform Enumeration), which is a structured naming
scheme for IT software, systems, and packages.
• CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration), which lists common software’s
vulnerabilities.
• CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification), which
lists common attack patterns on software and their taxonomy.
• CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), which lists all publicly
known cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exposures.
Furthermore, they can also collect and store external CTI data sources through
available documents in various formats like JSON (JavaScript Object Notation)
and XML (eXtensible Markup Language). There are several knowledge bases avail-
able, including commercial SKBs (Security Knowledge Bases) from major security
vendors and SKBs from standards development bodies [e.g., the OWASP (Open
Web Application Security Project) Security Knowledge Framework]. Nevertheless,
these knowledge bases do not include security knowledge for physical assets, which
limits their ability to support integrated (i.e., cyber/physical) security.
Hence, there is a need for enhancing knowledge bases and formats for represent-
ing cyber-threat intelligence, with information about physical assets and security,
towards Cyber-physical Threat Intelligence (CPTI). In-line with this requirement,
Chapter 3 introduces FINSTIX, a STIX (Structured Threat Information Expres-
sion) based format, for supporting integrated security modeling for critical infras-
tructures in the financial sector.
1.3.3 Automation and Flexibility
To increase the automation of security processes, financial organizations are
nowadays offered with the opportunity of leveraging Machine Learning (ML) and
Artificial Intelligence (AI) on large volumes of security data. Specifically, finan-
cial institutions are currently collecting large amounts of cybersecurity and phys-
ical security related information through many different sensors and probes. This
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information, if analyzed properly, could provide insights about possible security
incidents. Moreover, it can also facilitate the extraction of hidden attack patterns,
beyond the ones already known and registered within security knowledge bases.
Also, it is possible to employ predictive analytics towards identifying and anticipat-
ing security threats before their materialize. This can greatly boost the preparedness
of security teams like CERTs.
AI and ML algorithms can boost not only the intelligence and proactiveness of
the security processes, but also their automation as well. Specifically, they can auto-
mate security and surveillance processes through obviating manual surveillance and
tracking of security information streams (e.g., from CCTV systems). Furthermore,
they can boost the continuous, 24×7, monitoring of financial systems and trans-
actions, through lowering the human resources needed for the surveillance tasks.
Two of the following chapters introduce data-driven, AI-based solutions for secu-
rity and surveillance. Chapter 4 presents an AI-based gateway that can combine
cyber and physical surveillance in financial environments. The gateway offers a
range of intelligence and performance features, which are detailed in the chapter.
Also, Chapter 7 presents a novel system for collecting security data from differ-
ent probes, which incorporates security intelligence (e.g., awareness about secu-
rity events) towards adapting the rate, the scope, and the context of the data
collection.
1.3.4 Information Sharing and Collaboration Across
the Financial Services Supply Chain
As already outlined, financial institutions are nowadays digital interconnected
as part of different value chains and purposes. SWIFT and SEPA (Single Euro
Payments Area) transactions are, for example, carried out across interconnected
institutions. As another example, various financial enterprises are interconnected
in the scope of trading and stock exchange transactions. Interconnected enterprises
are vulnerable to attacks that originate from attacks against other stakeholders in
the value chains where they participate. Specifically, financial organizations should
not only consider the status of their assets and infrastructures. Rather, they should
keep an eye on the status of interconnected infrastructures as well. A potential
vulnerability in a connected infrastructure can influence other stakeholders in the
supply chain.
Moreover, to address supply chains security, stakeholders had better collaborate
in their security processes. As a prominent example, enterprises could engage in
collaborative assessments of the risk factors that are associated with their assets.
Such processes can be empowered by the automated and seamless sharing of infor-
mation across stakeholders of the supply chain. Currently, financial organizations
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share such information as part of regulatory mandates and in the scope of their
participation in initiatives like the Financial Services Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (FS-ISAC). Nevertheless, the level of security information sharing
is still quite low. Lack of trust is one of the reasons that make organizations reluc-
tant to share security information. In recent years, distributed ledger technologies
(i.e., blockchain technologies) are explored as a means of sharing information across
financial organizations in a decentralized and trustworthy way. Chapter 5 presents
a relevant approach, where data shared through a blockchain is used to facilitate
collaborative risk assessment.
1.3.5 Regulatory Compliance Technologies
To confront the challenges of regulatory compliance, financial organizations need
technologies that facilitate the implementation of relevant technical measures. As a
prominent example, data anonymization and data encryption can be used to facili-
tate adherence to GDPR principles. Likewise, SIEM systems can be used to collect
and analyze information about access, transfer, and use of data in an organization,
towards identifying potential data breaches. In this context, Chapter 6 presents a
suite of security tools for PSD2 compliance. These include, for example, pentesting
tools for Open Banking APIs (Application Programming Interfaces), which are des-
tined to identify vulnerabilities of these APIs prior to their use in PSD2 compliant
applications.
1.3.6 Security-by-Design and Privacy-by-Design
Beyond regulatory compliance, financial organizations need to adopt new princi-
ples regarding the design and implementation of their applications. Specifically,
they are expected to adhere to the security-by-design and privacy-by-design princi-
ples. The latter should become the preferred path of the software design and devel-
opment cycle for financial organizations like banks. Likewise, traditional serialized
development approaches should be updated towards more flexible and responsive
approaches that involve the design and implementation of security controls early
in the application development life cycle. Note that privacy-by-design is referenced
in the text of the GDPR regulation, and hence, it can serve as a basis for achieving
GDPR compliance as well.
1.3.7 Security Education and Training
Financial organizations should heavily invest in security education and training
with a twofold objective: First to close the knowledge gap about cybersecurity issues,
and second towards engaging the organization’s personnel in IT security, regardless
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of their background and security knowledge. Such measures will help ensuring
that employees are no longer one of the weakest links in the security value chain.
Along with investments in training and education, financial organizations should
be investing in IT security awareness campaigns. In this direction, the FINSEC
project is contributing to training and awareness raising based on various trainings
and presentations that are available through the market platform of the project, i.e.,
finsecurity.eu.
1.4 Conclusions
The critical infrastructures of the financial sector are increasing in size, complexity,
and sophistication, while at the same time comprising both cyber and physical ele-
ments. At the same time, financial organizations are obliged to comply with many
and complex regulations and directives about security, privacy, and data protec-
tion. As a result, financial enterprises must deal with increased security vulnerabil-
ities and threats in a rapidly evolving regulatory environment. To this end, they
are increasing their investments in cybersecurity and its intersection with physical
security. Despite the rising investments, they remain vulnerable to security and pri-
vacy threats, as evident in several notorious incidents that have occurred during the
last couple of years.
In order to properly secure the critical infrastructures for the financial sector,
there is a need for new integrated approaches that addresses physical and cyberse-
curity together rather than dealing with them in a “siloed” fashion. To this end,
financial organizations should benefit from the capabilities of emerging technolo-
gies like Big Data and AI analytics for security monitoring and automation, while
at the same time leveraging the flexibility of the DevOps paradigm that provides
opportunity for frequent changes to security measures and policies (e.g., patching
on a daily basis). Likewise, integrated approaches to security knowledge model-
ing and information sharing can be employed. Following chapters of the first part
of the book will illustrate novel technologies for cyber-physical threat intelligence,
which address several of the security challenges that are currently faced by financial
organizations.
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Chapter 2
A Reference Architecture for Securing
Infrastructures in the Finance Sector
By Ernesto Troiano, John Soldatos, Ariana Polyviou,
Alessandro Mamelli and Ilesh Dattani
While the critical infrastructures of financial institutions encapsulate both physical
and cyber assets, their security is regarded in isolation from one another making
financial institutions vulnerable to attacks against their physical and cyber assets.
Drawing on an analysis of the needs of financial institutions, this Chapter proposes
the FINSEC Reference Architecture (RA). The FINSEC RA aims at addressing the
cyber-physical integration, the collaboration of stakeholders in the financial sec-
tor, the regulations and recommendations, the low level of automation at probes
and platform/services level, and the lack of flexibility in front of a wide range of
threats. The proposed architecture accounts for the regulations and recommenda-
tions applicable to the financial security sector and considers relevant recommen-
dations from standards development organizations such as ENISA. The Chapter
reflects on the methodology adopted for building the RA and presents the schema
of the RA including its structure tiers and building blocks corresponding to the
different functionalities of FINSEC platform.
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2.1 Securing Finance Sector Infrastructures:
The Challenges
Responding to the demands of the global economy, the financial sector’s critical
infrastructures have become more digitalized and interconnected than ever before.
And yet, the wide deployment of Big Data, Internet of Things (IoT), Artificial Intel-
ligence (AI), blockchains, mobile Apps, Cloud services, and web infrastructures,
coupled with a wave of financial technology (FinTech) innovations, has resulted
in an explosion of the number of financial transactions. Thus, the critical assets of
financial institutions are no longer only physical (e.g., bank branches, buildings,
ATM dispenser), but comprise many different cyber assets (e.g., computers, net-
works, IoT devices) as well. As discussed extensively in the chapter that introduces
the security challenges of the financial sector despite the existing cybersecurity mea-
sures, recent cyberattacks demonstrate that financial organizations remain vulnera-
ble. For this reason, financial institutions are currently investing in extending their
cyber-resilience capacity.
Despite the fact that critical infrastructures of the financial sector comprise both
physical and cyber assets, their security is addressed in isolation from one another.
This includes different technologies and security teams handling security attacks of
the physical and cyber assets. As a result, these practices lead to inefficient security
measures, increased cost, and limited ability to effectively address attacks that com-
bine both the physical and cyber assets. Enhancing the collaboration of all relevant
stakeholders is necessary for identifying and alleviating issues in a timely manner.
However, rather than collaborating extensively on risk assessment and mitigation,
their current collaboration is rather limited to the exchange of data as imposed by
security regulations.
Another major challenge for the security of financial institutions is the automa-
tion of security functions. Hackers and adversaries are continually taking advantage
of leading-edge technologies in order to exploit the rising number of vulnerabilities
of the physical and cyber assets. While the level of automation is low, it is impossible
for security officers to execute all security and protection tasks such as detection,
monitoring, patching, reporting, and security policy enforcement activities. This
challenge urges the need for solutions that offer immediate mitigation actions, as
well as (semi)automated enforcement of security policies. Recent advances such as
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and automated orchestration of security
functions can provide solutions in this respect.
This Chapter proposes a reference architecture for securing critical infrastruc-
tures of the financial sector, FINSEC RA, while accounting for the emerging need
to address physical and cyber asset security combined. The proposed architecture
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incorporates recent technological advances to offer an integrated security solution
for the critical infrastructures of financial institutions.
2.2 A Reference Architecture for Securing Critical
Infrastructures of the Financial Sector
2.2.1 FINSEC RA: Background and Rationale
In order to address these challenges, vendors and integrators of security solutions
need security middleware libraries and blueprints for the development, deploy-
ment, and operation of security systems that address the limitations of existing
platforms in terms of supporting integrated (cyber/physical) security, boosting reg-
ulatory compliance, increasing automation, as well as ensuring flexibility and speed
in deploying security functions. In this direction, a security Reference Architecture
(RA) offers a synthesis of best practices based on past experiences and relevant
blueprints for security solutions. A Reference Architecture (RA) can also serve
as a conceptual framework for building security systems faster, while minimizing
development, deployment, and operational risks. Furthermore, an RA serves as
a device for communicating security contexts and solutions requirements across
interested stakeholders. It therefore provides a common context and vocabulary,
along with a repository of patterns for use by interested stakeholders. As such it
facilitates teamwork in developing, deploying, and operating security systems for
the financial sector.
The initial proposal for a new NIS Directive and the discussions documenta-
tion [1] states that an “insufficient level of protection against network and infor-
mation security incidents, risks and threats across the EU […, may undermine, ed.]
the proper functioning of the Internal market.” This statement is particularly rel-
evant in the finance sector, where a failure of critical IT infrastructure can lead to
major damages to financial markets with deep economic consequences. The H2020
FINSEC project is intended to support the need for better protection and resilience
of this critical infrastructure.
FINSEC is a joint effort of security experts and financial organizations towards
providing integrated (i.e., cyber/physical) solutions for the critical infrastructures of
the finance sector. One of the main results of the project is a Reference Architecture
(RA) for the development, deployment, and operation of integrated solutions in
the finance sector. The RA is motivated by the need to apply innovative patterns to
the development and deployment of security systems for the critical infrastructures
of the sector. As such it’s a foundation for the solutions that the project provides
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to different financial organizations including banks, payments organizations, and
FinTech enterprises.
The development of FINSEC RA has considered concepts and building blocks
from some well-known and accepted generic RA, such as the RA of the Industrial
Internet Consortium and its Industrial Internet Security Framework (IISF) [2].
In this way, the FINSEC RA leverages experiences from established communities,
while at the same time being in-line with the evolution of security concepts that
have emerged and/or evolved in these communities.
2.2.2 FINSEC RA: Accounting for ENISA’s Recommendations
The specification of the FINSEC RA has also considered recommendations of stan-
dards development organizations for security in the finance sector. In particular, we
have accounted for the recommendations provided by ENISA in terms of:
• Network and information security in the Financial Sector [3].
• The use of Cloud Computing in the Finance Sector [4].
With respect to FINSEC, the above-listed recommendations present some lim-
itations for 2019–20 state of the art, as they are focused on circa 2014–15 issues of
cybersecurity, rather than current integrated (cyber/physical) security. Nevertheless,
they are motivated by the updated (circa 2019) finance sector regulatory landscape
and deals with two of the most important elements of contemporary finance sector
infrastructures, namely networks and cloud computing infrastructures. Note also
that the above-listed reports and recommendations do not focus on technical mea-
sures only (that can be addressed in a technical architecture), but extend to policy
and organizational recommendations.
ENISA’s report on the security of cloud computing infrastructures for the finan-
cial sector [4] outlines the challenges of managing governance and compliance risk,
while providing tools and techniques for negotiating SLAs, especially in cases where
smaller institutions are involved as customers of the cloud services. Furthermore,
the report outlines the importance of improving security and privacy certification.
Relevant recommendations for confronting these challenges are included in the
report and addressed to financial institutions, cloud services providers, and regula-
tors. In brief, the report includes the following recommendations, which we have
built on in the RA:
• Extending the national good practices and standards in the areas of Cloud
governance and risk management.
• Defining practices and standards for incident information sharing.
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• Defining minimum security requirements for adoption of Cloud computing
in FIs.
• Provision of transparency and assurance from cloud providers to financial
institutions.
• Better informing both regulators and financial institutions about the security
risks and opportunities connected to the use of cloud computing.
• Continuing effort towards harmonizing the legal and regulatory environment
within the European Union.
Similarly, ENISA’s report on network and information security [3] provides rec-
ommendations for strengthening the security of networking and communication
infrastructures, including:
• Consolidating scattered NIS obligations in supervisory guidelines.
• Establishing guidelines on how NIS supervision practices in the Finance sec-
tor apply by extension to their supply chain, including Cloud providers that
operate financial services.
• Establishing guidelines which summarize the key conditions for the adoption
of Cloud-based applications or services in the Finance sector.
• Organizing regular and voluntary NIS stress tests in the Finance sector
towards identifying possible black swan risks and uncovering to the great-
est extent possible unknown risks.
Table 2.1 outlines how FINSEC RA aligns to some of the above-listed recom-
mendations, notably through relevant technical measures:
2.2.3 Logical Design
2.2.3.1 Tiered Approach
The main goal of the RA is to alleviate the currently “siloed” landscape of physi-
cal and cybersecurity through enabling financial organizations to deploy integrated
security solutions. The latter are characterized by the seamless flow of security infor-
mation for both cyber and physical assets to the security department and teams of
the organization. Hence, FINSEC RA does not focus on the physical security and
the IT departments only, but rather addresses the needs of the top level manage-
ment of organizations, notably in terms of managers [e.g., CSO (Chief Security
Officer) or CEO (Chief Executive Officer)] that are in charge of the resilience of
the organization.
Solutions that adhere to the RA will leverage security monitoring probes avail-
able in the organizations, including existing cybersecurity applications (e.g., SIEM
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Table 2.1. RA alignment according to ENISA recommendations.




FINSEC and the FINSEC RA come with a
specification of a data model for exchanging security
and threat intelligence information in the Finance
Sector, i.e., the STIX-derived FINSTIX model.
FINSTIX facilitates the modeling and sharing of
security incidents as well. Moreover, the FINSEC RA
includes a module dedicated to security information
sharing (including sharing of incidents in the supply
chain).
Boosting SLA management
in the Financial Supply
Chain
The information sharing module of the FINSEC RA
facilitates transparent data sharing in the financial
supply chain, which can boost SLA management.
One of the FINSEC pilots involves provision of
security services to smaller financial organizations that
take advantage of cloud-based financial services.
Moreover, the FINSEC RA is designed as a
microservices-based architecture with data-driven
security services in the cloud that can support a
cloud-based SECaaS (Security as a Service) paradigm.
It can also provide the means for sharing
SECaaS-related information for managing the
respective SLAs.
Address Risks through Stress
Testing
The core security services of the FINSEC RA include
risk assessment, vulnerability assessment, and
pentesting. These can be used by financial organizations
in order to perform security stress tests in their
infrastructures in-line with ENISA’s recommendations




FINSEC RA promotes a transparent, decentralized
information sharing approach, which is realized in the
project based on a blockchain infrastructure. In this
way, FINSEC contributes to transparency, while at the
same time providing data-driven tools (e.g., analytics)
for the implementation of regulatory compliance and
assurance services.
systems, antivirus applications, log scanning probes) and available physical secu-
rity systems [e.g., a PSIM (Physical Security Information Management System),
a CCTV (Closed Circuit Television System), biometric access control systems].
These probes will provide security data that will drive security functionalities such
as risk assessments, management of alerts, and compliance auditing functions.
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Figure 2.1. Data-driven API.
The RA is structured in tiered approach, yet it also includes cross-cutting ele-
ments that do not belong to a single, but rather to multiple tiers. Nevertheless, in-
line with the previously presented principles, the architecture is modular, and from
a physical perspective, it enables every module to communicate with any other like
a modern microservices architecture. The Figure 2.1 illustrates the main modules
and tiers of the RA.
With reference to figure, the modules of the RA are structured based on the
following tiers:
• Field Tier: The Field Tier is the lower level of the RA and includes the probes
and their APIs, whose role is extracting raw data from the physical and logical
assets to be protected against threats. For example, CCTV analytics and SIEM
are involved in this layer to give useful information about potential attacks
to the upper tiers.
• Edge Tier: The Edge Tier contains the Actuation Enabler and a Data Collec-
tion module, which is needed to filter the needed information during their
flow towards the upper levels. The Actuation Enabler is responsible to allow
some actions to be done from the upper layers onto the probes, such as the
shutdown of a server in case of threat or the close of an automatic door of a
protected room.
• Data Tier: The Data Tier is the logical layer where information is stored and
is organized into three different storage infrastructures, providing consisting
data access API to all other modules.
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• Service Tier: The Service Tier is where the kernel applications of the FINSEC
and the security toolbox are running, able to be used by the external world.
• Presentation and Communication Tier: The Presentation and Communi-
cation tier offers interface to rest of the world (e.g., consumers of the security
services that adhere to the RA). This tier provides dashboards that monitor
data and assets, along with the FINSEC Collaborative Module that supports
sharing of security information with other financial organizations regardless
of whether the latter are running systems compliant with the RA or not.
The FINSEC Core platform, delimited by the blue bar in the picture, comprises
three tiers, namely the edge, data, and service tiers. It also specifies the two main
interfaces that are used to support the interactions of the data-driven platform with
other systems and applications:
• The northbound API towards higher level applications (e.g., end-user appli-
cations), called FINSEC SECaaS API to align to the DoA and the core con-
cept of FINSEC. It represents a consistent and unified view of the individual
APIs exposed by the service tier high-level services that represent the “major
intelligence” of the platform. The FINSEC SECaaS API is exposed by the
API Gateway, which is the single-entry point to the system for external clients.
Among other capabilities, the API Gateway provides and supports Authen-
tication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) services, which conceptually
are part of the two vertical modules on the right of the figure (Application
Security and Monitoring/logging).
• The southbound API interface, consisting of an EVENT API and PROBE
API, allows communication between the Edge Tier and physical and cyber-
security probes.
The FINSEC SECaaS API is leveraged and invoked by external (north end)
Business Client Applications (upper side of the figure). They are outside of the
FINSEC core platform and interact with it only through the FINSEC SECaaS
REST API. Some typical examples of business client applications include:
• The FINSEC Dashboard application, which is a (WEB) GUI used by the
profiled end users of the platform. Note that in addition to the FINSEC
dashboard application, additional dashboards can be implemented using the
above-listed APIs.
• The FINSEC Collaboration application, which enables the collaboration
of platforms and applications across the financial services supply chain (e.g.,
security data sharing). Likewise, additional applications for supply chain
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security can be implemented by leveraging these APIs, such as applications
for collaborative risk scoring and assessment.
• Other Third-party Applications that exploit the data and security capabil-
ities of FINSEC.
2.2.3.2 The Service Tier
The Service Tier defines the high-level services that represent the “major intelli-
gence” of the platform. The Service Tier services communicate with each other in
three possible ways as follows:
• SYNCHRONOUS, through their REST API (in this case, being the services
internal to the platform, it is not necessary to use AAA).
• ASYNCHRONOUS, via an MQ bus, yet in this case, queues and messages
formats must be defined.
• ASYNCHRONOUS, through the DB (Database) Infrastructure.
2.2.3.3 The Data Tier
The Data Tier provides an infrastructure to serve data that follow the FINSEC Ref-
erence Data Model (RDM), which extends the STIX standards and is illustrated in
latter paragraph. It provides access in read/write via a Data Access API, exposed by
an ad hoc service of the platform (Data Manager). This module exposes convenient
data access and manipulation functions to clients, is responsible for ensuring valida-
tion of input data against the data model and abstracts away the actual underlying
DB engine(s), which can be changed without affecting upper-level services.
A possible alternative option, which enables the avoidance of an intermediate
data access layer, is to use the CRUD (Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete) REST API
already exposed by the DB engine (if available, depending on the DB engine chosen
for the implementation) and rely on DB validation rules for ensuring consistency
and validation of data with reference to the FINSEC RDM. The latter can be used
by the modules of the Service tier to communicate with each other, in-line with the
third of the above-listed approaches for communication.
In addition to data conforming to the common data model, the DB
infrastructure may contain additional ad hoc data stores for private data reserved
to the individual Service tier modules, useful for enabling their own internal logic.
The concept in this case is that the individual service could still have a private DB
schema for its own settings/local data, e.g., for processing with its own algorithms,
and then proceed to publish data on the common DB schema (via the Data Access
API) following the FINSEC data model only once it has identified events useful
for the common intelligence of the system, as previously mentioned.
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The Data Tier provides the fundamental service for and will be based on:
• A Data Base suited to manage the non-structured Threat Information made
by events, incidents, logs, etc. It can be either a non-traditional DB (e.g.,
NoSQL, memSQL) or a conventional SQL relational DB.
• A Big Data Infrastructure to manage the large amount of data to be processed
and distributed according to the requirements of the client modules, typically
those ones of the Service tier needing BD/AI capabilities to perform their
business logic.
• The Security Knowledge Base, which is used to automatically resolve
observed data streams into known threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks
encoded in the database.
2.2.3.4 The Service Tier
The Edge Tier communicates with the infrastructure (IT/Physical) through the
southbound API interface. This API consists of the union of two distinct APIs:
• Event API, which is implemented to receive events in push and/or pull
modes, and it is invoked by the probes.
• Probe API, which is implemented by probes to receive commands from FIN-
SEC. In this case, probes can operate as actuators as well.
Overall, probes send events formulated based on the FINSEC RDM, in all cases
when they want to publish data on the Data Tier (e.g., the DB infrastructure and
possibly ingestion in the Big Data Infrastructure).
2.2.4 Main Services and Building Blocks of the RA
Each of the modules of the RA is thought as a black box with proper interfaces exe-
cuting specific functions. Moreover, each module can be implemented as a software
manageable and independently deployable service, i.e., respecting the microservices
architecture (MSA) paradigm and communicating with standard interfaces (i.e.,
REST API). The list of the modules and services of the Reference Architecture that
are depicted in the above figure are as follows:
• FINSEC Dashboard: Web application that presents events, threats, inci-
dents, logs, etc., in a User Graphical Interface. The application will be web-
based and will interact with the other microservices to gather information to
be present to the dashboard graphically and intuitively.
• FINSEC Collaborative Module: Service application for collaborative secu-
rity information sharing and Threat Intelligence. The application will have a
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microservices interface that will provide APIs for exchange information about
threats and mitigations. Exchanged data is based on FINSEC Data Model.
• API Gateway: API Gateway is a fully managed service that provides to other
services ways to create, publish, maintain, monitor, and secure APIs at any
scale.
• Actuation: Application that offers API to other services to operate on the
physical and logical infrastructure sending commands to the physical or log-
ical components.
• Anomaly & Risk detection prioritization: Application for anomaly and
risk analysis. It consumes current data sources (logs, incidents, etc.) and pro-
duces incidents and alarms. Application consumes DATA Access API and
push threat information using API of other services (e.g. Dashboard, Collab-
orative Module, etc.).
• Predictive Analytics: Application that will analyze risk and threats from cur-
rent data sources (logs, incidents) and predicts threats and patterns of threats.
Application uses DATA Access API and push threat information using API
of other services (e.g., Dashboard, Collaborative Module, etc.).
• Risk Assessment Engine: Application for Real-time assessment of security
risks, including business interpretation. It analyzes current model of assets
associated with business risks levels stored as data model in DB and produces
a risk assessment analysis. The Models are produced by the Audit and cer-
tification tool. Application uses DATA Access API push threat information
using API of other services (e.g., Dashboard, Collaborative Risk Management
modules, etc.).
• Audit and certification tool: Web Application with HMI to produce a data
model representation of assets of the infrastructure. Application will be basi-
cally a Data Entry application plus Import from other data sources. Applica-
tion produces reports displayable and exportable (e.g., pdf ).
• Collaborative Risk Management: Application for collaborative risk analysis
and management in the financial supply chain. It can be implemented based
on either centralized (e.g., a centralized database accessed by all stakeholders)
or decentralized approaches (e.g., a distributed ledger approach). The module
provides an API for other services to push threat information.
• MQ BUS: This is an asynchronous Message Passing Application. It provides
Push/Pull APIs for basic message passing.
• Security Database: A NoSQL application for storing data according to the
FINSEC Data Model.
• Knowledge Base: A NoSQL application for storing data according to
the FINSEC Data Model. It incorporates knowledge from various sources
(including vulnerability databases) and used to automate the resolution of
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threats and vulnerabilities as part of security functionalities like risk manage-
ment. It provides a CRUD (Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete) API for storing
Knowledge Base documents.
• Big Data Infrastructure: It is a distributed File System Application. It pro-
vides API for scaling data across multiple servers.
• Data Collection: Application module that provides API to EDGE services
like CCTV or SIEM for pushing data (events, logs, etc.) to the Security
Database. The application also performs normalization and prioritization to
the information supplied by the EDGE applications.
• Actuation Enabler: Application module that provides API to the ACTUA-
TOR service pushing action to the Logical and Physical infrastructure (e.g.,
shutdown of a server or close a door of a data center). The application per-
forms abstraction and normalization to adapt to different EDGE compo-
nents.
• CCTV/Analytics: Any Video Surveillance application can be integrated will
use FINSEC Event API to push information to the FINSEC core and pro-
vides FINSEC Probe API to interact with the EDGE components.
• SIEM: Any Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) can be
integrated as long as will use FINSEC Event API to push information to the
FINSEC core and provides FINSEC Probe API to interact with the EDGE
components.
• Logical Probe: Field-level logical sensor/actuator to give data on the status of
the assets such as logs and actuation commands on logical assets (e.g., shutting
down a server to protect it). Note that any probe can be integrated as long
as will use FINSEC Event API to push information to the FINSEC core and
provides FINSEC Probe API to interact with the EDGE components.
• Pentest Tool: Service application acting on the field to extract information
on the status of the assets. The Pentest is an assessment of the capacity of an
asset to react to a penetration attempt by an actor, through the simulation of
an attack. Service provides APIs will give information about the status of the
asset and the attack typology under simulation.
• Service Mesh and Configuration Management: Service application that
provides API to discover services within the infrastructure; moreover, their
configuration will be done via this building block. Its APIs will need to give
the user the current configuration for each service within the RA.
• AAA Application Security: Service application that provides basic API
for Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting users and other services
within FINSEC platform. It is part of the “vertical” building blocks, not
belonging to any specific tier.
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• Monitoring/Logging “Diagnostic” Module: It provides API for storing and
retrieving logs from other services (e.g., connection/disconnection, search for
services, use of certain services, getting warning and alarms, actuation on
cyber or physical assets, etc.).
All services must provide standard API to start/stop/shut down/monitor/status
of the application.
2.2.5 FINSTIX: The FINSEC Reference Data Model
The data-driven operations and data flows specified in the FINSEC RA hinge on
the adoption and use of common data semantics for the full set of data/informa-
tion that are exchanged between the modules of the architecture. To this end, the
FINSEC RA is accompanied by a Reference Data Model (RDM) specification,
which specifies the format and the semantics of the security data that flow across
the modules of the architecture. The RDM is based on the second version of the
STIXTM (Structured Threat Information Expression) (STIX2) [5], which is one of
the most prominent standards for sharing threat intelligent information. In partic-
ular, the FINSEC RDM, which is conveniently called FINSTIX, is an extension of
STIX2 into the physical and logical domain. FINSTIX has been developed based
on the following principles that facilitate its implementation and integration with
solutions that adhere to the FINSEC RA:
• The FINSTIX Data Model basic object is a sequence of key values that can
be passed as JSON (JavaScript Object Notation).
• The FINSTIX Data Model general object is an aggregate of more objects and
relations still expressed in JSON.
• FINSTIX includes information relevant and specific to the financial sector,
including common threats and vulnerabilities faced by financial organiza-
tions.
• FINSTIX defines other objects and relations to STIX2 to cope with the corre-
lation of physical and logical data, as a means of supported cyber and physical
security integration.
In the scope of solutions that comply with the FINSEC RA, probes gener-
ate events and observed data according to the FINSTIX Data Model. Likewise,
Data Collectors (DC) have the function to gather data from probes normalizing,
sanitizing, prioritizing, and storing CPTI into the Data Layer. In other words, a
DC knows the syntax-semantic and add or subtract further information to the
FINSTIX objects passing through. Moreover, security knowledge [e.g., as of part
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of the Knowledge Base (KB) of the FINSEC RA] is represented with FINSTIX
objects as well. Also, any analytics algorithms [including predictive analytics based
on machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) techniques] in security appli-
cations use events, observed data, and the Knowledge base and Asset Models to
produce Cyber-physical Threat Intelligence.
FINSTIX includes the STIX Domain Objects (SDO) already defined by STIX2,
including Identity, Observed Data, Indicator, Intrusion Set, Vulnerability, Tool,
Attack Pattern, Campaign, Malware, Threat Actor, Course of Action, and Report.
Nevertheless, FINSEC specifies several extensions to STIX2, notably extensions
that address security use cases of the financial sector. These extensions are specified
in terms of custom objects like:
• Organization that comprises information about a financial organization.
• Asset encoding information about an organization’s valuable infrastructure
such as PC, server rooms, ATMs, applications, and everything else inside the
organization that is considered crucial.
• Area of Interest, a logical/physical area inside an asset such as the screen/key-
board of an ATM or an indoor area (server room).
• Service which signifies a collection of assets forming a publicly exposed ser-
vice.
• Probe that is used to support the security monitoring infrastructure. A Probe
usually monitors one or more areas of Interest.
• Probe Configuration that provides data sent to a probe in order to configure
details such as the area under monitoring or the bit rate of the monitoring
process.
• Event including information of something that happened or is happening.
• Person which extends the STIX Identity objects and is used to describe peo-
ple involved in the events created by the probes.
• Risk, the calculated risk for a specific asset or service.
• Risk Configuration which provides information needed to optimize the risk
assessment (e.g., triggers and other useful options).
• Regulation, an object used to depict a regulation violation. The regulation
violation information can be communicated to Regulatory authorities and
other Organizations.
• CPTI which is the principal object that collects and provides threat informa-
tion. One or more CPTI objects are used to generate the output of the threat
intelligence process, i.e., a report about ongoing or possible future attacks on
one or more assets belonging to the infrastructure.
A detailed presentation of the FINSTIX specification is out of the scope of this
whitepaper. Interested readers shall contact the FINSEC Project coordinator.
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2.3 Security Use Cases for Financial Institutions
The FINSEC RA, along with the FINSTIX specification, enables the implementa-
tion of a wide range of security use cases for financial institutions. Some prominent
examples follow and also illustrated in Figure 2.2.
2.3.1 SWIFT Network Attacks
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) pro-
vides a network that enables financial institutions to send and receive information
about financial transactions in a secure, standardized, and reliable environment.
It is a messaging network, which facilitates the secure transmission of informa-
tion and instructions based on a standardized system of codes. The SWIFT net-
work is one of the most critical infrastructures of the financial sector, as it enables
many financial transactions with very high monetary value. Any disruption to
the operation of this network can have significant socio-economic implications
(including significant financial losses), as evident in a number of recent attacks
against it [6].
The operation of SWIFT network is based on a supply chain of relevant stake-
holders, while entailing both cyber (e.g., networks, computers) and physical (e.g.,
SWIFT devices, SWIFT transactions rooms). Therefore, integrated (cyber/physi-
cal) approaches to securing the SWIFT network, along with stakeholders’ collabo-
ration in the supply chain, can increase its resilience. In-line with the FINSEC RA,
probes can be used to collect security information about cyber and physical assets,
as a means of identifying risks and non-obvious abnormalities. For example, a FIN-
SEC compliant system can correlate information about attempts for unauthorized
access to physical spaces or devices with information about vulnerabilities of the
SWIFT ICT infrastructure. In this way, strong protection from insider threats can
be provided, along with resilience against combined cyber/physical attacks [e.g.,
cases of an intruder (or insider) who exploits cyber vulnerabilities in order to give
malicious SWIFT commands from the inside]. Likewise, the collaborative modules
of the FINSEC RA can enable financial organizations that participate jointly in
SWIFT transactions to share threat information and accordingly to use the shared
information towards jointly scoring risks associated with SWIFT-related assets.
This scenario deals with the monitoring of events in a SWIFT system, where
a SysLog events probe monitors the network traffic, and the upper layers of FIN-
SEC platform analyze the risk level according to the login attempts and the related
timestamps.
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Figure 2.2. Pilot scenarios #1 – #2 data flow.
2.3.2 ATM Network Protection
The network of ATM (Automatic Teller Machines) is another prominent example
of financial sector infrastructure that includes both cyber and physical elements. A
single ATM includes a PC, a vault, and a printer, which are interconnected. Fur-
thermore, ATM machines are themselves networked via ICT infrastructure. The
integrated security capabilities of the FINSEC RA can be exploited in order to
correlate cyber and physical security events that can indicate abnormal situations
in the use of one or more ATM machines. To this end, appropriate probes like
CCTV cameras and sensors that can provide information on the physical status
of the ATM’s objects are needed. Based on such probes and the analysis of their
information, it is possible to extract and correlate a wide array of events and notifi-
cations such as a person entering or being the ATM area, detection of a use of a valid
card, detection of whether the ATM case is open (e.g., based on vibration sensors),
interaction between people in the ATM area (e.g., when two or more people are
very close), people fighting, people leaving the ATM, and more. The correlation
of such events can enable the detection and timely sharing of CPTI information
between relevant security stakeholders such as the security officers of a bank, their
IT department, law enforcement agencies, and more.
2.3.3 Regulatory Compliance
FINSEC RA can also enable the development and deployment of solutions that
boost Data Privacy Compliance, as a means of boosting financial organizations’
compliance with relevant directives and regulations such as the General Data
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Protection Regulation (GDPR) for organizations that operate in Europe or col-
laborate with European financial institutions. This is very important for financial
organizations, as they typically handle large amounts of sensitive consumer data.
In particular, the FINSEC RA can boost the implementation of SIEM and other
probes that:
• Record all events associated with handling of personal data, as a means of
providing a complete and reliable audit trail for such data.
• Implementing and deploying advanced analytics algorithms over FINSTIX
as a means of quickly detecting data breaches.
• Providing additional analytics tools for analyzing those data breaches and
finding their root causes, along with relevant (i.e., responsible or liable) actors.
• Monitoring, logging, and analyzing changes to credentials and security
groups, notably groups that handle personal data.
• Auditing and verifying security controls to ensure that user data is treated
appropriately and in-line with GDPR principles.
Overall, the FINSEC RA forms a basis for the development of compliance audit-
ing services for all operations that access and/or process private data.
Moreover, the NIS Directive [Directive (EU) 2016/1148] [1] advocates for a
well-defined governance process, improved risk management, and management of
the overall supply chain. In this direction, the FINSEC RA specifies:
• Audit and certification services to support improved governance.
• Risk assessment, anomaly, and risk detection to better support risk manage-
ment.
• A supply chain collaboration concept that describes how FINSEC integrates
security and risk management across the supply chain. In particular, the Edge
Tier and SECaaS services of the architecture, together with the FINSEC Col-
laborative Module and Dashboard, provide integration/interaction with the
supply chain.
In ENISA’s work [4] on network and information security in the finance sector
indicated also the need for risk transparency for the immediate operational circle
in order to better manage the risks posed by the supply chain, which reinforces
FINSEC’s RA relevant for regulatory compliance.
2.3.4 Insider Threats
As briefly indicated in the scope of the SWIFT network protection use cases, insider
threats can be a very big headache for financial organizations as they can be very
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hard to detect. This is because insiders can appear as legitimate users. Solutions
compliant to the FINSEC RA can leverage SIEM-like functionalities in order to
detect and understand insider threats based on recording and analysis of insiders’
behavior. In practice, this can be implemented as follows:
• Detecting cases where users move across multiple systems within the intranet
of the financial organization.
• Identifying cases where users’ privileges and authorizations change, thus
enabling users to access different systems and possibly gain additional autho-
rizations.
• Detect “strange” and unusual behaviors, such as cases where users access sys-
tems during unusual days or times.
• Correlating events that do not have obvious links between them, such as
changes in the quota or authorizations of specific groups of users and cyber-
security vulnerabilities of financial infrastructures (e.g., SWIFT/SEPA infras-
tructures).
2.3.5 IoT Devices Security
The Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm enables financial organizations to leverage
data from the real world in designing and delivering their services [e.g., Point of
Sales (POS) devices and RFID devices]. These devices add new points of vulnera-
bility, given that the users of these devices may not take appropriate measures for
their security. The FINSEC RA can enable the implementation of systems that
can enable the security such devices through monitoring and analyzing their data
flows, while at the same time activating pentesting and vulnerability assessment
functionalities. In particular, the FINSEC RA can enable the implementation of
analytics applications that generate alerts whenever unusual flows or patterns of
data are detected. Such alerts can be visualized on appropriate dashboards and/or
shared with security teams like CERT/CSIRTs.
2.3.6 Managed Security
The FINSEC RA promotes the implementation of security solutions based on
modern cloud-based microservices architectures. As such it also provides the means
for implementing cloud-based Security as a Service (SECaaS) applications. The
latter are very important for financial organizations that lack the financial capac-
ity and/or the technical knowhow to develop, deploy, and operate on-premise
solutions. As a prominent example, SMEs (Small Medium Enterprises) dealing
with algorithms trading or payments do not typically have organized security
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departments and teams. Thus, they would rather dispose with a managed security
paradigm like SECaaS. The FINSEC RA can enable these organizations to access
services like pentesting, risk management, and vulnerability assessments as a service
(i.e. through a service provider) as soon as they can providing security data based on
appropriate probes. The SECaaS model can provide them with flexibility as well,
since they can request and access additional reports around compliance and privacy
on demand, i.e., where and when needed. Overall, the FINSEC RA provides the
means for implementing a wide range of managed security use cases based on the
SECaaS paradigm, as a means of maximizing flexibility and obviating the need for
significant capital investments on security infrastructures.
2.4 Conclusions
In order to properly secure the critical infrastructures for the financial sector, there
is a need for a new integrated approach that addresses physical and cybersecu-
rity together rather than having them treated by dedicated systems and processes.
Likewise, financial organizations should benefit from the capabilities of emerging
technologies like Big Data and AI analytics for security monitoring and automa-
tion, while at the same time leveraging the flexibility of the DevOps paradigm that
provides opportunity for frequent changes to security measures and policies (e.g.,
patching on a daily basis). In response to these requirements, this Chapter has intro-
duced a Reference Architecture developed in the frame of FINSEC project, as a
blueprint for implementing, deploying, and operating integrated (cyber/physical)
security systems.
Drawing on an in-depth analysis of the current needs of financial organizations
on integrated security that that addresses physical and cybersecurity together rather
than having them treated by dedicated systems and processes. The FINSEC RA
is a modular architecture that adopts modern principles of microservices architec-
tures and DevOps methodologies. It is a data-driven architecture that relies on the
collection, analysis, and sharing of security information, as a means of identifying
vulnerabilities and threats, but also as a means of instigating relevant remedial issues
and actions.
Based on the FINSEC RA, a wide range of security use cases can be implemented
and deployed. We have discussed some sample and very prominent use cases con-
cerning attacks against the SWIFT network, protection of the ATM network, con-
fronting insiders’ threats, boosting compliance to GDPR and other data protection
regulation, securing IoT devices, as well as implementing managed security based
on the SECaaS paradigm.
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FINSTIX: A Security Data Model
for the Financial Sector
By Giorgia Gazzarata, Ernesto Troiano, Enrico Cambiaso, Ivan Vaccari,
Ariana Polyviou, Alessio Merlo and Luca Verderame
The numerous recent cybersecurity incidents in the financial sector prompt for
the emerging need to elevate the security of the physical and cyber assets available
for financial institutions. To this end, the FINSEC project aims at designing and
building a reference architecture (i.e., the FINSEC Architecture) that offers inte-
grated security services designed for financial institutions. This Chapter describes
the Security Knowledge Base and the approach of the FINSEC project for sharing
the knowledge of Cyber-Physical Threat Intelligence of financial infrastructures,
based on a novel modeling language called FINSTIX.
FINSTIX enables the description and storage of cyber-physical security inci-
dents and simplifies their exchange and processing among the different reasoning
modules composing the FINSEC Architecture.
3.1 Introduction
In the last few years, the number of cybersecurity incidents against financial institu-
tions is growing. As extensively addressed in the chapter that introduces the security
34
Introduction 35
challenges of the financial sector, the growing sophistication of recent technological
innovations, the complex processes involving multiple organizations, and the fact
that services are becoming more digitized and interconnected raise the cybersecu-
rity risks for financial institutions. Financial institutions address cyber and physical
security attacks usually in isolation. This often leads to inaccurate vulnerability
assessment and risk analysis and, in general, limited security guarantees.
As a result, financial institutions must increase their robustness and develop inte-
grated approaches for addressing physical and cyberattacks. Reflecting on this need,
the FINSEC project aims to design and build a reference architecture for the inte-
gration of both physical and cybersecurity threats of financial institutions, thus
proposing an integrated framework for predictive and collaborative security.
In particular, as described in the chapter that introduces the security challenges
of the financial sector, the FINSEC Architecture defined in the project fosters the
interactions between different financial institutions and third parties to enable the
discovery and detection of sophisticated cyber-physical threats.
Within the FINSEC Platform, the Security Knowledge Base (SKB) is the cluster
of Cyber-physical Threat Intelligence (CPTI) information. The SKB serves all the
modules of the architecture with the information needed for their predictive and
detection tasks.
FINSTIX is the data model employed by the SKB to represent every piece of
information that transits in the FINSEC Architecture. Due to the FINSTIX data
model, the SKB is able to represent the relationships among different cyber and
physical threats, as well as new attack patterns involving the financial infrastructures
discovered by the Service Tier of the FINSEC Platform.
The knowledge is collected from different publicly available threat intelli-
gence sources, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases,
MITRE, Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) pat-
terns, and existing OVAL specifications. Finally, the SKB enables the visualiza-
tion of all the information on the vulnerabilities affecting the infrastructure assets,
thanks to an ad hoc dashboard.
The FINSEC Consortium can boast the FINSTIX data model as a key innova-
tion introduced by the FINSEC project, thereby addressing the current limitations
in the mainstream approaches of threat intelligence and data modeling of cyber-
physical threats.
In detail, the Chapter is structured as follows:
• Section 3.2 presents the background on Cyber Threat Intelligence, STIX,
and the knowledge base technology.
• Section 3.3 introduces the Security Knowledge Base and the FINSTIX Data
Model.
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• Section 3.4 shows the interaction between the Security Knowledge Base and
the FINSEC Dashboard and between the Security Knowledge Base and the
Collaborative Risk Management module.
• Section 3.5 concludes the Chapter.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Cyber Threat Intelligence
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a holistic approach to the automated sharing
of threat intelligence [1], and it is nowadays considered one of the most promis-
ing strategies in the cybersecurity topic [2]. In the CTI context, [3] proposes a
classification and distinction among existing threat intelligence types. Similarly, [4]
and [5] summarize and compare the most prevalent information-sharing models.
Along the same lines, [6] and [7] propose a survey of the current platforms and
formats available for threat information sharing. There are different CTI formats
available, like OpenIOC [8], Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Informa-
tion (TAXII) [2, 4], Real-Time Internetwork Defense (RID) [4, 9], Incident Object
Description Exchange Format (IODEF) [1, 10].
Among the available CTI formats, Structured Threat Information Expression
(STIX) [11] is considered the most commonly used CTI standard [12], although
CyBOX and TAXII are considered good alternative solutions [6]. STIX provides a
modular format that can also efficiently incorporate other standards [1]. STIX is
adopted in different contexts of different nature. In this context, [13] adopts STIX
as an input format for analyzing data for machine learning algorithms to increase
new threat detection ability and responsiveness. Instead, [14] presents an innovative
approach to automatically generate Cyber-threat Intelligence data as STIX docu-
ments, starting from raw threat data. [15] adopts STIX to share threats and security
information in IoT contexts, while [16] and [17] make use of a blockchain-based
system to share CTI data using STIX format. [18] proposes an industrial adoption
of STIX to exchange information between Integrated Management System (IMS)
and Security Information and Event Management systems (SIEM). [19] presents an
alternative use of STIX, to describe the actual state of the reference system, instead
of exchange attack information. [20] presents a collaborative platform to share cyber
threat information using STIX by focusing on anonymity exploitation. [21] makes
use of STIX for threat information inputs, combining it with other similar infor-
mation sources to develop a collaborative cognitive system, able to detect threats
by combining different collaborative agents, covering both host and network infor-
mation. [22] combines STIX concepts with Markov chains ones, for cyber threats
modeling, while [23] proposes a cyber threat protection solution based on a Threat
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Intelligence Platform (TIP), based on both STIX and TAXII. Instead, [24] proposes
MANTIS, a threat intelligence platform that makes use of different standards for
threat data correlation, accomplished through a novel similarity algorithm. [25]
proposes CyTIME, a framework that integrates CTI data like STIX under a global
JSON format and automatically generates network security rules from the incorpo-
rated data seamlessly. Another innovative framework is proposed in [26], making
use of STIX to exchange information about detected incidents, generated alerts,
and applied mitigations. [27] introduces STIXGEN, a framework based on STIX
able to generate error-free structured data.
Although it is widely used, the STIX format presents different limitations:
[28] analyzes STIX by detailing the advantages and limitations of the format.
Indeed, STIX is considered very complex to implement [4] and lacks support to
reasoning [29]. In virtue of this, different extensions of STIX are proposed. For
instance, UCO (Unified Cybersecurity Ontology) is a semantic-based alternative
of STIX [29]. Also, [30] proposes some extensions of STIX, while [31] extends it
to support the inclusion of relevant attack details on sophisticated attacks through
the description of complex patterns. Similarly, while [32] extends STIX to sup-
port network and security events, [33] proposes a STIX extension to integrate and
support additional cyber threats. Such extension is used in ChainSmith, a system
able to extract Indicators of Compromise (IoC) by analyzing technical articles and
industry reports.
The proposed work represents an extension of STIX in the fintech context. FIN-
STIX includes both cyber and physical security threats and enables the description
of organization assets and how they are interconnected.
3.2.2 Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX)
The OASIS Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) standard [11]
is a language and serialization format that facilitates cyber threat intelligence
(CTI) [34]. STIX has been designed with a focus on four different use cases [35]
that include: (I) Analyzing Cyber Threats; (II) Specifying Indicator Patterns for
Cyber Threats; (III) Managing Cyber Threat Response Activities; (III) Sharing
Cyber Threat Information.
Although STIX was initially designed with the trademark of the MITRE Corpo-
ration, aiming to foster both the development of STIX and promote its adoption, it
has been transitioned to OASIS. STIX defines two different types of objects, namely
the STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) and the STIX Relationship Objects (SROs).
SDOs represent the concepts commonly used in CTI. The SROs represent the
relationships between the SDOs. SDOs and SROs are listed and briefly described
in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively.
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Table 3.1. STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) [11].
Object Name Description
Attack Pattern A type of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that
describes ways threat actors attempt to compromise targets.
Campaign A grouping of adversarial behaviors that describes a set of
malicious activities or attacks that occur over a period of
time against a specific set of targets.
Course of Action An action taken to either prevent an attack or respond to
an attack.
Identity Individuals, organizations, or groups, as well as classes of
individuals, organizations, or groups.
Indicator Contains a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or
malicious cyber activity.
Intrusion Set A grouped set of adversarial behaviors and resources with
common properties believed to be orchestrated by a single
threat actor.
Malware A type of TTP, also known as malicious code and
malicious software, used to compromise the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of a victim’s data or system.
Observed Data Conveys information observed on a system or network
(e.g., an IP address).
Report Collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more
topics, such as a description of a threat actor, malware, or
attack technique, including contextual details.
Threat Actor Individuals, groups, or organizations believed to be
operating with malicious intent.
Tool Legitimate software that can be used by threat actors to
perform attacks.
Vulnerability A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker
to gain access to a system or network.
Table 3.2. STIX Relationship Objects (SROs) [11].
Object Name Description
Relationship Used to link two SDOs and to describe how they are related to
each other.
Sighting Denotes the belief that an element of CTI was seen (e.g.,
indicator, malware).
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Analyzing SDOs and SROs from a graphical representation viewpoint, the
SDOs can be considered as the nodes and the SROs can be considered as the edges
of a directed graph, as shown in the examples in [36].
In STIX 2, SDOs and SROs are represented in JSON as described in the spec-
ification of STIX [37]. The STIX standard enables customization in two differ-
ent ways: Custom Properties and Custom Objects. The first regards the addition
of properties not defined by the specification of existing SDOs, while the second
one regards the creation of brand-new objects. Regardless of the means used to
customize STIX, certain requirements need to be fulfilled in order to ensure the
compatibility with the standard, as described in [38].
3.2.3 Knowledge Base Technology
Knowledge base technology is used to collect, organize, share, and retrieve complex
structured and unstructured information representing facts and assertions about the
world. Usually, the content of a knowledge base comes from several contributors
who are well versed in the subject. Differently from a simple database, a knowl-
edge base does not consist only of tables with numbers, strings, dates, etc., but also
contains objects with pointers to other objects that, in turn, have additional point-
ers [39]. The ideal representation for a knowledge base is an object model, which
is often called ontology.
There are two major types of knowledge bases: human-readable and machine-
readable. A human-readable knowledge base enables the users to access and use
the knowledge. Its content can consist of documents, manuals, troubleshooting
information, and frequently answered questions. It can be interactive and can lead
the users to the solutions to their problems, relying on the information provided
by expert users to guide the process. A human-readable knowledge base is con-
trasted with a machine-readable knowledge base, which stores knowledge in system-
readable forms and is limited in interactivity [40].
3.3 The FINSEC Security Knowledge Base
The FINSEC Security Knowledge Base (SKB) is one of the modules contained in
the Data Tier of the FINSEC Reference Architecture. The Security Knowledge Base
aims to collect information coming from different sources of Cyber Threat Intel-
ligence. In particular, the added value of the Security Knowledge Base compared
to the existing ones, is the definition of the relationships between different assets
and their interactions as part of the critical infrastructures of the financial sector.
This feature will enable the services of the Service Tier to consume the information
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contained in the Knowledge Base for producing new Cyber and Physical Threat
Intelligence, namely new data about vulnerabilities, threats, risks, and attacks affect-
ing the cyber and physical infrastructure of the financial organizations. Obviously,
the Service Tier will feed the Security Knowledge Base with this new information.
The (SKB) is a mixture of human and machine-readable knowledge base. On
the one hand, the knowledge should be consumed by the FINSEC Platform ser-
vices to produce new knowledge. On the other hand, the content of the knowledge
base should be consultable by users through a visual interface. To suit the FIN-
SEC needs, the content of the Security Knowledge Base should satisfy two essential
requirements:
(1) It should be structured in order to enable automatic processing;
(2) It should include information on the infrastructure and the organization
assets, for enabling the FINSEC Platform to perform Cyber and Physical
Threat Intelligence.
Below, Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 explain the used ontology and the architecture of
the FINSEC Security Knowledge Base, respectively. Instead, Section 3.3.3 presents
a simple visual interface that allows to visualize the content of the Security Knowl-
edge Base.
3.3.1 The Security Knowledge Base Data Model
To realize a knowledge base, it is essential to design the appropriate data model,
which is the format used to represent the information contained in the knowl-
edge base. In the design of a data model, one approach is to define a completely
new set of objects coping with the business requirements of the considered use
cases. However, this approach incorporates the risk of missing other relevant cases.
Alternatively, another approach is to employ an existing standard (or a mix of
standards) and then extend it such that missing components can be added. In
our approach, we adopted the latter option and confronted it with the business
cases of the project to assure consistency. Among the existing CTI formats, STIX
is considered the most commonly used CTI standard [2]. Due to its modular-
ity, it can also easily incorporate other standards [1]. Also, STIX enables easy cus-
tomization and extension. For these reasons, the STIX was employed as the basis of
the FINSEC Data Model. The result is the FINSTIX Data Model, which extends
STIX 2.0 combining information coming from both physical and logical worlds.
To this end, FINSTIX is the data model used not only by the FINSEC Secu-
rity Knowledge Base, but also by the probes and all the other modules of the
FINSEC Platform to communicate with each other. In particular, the design of
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FINSTIX accounted for the needs of each module. To the best of our knowl-
edge, FINSTIX is the first data model integrating CTI with the physical world,
and thus, this could be considered as an innovative contribution of this book
Chapter.
3.3.1.1 From STIX to FINSTIX
Due to its expressiveness, flexibility and extensibility, STIX can be considered as one
of the most famous industrial standards used to represent and share CTI. However,
it encapsulates two weaknesses. First, it does not provide an accurate representation
of the financial institution’s infrastructure. Second, it does not envisage physical
systems, but it is rather limited to the cyber ones. Due to these limitations, STIX
was extended.
There are two possible kinds of extensions of the STIX standard: the first regards
the definition of custom parameters into STIX Domain Objects already defined
by the standard itself; the second consists in the definition of brand-new custom
objects. Within the FINSEC project, both approaches have been used. “STIXTM
Version 2.0. Part 1: STIX Core Concepts” [22] contains the rules to follow to extend
STIX preserving compliance with the standard.
The resulting data model has been named FINSTIX (from FINSEC-STIX),
which includes all the domain objects defined in STIX. The objects included in
the FINSTIX Data Model take the name of FINSTIX Domain Objects (FDOs).
Every FDO is a collection of key-value pairs that represent data or relations in
JSON format. The FINSEC extension to STIX has been driven by the FINSEC
project use cases, which led to the definition of the custom objects listed and briefly
described in Table 3.3.
All the custom objects introduced in FINSTIX contain the following mandatory
elements:
• type: type of FDO.
• id : univocal identifier of the FDO. It must have the form “<type>--uuid”,
where <type> is the FDO type.
• name: name of the FDO.
• description: description of the FDO.
• subtype: subtype of the FDO. Its value depends on the FDO type.
• domain: it can be “Cyber” or “Physical.” It is used to distinguish between
cyber or physical domain.
• datatype: it can be “Model” or “Instance.” It is used to distinguish a model
from an object created at run-time.
• x_organization: id of the referenced organization. This key is used for multi-
tenant applications, in other words, to protect organizations from disclosure
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Table 3.3. FINSTIX Domain Objects (FDOs).
Name Description
Organization Financial organization.
Asset Organizations’ valuable infrastructure. PCs, server rooms,
ATMs, applications, and everything inside an organization
that is crucial.
Area of Interest Logical/physical area, for example, an indoor area (server
room).
Service A collection of assets forming a publicly exposed service, for
example, a web application.
Probe Object used to support monitoring infrastructure. A Probe
usually monitors one or more areas of interest.
Probe Configuration Data sent to a probe to configure details such as the area
under monitoring or the bit rate of the monitoring process.
Event Information on something happened/happening.
Collected data A group of observed data collected by the network probe.
Agent Person involved in the events created by the probes.
Risk The calculated risk for a specific asset or service. The upper
levels of FINSEC calculate it in real time.
Risk Configuration Parameter specification to optimize the risk assessment
process. It defines the triggers and other useful options.
Regulation An object used to depict a regulation violation. FINSEC must
deal with this kind of issue, even if different from attacks. The
regulation violation information will be sent to regulatory
authorities and other organizations.
Vulnerability score Rating used to provide a score to a vulnerability.
Cyber-Physical Threat
Intelligence
Data set fed and enriched by threat information as soon as
they are gathered from the probes and processed by the
Predictive Analytics module. One or more CPTI objects are
used to generate the output of the intelligence process, which
is a report about ongoing or possible future attacks on one or
more assets belonging to the infrastructure.
of their data. x_organization is also a custom property in the FDOs already
defined in STIX.
• reference: id of the referenced object. It usually refers to the object above in
the hierarchy. It is used to create trees of objects.
datatype is an important and mandatory field, whose value can be “Model” or
“Instance.” In the first case, the objects represent a model that can be used as a basis
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Figure 3.1. Hierarchical representation of an organization infrastructure.
for the analytics to recognize future malicious events; in the second case, instead,
the objects are generated by the probes at run-time. Because of this distinction, it
becomes clear that:
• The analytics core services match the events with known models and find cor-
respondences (malicious events/attacks), meaning that from the events they
produce threat intelligence instances.
• The predictive analytics module produces new models as a result of events
analysis.
Every custom object presents a reference to a parent object (through the key
reference), which enables to create a hierarchy of objects. For example, Figure 3.1
shows a graph representing an organization and its infrastructure. The graph has
been created automatically starting from test data that have been pushed into the
Data Tier in FINSTIX format.
Events and observed data produced by the organization probes are pushed into
the FINSEC Platform, which correlates and aggregates information also gathered
from asset models and external Cyber Threat Intelligence through the machine
learning analytics and prediction algorithms. The result of this process is the Cyber-
Physical Threat Intelligence (CPTI), which integrates important information com-
ing from both the cyber and the physical world. The CPTI produced in the FinTech
sector is the added-value information produced by the FINSEC platform that could
be exchanged (in-out) between financial organizations and security organizations
(CERT/CSIRT like). The integration between cyber and physical security aspects
introduced by FINSTIX is an innovation attributable to the FINSEC Project.
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Figure 3.2. The Security Knowledge Base architecture.
3.3.2 The Security Knowledge Base Architecture
This section presents the architecture of the FINSEC Security Knowledge Base,
which is depicted in Figure 3.2. The SKB consists of:
• The SKB Database, which actually stores the knowledge.
• The SKB Engine, which manages the operations on the database. It exposes
REST API to interact with the other modules.
• The SKB Connectors (one for each external source), which translate the
information coming from external threat intelligence sources into the data
model to promote homogeneity and integrity among the FINSEC services.
The content of the FINSEC Security Knowledge Base is stored into an instance
of MongoDB. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, the information is stored as FINSTIX
Domain Objects to enable semantic interoperability among all the modules in the
platform and between the FINSEC Platform and the external modules (such as the
FINSEC Probes and the FINSEC Dashboard).
The Security Knowledge Base Engine is a microservice developed in Python-
Flask. It is a simple module handling the operations on the database. Its func-
tionalities are exposed through a REST API. The principal methods are described
hereafter:
• The methods insertkb and insertkb_many enable to insert, respectively, one
or more FINSTIX Domain Objects into the Knowledge Base. The input
comes from the SKB Connectors or from the Service Tier.
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• The methods getkb and retrievekb enable to retrieve, respectively, one or more
FINSTIX Domain Objects.
At the time of writing, the FINSEC Security Knowledge Base contains FDOs
coming from two different external sources of threat intelligence: MITRE Adversar-
ial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK) and MITRE Com-
mon Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). In the future, other sources of CTI will
be imported.
Those “other sources” may include cooperation with financial-sector stakehold-
ers not currently involved in FINSEC, to include their experiences of interoper-
ability issues, both across the multiple security knowledge bases described above,
and more widely (e.g., potentially including metadata and ontologies used in
joint actions by police and anti-fraud agencies to produce and share their intel-
ligence analysis reports). An EU-wide example is the collaboration of Eurojust and
Europol, which have set up a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) to counter organized
international criminal attacks on cyber and physical weak points in banking organi-
zations across Europe. The JIT used Europol’s Malware Analysis System to collate
and interpret threat intelligence, including terabytes of evidence of banking sector
frauds, which led to the conviction of dozens of skilled criminals who had widely
shared their methods of defeating the security measures introduced by banks. The
JIT’s use of a single system side-stepped the risk, with multiple systems of incom-
patibilities in methods of collecting and appraising data. Contrast with the recent
reports of such problems in the UK police system for citizens to report possible
large-scale cybercrime, the UK lost many citizen reports and had to process many
others by hand (e.g., [41]).
Since the semantics used to represent the information depends on the source of
CTI, the knowledge base needs a connector for each external source of informa-
tion. Each connector is responsible for the translation of the information coming
from the source into the FINSTIX Data Model. Since ATT&CK content is pro-
vided in STIX, it does not need any transformations to comply with FINSTIX. On
the contrary, the CVE Connector has to translate the vulnerability imported from
CVE in FINSTIX: for each CVE vulnerability, it creates the vulnerability and the
vulnerability score FDOs, then, as shown in Figure 3.3, it takes different steps to
create the relationships among the vulnerability and the affected assets.
After the translation to FINSTIX, the connectors interact with the SKB Engine
through the API to insert the new knowledge into the SKB Database. At the
time of writing, the connectors do not implement any protocol to collect CTI;
however, standards such as the OASIS Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelli-
gence Information (TAXII) will be considered in the second phase of the FINSEC
project [42].
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Figure 3.3. CVE connector.
3.3.3 The Security Knowledge Base Visual Interface
Other than the API, the content of the Security Knowledge Base is browsable
through a primary visual interface, which is available in the KB page of the Data
Layer application [43]. In this first page, the user can see a list of all the FINSTIX
objects contained in the Knowledge Base. Clicking on the id of a specific object, the
user can see further details of the object itself, as shown in Figure 3.4. In particular,
the user can visualize a graph showing the relationships between the selected FDO
and the other FDOs. The FINSTIX object data fields are then displayed under the
graph. In the future, the visual interface will be improved, for example, supporting
a sophisticated search of the FDOs through filters.
3.4 Interaction with the Dashboard and the
Collaborative Risk Management Module
The FINSEC Dashboard allows a user to access some pieces of information
related to the organization’s assets and retrieved by the Security Knowledge Base.
Dashboard and the Collaborative Risk Management Module 47
Figure 3.4. Relational graph and object details.
Figure 3.5. Criticality of the vulnerabilities.
For example, in the main page, the user can see the graph in Figure 3.5, which
enables to get a grasp on the criticality of the vulnerabilities affecting the assets of
the infrastructure for the organization.
Figure 3.6 illustrates part of the Vulnerability page. From left to right, the user
can see two graphs representing two assets with the affecting vulnerabilities; on the
right, a table shows details on the vulnerabilities affecting the assets. In particular,
each row presents the description of the vulnerability, vendor, product name and
version of the affected asset, and the vulnerability score.
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Figure 3.6. Vulnerabilities affecting the infrastructure.
Figure 3.7. Risk associated to the service.
In the MVP, the information contained in the Security Knowledge Base is con-
sumed by the Collaborative Risk Management module to calculate the risk associ-
ated with the infrastructure services. The Collaborative Risk Management module:
1. Retrieves the vulnerabilities and the related scores affecting the assets that
compose the service.
2. Calculates the individual asset risk for each asset composing the service, based
on the affecting vulnerabilities, the impact and the threat level for the asset
itself.
3. Calculates the service risk starting from the assets’ individual risks.
The user can see information on the organization services in the Service page of
the Dashboard. In particular, Figure 3.7 shows a graph representing a service and
the assets that compose it. As shown in the graph, there is a risk associated to the
service, which is calculated by the Collaborative Risk Management module.
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3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter presented the FINSEC Security Knowledge Base (SKB), a cluster
of CPTI information. The SKB serves all the modules of the architecture with the
information needed for their predictive and detection tasks. The Chapter also intro-
duced FINSTIX, which is the data model used not only in the SKB, but also in the
entire FINSEC Platform to enable the interaction among the different modules of
the platform and between the platform and external modules (such as the FINSEC
Probes and the FINSEC Dashboard). FINSTIX extends the STIX 2.0 standard by
including custom objects and parameters tailored to the financial organization. To
the best of our knowledge, FINSTIX is the first data model that bridges the cyber
world and the physical world, thus enabling the extension from Cyber Threat Intel-
ligence to Cyber-physical Threat Intelligence.
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FINSEC Cyber-physical Security Gateway is an intelligent system that takes over
information from different security systems installed within a site or a perimeter
(intrusion detection, access control, fire detection, technical alarms, etc.) and, using
the data extracted from the images provided by the video surveillance system, iden-
tifies threats and events before they become critical. The module is used to analyze
security events and situations, allows the integration of cybersecurity concepts, as
well as the monitoring of risks associated with critical installations for business
processes: technical alarms, maintenance, internal procedures, and even commer-
cial applications. Once the events are documented, they can be transformed into
alarms on FINSEC Platform via FINSTIX Data Model or on other PSIM (Physi-
cal Security Information Management) and/or VMS (Video Management System)
platforms, as the information may represent the best support in making decisions
regarding threats either on-site or remotely.
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4.1 Overview
FINSEC Cyber-physical Security Gateway is an intelligent system that takes over
information from different security systems installed within a site or a perimeter
(intrusion detection, access control, fire detection, technical alarms, etc.) and, using
the data extracted from the images provided by the video surveillance system, iden-
tifies threats and events before they become critical. The module is used to analyze
security events and situations, allows the integration of cybersecurity concepts, as
well as the monitoring of risks associated with critical installations for business
processes: technical alarms, maintenance, internal procedures, and even commer-
cial applications. Once the events are documented, they can be transformed into
alarms on FINSEC Platform via FINSTIX Data Model or on other PSIM (Physi-
cal Security Information Management) and/or VMS (Video Management System)
platforms, as the information may represent the best support in making decisions
regarding threats either on-site or remotely.
The system is designed to analyze security events and situations, allows the inte-
gration of cybersecurity concepts, as well as the monitoring of risks associated with
critical installations for business processes: technical alarms, maintenance, internal
procedures, and even commercial applications. Such system integrates specific func-
tions that configure an internal security layer used to prevent cyberattacks on the
connected systems. The entire hardware and application-based architecture allows
different standard and protocols for sensors as well as different data models for up-
link connection assuring, by design, the compatibility and integration with systems
that use modern IoT (Internet of Things)-type technologies.
The overall system is based on a multi-sensor and multiple-technology detection,
where each subsystem can be a standalone one but the processed information (phys-
ical events, cyber detections, associated data, other relevant sensing) is conveyed to
the Cyber-physical Security System for local data fusion. The main objectives of
the Cyber-physical Security System are:
• Properly detect, collect, and locally fuse the information from the local detec-
tion to achieve high detection probability;
• Verify the detection events so as to reduce the false alarm rate;
• Provide relevant information to the global data fusion and Global Platform;
• Include a mitigate layer for reactions to central commands, including predic-
tive actions based on global knowledge and threat risk level.
4.2 Classical vs Smart Security Controllers
The appearance of the concept named “Cyber-physical Systems” (CPS) was deter-
mined in the first place by the need for evolution of the computer science
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and technology. The CPSs perform an embedding process of all their components
and offer a close interaction between the cyber and physical components. This is
the main improvement over the conventional systems, where computing systems
and communications are added to the physical processes, by keeping the identity
of every component.
The development of CPS was possible due to the existence of global networks
as “Internet of Things” (IoT) and “Internet of Services” (IoS), along with complex
networks of sensors. The interconnection between systems embedded in manage-
ment system architectures and multiple sensor networks had led to the emergence
of this new class of systems, named “Systems of systems”. CPSs will transform the
way it interact with the physical world, just like the Internet has transformed the
way we interact with others.
By integrating all of the components, CPS ensures new capabilities as higher
efficiency, lower costs, and the ability to interconnect in within the framework of
complex structures. Therefore, these systems play an important role in the devel-
opment of future systems [1].
4.2.1 Classical Cyber-physical Systems
The design and implementation of the CPSs was possible due to the emergence of
sensor networks and network-embedded systems. These systems represent a com-
plex new class, which can collect a large amount of real-time data from the sensor
network, in order to take the most suitable decision. One of the complications that
arise during the design of such a system is that the physical world is not entirely
predictable. For this reason, the system must be robust to changing environmental
conditions.
The ultimate goal of CPS is to use infrastructure cybernetics like detection, com-
puting, communication, and hardware/software, in order to intelligently monitor
(from physical to cybernetic) and control (from cybernetic to physical) the sur-
rounding world.
The CPSs integrate sensors, execution elements, physical processes, electronic,
and software devices in such a way that they allow the acquisition of strong inter-
connected systems, with real capabilities. The performances and the complexity of
the systems are easy to highlight when two or more domains are interconnected.
Due to the complex systems that have to interact continuously, it is necessary to
design a precise architecture for the whole CPS.
Building blocks of the CPS have appeared since the last century. The blocks and
concepts used in the development of this system are presented in Figure 4.1. One
of those blocks is the embedded software system. These include the specialized pro-
cessors both by construction (design) and by a specific software. This part of the
system generates optimized solutions in order to ensure the control of a system.
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Figure 4.1. Cyber-physical system—examples and concepts.
But there are at least two problems regarding this block. The first is that it repre-
sents a closed solution, which implies a complete separation of the other systems.
It is not intended for networking. The second problem relates to the fact that the
operating safety has been tested and is guaranteed for a certain hardware and soft-
ware implementation. If it is necessary to replace the microprocessor with a newer
one, then the whole system will have to go through all the tests from the beginning.
The second block is the microsystem, which integrates in the same component
the input transducer (sensor) or the output transducer (actuator), and the process-
ing part of the electrical signal. This block ensures the interaction between CPS and
physical environment. The accelerated development of the transducers that provide
the interface with the physical world was one of the progress factors that lead to the
new industrial revolution—Industry 4.0.
In addition to these two blocks, the human factor, the experts in the field, is
incorporated in the decision process. Also, the client is included in the system,
which allows the manufacture of personalized products.
It is more challenging to design a CPS, compared to a purely cyber system or a
physical system. In this case, both the behavior of computational components and
the physical environment must be taken into account, in order to obtain a unified
framework. The design differences between software and mechanical engineering
increase the difficulty level of implementing a CPS. As can be seen in Figure 4.2,
during last years it was developed a design architecture consisting of five layers [2].
The first layer is the Smart Connection Level, which involves collecting data
from the physical environment. In order to design a CPS, the connected systems
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Figure 4.2. Levels of 5C CSP architecture.
and their components must acquire the data as accurately as possible. At this level,
there are used different types of sensors, which can collect a large variety of data.
Afterwards, the Conversion stage follows. At this point, the data collected from
different resources is converted into relevant information, which can be used in the
real-world application.
The next stage is the Cyber Level, which is one of the most important step in
developing a proper design for CPS. After the information is extracted from all
the interconnected machines, it must be compared with other similar machines, in
order to discover details regarding system variation and life prediction. In this way,
it can be created a base for every machine through the system, to know as much
details about how a specific machine behaves in time.
At this point, the human operator has all the information needed so he can
make the decisions. In the Cognition Level, the decisions must be prioritized and
optimized, in order to determine the priority of tasks. In the last stage, the Con-
figuration Level, the user is in charge of maintenance, by supervising the system
and giving feedback to the physical part. The system can be reconfigured depend
on the priority of the tasks and the risk criteria. In this way, it will be designed a
self-adaptive and self-configured system [2].
So, during the five levels presented above, the CPS retrieves data from the sensor
network and decides if an irregular action has taken place. If the alarm sensors detect
an event which is not normally part of the environment, they send signals to the
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alarm panel. For the system to be fully operational, the sensors must be strategically
placed in order to monitor all the areas that require security alerts [3].
The presence of an unusual event is signaled to the human operator, by gener-
ating an alarm. The performance of CPS is influenced by the way it detects those
events that need immediate attention and also by the number of false alarms it gen-
erates. Also, the system depends on the human component. People are responsible
for the proper functioning of the CPS. They must monitor the system and the gen-
erated alarms, in order to decide if any intervention is necessary to ensure that the
technology is applied properly.
One of the main challenges, which comes from the interconnection of several
systems, is to ensure the security of a CPS. Because of the existence of distinct
components, a failure in one of them could lead to a whole system failure [4].
If taken separately, the components may not represent a real threat during an attack,
when they are interconnected it could lead to serious consequences. The concern
about real-time operation can interfere with the security of the system.
The system and the human operator interact in a spontaneous manner, which
represents a real challenge for designing the system. The CPSs are described as “Sys-
tems of systems” as a result of interconnection of the embedded systems linked to
the physical environment through sensor networks and execution elements. Those
systems have partial autonomy and adaptive ability, and also an advanced cooper-
ation between system and human component.
Everyday life is becoming increasingly dependent on such systems. For this
reason, the ability to adapt to such intelligent systems need to be continuously
improved through education and training. The tendency to increase the compu-
tational intelligence, the degree of automation, and control of some complex pro-
cesses requires the rethinking of the human operator role and training for new skills
and actions. In addition, the large amount of data that is retrieved from the physical
environment leads to the generation of many alarms, which are becoming increas-
ingly difficult to be managed by a human operator.
For those reasons, the classical CPS need further improvements, in order to keep
up with the evolution of the physical environment.
4.2.2 Need of Improvement
The correct functionality of the CPSs depends on the correctness and accuracy of
the sensor network. The data acquired from the sensors can be influenced by many
external environmental factors. Furthermore, the sensors can be affected by faults
and uncertainty, which can have a strong negative effect on the decision-making
process. This will either lead to multiple false alarms or missed unusual events [5].
Other major design challenges of the CPS are the disconnection between abstrac-
tion layers, the lack of precise synchronization, or the inadequate consistency.
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For CPS development through major progresses and by integrating advanced tech-
nologies is required a deeper understanding of the integration of real-time process-
ing, with embedded wireless network which works with a wide range of sensors.
For a complex and complete operation of the CPS is required an efficient detection
and control of the physical systems, through a robust software architecture, focused
on system hierarchies, protocols, and analytical procedures.
Furthermore, the CPSs should use concepts of new and highly intelligent pro-
gramming and advanced hardware design. The mechanisms used to interact with
sensors are not fully represented by existing programming languages. The CPSs
must be concurrent, because the surrounding world is concurrent. So, an improve-
ment is the usage of abstractions which can lead to an intuitive modeling of the real
world [1].
CPSs must overcome all challenges and events that may take place in the future,
in order to ensure security, safety, and predictability. These systems must operate
in real time all of the operation needed and take into account data delays captured
by the sensors.
4.2.3 SMART Cyber-physical Systems
Due to the continuous increase of the interconnection between the physical and
the virtual world, and the development of increasingly sophisticated and complex
algorithms, became necessary the emergence of a new generation of cyber-physical
systems.
The Smart CPS represents a modern CPS system, which is able to integrate a
larger number of physical components and, respectively, computation components.
This new system can control the items from their environment in a more intelligent
manner, in order to achieve a higher degree of efficiency [6].
The main difference between the classical CPS and the smart Cyber-physical
Systems is related to how they process the data retrieved from the network of sen-
sors. Sensors provide data taken from a physical object, which is further used by
the device to perform a function.
Regarding the classical systems, the data generates alarms directly, without going
through a processing level. This explains the occurrence of many false alarms or
the loss of real alarms. Thus, an evolution of the system was essential, which is
way were introduced multiple stages of data processing. In the case of smart CPS,
after the data is collected by sensors, a number of algorithms are developed and
simulated again until a correct action is selected and the response is sent to the
action device. Thus, after the phases of data processing, aggregation, and fusion,
the alarms received by the user will be fewer and more accurate.
The number of false alarms decreases, being generated only the alarms that rep-
resent a real risk. This is one of the major improvements made by smart CPSs,
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Figure 4.3. Data processing flow.
which greatly help the human operator, while also increasing the efficiency of the
alarm system. The processing phase of the data acquired by the sensors network
consists of several techniques and processes presented in the diagram in Figure 4.3.
The data collected by the sensors network must go through several processing steps
in order to generate the information that finally reaches to the human operator.
A first step is data validation. The data must be as accurate as possible so that
the final system does not generate false alarms. This is the phase in which the data
is cleaned and verified, so that only the correct, consistent, and valid data will pass
further through the system. The accuracy and the correctness of the final system
depend on this first step.
Next step is the sorting of data. Previously obtained data is systematically
arranged in a logical order and grouped into several sets according to certain prop-
erties. The relevance of the data is very important during processing phase. The
existence of irrelevant data leads to a decreased quality of the information gener-
ated in the end.
The data is further reduced from detailed sequences, so that in the next step
the information being represented as simple as possible. The aggregation step is
one of the most important phases of data processing. Using various aggregation
techniques, the data can be combined from several measurements, from various
sensors in the network. When the data are aggregated, the observation groups are
replaced by a statistic based on these observations. By combining several measure-
ments, both the redundant information and the wrong information from the sys-
tem can be eliminated. In this way, the smart CPS system will generate in the end
fewer false alarms and more correct ones. And so, the accuracy and correctness of a
smart CPS is increased compared to the classical systems.
The last three steps analyze the aggregated data and interpret them in order
to generate detailed lists describing the information reached in this point. The
last step, the classification of information, groups the data into several categories.
In essence, the role of data classification is to use known variables in order to predict
unknown or future variables.
So, data processing is the way in which all the data received from the sensors is
converted into useful and correct information. This process is implement through
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a computer that receives at input rows of data and generates at the output the
information used later by the human operator.
The smartness of this system is, for the most part, implemented in software.
The smart CPS combine data from various sources and apply intelligent algo-
rithms that process information from the real world. The interactions that occur at
the physical level can change the behavior in the virtual world. This connection is
exploited by the smart CPS system for continuous improvements of the processes,
which is reflected in a higher level of adaptation to the physical environment, and
also of optimization of the system. Thus, a more diverse range of applications and
services can be developed.
The components of the smart CPS interact with each other in a robust and
decentralized manner. These components must also maintain a high degree of
autonomy. For this reason, there are several challenges during the implementation.
One of the challenges is to design intelligent physical infrastructures for commu-
nicating between physical objects and virtual world. Another major challenge is the
processing of data collected by the sensors. It must be ensured the data stream pro-
cessing along with data analytics, and the implementation of newer machine learn-
ing techniques, through development of self-adaptive software. Moreover, being a
system with an increased complexity, and also having integrated a human compo-
nent, it must be taken into consideration the social and behavioral problems that
arise.
One other major problem that has arisen with the increase of the capabilities of
smart CPS system is the need to increase the security. In order to increase efficiency,
those systems have complex functionalities and advanced algorithms, which also
increase the likelihood of a potential attack. This has a negative effect on the security
system [6].
4.2.4 Applications of Cyber-physical Systems
The CPSs provide unique features, which is why they are used more and more often
in the surrounding world. These systems have a very wide range of applicability,
starting from automated machines to the medical field. In addition, these are very
common in the field of security. Whether it is the supervision of personal houses
or areas with higher risks, such as an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), the CPS
systems are increasingly widespread.
One of the first areas in which those systems have been used is the field of trans-
port. Modern automated vehicles represent the typical example of a CPS. These
cars provide a number of features, as obstacle detection system, deceleration system
in case of obstacle detection, automatic driving, and continuous surveillance of the
energy consumption of the car, etc. Furthermore, those systems are used also in the
aerospace field, the requirements being much more demanding in this case.
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Figure 4.4. Applicability of CPSs—ATM’s security.
Another area in which the CPS systems gain ground it the medical field. These
make it possible to remotely monitor an elderly or a sick person. For this purpose,
the sensors must be installed in the room or even in the clothing. Afterwards, the
sensors will trigger alarms in case of any danger.
In recent years, the CPSs have begun to be used also in the field of environmental
protection. These can be used in order to monitor the degree of pollution and
to alert in case of danger situations such as floods, fires, earthquakes, etc. Besides
that, the climate change can be closely monitored, together with its effects on the
planetary scale.
Nowadays, the biggest spread of CPS systems is in the security field. These are
commonly used to supervise various buildings or areas. The most frequent is cur-
rently the case where those systems are installed for the surveillance of personal
houses. The use of CPS turns the house in a safer and more secure place, and, in
addition, it can provide many other features designed for a “smart” house. Further-
more, another main role of the CPSs systems is the surveillance of several organi-
zations, like banks. Such situation is presented in Figure 4.4.
This is the moment when it becomes obvious the importance of the evolution of
CPS systems, from classical to smart systems. In situations related to security and
surveillance of perimeters or buildings with high risk of attacks, a more efficient
and accurate system is required. The main reason is that generating a large number
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of false alarms will tire the human operator, which could subsequently lead to the
loss of other real alarms. The probability of not taking into account a real attack
from inside the perimeter increases with the number of false alarms generated by
the system.
On the other side may also arise a situation when a real alarm is not generated
by the system. In this case, the ATM security is compromised. For this reason,
the most appropriate system to monitor and protect an ATM, or other area prone
to attacks, is the smart CPS system. This should lead to increased security in the
financial-banking field, and, on a larger scale, to increased national security.
4.3 Data Fusion (Physical and Cyber Events)
4.3.1 Theoretical Aspects
Data fusion is the process of combining data from multiple sources (sensors, cam-
eras, etc.) and processes (video analytics algorithms, cyber security agents) in order
to obtain more relevant and useful information at the end.
The most common data fusion usage is in geospatial applications due to the
necessity of correlating targets in space and time (the sensors do not report the
information simultaneously).
Through the activities that an attacker can carry out in the pre-stages of an attack,
as well as during the intrusion itself, they can use tactics specific to the military
space, misleading detection systems, resulting in monitoring data being uncertain
and confused.
In addition, the transposition of more and more human activities in the vir-
tual space, combined with the dynamics of technological changes, will determine
an increased complexity of IT architectures and their associated management pro-
cesses. According to the principle of the incompatibility between precision and
complexity, which manifests strongly in human monitored systems, it is expected
that, in terms of security management, this complexity is translated as the avail-
ability of a large mass of data and information, but which will have an increasingly
high content of imperfections.
The imperfection of the data must be incorporated into the systems that are
trying to provide the most accurate modeling of reality. However, this is difficult
to achieve with the use of current solutions offered by information management
systems.
One of the mathematical models that allows working under uncertain condi-
tions is known by the name of evidence-based reasoning theory (Dempster-Shafer
theory—DST) [7, 8]. The premise of the theory was that the ignorance of an
agent towards one statement must not cause the probability to be evenly divided
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between the value of truth and of false, as assumed in classical probabilistic reason-
ing. Even more, if there is the possibility of some mutually exclusive alternative, and
the agent can only set the probabilities for some of them, according to the classical
probabilistic reasoning, the remaining probabilities must be distributed in a certain
way between the other alternatives.
Definition:
2 = {θ1, . . . , θn} (4.1)
is called the fusion problem framework, and θi , where i = 1, . . . , n, represents the
set of hypotheses.
Shafer Model (M0(2)) assumes that θi (i = 1, . . . , n) are precisely identified
such that to ensure the exclusivity and completeness of the hypotheses. If 2 is
open (condition exhaustiveness is not met), an element θn+1 can be added closing
so that it works with a closed case {θ1, . . . , θn, θn+1}. Thus, without losing from
generality, it will be considered that Equation (4.1) defines a closed discernment
framework.
In the initial TDS, subsets are constructed as sentences, where the sentences of
interest are shaped as:
Pθ (A) = the truth value of θ is in a subset A of 2 (4.2)
Given the isomorphism between Pθ (A) and A, for simplicity and consistency
with the terminology adopted in other theories, a representation based on sets is
used in the definitions that follow.
Definition:
The power set
22 = (2,∪) (4.3)
represents the set consisting of all subsets of 2 created based on the following
rules:
• ∅, {θ1, . . . , θn} ∈ 22.
• If A, B ∈ 22, then A ∪ B ∈ 22.
• 22 does not contain any other element except those obtained using the first
two rules.
For 2 = {θ1, θ2, θ3}, we will obtain:
22 = {∅, {θ1}, {θ2}, {θ3}, {θ1 ∪ θ2}, {θ2 ∪ θ3}, {θ1 ∪ θ3}, {θ1 ∪ θ2 ∪ θ3}} (4.4)
having the property |22| = 8.
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Definition:
It is called the basic trust table (simply called the table function); the function is:
m(·): 22→ [0, 1] (4.5)
associated with a body of records B as follows:
m(∅) = 0 (4.6)∑
A∈22
m(A) = 1 (4.7)
where the value m(A) is called the generalized mass of basic confidence of A.
4.3.2 Necessity of Data Fusion for Cyber-physical Security
Commonly cybersecurity and physical security are two completely different aspects
and are treated by different security companies with different intervention protocols
(Figure 4.5).
This can be a serious security vulnerability due to the fact that in many cases, the
two types of attacks are correlated. The complexity of the attacks is also increasing
and the technologies and techniques are getting harder to detect and combat. One
typical example of a correlated attack is when a cyberattack is perform to disconnect
an ATM from the back network and then a physical attack is conducted with divides
that can perform unlimited withdraws.
There are several motives and flows in the current systems that permit these types
of attacks to function.
Figure 4.5. Current approach to CPS.
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The first and most evident is the fact that the cybersecurity firms don’t have
intervention teams for the field, and when such an intervention is required, they
rely on human intervention to notify the physical security team. This approach is
inefficient and could be easily resolved if the end point could send certain events
to both teams.
The second aspect that permits these attacks is the fact that the end point, in this
case let’s say an ATM, does not have any decision power. The most simple exam-
ple of local decisions that could enhance security is the decision to put the ATM
on lockdown in the case that it losses communications with the central servers.
These approaches were prohibitive in the past due to the costs, size, and power
consumption of systems that could make these aspects possible. Fortunately, cur-
rently embedded systems are extremely affordable and power efficient and have then
sufficient computational power to handle the required tasks.
4.3.3 Implementation
As mentioned, NanoPCs such as the Raspberry Pi platform are more than powerful
enough to operate a Data Acquisition module, a Data Fusion module, and a Deci-
sion and Distribution module, without requiring special consideration to space and
power needs.
Such modules are being developed and launched to the market (Figure 4.6) at
the time of writing this, but this can be considered as being quite late. Just in the
UK, in 2019 the total ATM fraud damages were around 100 million Pounds [9], so
if such solutions were implemented earlier, and assuming that they would prevent
Figure 4.6. Intrusion detection and access control board.
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only 10% of the thefts, the savings would be at around 10 million Pounds just in
the UK.
With such a module connected between the sensors, the ATM PC and the cen-
tral server could monitor all activity and determine if something is out of the ordi-
nary, especially due to the fact that it has information about the whole state of the
system.
4.4 Integration Layer FINSTIX Data Model
Implementation
In the FINSEC project, a solution has been developed and demonstrated for an
integrated, intelligent, collaborative, and predictive approach to the security of crit-
ical infrastructures in the financial sector. To this end, a proper data model is crucial
to provide an integrated representation of physical and cyber assets and their rela-
tionships, to operate on data and to define the scope of the prediction algorithms.
In the design of a data model, two different approaches can be adopted: the first
one comprises the definition of the model from scratch, covering all the business
requirements of the considered use cases. This approach has a number of advan-
tages, most relevant here being the fact that the data model would be perfectly
adapted for the task and would be likely of a smaller size. Even though these advan-
tages are substantial, the fact that the model would not be in a known industry
standard is enough motive to dismiss this approach and continue to the second
option.
The second option comprises the expansion (i.e., particularization, detailing) of
an existing standard with the objects individualized by the use cases and missing
in the standard. Thus, the FINSEC project pursued the second solution, resulting
in the FINSEC-FINSTIX data model. FINSTIX extends the Structured Threat
Information eXpression (STIX) 2 [10] standard combining information coming
from both physical and logical worlds (thus supporting defenses against both cyber
and physical threats).
STIX has been chosen because it already defines concepts important for the CTI
(such as Observed Data, Vulnerability, Attack Pattern, Malware, Course of Action),
while enabling an easy extension through the addition of custom parameters to
already existing STIX objects and/or the creation of brand-new custom objects.
In addition, STIX allows easy references to other external sources of intelligence
(such as CAPEC).
The FINSEC extension to STIX2 has been driven by the FINSEC Project use
cases, which led to the inclusion of information relevant to the financial sector,
enabling the correlation of physical and logical data.
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The whole FINSEC Platform can be conceived as an “intelligent engine” capa-
ble of transforming events and observed data from the physical and digital world
(physical-cyber infrastructure) into Threat Intelligence. The information produced
will be referred to Cyber and Physical Threat Intelligence (CPTI). In the same
way that Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is valuable information exchanged in the
Cyber Security Domain, the CPTI produced in the FinTech sector is the added-
value information produced by the platform which could be exchanged (in-out)
between Financial Organizations and Security Organizations (CERT/CSIRT-like).
As an overview, the FINSTIX data model describes in detail the following
aspects:
• The location and the characteristics of surveyed site
• The asset that is protected and its complete description
• The sensors that feed info into the system and they’re afferent description
• The event description
The data model is in the JSON format. Up next, we will present a few examples
of this data model so things become clearer. The examples are disposed from the
highest level to the lowest. Before the complete JSON example section, we will pro-











"name": "Wirecard Co, Roma",
"description": "Service Provider of ATM network",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",
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"description": "area inside the ATM",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",
"reference": [ "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c" ],
"coordinates": [

































"name": "Room of a bank Branch",
"description": "Bank Room with ATMs, cash desks and other assets",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",
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"description": "area of the ATM",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",








































"description": "ATM #534 inside the building",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",
"reference": [ "x-asset--1dc5b93d-7f74-42a6-a428-508bd90dde50" ]
}










"description": "Permit legitimate access, forward sensor information",
"x_organization": "x-organization--d02ca029-9afb-46de-af03-893c6cb4d79c",





















As it can be seen, the majority of the data model is human readable and the fields
that are not are explained in the chapter detailing the protocol in more detail, here
we are detailing the implementation.
When the connection is established to the end point, all the packages in the
examples must be sent to the server in order to validate the connection. Afterwards,
only the Event data is required, due to the fact that the server stores the end point
description.
4.5 Conclusion
It is clear that standard security approaches are no longer viable for the modern
world. The being said, the latest technologies available for artificial intelligence (a.i.
Deep Neural Network—DNN, Convolutional Neural Network—CNN) have yet
to be proven as secure and reliable as needed for financial institutions and applica-
tions. Another disadvantage of modern artificial intelligence approaches is the fact
that they require a great deal of computational power, as such they consume a lot
of electrical energy, thing that must be taken into account.
Taking this into account, we consider that the best approach for these cases is a
combination of statistical validation, logical trees, and human monitoring. Such a
system will yield the best results with the minimum of false alarms, without missing
any relevant events, and notify all the interested parties. This fact will greatly reduce
the time of intervention and drastically increase the system efficiency.
One of the latest technologies is the concept named “Cyber-physical Systems”
(CPS). This system was determined in the first place by the need for evolution of
the computer science and for increasing the security in fields like financial-banking.
The main purpose of CPSs is to use infrastructure cybernetics like detection, com-
puting, communication, and hardware/software, in order to intelligently monitor
(from physical to cybernetic) and control (from cybernetic to physical) the sur-
rounding world. Furthermore, the latest CPSs systems, called Smart Cyber-physical
Systems (sCPSs), lead to an increased efficiency by processing the data collected by
the sensors network (data aggregation, data fusion). Using such systems, it is pos-
sible to generate fewer false alarms and also to increase the final accuracy by not
missing the real alarms. This is the reason why in areas like banks or other organi-
zations, with an increased risk of cyberattacks, the CPSs represent the most suitable
and secure system that can be used.
Data fusion is one of the most important steps in determining the validity and
accuracy of the information provided by the sensors. There are many types of algo-
rithms that are suitable for these applications. The thing they all have in common
is that they all consider the data collected by the sensor being imperfect, until they
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can validate or invalidate the information. Data fusion represents the main reason
why the system will not generate any false alarms in the end, and also why it assures
that any relevant information will not be missed. And so, the human operator who
must verify all the alarms and validate them will no longer have to deal with so
many false alarms, and the efficiency of the system will be increased.
The last step important for an intelligent gateway is communication between
all the systems and subsystems that compose the solution. In this chapter, we have
presented examples of the FINSTIX protocol that are relevant for access control
and alarm scenarios. The examples provided are complete, from the highest level
(Monitoring Server) to the lowest level (sensors).
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Information Sharing and Stakeholders’
Collaboration for Stronger Security
in Financial Sector Supply Chains:
A Blockchain Approach
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Security incidents in the finance sector highlight the need for sharing security infor-
mation across financial institutions, as a means of mitigating risks and boosting
the early preparedness against attacks. To address this issue and enhance the secu-
rity and trust in the information sharing process, a blockchain-based solution for
sharing security information in a decentralized way can be employed. Our earlier
research work has reflected on this approach and proposed a reference architec-
ture that incorporated a blockchain-based sharing of security information for crit-
ical infrastructures of the finance sector. In this Chapter, we extend this reference
architecture by enhancing its collaborative risk assessment approach and a secu-
rity knowledge database. We then employ an example to provide a demo of the




In recent years, we have witnessed a steady rise of cybersecurity incidents against
infrastructures of the financial sector, such as phishing, ransomware, and DDoS
(Distributed Denial of Service) attacks. These incidents include notorious attacks,
which have resulted in significant economic damage, while decreasing trust in finan-
cial institutions and questioning their social value. As discussed extensively in the
Chapter of this book which introduces the security challenges of the financial sec-
tor, the critical infrastructures of financial institutions are vulnerable. Some of the
reasons of their vulnerability is the integration between physical and cybersecu-
rity and the connectivity between the different systems and infrastructures. First,
there is currently limited integration between physical and cybersecurity. This is
because data-driven systems for the security of the finance sector are mainly address-
ing cybersecurity and ignore physical security systems. As a result, vulnerability
assessment, threat analysis, risk mitigation, and response activities are fragmented.
However, holistic approaches could assist financial institutions in better address-
ing security incidents involving both cyber and physical assets of their critical
infrastructures. Second, as financial infrastructures are more connected than ever
before, attacks are likely to impact other infrastructures and systems in the financial
chain [1]. Thus, stakeholder collaboration could largely contribute identifying and
alleviating such issues more effectively.
The exchange of security information across collaborating stakeholders of the
financial services value chain can be a foundation for security collaboration in the
relevant supply chain. In the scope of an integrated security approach, informa-
tion for both cyber and physical security should be exchanged. This Chapter draws
on [2] to extend the proposed blockchain-based system for collaborative security in
the finance sector that includes an enhanced collaborative risk assessment approach
and the incorporation of a security knowledge database.
5.2 Related Work
Collaboration is considered as one of the key activities in a plethora of European
national cybersecurity strategies. Collaboration refers to the enhancement of cyber-
security at different levels so as to encapsulate threats sharing, risk assessment, and
awareness raising. This is also reflected in the establishment of formal structures
such as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC) and Public Private Part-
nerships (PPP) [3]. In the finance sector, the Financial Services Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) [4] was also established, as an industry forum for
sharing data about critical cybersecurity threats in the financial services industry.
ISAC centers support information sharing across stakeholders and assist the related
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collaborative workflows, such as those implemented in other sectors of the economy
(e.g., the maritime [5] and transport sectors [6]). Collaborative security and infor-
mation sharing options have been proposed in the literature (e.g., [7]), in order to
support and complement conventional risk assessment techniques (e.g., [8, 9]). The
rationale of information sharing is to trigger security processes like risk assessment
and threat analysis, based on information received from other parties that join the
collaborative security infrastructures. Trustworthiness and the security of the infor-
mation sharing process are the two main obstacles in leveraging collaboration. This
is because the use of a centralized database for sharing data involves disadvantages
such as the requirement for a trusted third party (TTP) that will assume the own-
ership and will guarantee the integrity of the shared information. Additionally, it is
susceptible to security attacks, which can compromise the shared data.
Financial organizations are overall reluctant to share information and thus avoid
to share any information that lies beyond their compliance with regulations. Thus,
a decentralized approach could provide solutions for addressing this issue. In partic-
ular, the use of blockchain technology could enable financial organizations to share
information in a shared distributed ledger in a secure and decentralized way and
hence in this way provides distributed trust. Alternative technologies that could be
employed include STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) [10], a proto-
col developed by OASIS to model cyber threat intelligence. TAXII (Trusted Auto-
mated Exchange of Intelligence Information) [11] refers to the application-layer
protocol developed by OASIS to exchange STIX data. TAXII runs on top of HTTP
and can provide secure connections over SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) if needed. But,
TAXII is mainly a communication protocol, and thus, it does not provide storing
capabilities. Hence, although it supports both publish-subscribe and client-server
topologies, compared to blockchain, it lacks the guaranteed degree of confiden-
tiality. Along the same lines, the alternative of pure P2P networks [12] could not
provide a viable solution for sharing financial data. This is because the lack of solid
authorization techniques could lead in information compromise, bad connections
could possibly produce big network latency, while malicious files or messages can
be easily implanted and consumed by other peers. For these reasons, information
sharing is nowadays one of the most prominent blockchain use cases in the financial
sector [13]. Existing literature provides a thorough analysis on the benefits arising
by the use of blockchain technology in the financial sector [14, 15].
5.3 Collaborative Risk Assessment
In the proposed architecture, risks are calculated using specific metrics. These met-
rics include the vulnerability level, the impact level, and the threat level. Both
vulnerability and impact levels were derived from the CVSS scores of the assets’
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vulnerabilities detected. The threat level is now a result of events occurring inside
the organization and historical information. As a result, the calculations are more
precise and are based on the current state of each organization.
Risk configuration is an object that follows the FINSTIX format (see Chapter 3)
defined to make the risk calculation process easily adaptable to the needs of each
organization allowing them to easily edit calculation triggers, add or remove events
from the calculation scope, and, in general terms, enable customization. Essentially,
through this object an officer can map events to threats and define trigger thresholds
for the risk calculation.
5.3.1 Services
The first step to initialize a risk calculation suite is the creation of a Service. Services
are stored in the FINSEC data-tier; hence, the communication with it is critical.
In the current platform state, the data tier is protected using basic authentication.
To protect the credentials, the username and password are provided as environment
variables during the container initialization.
The form creation involves the asset selection as well as the vulnerability defini-
tion for each asset. The latter is now leveraged by the introduction of the Security
Knowledge Base.
Important information related to a service includes:
• Name—which identifies the service along with the id;
• Description—which provides extra information for the security officers;
• Criticality—which defines the level of importance of the service. This infor-
mation is important because mitigation actions are sometimes urgent and
should be handled immediately;
• Subtype—which identifies the level of exposure (e.g., if the service is part of
a supply chain, the subtype value will be “public”);
• Service references—which lists the dependency of the current service to other
services, either inside or outside the borders of the organization.
5.3.2 Threats
While Services provide the ability to group assets inside the organization, it could
be impossible to calculate a risk on them without the detection of threats that may
target the service. Likewise, a list of events should be defined. These events affect
the level of the threat in real time. Threats are associated with the Service using the
risk configuration object. Threat objects must be stored in the Security Knowledge
Base. Therefore, the form endpoint of the Collaborative Risk Assessment GUI
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(Graphical User Interface) will send a POST request to the deployed FINSEC KB
(Knowledge Base).
The key properties of a Threat are:
• Name—identification of the threat;
• Description—details of the threat;
• Domain—cyber or physical;
• Subtype—related to the subtype. Example may be “natural disaster” in case
of “physical subtype”;
• Impact description—What may happen if the threat if realized;
• Likelihood.
5.3.3 Events
As mentioned before, events play a significant role in the risk calculation process.
First, a security officer needs to define event models and then map them to a prede-
fined threat. For instance, an “invalid login attempt” is related to a “SWIFT com-
promise threat.” Consequently, when a probe produces an instance of this model,
the Collaborative Risk Assessment platform detects it, and if the trigger value is
reached for this specific event, the overall risk of the related threat is re-calculated.
Event details must include the following values:
• Name—identifies the event;
• Description—provides more information about the event;
• Domain—cyber or physical;
• Subtype—main or sub (in case the event is of subtype sub, it means that it is
dependent of another parent event);
• Probe reference – defines the probe that produced the event;
• Coordinates—only for event instances;
• Observed references—provide the whole observation (may be pointing to an
observable like IP address, binary file, etc.).
5.3.4 Triggers
A key consideration is the conditions that trigger the calculation process. In our
approach, the calculation can be triggered in three ways:
• Manually;
• Vulnerabilities of the assets involved have changed;
• Event Instances reach a specified threshold.
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The threshold is defined during the risk configuration by the security officer. It is
an integer value which currently refers to the detections per day. Thus, when set to
the number 3, the risk computation will run after the third detection of the specific
event. The same event model may be associated with other threats, with a lighter or
more sensitive bound. The threshold value is stored inside the Collaborative Risk
Assessment platform’s local storage (internally).
5.3.5 Risk Calculations
Figure 5.1 presents a high-level overview of the risk calculation process. For the
service to function properly, certain preconditions need to apply. These include the
service definition, the threat to event mapping, and the probe to be up and running.
As soon as a probe produces a new event, it is forwarded through the data collec-
tor to the FINSEC data layer. The Collaboration Service is connected to the data
layer and is “listening” for event instances. After the event detection, the Collabo-
rative Risk Assessment Engine:
• Examines all the Services of the organization;
• For each service, it checks the corresponding risk configuration;
• If the risk configuration does not define a relation of the current service to
the event detected, the process is terminated;
• If the risk configuration defines a relation of the current service to the event
detected, The Collaborative Risk Assessment Platform fetches the threats
related to the event instance as well as all the vulnerabilities of the service
(through its assets);
• The vulnerability, impact, and threat levels are calculated internally;
• A new FINSTIX risk object is created and sent to the data layer;
• The object is also displayed in the Dashboard;
Figure 5.1. Collaborative risk assessment inputs/outputs.
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• The logged in security officer checks the new risk calculation details;
• The officer can either approve or decline sharing the object with other stake-
holders.
Note that the Collaborative Risk Assessment Engine is developed and cus-
tomized based on the risk assessment platform of the H2020 MITIGATE project1.
5.4 Information Sharing Architecture
5.4.1 FINSEC Platform Overview
Aiming to elevate security collaboration in the financial services supply chain,
this Chapter extends the proposed information sharing architecture included
in [2]. The proposed architecture (Figure 5.2) regards wider platform for finan-
cial infrastructures security developed in the frame of the FINSEC H2020 research
project. The implementation of the FINSEC platform is based on a state-of-the-art
microservices architecture. The platform encapsulates a Big Data system for secu-
rity analytics, which provides the means for collecting security-related information
from physical and cybersecurity systems. The platform can be viewed as a n-tier
architecture, with a lower layer (i.e., the edge layer) that interfaces with the actual
physical and logical infrastructures. Moreover, it includes several cross-cutting ser-
vices, which are not confined to providing support to a single tier, but rather support
functionalities that may reside in any of the layers of the architecture.
Figure 5.2. Main tiers of the FINSEC platform architecture.
1. https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/653212
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The main tiers of the architecture enable the implementation of the previously
presented building blocks and are as follows: (i) The Field Tier is the lower level and
includes the probes and their APIs, whose role is extracting raw data from the phys-
ical and logical assets to be protected against threats; (ii) The Edge Tier contains the
Actuation Enabler and a Data Collection module, which is needed to filter infor-
mation as it flows towards the upper levels; (iii) The Data Tier is the logical layer
where information is stored and organized into three different storage infrastruc-
tures, providing consisting data access APIs to all other modules; (iv) The Service
Tier is where the kernel applications and the security toolbox will be running (i.e.,
the security kernel of the platform), able to be used by external applications via
proper APIs; (v) The Business Client Applications tier is the layer where end users
and business applications may actually get benefits from the platform capabilities.
The FINSEC dashboard enables the end users to visually monitor in real time the
data and assets managed by the platform, while the (Supply Chain) collaboration
module enables the sharing of information with other instances of the platform,
including instances deployed in different business organizations.
The core platform encapsulates three tiers: the Edge, Data, and Service tiers,
which interact with the external environment with two main interfaces, north-
bound API and southbound API. (i) The northbound API towards higher level
applications (e.g., end-user/business applications) called SECaaS (Security as a
Service) API. It represents a consistent and unified view of the individual APIs
exposed by the service tier high-level services that represent the “major intelli-
gence” of the platform. The SECaaS API is exposed, and the API Gateway, which
is the single-entry point to the system for external clients. Among other capabili-
ties, the API Gateway provides and supports Authentication, Authorization, and
Accounting (AAA) services, which conceptually are part of the two cross-cutting
vertical modules on the right of the figure (Application Security and Monitor-
ing/logging). (ii) The southbound API interface, consisting of an “Event API” and
a “Probe API”, allows communication between the Edge Tier and physical and
cybersecurity probes.
The SECaaS API is leveraged and invoked by external (north end) Business
Client Applications (upper side of the figure). They are outside of the core plat-
form and interact with it only through the SECaaS REST API. Typical examples
of business client applications include: (i) The Dashboard application, a web-based
GUI used by the profiled end users of the platform; (ii) The Collaboration applica-
tion, which enables the collaboration of multiple platform instances (data sharing
etc.); (iii) Third parties’ applications that exploit the capabilities of the platform,
such as risk assessment and regulatory compliance applications. The Collaboration
application is illustrated in following paragraphs, as it is based on the sharing of
data in a blockchain infrastructure.
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The Service Tier defines the high-level services that represent the “major intel-
ligence” of the platform. The Service Tier services communicate with each other
in three (3) possible ways: (i) Synchronous communications through their REST
APIs. In this case, being the services internal to the platform, it is not necessary
to use AAA functionalities; (ii) Asynchronous communications via an MQ bus;
(iii) Asynchronous communications through the Database Infrastructure.
The collaborative module refers to a FINSEC service aims to provide a collab-
oration platform on top of a blockchain ledger. The module is deployed as a FIN-
SEC service and provides endpoints to produce and consume FINSTIX messages
across organizations. It was originally built to support the Ethereum blockchain;
however, efforts are in progress for supporting Hyperledger Fabric. The Open API
provided is not expected to change drastically, so the already available endpoints
are used to push/pull messages from the blockchain. New capabilities, trust model
definition and so on will not pose further issues, and the integration will be seam-
less. The integration with the collaborative module was rather simple. Instead of
the MITIGATE UI, now the information sharing functionality is embedded inside
the FINSEC Dashboard.
The security knowledge base essentially utilizes external sources of attacks and
vulnerabilities. The most popular of which are NIST NVD and ATT&CK. In case
a new asset is stored inside the data tier, it is automatically associated (based on
product name and version) with all its known vulnerabilities. This fact eliminates
the need of manually importing cyber vulnerabilities for each new asset. Only phys-
ical vulnerabilities should now be imported by a security officer. Figure 5.3 presents
the Security Knowledge Base architecture.
Additionally, the introduction of the security KB ensures that the vulnerabili-
ties are up to date and updated when necessary. Integrating with the KB required
the utilization of its endpoints to persist and fetch information related to threats
Figure 5.3. Security knowledge base—external sources.
Implementation 85
and vulnerabilities. The communication was RESTful, and the authentication was
achieved using basic authentication2 just as the data-layer case.
5.5 Implementation
5.5.1 CRUD Operations—User Interface
Collaborative Security Tools are encapsulated in the FINSEC Dashboard. Thus, all
the forms needed are generated through the JSON schemas defined as a FINSTIX
domain object. As a result, form validation coupled with form inputs needed for
each object are provided for assets, threats, vulnerabilities, services, events and
services. Association of domain objects lies on the security officer drag and drop
actions, while notifications are still provided to the end user. The efforts were basi-
cally to update the FINSTIX schemas, align the Angular versions, code refactoring,
so the forms can be automatically generated and other code adjustments on the
Dashboard end to enable the full MITIGATE frontend operations.
Figure 5.4 presents the new form layout embedded in the FINSEC Dashboard.
Both the validation errors and the input fields are auto-generated from a FINSTIX
schema. Figure 5.5 illustrates the association functionality which is achieved with
a dual filterable list box. Finally, 5 displays the sharing prompt as realized in the
Dashboard.
Figure 5.4. Form layout—dashboard integration.
2. Basic Access Authentication requires a client to provide a username and a password during the HTTP mes-
sage exchange. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_access_authentication
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Figure 5.5. Server room asset creation.
5.6 Demonstrator
Drawing on an example of the behavior of a logged in security officer, in this Section
we provide a demo of the proposed approach.
5.6.1 Initialization
As a first step, the security officer logs in and navigates to the Assets page. By clicking
the button “Add New,” the tool displays a form which must be filled and submitted
to generate the new Asset. Figure 5.5 illustrates the generation of the first Asset
detected.
Next up, the security officer navigates to the Events page and creates the event
models which will be considered for the risk calculations of the current demonstra-
tor (Figure 5.6).
Soon after the event model definitions, the security officer must introduce a
Threat. The operation is illustrated in Figure 5.7. Additionally, Figure 5.8 sketches
the mapping of the Threat created with the appropriate event models. This step
is crucial for the dynamic risk calculations. Note that threats are stored inside the
Security Knowledge Base.
Figure 5.6. Invalid Signon event model creation.
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Figure 5.7. SWIFT compromise threat creation.
Figure 5.8. SWIFT compromise threat mapping to relevant events.
Figure 5.9. SWIFT service creation.
Figure 5.10. SWIFT service asset attachment.
At this stage, the security officer is ready to create the SWIFT service. The pure
service information is initially provided. Consequently, the threats are associated
with the service, and finally, a risk calculation object is being filled in to define risk
triggering conditions. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 illustrate the steps followed.
Inputs/Outputs
All the FINSTIX objects created via the FINSEC Dashboard. These objects will
serve as input for the MITIGATE tool. The objects cover both the use cases defined
in the SWIFT Service pilot and include the Assets detected, the Event models, the
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Threats identified, the Service, and finally the Risk Configuration Object. Addi-
tionally, the MITIGATE will listen for Probe events, and thus, these events are
also considered input for the Collaborative Risk Assessment Service. Vulnerabili-
ties detected for every asset are used in the risk calculations. They are the building
blocks for calculating the Vulnerability and Impact metrics. Using the aforemen-
tioned inputs, the MITIGATE platform will produce a risk object which will be
available for sharing with other stakeholders. The risk object essentially constitutes
the output of the Collaborative Risk Assessment Service.
Demonstrator
As soon as all the necessary input is provided by the Security Officer, the vulnera-
bility constitution is available in the FINSEC Dashboard home page. Figure 5.11
illustrates the vulnerabilities for the SWIFT service pilot, categorized by their
domain (cyber/physical).
Figure 5.12 displays the auto-imported vulnerabilities from the Security Knowl-
edge Base, while Figures 5.13 and 5.14 compose a proof that the vulnerabilities
detected for the NodeJS server are also defined in the external source (CVE).
Figure 5.11. FINSEC Dashboard homepage—vulnerability categorization.
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Figure 5.12. Vulnerabilities—auto-imported from the security knowledge base.
Figure 5.13. NodeJS vulnerabilities detected.
pt
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Figure 5.14. CVE vulnerabilities cross check.
Figure 5.15. Probe events detected.
Figure 5.15 illustrates the Probe events detected. For the specific SWIFT ser-
vice scenario, they are both the “Invalid Signon Attempt” and the “Submission of
SWIFT messages outside working hours.”
One notification is displayed on the upper right corner as soon as a risk value is
changed. The risk value calculated for the SWIFT service and especially the SWIFT
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Figure 5.16. Risk results—graphical representation of the service generated.
Figure 5.17. Threat identified for the SWIFT service.
Service Compromise Threat due to “Invalid Signon Attempt” events produced by
the Syslog Probe is provided in Figure 5.16.
SWIFT Service details are illustrated in Figure 5.17. Both a table detail view and
a relation graph are available.
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The incidents related to the Compromise of the SWIFT service were successfully
detected for both use cases without providing false positives.
5.7 Conclusions
This Chapter extended the approach introduced in [2] for sharing security infor-
mation across financial organizations, towards enabling collaborative security in the
financial services supply chain. In particular, it described a blockchain infrastruc-
ture, as a means of leveraging the advantages of auditability, security, and distributed
trust offered by distributed ledger technologies. The blockchain infrastructure is
appropriately integrated to a wider platform for financial services security, which is
destined to protect both cyber and physical assets. In particular, this Chapter has
introduced the extended collaborative risk assessment functionalities of the plat-
form as well as the platform’s security knowledge base. Then, drawing an example
of the behavior of a logged in security officer, it has demonstrated the functionality
of the user interface and dashboard.
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Chapter 6
Automated Assistance to the Security
Assessment of API for Financial Services
By Andrea Bisegna, Roberto Carbone, Mariano Ceccato,
Salvatore Manfredi, Silvio Ranise, Giada Sciarretta,
Alessandro Tomasi and Emanuele Viglianisi
This chapter presents the challenges related to the security assessment and the auto-
mated synthesis of mitigation measures of APIs for financial services. The focus is
on the APIs supporting the implementation of the new Payment Services Direc-
tive [PSD2]. It also gives an overview of an innovative approach to address these
challenges by (i) the automated identification and mitigation of security miscon-
figurations underlying sessions based on Transport Layer Security [TLS], which is
ubiquitously used to build a foundation layer of security; and (ii) the automated
penetration testing and synthesis of mitigations for the functionalities provided by
APIs built on top of it, both business (e.g., payments) and security (e.g., authentica-
tion or authorization). The main novelty of the proposed approach lies in the tight
integration of identification and mitigation phases by means of actionable mea-
sures that allow users to significantly strengthen the security posture of the entire
API ecosystem.
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The Regulatory Landscape
The Electronic Identification, Authentication and Trust Services [eIDAS] Regu-
lation is the keystone regulation that defines requirements granting legal validity
throughout the internal market to electronic transactions, equivalent to previous
paper-based documents. To that end, it regulates Qualified Certificates (QC), elec-
tronic seals and signatures, and trust service providers. Security guidelines for the
appropriate use of QCs have been published by ENISA QTS [ENISA QTS].
The Revised Directive on Payment Services [PSD2] is intended to protect
and promote competition in the internal market by mandating that Account
Servicing Payment Service Providers (ASPSP)—most likely traditional banking
institutions—open their services to Third-party Providers (TPP) of Services includ-
ing account information (AISP) and payment initiation (PISP) providers.
The Regulatory Technical Standard [RTS] defines requirements on the use of
QCs for website authentication and electronic seals for communication among
TPPs and ASPSPs. Guidance on the use of QCs is included in [EBA-OP-2018-7].
The [ETSI TS 119 495] standard defines how to implement the requirements
of the RTS for use of QCs to meet the regulatory requirements of PSD2. For
instance, it defines the requirements for Qualified Website Authentication Cer-
tificates (QWACs), and it clarifies specifically that a QWAC “should be used to
establish a secure TLS channel to protect the communication (in the transport
layer) from potential attackers on the network.”
Open Banking API Security Recommendations
Under PSD2, banks are to provide an interface for third parties to access account
information and perform operations (e.g., payments) on behalf of the account
holder. The regulation does not specify technical solutions.
The Berlin Group standards and harmonization initiative proposes several pos-
sible approaches in its detailed “Access to Account (XS2A) Framework,” including
XML/JSON data model and associated messaging, as well as OpenAPI files to assist
developers with implementation. At its core, XS2A provides a detailed description
of REST API and their usage for the purposes of authentication of involved parties
and authorization to access Service resources, such as Account Information (AIS),
Payment Initiation (PIS), and Confirmation of Funds (PIIS).
The security of these APIs is based on both the transport and application layers.
The first core technology explicitly identified by the guidelines is the Transport
Layer Security [TLS] protocol: in particular, “the communication between the TPP
and the ASPSP is always secured by using a TLS-connection using TLS version 1.2
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or higher.”1 [XS2A-IG]. Additionally, [XS2A-IG] requires mutual authentication
of TPP and ASPSP using eIDAS- and RTS-compliant QCs, which must include
all the roles for which the TPP is authorized.
On the application layer, the core technology for authorization is the Open
Authorization Protocol [OAuth2], in particular the “Authorisation Code Grant”
flow is mandated for PIS and AIS. While other options are available and discussed
below, OAuth is seen as preferable.
Strong Customer Authentication in XS2A
Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) is one of the main requirements set out
by PSD2 (article 97) and RTS (Chapter III). The ASPSP must determine how to
enforce SCA on a per-transaction basis, in compliance with those requirements.
In the XS2A framework, TPPs have three broad categories of options to allow
compliance with SCA requirements:
1. Redirection—of users to their account holders and back to the TPP—using
an authentication solution based on, e.g., OAuth 2, such as [OIDC];
2. Decoupling, in which the communication between user and account holder
proceeds on an entirely separate channel; and
3. Embedding, in which the TPP has to embed the PSP’s entire SCA flow in
their own app.
Approach 3 involves a deep level of integration with every single account holder,
which is much more work than the other options and requires an extremely high
level of trust between the parties as it requires the sharing of user credentials.
Approach 2 is more lightweight and scalable but incurs a higher risk of hanging
business processes as the TPP must wait for notification of a completed operation
on a separate channel. Option 1 is clearly seen as preferable.
Approach Redirect (OAuth 2) Decoupled Embedded
SCA Directly between user and PSP Entirely at XS2A interface
Third-party
Provider
Does not need detailed
information about the
individual steps of SCA
No impact on the
user/provider interface
Needs SCA details for the
user, e.g., displays
challenge
Example Standard interface, e.g.,
“scope” attribute of
authentication request is




details to dedicated mobile




Users enter username and
password through their
browser and are shown a
QR code to be scanned
1. We note that TLS 1.2 is now officially marked as obsolete; TLS 1.3 is the current standard.
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Automated Analysis of TLS
Transport Layer Security [TLS] consists of a set of cryptographic protocols designed
to provide secure communications over a network. The popularity of TLS has
encouraged attackers to find vulnerabilities and develop exploits. The variety of
known attacks is the result of (i) maintaining backward compatibility and (ii) evolv-
ing use-case scenarios in which TLS is deployed.
One cannot “just deploy” TLS. Setting up a TLS server requires some amount
of configuration, including:
• Choosing a set of cipher(s);
• Choosing the versions of TLS to be offered;
• Setting a certificate issued by a trustworthy CA;
• Coping with implementation issues (e.g., vulnerable libraries).
Several tools have been developed to help administrators deploy secure TLS
instances. While such tools are quite effective in automatically finding vulnera-
bilities and issuing warnings about possible attacks, the burden of finding adequate
mitigation measures is left to administrators who must first collect information
about the identified problem and related fixes. Typically, such information is dis-
tributed in several sources ranging from scientific papers to blog posts. Even disre-
garding the effort to collect enough material to enact a mitigation, administrators
should have enough skills to understand the often subtle details and turn the infor-
mation in a concrete strategy to fix the problem. Additionally, each tool has vary-
ing degrees of coverage and does not specify mitigations for the issues identified.
In other words, there is a problem in making the tools’ reports actionable.
To address these issues, we developed TLS Assistant [MRS19], an open source
tool that combines state-of-the-art TLS analyzers with a report system that shows
the full set of viable attacks and suggests appropriate mitigations. The tool’s archi-
tecture is summarized in Figure 6.1. Its goal is to assist an administrator in securing
TLS configurations by:
• Detecting TLS and HTTPS misconfigurations;
• Providing
◦ A brief attack description;
◦ A mitigation description;
◦ Mitigation code snippets (for Apache and nginx web server).
We successfully tested the use of TLSAssistant in the deployment of an eIDAS
solution based on the new Italian identity cards before its submission for eIDAS
notification, discovering that the first release was prone to Lucky 13 [AFP13]
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Figure 6.1. TLSAssistant workflow.
and 3SHAKE [BDLFPS14]. The server-side vulnerabilities issues were promptly
patched, and the report was judged to be both easy to read and complete.
RESTful API Security Testing
API security issues can have a serious impact on all the applications that
depend on them. Indeed, not only is there a growing business for API man-
agement [GMQAPI19] but there is a dedicated [OWASP API] top 10 security
issue list, of which we highlight “API2:2019 Broken User Authentication” and
“API7:2019 Security Misconfiguration.” For example, the Harbor enterprise docker
container management service was found to expose a “POST /api/users” registra-
tion API in which new users could self-register and inject a “HasAdminRole=true”
attribute, thereby mounting an escalation of privilege attack remotely on any service
exposing this API—see [CVE-2019-16097].
Specifically in the financial sector, a report by TrendMicro [HMcAM19] high-
lights challenges arising from the new paradigm, for instance, due to the different
trust model underpinning the open banking framework. Among several issues, the
basic building block of authorization protocols is still a work in progress.
While OAuth 2.0 is arguably the de facto standard for authorization protocols,
it is a family of profiles tailored to specific use cases and scenarios. The higher
security requirements inherent to the financial sector and the intrinsic novelty of
exposing banking APIs to third parties have prompted the establishment of a work-
ing group for a dedicated Financial-grade API profile [FAPI], designed to harden
OAuth under more adversarial circumstances—for instance, by assuming that sen-
sitive tokens can be leaked by the user’s browser or operating system, as is the case
for many man-in-the-middle attacks, and allowing for the possibility that API end-
points may be misconfigured. Several mitigations have been proposed, for instance,
requiring the use of mutual TLS between third parties and account providers;
nevertheless, researchers in [FHK19] found that the expected security properties
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did not appear to hold in all cases, for instance, allowing malicious actors to force
an honest TPP to perform write-like operations (e.g., payment authorizations) from
the attacker’s device on an honest user’s account.
We note that the use of OAuth on its own for authentication is considered
improper; the OpenID Connect [OIDC] protocol builds an authentication layer
on top of OAuth, and indeed, this is used in FAPI.
Automated Black-box Testing of RESTful APIs
We developed a synthesis of functional and security black-box tests, to appear in
[VDC20]. It allows the automatic generation of test cases for RESTful API against
errors and vulnerabilities. Indeed, errors can be indicators of potential vulnerabili-
ties that may be exploited to mount attacks.
The tool’s architecture is summarized in Figure 6.2. It takes as input an OpenAPI
specification, containing all the necessary information to reach the API and the
description of the endpoints. The first module generates an Operation Dependency
Graph that, together with the Swagger specification, is given as input parameter
to the Nominal Tester module in order to test the API’s nominal behavior. The
Nominal Tester outputs the nominal test cases and a set of structured reports that
are given as input to both Error Tester and Security Tester. The former tests the
Figure 6.2. Black-box tool workflow.
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correct error handling in case of malformed requests, for example, missing required
parameters. The latter tests the API against common security vulnerabilities issues,
such as SQL injection.
The execution scenarios generated by Nominal Tester, Error Tester, and Security
Tester are run in the RESTful-API-under-test and its responses are monitored to
spot the presence of programming mistakes, errors, and vulnerabilities. A set of
oracles are defined to this aim, which check responses across multiple dimensions,
such as error status code, data consistency with the OpenAPI specification, syntax
and well-formed output data, traces of injection vulnerabilities.
Interesting execution scenarios generated by nominal, error and security testers
are output as a set of test cases, consisting of JSON description of steps and java
code using swagger codegen, to document and reproduce the issues.
OAuth/OIDC Testing
We also developed a tool for automated OAuth/OIDC penetration testing as a
plug-in for the Burp Suite, designed to be integrated in our security training and
pen-testing environment Micro-ID-Gym [BCMOPR19]. Our plug-in performs
both passive and active tests over the traffic generated during an OIDC flow.
Passive tests do not interfere with the flow itself but analyze the recorded traffic,
checking, for instance, standard compliance—whether exchanged messages con-
form to specifications—and Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection—e.g.,
by correct implementation of Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE). Active tests
verify the behavior of the endpoints when subject to unexpected, modified, or
removed input parameters during the OAuth flow.
The plug-in is built on top of Burp Proxy, a tool which allows testers to
intercept all requests and responses and leverages the selenium-webdriver browser
automation library. The input is a recorded test track, used as a guide for a sele-
nium instance. The track contains the instructions to guide the selenium driver
through an OAuth/OIDC flow. The track can be played back so that a tester may
observe whether the browser, controlled by the selenium driver, is performing as
expected. The tool is designed to pinpoint the step of the flow in which incorrect
behavior has been sighted, and courses of action to mitigate against it are to be
integrated.
Summary
Our proposed approach to TLS and API security is one that integrates the gen-
eration of actionable intelligence and offers concrete courses of action for the
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mitigation of vulnerabilities. Our ongoing work includes the integration of TLSAs-
sistant in the FinSec platform, the identification of compliance impacts of identified
vulnerabilities, and models for continuous risk assessment. In future work, we aim
at extending API testing with new penetration testing functionalities, bundle them
to build a set of cooperating security services, and integrate the resulting component
in a suitable platform.
Acknowledgments
Black-box and white-box security tests for REST API were developed as part of
Teîchos, an EIT Digital Finance project.
TLSAssistant was developed in a joint lab with IPZS and is currently being
enhanced and integrated in FINSEC, a H2020 Critical Infrastructure Innovation
Action project (Contract Number: 786727), which is co-funded by the European
Commission in the scope of its H2020 program.
References
[AFP13] N. J. Al Fardan and K. G. Paterson: “Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the TLS
and DTLS Record Protocols.” 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, Berkeley, CA, 2013, pp. 526–540, doi: 10.1109/SP.2013.42.
[BDLFPS14] K. Bhargavan, A. Delignat-Lavaud, C. Fournet, A. Pironti and P.
Strub: “Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and Fixing Authen-
tication over TLS”. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2014: 98–113.
[BCMOPR19] A. Bisegna, R. Carbone, I. Martini, V. Odorizzi, G. Pellizzari and
S. Ranise: “Micro-Id-Gym: Identity Management Workouts with Container-
Based Microservices.” IJISC 8 (1), pp. 45–50, 2019.06.28.
[CVE-2019-16097] NIST National Vulnerability Database: Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures #2019-16097. URL: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/
CVE-2019-16097
[EBA-OP-2018-7] “Opinion of the European Banking Authority on the use of
eIDAS certificates under the RTS on SCA and CSC.” URL: https://eba.
europa.eu/file/58802/
[eIDAS] “Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services
for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive
1999/93/EC.” URL: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/910/oj
102 Security Assessment of API for Financial Services
[ENISA QTS] “ENISA studies on qualified trust services.” URL: https://www.
enisa.europa.eu/topics/trust-services/qualified-trust-services
[ETSI TS 119 495] “Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Sector
Specific Requirements; Qualified Certificate Profiles and TSP Policy
Requirements under the payment services Directive (EU) 2015/2366”.
V1.4.1, November 2019. URL: https://www.etsi.org/standards-search#page=
1&search=TS119495
[FAPI] OpenID Financial-grade API (FAPI) Working Group. URL: https://
openid.net/wg/fapi/
[FHK19] D. Fett, P. Hosseyni and R. Kuesters: “An Extensive Formal Security
Analysis of the OpenID Financial-Grade API.” Proceedings of S&P 2019,
pp. 1054–1072. doi: 10.1109/SP.2019.00067.
[GMQAPI19] Gartner “Magic Quadrant for Full Life Cycle API Management”
2019. URL: https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-1OGPZC68&ct=
190905&st=sb
[HMcAM19] F. Hacquebord, R. McArdle, F. Mercês and D. Sancho: “Ready




[MRS19] S. Manfredi, S. Ranise and G. Sciarretta: “Lost in TLS? No More!
Assisted Deployment of Secure TLS Configurations.” In: DBSec 2019:
Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXXIII pp. 201–220. LNCS
11559. doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-22479-0_11. URL: https://stfbk.github.io/
tools/TLSAssistant
[OAuth2] “The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework.” IETF proposed standard.
URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
[OIDC] “OpenID Connect”. URL: https://openid.net/connect/
[OWASP API] OWASP foundation Top 10 API security issue list. URL: https:
//owasp.org/www-project-api-security/
[PSD2] “Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 November 2015 on payment services in the internal market,
amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Reg-
ulation (EU) No. 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC.” URL:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/2366/oj
References 103
[RTS] “Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2018/389 of 27 November 2017
supplementing Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and
of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for strong cus-
tomer authentication and common and secure open standards of communi-
cation (Text with EEA relevance).” URL: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg_del/
2018/389/oj
[TLS] “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol”. IETF proposed standard.
URL: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446 (v1.3), https://tools.ietf.org/html/
rfc5246 (v1.2 – obsolete).
[VDC20] E. Viglianisi, M. Dallago, M. Ceccato: “RESTTESTGEN: Automated
Black-Box Testing of RESTful APIs.” Accepted to appear in ICST 2020
Research Papers.
[XS2A-OR] NextGenPSD2 Access to Account Interoperability Framework –
Operational Rules V1.3 2018.12.21. URL: https://www.berlin-group.org/
nextgenpsd2-downloads
[XS2A-IG] NextGenPSD2 Access to Account Interoperability Framework –




Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection
and Analytics for Securing Critical
Financial Infrastructure
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Aidan Shribman, Beatriz Gallego-Nicasio, Enrico Cambiaso,
Ivan Vaccari and Maurizio Aiello
This chapter presents the FINSEC adaptive and intelligent data collection and ana-
lytics system for securing critical financial infrastructure. It enhances the intelli-
gent, resilient, automated, efficient, secure, and timely manner the collection and
analysis of security-related data for securing cyber-physical financial infrastructure
and services. Making security data collection and analysis intelligent and capable
of quickly spotting, learning from, and addressing zero-day threats is essential to
economizing of resources and accessing the right information at the right time.
This is achieved through the configuration of configurable collection probes and
the adaptation of different collection strategies. The chapter further addresses how,
inter alia, (i) the nature and quality of collected data affects the efficiency and accu-
racy of methods of attack detection and defense, (ii) the detection capability can be
improved by correlating wide-ranging data sources and predictive analytics, (iii) the
rate of the data collection at the various monitoring probes is tuned by manag-
ing the appropriate levels and types of intelligence and adaptability of security
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monitoring, (iv) the optimization of bandwidth and storage of security informa-
tion can be achieved by rendering adaptiveness and intelligence and by integrating
smart security probes and a set of adaptive strategies and rules, and (v) the increased
automation is achieved through a feedback loop of collection, detection, and pre-
vention that allows the early detection and prevention of security compromises and
consistently makes security analysis more effective.
7.1 Introduction
Cyber-physical attacks are growing rapidly and posing a substantial risk to the sta-
bility of the overall financial sector. Attacks are increasing in number, scope, and
sophistication, making it difficult to predict their total impact. The nature and fre-
quency of cyber risks have changed rapidly in the directions not anticipated before,
and more risk-managers are becoming aware of the value of engaging with Fintech
R&D to keep track of new types of attack surfaces and risk management options,
such as FINSEC is addressing. Leading security researchers are coming to the same
conclusions (e.g., the state-of-the-art 2019 Cyber Risk Outlook report [1]). In this
chapter, we look further ahead than this Cambridge report, blending risk policy,
risk technology, and risk-management best practice. Our findings include:
• It is essential to track and maintain the security of critical financial infrastruc-
ture and services through the collection and analysis of security-related data
in an intelligent, resilient, efficient, secure, and timely manner.
• Making security data collection and analysis intelligent and capable of quickly
spotting, learning from, and addressing zero-day threats is essential to econo-
mizing resources and accessing the right information at the right time through
the configuration of data collection probes and the adaptation of different
collection strategies.
• The nature and quality of collected data affects the efficiency and accuracy of
methods of attack detection and defense.
• The detection and defense capability can be greatly improved by correlating
wide-ranging data sources and by predictive analytics.
Adversaries may attack financial services, damage infrastructure, manipulate crit-
ical information, therefore causing serious financial loses. Considering the risks of
a large-scale financial network system, it is important to calculate not only the
risks of separate nodes but also the risks from connections. Furthermore, adaptive
attackers will adapt their strategies to the current security situation and to newly
deployed countermeasures. Such emerging attacks can become very sophisticated
and can be coordinated, persistent, collaborative, or cooperative with specialized
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attack expertise. Therefore, there is a need to implement adaptive and intelligent
data collection and analytics to cope with a constant update of attack vectors.
The amount of data collected by financial organizations to maintain security is
growing every day, and these huge amounts of data can no longer be stored effi-
ciently or processed in real time. Therefore, due to a high dimensionality of data
collected from cyber-physical systems, a constant growth of data due to improve-
ments and exposure to new vulnerabilities, and a constant update of attack vec-
tors, Deep Learning (DL)-based security models are essential for adaptability and
extendibility with the data drift, continuous discovery of new system threats, and
vulnerabilities [2]. In this chapter, we present a model for developing an adaptive
and intelligent data collection and analytics that adapts the collection rate and stor-
age state configuration to the analytical systems, threats detected by those systems
over time, and economizing the cost of collection and storage resources.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 briefly reviews related
work. Section 7.3 sets the scene by describing data collection and analytics. Sec-
tion 7.4 presents the architecture of adaptive and intelligent data collection and
analytics and its implementation in the overall FINSEC Reference Architecture
(RA) highlighting its peculiar characteristics. Section 7.5 presents the adaptive data
collection strategies which are used to economize use of resources and optimize
bandwidth and collection rate. Section 7.6 describes the implementation of differ-
ent modules and the validation of the predictive analytics algorithms for intelligent
processing. Finally, Section 7.7 concludes the chapter.
7.2 Related Work
Adaptive data collection refers to the collection of security-related data to improve
collection efficiency, ensure collection accuracy, reduce the amount of collected
data to minimize the effect of data collection, and automate the data collection
by adjusting to different environmental contexts and situations. Several authors
address adaptive data collection in different settings.
Lin et al. [3] present the design and implementation of an adaptive security-
related data collector based on network context in heterogeneous networks, and
they used adaptive sampling algorithm to reduce the amount of collected data.
The authors argue that sampling methods to collect data and the collection fre-
quency need to be determined according to specific conditions. For instance, if the
data variation is large, the collection interval should be reduced, so as to reflect
the variation trend of data; and if the data variation is small, the collection inter-
val can be increased, so as to reduce the amount of data collected while ensur-
ing the accuracy of data collection. They propose an adaptive collection frequency
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adjustment strategy based on predicted variation ratio. They argue that regression
algorithms can be used for prediction, such as linear regression, support vector
regression (SVR), logistic regression, KNN regression, etc. They further argue that
data variation can also be represented by calculating the ratio of predicted accuracy,
which is the ratio of the predicted value of the data to the real value of the data.
When the predicted value of the data is close to the real value, it indicates that the
data variation is small, and when the predicted value of the data is very different
from the real value, the data variation is large.
Habib et al. [4] investigated self-adaptive data collection and fusion for body
sensor networks. Their approach uses an early warning score system to optimize
data transmission and estimates in real time the sensing frequency, and uses a data
fusion model using a decision matrix and fuzzy set theory. Their adaptive sam-
pling algorithm adapts the sampling rates of sensors to the vital sign dynamic evo-
lution. An adaptive data collection protocol was proposed in [5], which collects
periodically sensor readings and prolongs the lifetime of a periodic sensor network.
Authors’ sampling rate adaptation is based on the similarity between periods of
cycles using Euclidean distance measure to adapt its rate of sampling according
to the dynamic modification of the monitored environment. An efficient adap-
tive sampling approach based on the dependence of conditional variance on mea-
surements varies over time as proposed in [6], which adapts sampling rates to the
physical changing dynamics and minimizes over-sampling, and improves resource
efficiency of the overall network system. An adaptive sampling approach for energy-
efficient periodic data collection in sensor networks is proposed [7]. The approach
provides each sensor node the ability to identify redundancy between collected data
over time, by using similarity functions and allowing adaptive sampling rate.
Ji and Ni [8] present an adaptive data collection method based on the network
data correlation and variation routines. Their method selects the data collection
in association with network data variation and adjusts collection frequency based
on the ratio of the data variation amplitude. It can adjust data collection accord-
ing to network load to reduce the burden on network bandwidth and processing
resources. The frequency adjustment strategy can reduce data collection times when
the data vary gently and increase data collection times when the data vary dramat-
ically. Tang and Xu [9] investigate data collection strategies in lifetime-constrained
wireless sensor networks. Their objective is to maximize the accuracy of data col-
lected. They developed adaptive update strategies for both individual and aggregate
data collections.
Lin et al. [10] highlight the challenges posed in collecting security-related
data, which indicates relevance to security, safety, privacy, and trust, in the big
data era. Their examples of making data collection difficult are due to its 5Vs
(volume, variety, value, velocity, and veracity) characteristics and further the
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5G networks’ characteristics of being heterogeneous, supporting device-to-device,
machine-to-machine and other communication technologies, and different net-
works such as Internet, Mobile Ad hoc Networks, mobile cellular networks and
wireless sensor networks. Security-related data fundamentally affects the efficiency
and accuracy of attack detection and defense methods. Jing et al. [11] survey exist-
ing studies about security-related data collection and analytics for measuring the
Internet security. They argue that for measuring the security of the internet and
detecting the Internet attacks, collecting different categories of data and employ-
ing methods of data analytics are essential. A number of surveys of data collection
approaches exist [3, 10–15], addressing different settings.
As demonstrated above, there exist many adaptive data collection methods using
different strategies. However, few of them are aimed at adaptive multi-layer data
collection applying artificial intelligence and deep learning. This chapter addresses
adaptive and intelligent multi-layer data collection through the correlation of wide-
ranging data sources and predictive analytics to improve the detection capability,
the improvement of the quality of collected data that affects the efficiency and accu-
racy of methods of attack detection and defense, the rendering of adaptiveness and
intelligence, and the integration of smart security probes and a set of adaptive strate-
gies and rules. It also addresses the different means for physical and cybersecurity
as means of tuning the rate of the data collection at the various monitoring probes.
7.3 Data Collection and Analytics
7.3.1 Requirements
7.3.1.1 Data collection requirements
Before going through data collection in a physical system, one may verify a set of
requirements aspects that are identified and summarized below, but more details
can also be found in [15]:
• Efficiency: On one hand, the collected data should be compact, the unnec-
essary data that are useless in attack detection should not be collected. On the
other hand, the needed data should be collected in a real-time and high-speed
manner to decrease the time delay of attack detection.
• Privacy: In the data collection process, the sensitive information of some
particular data should be protected.
• Resource consumption: The consumption of resources including power,
memory, and network bandwidth in the process of data collection and data
communication should be well considered.
• Adaptability and Intelligence: The data collection process should be adapt-
able to the context of the physical and cyber-world, as well as to the
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security context. In particular, the rate of information acquisition/collections,
along with the type of data collected, should be adaptable to changing secu-
rity contexts. Adaptability should be performed in an intelligent way, i.e.,
towards optimizing the amount of information available for the security task
at hand, while ensuring availability of the proper information.
• Configurability: To support adaptability and configurability in data collec-
tion, the data collection systems to the used in the project (e.g., probes) must
be configurable.
• Automation: To automate the data collection and adaptation by adjusting
to different environmental contexts and situations. Machine Learning (ML)
techniques are helpful for implementing automatic adaptable solutions capa-
ble of adjusting to new situations and timely reacting in the face of threats
and anomalies [16].
The authors [10] specify 13 functional requirements and 5 security require-
ments, and 9 functional objectives and 6 security objectives, and the relationship
between these.
7.3.1.2 Quality attributes for data analytics
The authors in [17] present a systematic review aimed at identifying the most fre-
quently reported quality attributes and architectural tactics for big data security
analytic systems. Their findings are twofold: (i) identification of most frequently
reported quality attributes and the justification for their significance for big data
cybersecurity analytic systems; and (ii) identification and codification of architec-
tural tactics for addressing the quality attributes that are commonly associated with
big data cybersecurity analytic systems. The identified tactics include six perfor-
mance tactics, four accuracy tactics, two scalability tactics, three reliability tactics,
and one security and usability tactic each.
• Performance is a measure of how quickly a system responds to user inputs
or other events.
• Accuracy is a measure to which a system provides the right results with the
necessary degree of precision.
• Scalability is a measure of how easily a system can grow to handle more user
requests, transactions, servers, or other extensions.
• Reliability is a measure of how long a system runs before experiencing a
failure.
• Usability is a measure of how easy it is for people to learn, remember, and
use a system.
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• Interoperability is a measure of how easily a system can interconnect and
exchange data with other systems or components.
• Adaptability is a measure of how easily a system adapts itself to different
specified environments using only its own functionality.
• Modifiability is a measure of how easy it is to maintain, change, enhance,
and restructure a system.
• Generality is a measure of the range of attacks covered by a security analytic
system.
• Privacy assurance is the measure of the ability of a system to carry out its
business according to defined privacy policies to help users trust the system.
• Security is the measure of how well a system protects itself and its data from
unauthorized access.
• Stealthiness is the measure of the ability of a security analytic system to func-
tion without being detected by an attacker.
7.3.2 Data Sources
Data sources from which security event data are collected include, but are not lim-
ited to, network traffic data, firewall logs, web logs, system logs, router access logs,
database access logs, and application logs, system statistics, etc. [11].
7.3.3 Data Collection Categories
The following categories of data collection can be distinguished [11].
Packet-level data: A packet consists of a packet header and a packet payload. They
are generated when using protocols like TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. Based on this defini-
tion, a classification of these data for detecting DDoS and Worm attacks can be as:
Source/Destination IP address, Source/Destination port, Time to live, Timestamp,
Packet payload, Packet size, and Number of packets.
Flow-level data: In high-speed networks with rates up to hundreds of Gigabit per
second, collection of packet-level data requires expensive hardware. Thus, flow-
level data was introduced and can be considered as a stream of packets. The flow-
level data is classified into Flow count, Flow type, Flow size, Flow direction, Flow
duration, and Flow rate.
Connection-level data: A connection is defined as the aggregated traffic between
two IP addresses from the perspective of a specific network. A connection will con-
tain many flows. Thus, a difference between a connection and a flow is the flow
does not have size restriction, that is to say, the flow is generated even if a single
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packet has been exchanged. But, a connection is generated by at least two packets.
The connection level data can be divided into the following types: Connection size,
Connection duration, Connection count, and Connection type.
Host-level data: This data is collected from a host. This data provide comprehen-
sive knowledge of system events as it records host activities, changes, resource con-
sumption, etc. These changes are widely used in Host-based IDS. We mention in
the following two commonly used types of host-level data in attack detection: CPU
and Memory usage and Operation log.
7.3.4 Security Probes
Security probes are created to capture and assess the overall security of servers, net-
works, databases, etc. and to generate events when they find problems, and have
the following abilities:
Topology probes: Probes that have the ability to capture network topology, inter-
face, bridge, namespace attributes. Examples include ethtool (a utility for Linux
kernel-based operating system for displaying and modifying some parameters of
network interface controllers and their device drivers), Network system simulation
software (this includes Software-Defined Network or similar software to simulate
the real network functions; An example is the Open vSwitch Database management
protocol), Simple Network Management Protocol (an Internet Standard protocol
for collecting and organizing information about managed devices on IP networks
and for modifying that information to change device behavior), Telnet (protocol
to provide a bidirectional interactive text-oriented communication facility, which
can be used to connect to network equipment and extract management data),
Network Interface Filtering Card (a hardware-based probe that can be remotely
configured to focus in more detail on selected traffic and/or filter out malicious
forms), etc.
Flow probes: Probes that have ability to follow a flow along a path in the topol-
ogy. Examples include sFlow (sampled flow) (an industry standard for packet
export at Layer 2 of the OSI model), Data Plane Development Kit (a set of
data plane libraries and network interface controller drivers for fast packet pro-
cessing, currently managed as an open-source project under the Linux Founda-
tion), libpcap (commonly used packet capture library, which also defines the de
facto external format for packets), sCap (a more efficient implementation of the
standard libpcap, using shared memory and so-called subzero packet copy), Inter-
net Protocol Flow Information Export (a protocol for exporting Internet Proto-
col flow information from routers, probes and other devices), NetFlow (a feature
of Cisco routers that provides the ability to collect IP network traffic as it enters
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or exits an interface), Flowmon probe (a hardware-based probe that uses IPFIX
protocol), etc.
7.3.5 Predictive Security Analytics for Adaptive Data
Collection
Predictive analytics are used to predict security attacks, threats, and anomalies.
Based on the predicted security events, mitigation measures can be triggered, for
example, to adapt the data collection rate, close a door, etc. It requires constant
monitoring, capturing, and processing large amounts of various data. These data is
often redundant. Thus, the storing and processing resources are used unnecessary,
and the same prediction results can be achieved with significantly less data. It is,
therefore, important to develop lightweight predictive data analytics that can give
earlier indications about possible cyberattacks based on less data amount and pro-
cessing. This will allow reducing the amount of collected and processed data while
maintaining the required level of threat detection. We need to select the algorithms
that give best prediction results and can, therefore, function as a base for the pre-
dictive analytics. For this purpose, several machine learning, deep learning (DL),
artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms are to be selected and tested using different
datasets available online.
DL or deep neural networks are especially relevant for scenarios where massive
datasets are collected. One of the principal DL features is the ability of a DL model
to adapt to the behavior of systems to previously unseen scenarios in cybersecurity,
thus ensuring generalization of the models [2], which is one of the key goals of AI.
Trust and explainability are two other important features to ensure trustworthiness
of AI-based cyber systems. Recent research in Explainable AI (XAI) successfully
showed how deep neural-network-based intrusion detection systems can help in
improving user trust [18]. Adversarial learning offers an approach to increase our
understanding of these models. Adversarial learning exploits how a DL system can
be “fooled” to wrong conclusions. This knowledge strengthens the system against
incorrect intrusion detection decisions. Hence, trust of the system is increased and
explainability is improved [18].
Berman et al. [19] survey DL methods for cybersecurity applications covering
a broad array of attack types including malware, spam, insider threats, network
intrusions, false data injection, and malicious domain names used by botnets. They
discussed the DL architecture and training process for popular and emerging meth-
ods ranging from RNNs to GANs and their application to a wide variety of these
cybersecurity attack types.
In this Project, we among other things use AI-based (i.e., deep learning mech-
anisms) predictive analytics that enable us the identification of complex attack
patterns.
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7.4 Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection
and Analytics
This section first presents the architecture overview and its implementation in the
overall FINSEC Reference Architecture (RA) followed by the descriptions of the
various features and services. The security of critical financial infrastructure and
services must be tracked and maintained through the collection and analysis of
security-related data in an intelligent, efficient, secure, and timely manner. Mak-
ing security data collection and analysis intelligent and capable of quickly spot-
ting, learning from, and addressing zero-day threats is essential to economizing of
resources and accessing the right information at the right time through the con-
figuration of configurable data collection probes and the adaptation of different
collection strategies.
The nature and quality of collected data affects the efficiency and accuracy of
methods of attack detection and defense. The detection capability can thus greatly
be improved by correlating wide-ranging data sources and by predictive analytics.
Managing appropriate levels and types of intelligence and adaptability of security
monitoring is achieved through different means for adaptive data collection and
predictive analytics. This is important for physical and cybersecurity as a means of
tuning the rate of the data collection at the various monitoring probes. The cyber
and physical data need to be correlated taking the latency of communication into
account.
7.4.1 Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection and Analytics
Architecture
Figure 7.1 shows the architecture of the multi-layer adaptive and intelligent data
collection and analytics, which extends the classical data collection and analytics
process that includes data collection, data parse, data analysis, and data processing.
The approach makes this process adaptive by introducing feedback control loop and
letting the data collection depends on the result of the last data processed. Adapt-
ability refers to how a collection mechanism can adjust to different environmental
contexts and situations.
In Figure 7.1, the process modules include Monitor (data collector), Analyser
(data parser & analyser), Adapter (data processor), and Multi-layer Probes (Imple-
mented FINSEC Probes). The arrow between modules is data flow and control
direction.
The FINSEC project integrates smart security probes and a set of adaptive
strategies for the multi-layer data collection functionality, which includes render-
ing adaptiveness and intelligence, optimizing bandwidth and storage of security
114 Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection and Analytics
Figure 7.1. FINSEC adaptive and intelligent data collection and analytics architecture.
information, and boosting the intelligence of the probes. Security data analytics
methods are integrated in the process at appropriate level-specific analytics. While
predictive/regression algorithms such as linear regression, support vector machine
(SVM), logistic regression, KNN regression, and Random Forest (classification &
regression), K-nearest neighbors, and Decision Tree have been evaluated for the
lightweight analysis of adaptive strategies with promising accuracy results of 93%–
99%, deep learning mechanisms are under evaluation for the identification of com-
plex risk and attack patterns. These will be described in a later section. A set of rules
(both static and adaptive) will be defined for data processing and analysis, config-
uration, collection, and adaptation.
In the Multi-layer Probes, the FINSEC Data Collection API is called by the
actual implemented probes, e.g., skydive, to collect data from cyber and physical
assets at different levels (individual asset, combined assets, integrated process, and
supply chain).
The Monitor collects the data using the FINSEC Data Collection API and stores
it in the DB at the Data Layer. It analyzes and summarizes the probe data from some
probe types and integrates the probes and the Data Layer. The Monitor notifies the
Analyser module of collected data.
The Analyser module, such as anomaly detection and predictive analytics, ana-
lyzes the data and converts the standard data to service data (threats, anomalies,
attacks, etc.). Further, it passes the service data to the Adapter module.
The Adapter module disposes the service data depending on its value such that
it adapts collection strategies and controls the probes through the FINSEC Miti-
gation API and sends notification to external modules such as alarms and/or data
visualization tool or database.
The combinations of Deep Learning algorithms and statistical approaches are
utilized to deliver intelligence on anomalies and attacks with the sort of speed to
maximize the value of that intelligence. This allows to (i) enhance components of
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the FINSEC toolbox with more data and predictive security capabilities; (ii) train
predictive models running different iterations of different algorithms; (iii) use dif-
ferent models on the same set of data, determine the one that best fits; (iv) estab-
lish predictive models to be used for wider use in the financial sector; (v) correlate
cyber-physical events and detect cross domain anomalies through pattern detection
engine; and (vi) learn typical behavior of the system and detect anomalies through
machine learning engine.
The issue of false positives will be addressed to ensure reliability and accuracy. For
the quality attribute performance, accuracy, and security & privacy [17, 20, 21],
different measures are taken. Performance can be met through ML algorithm opti-
mization, feature selection and extraction, data cutoff, etc. Accuracy can also be
improved through alert correlation, combining signature-based and anomaly-based
detection, etc. The Security and privacy of the collected and analyzed data is pro-
tected through encryption and cross-cutting security services of the FINSEC plat-
form such as authenticity and integrity protection.
7.4.2 Implementation in the FINSEC Reference Architecture
The FINSEC Reference Architecture (RA) provides capability to foster new, intel-
ligent, collaborative and more dynamic approaches to detect, prevent, and mitigate
integrated (cyber & physical) security incidents, intelligent monitoring, and data
collection of security-related information (the topic of this section); predictive ana-
lytics over the collected data; triggering of preventive and mitigation measures in
advance of the occurrence of the attack; and allowing all stakeholders to collaborate
in vulnerability assessment, risk analysis, threat identification, threat mitigation,
and compliance.
Figure 7.2 depicts the implementation of the adaptive and intelligent data col-
lection and analytics architecture with the process modules in the overall FINSEC
RA, closing the adaptive loop of Monitor, Analyse, and Adapt/Configure through
a feedback control loop. The Monitor module maps to the Data Collection mod-
ule in the FINSEC RA, the Analyser module maps to the Predictive Analytics,
Anomaly Detection, and Risk Assessment services in the FINSEC RA, and the
Adapter module maps to the Mitigation service and Mitigation Enabler in the
FINSEC RA.
Having data collected with flexible granularity on one hand and with high
redundancy on the other allows the correlation of information between locations
and layers and the use of various algorithms to produce insights. In this way,
increased automation and optimization of bandwidth and storage of security infor-
mation is achieved using the adaptive collection strategies such as security threats,
content variation, collection/sampling rate, bandwidth variation/communication
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Figure 7.2. Implementation of the adaptive and intelligent data collection and analytics
architecture in the FINSEC reference architecture.
dynamics, application needs, context changes, and storage needs. This automation
can also be controlled through the FINSEC Dashboard user interface allowing the
human in the loop.
7.4.3 Automation Through Predictive Analytics
As mentioned above, the increased automation and optimization of bandwidth and
storage of security information is achieved using adaptive data collection strate-
gies such as security threats, content variation, collection rate, bandwidth variation,
communication dynamics, application needs, context changes, and storage needs.
This, in turn, is achieved through predictive analytics and is achieved at different
levels [16]:
• Automation of the data collection, which is inherently automatic in capturing
and recording of data for later processing and analysis;
• Automation of the data pre-processing, normalization, and preparation to
feed the inputs of the system;
• Automation of the analysis, training, and learning from the collected data,
and the detection process;
• Automation of the mitigation process for taking mitigating actions to avoid
escalation of the detected anomaly, intrusions, attacks through either passive
reaction such as raising alarms or stopping of the system or active reaction
such as avoiding system failure.
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The FINSEC solution adds another level of automation by tying these automa-
tion levels to an overall adaptive and automation level through the feedback con-
trol loop (monitor, analyze, and adapt) increasing the automation of monitoring,
analyzing, and adapting to the environmental context. This automation and adap-
tive nature of the FINSEC data collection and analytics allows us to meet quality
attributes requirements described in [17, 20, 21] by adjusting its collection mecha-
nism to different environmental contexts and situations, which are termed adaptive
data collection strategies and will be described in Section 7.5.
7.4.4 FINSEC Multi-layer Security Probes
The FINSEC probes implemented for data collection and analytics are CCTV
probe, Access Control probe, Network Skydive probe, SIEM probe, P2P Payment
probe, FaceID probe, and Syslog/App Login as shown in Figure 7.2. This section
describes these in brief.
7.4.4.1 CCTV probe
The CCTV probe monitors CCTV, analyzes movements, and detects physical
events that may cause threats. The analytics service produces events coming from
observations of physical interactions by CCTV.
7.4.4.2 Access control probe
The Access Control probe correlates cyber-physical events by checking the access
to a secured area by both the use of a badge and a fingerprint and the state change
signaled by movement sensors, vibration sensors, gas sensors, and temperature sen-
sors. Data access events indicate legitimate authentication through HID (Human
Interface Devices) readers and fingerprint readers.
7.4.4.3 Network Skydive probe
Skydive is an open source real-time network topology and protocols analyser. It pro-
vides real-time insights on network activity which can be used for anomaly detec-
tion. It provides agents that act as data collectors, employing efficient mechanisms
to control the granularity of data collected and collection intrusiveness, which
ensure minimal CPU, memory and network overheads on the monitored system.
These mechanisms allow for extra flexibility in capturing network topology and net-
work flow data, as compared to other existing tools. The challenge is to efficiently
collect data with minimal disturbance to the production workloads. This includes
memory and CPU but also the network itself that is shared in some level between
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the monitoring and data acquisition tooling and the production workloads. In addi-
tion to the common methods, sFlow, netFlow, pcap, etc., a modern advanced net-
working infrastructure for Host level capturing known as bpf and eBPF is utilized.
Those capturing methods make use of Linux Kernel and outperform legacy meth-
ods in a wide range of scenarios. With ebpf/bpf capturing, it is possible on one
hand to limit and slice the networking data captured to some defined value, and
even to change dynamically the capture to fit to on-going security demands and
on the other hand allow much more efficient capturing that required significantly
less CPU and Memory. All this optimization is achieved through configuring and
re-configuring of the frequency of data collection based on different adaptive strate-
gies. This is achieved using the probe configuration data model.
The Skydive probe is composed of Skydive Agents that collect topological infor-
mation (the Hosts, Switches and NICs (Network Interface Controllers) in the sys-
tem) and flow information (the L3 traffic streams; using powerful protocols analyz-
ers to understand the traffic). This information is reported by the Skydive Agents
to a Skydive Analyzer which aggregates the information at the cluster level and
stores it in a time-series database. Figure 7.3 provides a multi-layer Skydive probe
architecture.
The Skydive Analyzer exposes the real-time Flow information via a WebSocket
which enables construction of Export pipelines. It processes these flows (transform-
ing, encoding, compressing, and storing) and thus facilitates the construction of
analytical tools that consume Skydive flow information.
The FINSEC Skydive Adapter (also implemented in Python) pushes network
data as observed data to the data collector layer by performing the following steps:
Figure 7.3. Multi-layer Skydive probe architecture.
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• Classify flows according to traffic type (internal, ingress, egress, unknown)
• Reformat flows to FINSTIX (FINSEC Data Model)
• Submit flows to data-collector layer
7.4.4.4 SIEM probe
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems have been used in
IT since long ago to guarantee security in computer transactions and technological
environments. SIEMs collect information about the monitored IT system by using
agents deployed close to the infrastructure elements. This information is encapsu-
lated in the form of events, stored and correlated to identify anomalous behaviors,
discover possible threats, and detect security incidents. This way the SIEM offers a
security administrator a view of the security status and of the activity that is going
on in the monitored system.
In FINSEC, the SIEM probe is based on the XL-SIEM (Cross-Layer SIEM) tool
developed by Atos [22], which produces alarms by correlating events received from
different sources to offer extended information to other components. The event
sources are typically application logs and sensors such as HIDS (Host Intrusion
Detection Systems), NIDS (Network Intrusion Detection Systems), and AntiVirus.
7.4.4.5 P2P Payment probe
The P2P Payment Probe includes the following three modules that contribute the
following features to the FINSEC platform: The P2P Pay module monitors and
collects data of peer-to-peer payments sent on Blockchain infrastructure by end
users via their commercial banks; The Block chain module monitors and collects
Blockchain infrastructure parameters useful for anomaly detection on payments
sent on Blockchain and Blockchain itself; and The Actuation module provides a
web service interface to send specified events and commands to P2P Payment probe.
7.4.4.6 FaceID probe
The FaceID probe is two factors identification probe that combines physical level
(face recognition) and credential entering to authenticate users.
7.4.4.7 Syslog/App Login
Syslog Probe analyzes the logs generated by the internal Bank monitoring infras-
tructure. It is installed inside the Bank premises in a virtual machine with access
restrictions to users and software that can be added.
The responsibilities of the Syslog probe are to send initial information to the
data collector with the FINSTIX x-assets, x-probes, x-probe-configurations, to
monitor a local database which stores in near real time all the syslog events pro-
vided by the Bank’s internal monitoring infrastructure, to filter and analyze records
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received from the Syslog, and to generate corresponding x-event and observed-data
FINSTIX objects based on a set of rules; and the events generated are related to
a predefined threat providing the collaborative risk module the ability to perform
risk calculations.
7.5 Adaptive Data Collection Strategies
The FINSEC data collection strategies are based on security threats, content vari-
ation, collection rate, bandwidth variation, application needs, communication
dynamics, and environmental context change which all are addressed in the ensuing
sections.
7.5.1 Content Variation and Security Threats
To adapt the collection rate to content variations, FINSEC will implement the
adaptive sampling rate algorithm that is defined and presented in [7]. The algo-
rithm uses a score for sets similarity, which is defined in this study. The algorithm
computes the similarity between datasets collected during successive slots of mon-
itoring. Further, the amount of the redundant data is determined based on the
similarity score; thus, the size of the data sent for further processing is reduced.
To adapt the collection rate to security threats, the predictive analytics analyzes
collected data and predicts security attack, threat, or anomaly. Then, predictive
analytics initiates mitigation measure, in this case adaptive data collection strategy
via the FINSEC mitigation service. The FINSEC mitigation service instructs the
FINSEC Mitigation Enabler to adapt the collection rate. The FINSEC Mitiga-
tion Enabler instructs the Field tier probe to re-configure collection rate and the
Field tier probe re-configures its collection rate and pushes data accordingly, thus
adapting the rate of data collection based on the security context.
7.5.2 Anomaly Detection Driven Data Collection
Figure 7.4 shows a generic anomaly driven adaptive data acquisition approach pro-
posed for the FINSEC platform. It is composed of three components: (1) Mit-
igation rules defined using FINSTIX and stored in the Data layer. These rules
will define what events or attacks should trigger probe activations. Mitigation
service will apply these rules to decide when and which Probe Mitigation API
should be called; (2) Probes Mitigation API exposed by the probes to control
what operations should be performed by probes for the mitigation; and (3) Analyt-
ics and probes produce event and attack mitigation triggers to trigger mitigation
rules.
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Figure 7.4. Anomaly driven adaptive data acquisition.
For Skydive probe the above components become: Mitigation rules specify
which Skydive probe Actuation APIs should be called for anomalies detected on
network data (Network events) or cyber-physical attacks as reported by Anomaly
Detection service; Skydive’s probe exposes an API to control what types of the net-
flows should be acquired; and Anomaly Detection service reports network anoma-
lies and cyber-physical events to the Data Layer to trigger adaptive rules (e.g., start
acquiring internal traffic).
The adaptive anomaly detection comprises Pattern Detection Engine (PDE),
which correlates cyber-physical events and detects cross domain anomalies, and
Machine Learning Engine (MLE), which learns typical behavior of the system and
detects anomalies on Netflows. The online adaptive training updates models with
the most recent observations and gradually “forgets” old behaviors. The Big data
Spark-based process aggregates events over time periods and anomaly scores based
on the deviation of the observed behavior from the learned models. The platform
is modular that can be easily extended with new feature extractors, models, scorers,
and pattern detection components.
The adaptive strategies for anomaly driven data collection include more histor-
ical data, physical measurement, change of acquisition, and outlier-driven rate of
acquisition. The adaptive approach consists of adaptive rules defined using FIN-
STIX and stored in the Data layer; Adaptive service applies these rules to decide
when and which Probe Activation API should be called, and Probes Activation API
exposed by the probes to control how the data acquisition should be adapted.
7.5.3 Enhanced Security Analysis
The Atos XL-SIEM probe has been extended in FINSEC to support adaptive secu-
rity data collection and this way, enhancing SIEM’s security analytics capabilities.
With this purpose, a new functional component has been designed, the SIEM Probe
Analysis module, which is aimed to be deployed in the FINSEC platform. This
module is in charge of analyzing the information received through the FINSEC
Data Collector, from the SIEM Probe, and invokes the XL-SIEM Mitigation API
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to take the necessary adaptive actions. Through this, the SIEM probe can reconfig-
ure itself and the different sensors involved in the data collection, deployed at the
target IT infrastructure of the organization, and thus adapts to a new cybersecurity
context.
The SIEM Probe Analysis module analyzes FINSTIX data available in the FIN-
SEC platform, together with other relevant Threat Intelligence retrieved from exter-
nal sources. Two different strategies for FINSTIX data analysis are used:
• Detection of noisy events to adapt the quantity of events received from
the SIEM probe. This is implemented by creating filtering rules in the SIEM,
on-demand, to mute some specific kind of events. This improves the data
collection rate in the SIEM probe by lowering down the frequency of periodic
non-relevant events. Events are still collected in the SIEM but not reported
to the FINSEC platform;
• Exploitation of IoCs (indicator of compromises) to improve or extend
SIEM capabilities to detect security incidents and thus enhance the qual-
ity of events received from the SIEM. The SIEM Probe Analysis module
will retrieve IoCs from external sources [e.g., OTX (Open Threat Exchange)],
related to events or attacks reported to the FINSEC Platform. IoCs related to
suspicious activity already detected in the FINSEC Platform contain valuable
and high-quality information that, for instance, an IDS can use to improve
or extend their detection capabilities.
7.5.4 Application-driven Innovative Attacks
In the context of the detection algorithms investigated, the focus is on the detection
of application layer attacks. Threats like Slow DoS Attacks (SDA) [23], tunneling,
and covert channels [24] belong to this category. In the anomaly based intrusion
detection topic, after appropriate training on allowed scenarios, a characterization
of legitimate conditions is accomplished and used for detection. Particularly, the
aim of the algorithm is to monitor and analyze run-time traffic (through on-line or
off-line techniques), hence flag as legitimate or anomalous the analyzed traffic.
In order to analyze a potentially anomalous situation, a capture of network traf-
fic is needed to extrapolate predefined representative features able to characterize
the considered scenario. If we consider, for instance, Slow DoS Attacks [23], such
features may be related to the Delta parameters, extrapolated from network traffic
and representing timings used during single connections lives [25]. By using such
approach, by considering each Delta parameter, a proper threshold is defined as
a consequence of the initial training [26]. The legitimate traffic is characterized
to be included under the defined threshold, with a given confident interval. When
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Figure 7.5. Overview of delta parameters dynamic behavior over time, for HTTP traffic
between 00:00 and 24:00.
processing run-time traffic, each connection related to a Delta parameter exceeding
the defined thresholds will be flagged as anomalous, hence, potentially legitimate.
Although such approach is potentially able to identify run-time threats, in par-
ticularly advanced scenarios, a malicious user may attempt to elude the detection
system, by modifying the attack to make it behave like a legitimate condition. In this
case, if the detection system is not able to refine the calculated Delta thresholds in
real time, hence making the Delta threshold assume some sort of “dynamic” behav-
ior, detection may fail, hence expose the system to the attack without triggering any
detection.
Figure 7.5 reports the means of the Delta parameters over an entire day, from
00:00 to 24:00, when computing them on a network composed of around 50
nodes, in office environment, for HTTP network traffic.
As can be seen, their values are not static over time, but, instead, they assume
some sort of “dynamic” behavior depending on the day time. Such behavior may
depend, for instance, on scheduled backup activities executed overnight or on users
browsing during office hours. Because of this, a first detection approach is based a
dynamic adaptation of the Delta thresholds depending on the time of the day the
(potentially anomalous) traffic is captured. By adapting the thresholds through such
approach, it is possible to improve the detection of unknown threats, by contextu-
alizing the detection algorithm on the time of the day considered. An extension of
this approach may also monitor an entire week of traffic, to also extend the concept
to non-working days like Saturday and Sunday, even though the run-time thresh-
olds update activities.
By considering adaptive approaches, in conjunction with the approach described
above, it is possible to dynamically enable and disable the network analysis process
with a function of the network status. For instance, considering protection from
slow DoS threats, it is possible to enable such analysis only when critical conditions
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are measured. Hence, considering attacks targeting network services, it is possible
to adaptively monitor traffic only when the service load exceeds a predefined thresh-
old. This means that in case a network service is under loaded, or a partial DoS [27]
is executed, protection may not be enabled, also in view of the application a green
approach to cybersecurity [28]. Similarly, adaptive data collection and consequent
analysis may therefore be enabled only for the features that characterize specific
categories of attacks.
By considering a network platform like FINSEC, the detection algorithm may
be represented as the execution of the following steps:
1. The network probe captures information from live traffic.
2. The data collector receives captured information for collection/storage.
3. The data monitor component extrapolates features from collected data.
4. The data analyzer component identifies anomalies/threats
5. The data adapter component re-configures the detection system, involving
steps 3 and 4.
By adopting this approach is possible to build an adaptive detection system able
to identify cyber threats.
7.6 Implementation and Validation
This section provides a prototype implementation of the adaptive and intelligent
security monitoring infrastructure for the FINSEC project and its validation with
the anomaly detection example.
In this first phase, a prototype implementation of the adaptive and intelligent
security monitoring infrastructure is provided, which covers predictive analytics
describing the most relevant approaches to analyze the collected data and detect
attack patterns. In addition, the security threat and collection rate strategies are
implemented. Various alternative adaptive strategies are also defined: (i) appli-
cation layer adaptive collection strategies (Request start duration, Request dura-
tion, Request management duration, Response duration, and Next request start
duration), (ii) adaptive techniques for data acquisition for anomaly detection
(More historical data, Physical measurement, Change of acquisition, and Rate
of acquisition), and (iii) Adaptive data collection for enhanced security analysis
(Data Collection manager for reconfiguring the infrastructure of XL-SIEM agents,
Threat intelligence update service, and Adaptive security module, which analyzes
the events and alarms generated). The combination of these three architectural ele-
ments implements a feedback loop of collection, detection, and prevention that
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allows for early detection of security compromises and consistently makes security
analysis more effective.
7.6.1 Data Collector and Mitigation Enabler
The Data Collector (Monitor) conveys information from the probes to the Data
Layer, and it may also perform additional functions for each probe. For the Skydive
probe, it summarizes, at a regular interval, all “observed-data” objects seen during
this interval and sends this summary to the Data Layer. The summary is created as
an “x-collected-data” object, whose structure is fully described in The FINSEC Data
Model (FINSTIX). It includes a list of IDs of the summarized objects, a sequence
number and a time range bracketing the first and the last observed object. The
Data Collector has three endpoints for the Skydive probe, supporting respectively
ingress, egress, and internal traffic. Each of these traffic types is treated separately
by the Data Collector, so that separate summaries are created for each traffic type,
with separate sequence numbering.
In the prototype implementation, the Data Collector receives STIX objects of
type “observed-data” from the probes. The Data Collector stores these objects in
the Data Layer.
In the case of the Skydive probe in particular, the Data Collector also performs
a summarization service of the “observed-data” objects received. Each “observed-
data” object contains a set of “x-skydive-flow” objects representing native Skydive
flow objects. At a regular, configurable interval (which is 10 minutes by default),
the Data Collector sends an “x-collected-data” object to the Data Layer. This object
contains a summary of all the “observed-data” objects received from the Skydive
probe within the last interval. A separate series of ‘x-collected-data’ objects is cre-
ated for every combination of network flow type (ingress, egress, and internal) and
organization ID, and every object contains a sequence number within that series.
These “x-collected-data” objects are intended to inform the analyzer that new data
are available in the Data Layer.
7.6.1.1 Interface to Skydive
Skydive is a real-time network topology and protocol analyzer that can be used
to capture network topology and data flows. The Skydive architecture consists of
two types of software: agents and analyzers. The purpose of an agent is to collect
topology and flow data various types of probes. Thus, an agent needs to be deployed
on each computer to be monitored. The purpose of an analyzer is to consolidate the
information collected from a set of agents. Only one analyzer is needed, although
there may be more than one if redundancy is required.
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Figure 7.6. Anomaly detection with Skydive probe.
Each analyzer offers two types of interfaces for accessing its functions. The first is
a graphical user interface for interactive use of management and monitoring func-
tions. The second is an API that can be integrated with applications. This API
is based on the JSON format for exchanging data and the Gremlin language for
executing queries on the topology graph.
Figure 7.6 depicts the end-to-end data flow from Skydive probe to Anomaly
Detection service. Here are the main steps of the dataflow:
1. The netflow collected by Skydive Network probe are pushed to FIN-
SEC Data Layer through FINSEC Data Collection API as “observed-data”
objects.
2. Data Collection service periodically produces “x-collected-data” object that
references the “observed-data” objects.
3. Network Anomaly Detection Engine analyzes new “observed-data” objects
and reports anomalies as to FINSEC Data Layer as “x-event” object.
4. Alerts Detection Engine correlates reported events according to “x-attack”
models and report “x-attack” instances to FINSEC API Gateway
5. Mitigation Service (not implemented yes) will analyze produced “x-events”
and “x-attacks” to activate adaptive Mitigation API of Skydive Network
probe.
7.6.1.2 STIX and customizations
Structured Threat Information Expression (STIXTM) is a JSON-based language
for expressing cyber threat and observable information. A STIX [29] description
consists of a set of STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) and a set of STIX Relation-
ship Objects (SROs). The SROs describe relations between the SDOs, forming a
graph. In addition to these types of objects, there are also STIX Cyber Observables,
which are used by various SDOs to provide additional context to the data that they
characterize.
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The STIX language can be customized and remain compatible with STIX, as
long as certain syntactic rules are observed. In the case of the Data Collector, two
custom STIX object types, “x-skydive-flow” and “x-collected-data,” were intro-
duced. This was necessary, since Skydive delivers very detailed information on
flows in its own JSON-based format, which is incompatible with STIX. Each of
these flow descriptions is converted into an “x-skydive-flow” STIX object contain-
ing the same structure and the same properties as the Skydive flow object, except
that the properties are converted to be compatible with STIX syntax, and “type”
and “extensions” properties are added. The “x-collected-data” object type is used to
summarize the aforementioned objects.
7.6.2 Predictive Analytics
The general goals of predictive analytics models are to reduce false-positive rates
and to deal with a large amount of data for training and prediction, imbalanced
datasets, a large number of features, and categorical and continuous features [30].
Random Forest models outperform in achieving these goals due to their advantages
of low training time complexity, fast prediction, resilience to deal with imbalanced
datasets, embedded feature selection method and intrinsic metrics to rank features
by importance, and for their ability to deal natively with categorical and continuous
features [30].
To evaluate approaches for the adaptation of the data collection strategies and
intelligent processing, we have studied and tested predictive analytics based on
machine learning algorithms. At this stage, the following machine learning algo-
rithms have been selected for the predictive analytics toolkit: Support Vector
Machine (SVM) using the RBF (Radial Basis Function) kernel method, K-nearest
neighbors (KNN), Decision Tree using the Classification and Regression Tree
(CART) algorithm, Random Forest, and Multilayer Perceptron (MLP). These algo-
rithms are often applied to solve classification problems. We used the scikit-learn
package, Python 3. The PyCharm Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
was used for coding. pPckle files have been generated for each model and saved.
Furthermore, we explored the possibility of using deep learning algorithms and
tested a multi-layer perceptron neural network with 3 layers (on the CICIDS 2017
(Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset) dataset mentioned below).
The toolkit has been tested using the datasets KDDCup-99 [31], CICIDS
2017 [32], and UNSW-NB15 [33], which are described below.
The KDDCup99 is a relatively old dataset that was used for “The Third Inter-
national Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition.” The compe-
tition’s task was to build a predictive network intrusion detector model capable of
distinguishing between attacks and normal network traffic. This database contains
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a standard set of data to be audited, which includes a wide variety of intrusions sim-
ulated in a military network environment. All features provided with this dataset
have been applied.
The CIC IDS 2017 dataset was created by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecu-
rity. It contains benign traffic and the most up-to-date common attacks. According
to the authors, the network traffic analysis was performed using CICFlowMeter
with labeled flows based on the time stamp, source, and destination IPs, source
and destination ports, protocols and attack (CSV files). Generating realistic back-
ground traffic was prioritized. The authors used their B-Profile system (Sharafaldin
et al. [34]) to profile the abstract behavior of human interactions and generate nat-
uralistic benign background traffic. The dataset is built upon the abstract behavior
of 25 users based on the HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, SSH, and email protocols. The CIC
IDS 2017 dataset has over 2.83 M examples (2.27 M benign and 557,646 malicious
ones) in contrast to KDDCup-99 dataset with 148,517 flows including 77,054
benign and 71,463 malicious ones. For prediction, we used all provided features.
The UNSW-NB15 dataset was created as an IoT dataset in the Cyber Range Lab
of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS). The authors aimed to gener-
ate a hybrid of real modern normal activities and synthetic contemporary attack
behaviors. According to the authors, the raw network packets of the UNSW-NB
15 dataset was created by the IXIA PerfectStorm tool. This dataset has nine types
of attacks: Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance,
Shellcode, and Worms. The authors used the Argus and Bro-IDS tools to generate
totally 49 features with the class label. All features that were included in the datasets
have been used.
The test results for these three datasets are depicted in Tables 7.1–7.4, respec-
tively. The tests were done using a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5300 U CPU,
2.30 GHz, RAM 16.0 GB, and 64-bit OP.
Table 7.1. Classification results for KDDCup-99 dataset.
Training Training Testing Testing
Set Time Set Time Accuracy
SVM 3428901 3721.03 1469529 648.56 0.922812634431
KNN 3428901 88.5 1469529 24.94 0.986108253728
Decision Tree 3428901 26.394 1469529 4.74 0.9983703703703
RF (100 estimators) 3428901 712.58 1469529 43.645 0.999948282784
RF (300 estimators) 3428901 2095.318 1469529 120.91274 0.99994896327
RF (500 estimators) 3428901 3424.962 1469529 229.4986 0.999949643763


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































130 Adaptive and Intelligent Data Collection and Analytics
Table 7.3. Classification results for UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Training Training Testing Testing
Set Time Set Time Accuracy
SVM 82332 201.4 17534 37.2 0.720092009961
KNN 82332 14.32 17534 4.43 0.874246715967
Decision Tree 82332 0.1248 17534 0.0468 0.9474364579967
RF (100 estimators) 82332 1.1856 17534 0.234 0.958576507043
RF (300 estimators) 82332 3.2916 17534 0.5928 0.9625738272
RF (500 estimators) 82332 5.2884 17534 0.9984 0.9689476329
This preliminary study has shown that the SVM method has performed inade-
quately for training/testing time. It has also achieved lower accuracy for the UNSW-
NB15 Dataset. We concluded that this method could be excluded from further
work stage. The random forest method performs well while requiring slightly more
time for training than the decision tree method; the deep learning MLP also per-
forms well, with training time between random forest and the decision tree algo-
rithms, and validation accuracy comparable with both, especially from the second
epoch (after which the validation accuracy does not improve much).
In this preliminary study, we have used the datasets that were available online.
All features supplied with these datasets have been applied. In the next stage, we
plan to define how to select a feature set that produces acceptable results with prede-
fined accuracy while reducing the volume of the collected and stored data. Further,
we need to develop methods for predictive analytics that operate on real-time data
collections and investigate new efficient predictive algorithms based on deep learn-
ing techniques. We, therefore, need to investigate how combining various deep
learning approaches can improve the quality of the attack detection.
7.6.3 Anomaly Detector Service
7.6.3.1 Architecture overview
The Anomaly Detection service is composed of External and Internal Anomaly
Detection services as depicted in Figure 7.7. The Internal Anomaly Detection ser-
vice is part of the FINSEC infrastructure, and the External Anomaly Detection
service is running outside of the FINSEC infrastructure on the IBM cloud. The
External Anomaly Detection service is composed of two analytic engines: Network
Anomaly Detection engine and Attack Detection engine.
Other related FINSEC components are the Dashboard, Data Layer, Data
Collector, and the Skydive probe. Figure 7.8 shows the data flow between the
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Figure 7.7. External and internal anomaly detection services.
Figure 7.8. Anomaly detection data flow.
above-mentioned components and the Anomaly Detection service, starting from
the probe data acquisition and culminating in attack detection and reporting to the
dashboard. Described below are the main steps of the data flow:
1. The Netflow data is acquired by the Skydive Network probe and pushed into
the Data Collector.
2. The Data Collector aggregates the data and pushes it to the Data Layer.
3. The Netflow data from the Data Layer is processed by the Netflow Anomaly
Detection Engine of the Anomaly Detection Service.
4. The Netflow anomaly events detected in the previous step are reported to the
Data Layer.
5. Netflow anomaly events along with events produced by other services are
analyzed by the Attack Detection Engine.
6. The Cyber-physical attacks that are detected in the previous step are exposed
to the FINSEC Dashboard.
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7.6.4 SIEM Probe Analysis
As previously introduced in Section 5.3, the Atos XL-SIEM technology has been
extended with a new module, the SIEM Probe Analysis module, that supports
the implementation of adaptive data collection strategies with the ultimate goal
of improving the quality of security events collected and controlling the data col-
lection rate. This module, deployed as a service in the FINSEC platform, works
in combination with other services and modules of the XL-SIEM probe running
in the field. Figure 7.9 depicts all the elements that compose the XL-SIEM probe
adaptive infrastructure and illustrates their intended deployment. The figure also
shows the interaction of these elements with other services and components of the
FINSEC platform, such as the Data Collector.
On the left hand side of Figure 7.9, Monitored Infrastructure is the target infras-
tructure under surveillance. This infrastructure is composed by different logical and
physical assets such as laptops, servers, routers, printers, and the local area network.
These elements are monitored by different typical security sensors or probes such
as Host-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Network-based Intrusion Detec-
tion System (NIDS), or Antivirus (AV), all of them under the control of one or
more XL-SIEM agents. XL-SIEM agents are in direct communication with the XL-
SIEM probe to send security events or retrieve monitoring configuration updates.
XL-SIEM Probe represents the core of the XL-SIEM technology. The Data Collec-
tion Manager module, the Data Collection Rules database, and the Configuration
Update Service, which will manage the configuration of the remote monitoring
components, deployed at the Monitored Infrastructure. This configuration can be
updated as a result of an invocation of a specific adaptive action through the XL-
SIEM Mitigation API. This API is used by the XL-SIEM to allow modifying the
Figure 7.9. Overview of the XL-SIEM probe adaptive infrastructure.
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configuration of the XL-SIEM, particularly the configuration of data collection
process.
On the right hand side of Figure 7.9, the modules and services are represented
which are running under the umbrella of the FINSEC platform. This is the case of
the SIEM Probe Analysis module and the Data Collector with the corresponding
database to store the collected data. As part of the SIEM Probe Analysis module,
the Adaptive Security Analysis (ASA) service is in charge of, first, analyzing the
information received in the data-collector from the SIEM Probe and, second, tak-
ing decisions on which adaptive strategy to invoke through the XL-SIEM Mitiga-
tion API. The Threat Intelligence Update Service (TIUS) supports the ASA service
and is responsible for retrieving additional high-quality information about certain
security events under analysis. This additional information can be obtained from
another FINSEC source of security intelligence, such as the Knowledge Base, or
from external sources of IoCs, e.g., Open Threat Exchange (OTX) [35].
Each FINSTIX instance received from the XL-SIEM probe at the Data-
Collector is processed at the ASA to extract candidate IoCs from the list of
attributes, e.g., URLs, IPs, domains, malware hashes, etc. If the IoC is a public
IP, ASA uses the TIUS to consult in the OTX service and returns a list of related
“pulses.” The TIUS can subscribe the XL-SIEM probe to pulses in order to auto-
matically get new relevant IoCs. The subscription is done only if it is a trusted
pulse, i.e., if the number of subscriptions that this pulse already have is above a
threshold. Through this process, also known as IoCs Expander, the ASA compo-
nent can, for example, dynamically update the NIDS (e.g., Suricata [36]) with new
rules retrieved from the official NIDS update service (Emerging Threats [37], in
the case of Suricata). This way, the XL-SIEM probe adapts to collect additional
relevant security events from the monitored infrastructure.
On the other hand, the decision of the ASA after the analysis of the FINSTIX
collected data could be to reduce the quantity of events received from the XL-SIEM
probe for various reasons, e.g., because the information about a specific IP address
is considered not relevant (i.e., it is in a whitelist) or the probe can be instructed
to send FINSTIX events wrapping XL-SIEM alarms (high-level correlated data)
instead of XL-SIEM events (low level security information). The XL-SIEM probe
can be instructed to mute a particular type of event through the invocation of the
corresponding method of the Mitigation API. This results in one or more filtering
rules created in the XL-SIEM probe. These rules do not prevent the XL-SIEM to
generate the event and its corresponding FINSTIX instance but will not send it to
the FINSEC Data Collector. This way, the muted events can be recovered upon
request at a later point in time if necessary. Filtering rules can be retrieved and
removed too, by using the corresponding methods of the Mitigation API.
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7.6.5 Innovative Attacks
If we consider the last generation threats, it is important to consider that they may
expose characteristics that make them improve their efficacy, compared to old-style
threats. If we consider, for instance, the Slow DoS Attacks [23], the focus of our
work, compared to old-style flooding threats, the quality of the attack is in this case
enhanced, in terms of effects on the system and requirements to the attacker. This
is due to the fact that during the execution of an “innovative attack” like the Slow
DoS, almost all the packets composing the communication between the attacker
and the victim contribute and are important for the success of the attack itself. This
means that there is less waste of packets, from the attacker’s perspective, compared
to old-style flooding attacks, whose approach is to send a huge amount of packets
to the victim to attempt to saturate its resources, in case of a slow DoS, a smarter
approach is adopted. In virtue of this, reduced attack resources (CPU, memories,
bandwidth, etc.) are required.
Considering innovative attacks we have investigated, it is important to consider
that the Slow DoS category we have investigated is able to target application layer
protocols based on TCP. Known attacks [23, 27] are found in literature for proto-
cols like HTTP, HTTPS, or SMTP. Nevertheless, it is important to consider that
the same concept can be adapted and ported to affect different protocols as well. In
this case, it may be required to adapt the attack to make it able to target the consid-
ered protocol. If we consider, for instance, the MQTT protocol [38], widely used in
the machine-to-machine (M2M) context, it may be required to send specific com-
mands like CONNECT (with consequent reception of CONNECT+ACK) mes-
sages to perpetrate a long request DoS attack [23]. Preliminary tests executed [39]
against a real MQTT service supporting secure communications are shown in
Figure 7.10.
Figure 7.10. Results of tests of the SlowITe slow DoS attack against MQTT service [29].
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Figure 7.10 shows that the attack is successful, even on encrypted communica-
tions, and it is able to initiate a large number of connections. Tests also reported
that the denial of service is reached on the server just after the establishment of 1012
connections that are closed around 90 seconds after their establishment. Although
such number of connections may appear high, in this case, since the application
layer daemon is targeted, compared to the number of TCP connections, a network
host is able to manage (in the order of tens of thousands), such number is consid-
ered low. In addition, it is important to consider that no application layer packets
are exchanged after the establishment of a connection. Hence, required bandwidth
is extremely low. Indeed, we measured that around 340 Kbps were used required
for the attack.
In the cyber-security topic, it is therefore important to consider that innovative
attacks may create serious damage to the network and its components. Therefore,
it is extremely crucial to deploy appropriate monitoring and protection methods
and, at the same time, investigate the cyber-security field to acquire knowledge on
emerging threats.
Concerning detection from attacks that target specific protocols like MQTT, it
is important to consider that efficient detection is still an open issue in research [39],
since legitimate clients exploiting such protocols may be characterized by long times
of inactivity. This can be also found on SSH protocol, for instance, where connected
users may not exchange (at the application layer) any data with the server, even for
hours, without experiencing any connection closure. In virtue of this, it is particu-
larly important to investigate the topic and to adapt slow DoS detection algorithms
to such kind of “silent” protocols.
7.7 Conclusions
This chapter presented the FINSEC adaptive and intelligent data collection and
analytics system for securing critical financial infrastructure. Making the data col-
lection intelligent, resilient, automated, efficient, secure, and timely is essential to
economizing of resources, accessing the right information at the right time, and
quickly spotting, learning from, and addressing zero-day threats. This is achieved
through the configuration of configurable collection probes and the adaptation of
different collection strategies. The chapter further addresses how, inter alia, (i) the
nature and quality of collected data affects the efficiency and accuracy of methods
of attack detection and defense, (ii) the detection capability can be improved by
correlating wide-ranging data sources and predictive analytics, (iii) the rate of the
data collection at the various monitoring probes is tuned by managing the appropri-
ate levels and types of intelligence and adaptability of security monitoring, (iv) the
References 137
optimization of bandwidth and storage of security information can be achieved by
rendering adaptiveness and intelligence and by integrating smart security probes
and a set of adaptive strategies and rules, and (v) the increased automation is
achieved through a feedback loop of collection, detection, and prevention that
allows the early detection and prevention of security compromises and consistently
makes security analysis more effective.
The chapter also presented the adaptive data collection strategies, implementa-
tion of the different components of the system, and validation of the predictive
analytics algorithms for intelligent processing using publicly available and widely
used datasets with promising results. In our future work, we plan to validate the
efficiency of all components in real-life use-case scenarios of the FINSEC project.
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Security Challenges for the Critical
Infrastructures of the Healthcare Sector
By Eva Maia, Isabel Praça, Vasiliki Mantzana, Ilias Gkotsis,
Paolo Petrucci, Elisabetta Biasin, Erik Kamenjasevic
and Nadira Lammari
Healthcare organizations are an easy target for cybercrime due to their critical and
vulnerable infrastructure. Increasing digitalization has led to the emergence of sev-
eral security challenges. It is crucial to identify these critical challenges, not only
from a technical point of view but also from a legal and management perspective.
Recognition of the threats that may arise is also important to be able to fight cyber-
crime. Not just physical and/or cyber threats are relevant but also the combination
of both. It is important to understand how they can impact and destabilize health
services, and how they are being used by attackers to achieve their aims. This chapter
provides a brief introduction to the critical challenges in the healthcare sector and
a list of recent security incidents. Five main groups of threats and a critical assets
categorization are also presented. Finally, the EBIOS methodology is introduced
and used to describe two relevant cyber-physical scenarios of threat.
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8.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, cybercrime has been the greatest threat to every sector in the
world. Due to its critical and vulnerable infrastructure, the health sector is an easy
target for hackers. Moreover, healthcare organizations are highly trusted entities
that hold valuable and personal information, meaning that exploiting its vulnera-
bilities brings huge potential financial and political gain.
Several security challenges emerge from the needs of the healthcare sector. It is
important to ensure the security of data without impacting the availability of the
healthcare services, as they are crucial to human life. The increasing interconnec-
tion of physical and cyber assets of the hospital brings new threats that should be
considered to ensure patient safety. Also, legal requirements like GDPR in Europe
need to be taken into account to ensure patient data protection and compliance
with the regulations.
Being aware of security incidents that have occurred is very important for under-
standing the risks that healthcare facilities can face. It is also important to know
which critical assets are present and their impact on the availability of systems.
Only then is it possible to identify and design scenarios that can help recog-
nize threats that a security solution for a healthcare facility must cover. These
scenarios should exploit combined physical and cyber threats in the context of
cascading attacks, since they are the most complex and interesting threats to
cope with.
8.2 Challenges in Healthcare Sector
Nowadays, healthcare structures are equipped with common perimeter precautions
and active and predictive cybersecurity solutions. With these cybersecurity systems,
the possibility of successfully carrying out an attack on critical assets (for example,
on the main IT systems, HIS hospital information system, PACS picture archiving
and communication system, LIS laboratory information systems, and other vertical
software like for ER-ED) remains very low.
There is no other possibility of breaking the perimeter defenses, even using a
physical attack, since it is necessary to connect directly to servers and networks
sections that are not accessible from the outside. In this case, access with violence,
theft, or other fraudulent access should only be seen as complementary action of a
cyberattack.
It is known that hospital or healthcare structures do not work properly without
IT systems, in particular the PACS and the LIS, without which it is very difficult to
work with radiological images and laboratory tests, making diagnosis and therefore
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treatment of patients difficult, or extremely slow. This could be considered an attack
damage “multiplier effect.”
Therefore, it is essential to face the risk of attacks on hospital IT systems in
order to decrease the functioning capacity of hospitals and to absorb patients in
the emergency department, in the event of a terrorist attack and consequent maxi-
inflow of wounded people. For that, threats can no longer be analyzed solely as
physical or cyber. It is critical to develop an integrated approach in order to fight
against such combination of threats.
8.2.1 The Protection of Critical Assets—the Point of View
of Healthcare Structures Management
The management of Healthcare structures are used to facing complex challenges,
such as the typical complexities of the healthcare sector, and a number of internal
and external emergencies that may occur and have actually occurred; but the chal-
lenge of cybersecurity and physical security is something that in most European
hospitals and Healthcare structures there is not yet full knowledge of and is not
yet being considered; or perhaps, better expressed, that we are only now beginning
to consider as an emerging problem, but are still lacking widespread and shared
solutions.
Certainly, the IT sectors of Healthcare structures have, in recent years, had to
face a number of malware attack campaigns (the most famous being Wannacry,
NotPetya and CryptoLocker) that are not specifically directed to a particular type
of structure.
For some hospitals, the damage was greater than expected (for countless causes,
such as the diffusion of computer clients of different management and origin),
but this had the benefit of putting the structures and management on alert, and
considering the problem as a possible threat, like any other.
Only in recent years (mainly in USA and Asia) have attacks specifically tar-
geting healthcare facilities been reported (like orangeworm, kwampirs, medjack).
This confirmed a certainty: Hospitals are no stranger to malware and ransomware
cyberattacks.
In some cases, vulnerabilities of medical device systems have been exploited;
medical devices, something that was not considered a possibility, likely for cul-
tural reasons, coupled with the fact that the medical device suppliers themselves
did not consider an attack possible and were not prepared to deal with the possibil-
ity. Indeed, it is necessary to consider the particular market of medical devices:
• Productions in small series, sometimes very small series (for example, in
Radiotherapy);
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• Highly complex and innovative systems and therefore high costs for research
and development;
• Complex sector regulations (MDD, MDR, IVD, IVR), with the need to cer-
tify every different model;
• The consequent difficulty of keeping operating systems and antivirus
updated.
In recent years, there have been reported numerous local health structures
affected by massive ransomware attacks, with the consequence of the total blockade
of some departments, such as the emergency room and hospitalizations (!), with the
sole exclusion of the “most critical” patients not diverted elsewhere (in danger of
life, in other words, negotiable without the help of a computer system). A crimi-
nal attack with the explicit request for cash ransom, an operation organized on a
larger scale than the typical ransomware already widespread at the level of individ-
ual personal computers, more organized as entire networks and computer servers
are affected, making entire hospital systems unavailable.
Of course, we do not know the full consequences of the attacks, only what was
reported to the press—in some cases, it has been reported that the very few infected
computers have been reformatted, and restored, without significant loss of data; in
others, the administration admitted that it preferred to pay the ransom after several
days. But many operators are convinced that the cases disclosed are only a part of
those actually verified and never spread for obvious reasons of bad publicity.
The latest attacks that have been reported in the news took place in Octo-
ber 2019 (USA and Australia). Again, with reference to the world of the United
States, the analysis lead experts to believe that hackers are increasingly concentrated
on the portals, patients that are increasingly popular, as they are connected with
EMR/EHR (Electronic Medical/Health Record). At the same time in Europe, in
recent years (at least after the serious attacks on crowded and critical structures like
railways, undergrounds, airports), all critical structures are expected to be prepared
to be hit by attacks. Until now, attacks using explosives on hospital are documented
only in East and Middle East (Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan).
In short, there is a need for European structures to be prepared for the worst,
in order to deal systematically with these threats, simply because of the obvious
consideration that these threats will, sooner rather than later, hit the old continent as
well. Without forgetting the considerable latency due to finding suitable solutions
and the time necessary to spread them in the structures.
• To understand the reference context (and consequent difficulties and facili-
ties), it is important to consider the particular situation of typical European
healthcare structure: Entrances and access control—unlike public offices or
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other public buildings, no hospital or healthcare structure has the possibility
to restrict access to one or two “single point of entry,” nor is the commission-
ing of check points at a visitor control desk, with the control and filing of
identity documents, possible.
The reasons can be many and among these certainly is the fact of not
having so far hypothesized the need to protect these buildings from specific
attacks (a cultural aspect that is certainly erroneous). We cannot ignore also:
◦ The considerable inflows—many thousands of people for some European
hospital districts;
◦ The dimensions (hectares) of hospital enclosures, within the urban fabric
context, sometimes in historical contexts and historical buildings;
◦ The simultaneous presence of different organizations—such as universi-
ties, with consequent additional inflows of students and various attending
people.
• Critical assets—hospital structures are characterized by the presence of a very
large number of critical assets, probably of a small size when compared to
industrial plants, but with the contemporaneity of a huge number of dif-
ferent types of implants and different specific safety systems (idem—when
compared to industrial plants). For example: cryogenic systems, RX systems,
handling radioactive isotopes, big magnetic field systems, gas tanks, hyper-
baric systems and so on, And with the greatest difficulties deriving from the
co-presence of large number of people: patients, visitors, students (the largest
being some 10–20 thousand people);
• Separate management of IT assets (IT department) and medical devices assets
(clinical engineering department), for cultural and historical reasons; this sep-
aration was culturally motivated in the last century for the absence of net-
worked medical devices systems, at least those few who were computerized.
Nowadays, the opposite happens: very few medical devices are not comput-
erized and not connected to the IT network. Without denying the specific
skills of the two staff (IT and CE), there is a strong need for coordination in
management for cybersecurity aspects;
• Emergency Plans—all the hospital structures have a well-established habit of
confidence and have long established various emergency plans, maxi-influx of
patients, evacuation of patients, etc; the staff is therefore trained for even dis-
astrous events and can therefore also face the consequences caused by attacks;
• Provision of video surveillance systems—due to the difficulties of inserting
access controls, many hospital structures are equipped with several video
surveillance systems, videocameras and a videoserver, mainly for crime pre-
vention purposes (only with video-recording).
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8.2.2 The Protection of Critical Infrastructures
for the Healthcare Sector in Europe: Legal Challenges
8.2.2.1 The EU legal framework for the protection of critical
infrastructures
The legal framework concerning security and the protection of critical infrastruc-
tures in Europe is characterized by its complexity. This is due to the presence of
heterogeneous laws differing in scope (applicable at national or EU level) and mat-
ter (ranging from civil protection law, security laws, privacy laws, etc.) applicable to
the subject matter. Moreover, the protection of critical infrastructures encompasses
two parallel aspects, the physical and the cyber. Each aspect corresponds to what
is commonly referred to as “Critical Infrastructure Protection” (CIP) and “Criti-
cal Information Infrastructure Protection” (CIIP) (1). This parallel is also evident
in the EU legislation concerned with the topic1 [1]. CIP and CIIP are regulated
by respective directives (legislative acts setting out only a goal that all MS must
achieve via national laws). The most important piece of legislation concerning CIP
is the ECI Directive [2] dealing with the ‘European Critical Infrastructures’ (ECI).
The most relevant legislation dealing with CIIP is the NIS Directive [3] the aim
of which is to set up measures for a high common level of security of network and
information systems across the Union.2
8.2.2.2 Challenges originating from the EU legal framework
With regard to the CIP, the status of protection of national healthcare critical infras-
tructure results to be “disparate” [4] among the MS, which is due to the regulation
of security by national laws. As a consequence, some MS (e.g., the Netherlands
[5]) do not explicitly mention “healthcare” as a sector worthy of protection under
national CIP legislations.3
1. The outline of the legislative developments of CIP and CIIP legislation in Europe falls outside the purposes
of the present article. For an overview of the main pieces of legislation and policy-making instruments in
the EU, see A. Kasper, A. Antonov, “Towards Conceptualizing EU Cybersecurity Law” (2018).
2. The ECI Directive has been approved in 2008 and, although devoted to CIP, it applies only to CI that fall
under the definition of ‘European Critical Infrastructures. Member States’ national Critical Infrastructures
fall outside the scope of the ECI Directive. The ECI Directive remains, however, a key reference within
the EU CIP framework as it provides meaningful legal definitions on CI (such as, the definition of Critical
Infrastructure, under art. 2). Furthermore, the ECI Directive does not consider the healthcare sector as
worthy of being protected, while, the NIS Directive considers the healthcare sector as falling within the
scope of the legislation.
3. France is an example of a Member State that has included the healthcare within CIP legislation. The French
Defence Code (“Code de la Défense”) considers critical infrastructures as the ones that are vital for the
maintenance of the social and economic progress. It considers 12 sectors for critical infrastructures and
includes healthcare.
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With regard to the CIIP, the NIS Directive represents an important step towards
reaching a common level of cyber resilience across the EU as it has set, among
others, security and notification requirements for operators of essential services
(OES) (i.e., “healthcare providers” for the healthcare sector) [6]. Nonetheless,
many challenges—concerning the implementation and the interpretation of the
law by the EU MS—await to be addressed. For example, many MS have not
respected the deadline (9 May 2018) for the adoption of national laws imple-
menting the NIS Directive [7]. This has implied uncertainty for many stake-
holders willing to put in place the necessary measures foreseen by the EU law
and national law. Furthermore, in order to identify the OES (such as hospitals,
clinics, etc.) [8]. MS have adopted methodologies that have proven to be het-
erogeneous. [9] For instance, some MS have identified a very high number of
OES (for instance, Finland) [9], whereas others have identified less.4 Such differ-
ence in numbers may have a negative impact on the coherent application of the
NIS Directive within the Union, with possible consequences for the whole inter-
nal market and the effective handling of cyber-dependencies [9]. Moreover, the
Directive states that OES have to notify incidents “having a significant impact
to the continuity of the essential services they provide” [10]. Since the purpose
of the Directive is to provide a level of minimum harmonization [11], the body of
the text does not specify what “significant impact” means—leaving MS to provide
their own definition. This may consequently lead to fragmentation among oper-
ators across Europe who will have to follow their respective national approaches
with regard to incident notification.5 Similarly, the Directive does not granu-
larly define the security measures that OES must adopt “to prevent and mini-
mize the impact of incidents affecting the security of the network and information
4. To give an example, according to the data provided by the EC Report [8], Finland has identified 10.897
OES for all NISD sectors—due to the high number of OES identified for the healthcare sectors (see [9],
p. 27, footnote 8). This number appears to be very high, considering that the sum of all OES identified by
all the other MS for all the NISD sectors is 4.925. To give a comparative example with another MS, Italy
has identified 553 OES for all NISD sectors [9]. Furthermore, according to the preliminary documentation
available, Italy has identified 326 OES for the healthcare sector—see Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri.
Intesa ai sensi dell’articolo 4 del decreto legislative 18 maggio 2018, n. 65, recante attuazione della direttiva
(UE) 2016/1148 del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio, 6 luglio 2016: misure per un livello comune
elevato di sicurezza delle reti e dei sistemi informativi dell’Unione, tra il Governo e le Regioni e Province
autonome di Trento e Bolzano, sullo schema di decreto del Ministero della salute (version of 7 November
2018, available at: www.statoregioni.it).
5. While this problem remains, for the sake of completeness it is also true that the European Commission
is putting in place also coordinative efforts to tackle this kind of issues. As an example, see the European
Commission guidelines on Incident Reporting, which have been drafted within the framework of a Cooper-
ation Group composed by Member States’ experts. European Commission, Reference document on Incident
Notification for Operators of Essential Services. Circumstances of notification, CG Publication (February
2018). To be noted that the document is not binding.
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systems” [12]. This may bring further fragmentation among healthcare operators in
Europe.
Although the challenges mentioned above might appear copious, it should also
be stressed that during recent years, the EU has put in place several legislative mea-
sures to increase the level of CIP in Europe [13]. While there is still enough room
for improvement, legislative instruments such as the ECI Directive and the NIS
Directive have served as a catalyst in many Member States to pave the way for real
change in the institutional and regulatory landscape of critical infrastructures. Fur-
ther non-binding guidance at an EU level and the already established coordinative
mechanisms between Member States (most importantly the recently established
NIS Cooperation Group [14]) could be beneficial to achieve a higher degree of
coherence for CIP, and especially CIIP, in Europe.
8.3 Recent Security Incidents
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) definition “Hospitals com-
plement and amplify the effectiveness of many parts of the health system, providing
continuous availability of services for acute and complex conditions” [15]. They
are an essential element to health systems as they support care coordination and
integration and play a key role in supporting other healthcare providers, such as
primary health care, community outreach and home-based services. For these rea-
sons, cyber and physical attacks against hospitals, patients, healthcare workers, and
facilities have been on the rise worldwide [16].
More specifically, in terms of cyberattacks, it has been reported that 81% of 223
healthcare organizations surveyed and >110 million patients in the US had their
data compromised in 2015, with only 50% of the providers thinking that they
could protect themselves from cyberattacks [17]. In addition, between 2009 and
2018, there have been 2.546 healthcare data breaches that resulted in theft/expo-
sure of 189,945,874 records [18]. In the healthcare sector, hacking and malware
(including ransomware) are the leading attack type of health data breaches [19].
These data breaches result in large financial losses, but also in loss of reputation
and reduced patient safety.
Several cyberattacks in the healthcare sector have been reported and some exam-
ples of such incidents are presented below:
• 2017 WannaCry attack infected more than 300,000 computers across the
world demanding that users pay bitcoin ransoms. The WannaCry cyberattack
targeted the UK’s National Health Service (NHS). By exploiting a Windows
vulnerability, the hackers managed to infect at least 16 health centers and
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200,000 computers, which led to the cancellation of nearly 20,000 appoint-
ments and paralyzed more than 1,200 pieces of diagnostic equipment [20].
Moreover, according to US media, the Presbyterian Medical Centre shut
down for 10 days until it paid a $17,000 ransom [21].
• Medical Device Hijack (Medjack) is another known attack that injects mal-
ware into unprotected medical devices to move laterally across the hospi-
tal network [22]. Between the first detection of Medjack in 2015 and now,
there have been many variations of the attack with several hospitals’ medical
devices, including X-ray equipment, Picture Archive and Communications
Systems (PACS), and Blood Gas Analyzers (BGA), etc., having been attacked.
The attacker establishes a backdoor within the medical device, and almost any
form of manipulation of the unencrypted data stored and flowing through
the device is possible.
• It was reported in the press that in January 2019 hackers performed a ransom
attack in a heart specialist clinic in Melbourne, where the hackers hit patient
files [23]. As a result, staff was unable to access some patient files for more than
three weeks. The Clinic could have mitigated the impact if data was properly
and fully backed and if they were investing consistently in IT security.
• A billing company based in the USA, which operates the online payment sys-
tem used by a network of 44 hospitals in the USA, discovered that some of its
databases that contained 2,652,537 patients’ records had been compromised
in 2018. Upon discovery of the breach, access to data was terminated and
forensic specialists were hired to review the incident, secure affected databases,
and improve security controls (HIPAA, 2018).
• In 2019, it was revealed that a billing services vendor American Medical Col-
lection Agency was hacked for eight months between August 1, 2018, and
March 30, 2019. Since the breach was revealed, at least six covered entities
have come forward to report their patient data was compromised by the hack.
So far, up to 25 million patients from were affected [24].
• 128,400 records were affected by a sophisticated phishing incident that hap-
pened at New York oncology and hematology clinic. More specifically, four-
teen employee email accounts clicked on phishing emails, which exposed
health information in the email accounts. The clinic hired forensic special-
ists to assess the breach and types of data affected. Moreover, improvements
to data security following the incident included active monitoring of affected
systems, regular password resets, additional employee training, and new email
protocols [19].
On a similar line, in the USA, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services has developed a breach portal, the aim of which is to gather information
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on healthcare sector physical and cyber breaches. According to this portal, in
2019, 407 entities have been attacked and 40.267.487,00 individuals have been
affected. In addition, there have been identified four main types of breaches
hacking/IT incident (61%), improper disposal (1%), loss (3%), theft (8%), and
unauthorized access/disclosure (28%), with the hacking/IT incidents affecting a
total of 35.381.048,00 individuals and the unauthorized access/disclosure affect-
ing 4.551.487,00 individuals [25].
In addition, physical attacks deprive people of urgently needed care, endanger
healthcare providers, and undermine health systems. The WHO created the Attacks
on Health Care initiative to systematically collect evidence on attacks on healthcare,
to advocate for the end of such attacks, and to promote best practices for safeguard-
ing healthcare from attacks [26]. The initiative is global, but its main geographic
focus is at the country level. According to this initiative, in 2018 the healthcare
sector (19 countries) was attacked 388 times and this caused 322 deaths and 425
injuries. The attacks were mainly bombings (51%), shootings (14%), threats of vio-
lence (9%), etc. Several physical attacks, such as violence against physicians (includ-
ing hostage taking), fires, shootings, bombings against infrastructures, have been
reported all around the world and some examples of such incidents are described
below:
• While a nurse was examining a female patient, the accompanying Roma (gyp-
sies) group attacked her and injured her face. The incident happened at the
Salamina Island Health Center, Greece (POEDIN, 2018). Similar incidents
have been reported to other countries, such as Cyprus [27], Louisiana [28],
Kolkata [29], Australia [30], etc.
• A UK A&E registrar was held hostage when she had gone to check on a
young patient, who was having a mental health episode after taking drugs.
Unfortunately, the patient had managed to hide a pair of scissors, which she
pulled out before backing the doctor into a corner. The police were eventually
called and restrained the patient [31].
• A woman opened fire at a flat opposite a Catholic Hospital and then inside
the hospital in the south-western town of Lorrach in Baden-Wuerttemberg,
Germany, killing at least three, including one child, and wounding several
patients before police shot her dead [32].
• A gunman killed six patients in a hospital waiting room in the Czech city of
Ostrava and drove off. Police launched two helicopters to search for him, once
they had obtained pictures of the suspect from security cameras. When one
of the helicopters was flying over the car, the man shot himself in the head
and later died of his injuries [33]. It has been reported that shooting rates
in hospitals, increased from 9 per year from 2000 to 2005 to 17 per year
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from 2006 to 2011, according to a study published in 2012 in the Annals of
Emergency Medicine [34].
Physical or cyber incidents like the above could affect the healthcare services
provision and could cause overwhelming pressure, such as loss of infrastructure or
a massive patient surge. Hospitals not only provide care services but they are also the
last resort for disaster victims seeking care and represent an icon of social security,
connectivity, and community trust [35]. Thus, in this context, it is fundamental
for a hospital to remain resilient, maintain the level of provided care, and be able
to scale up its service delivery in any given emergency situation.
8.4 Threat and Risk Analysis
Threats are actions that can negatively impact valuable resources of an organization.
Typically, threats exploit vulnerabilities of the system, i.e., take advantage of some
weaknesses in the system to trigger an undesired outcome, as damage or loss of an
asset.
To guarantee the safety of the systems, it is very important to determine the
possible root causes of threats. According to ENISA [36], we can identify five main
groups of threats faced by healthcare organizations:
• Malicious actions that are deliberate acts performed by an internal or exter-
nal person or organization to destroy or steal data or sabotage the system. Mal-
ware (e.g., virus, ransomware), hijacking, social engineering, medical device
tampering, device and data theft are examples of malicious actions;
• Human errors that are related with misconfiguration or improper use of
devices and information systems, and incorrect execution of processes;
• System failures;
• Supply chain failures that are responsibility of third-party suppliers, for
example, power suppliers, medical device manufacturers, etc.;
• Natural phenomena.
The person or entity who is responsible for conducting these threats (threat
actor) can also be classified according to its role:
• Insider threat actor: this category is composed of the hospital staff (physi-
cians, nurses, administrative staff, etc.);
• Malicious patients and guests;
• Remote attackers: actors who are not physically in the hospital;
• Other causes: such as environmental or accidental equipment failure.
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Table 8.1. Asset categories.
Category Example
Specialist personnel Employees, Persons with special functions, etc.
Buildings and Facilities Main and ancillary buildings, Technical buildings, Power and
climate regulation systems, temperature sensors, medical gas
supply, room operation, automated door lock system, etc.
Identification Systems Tags, bracelets, badges, biometric scanners, CCTV (video
surveillance), RFID services, etc.
Networked Medical
Devices
Mobile devices (e.g., glucose measuring devices), wearable
external devices (e.g., portable insulin pumps), implantable
devices (e.g., cardiac pacemakers), stationary devices [e.g.,
computed tomography (CT) scanners], support devices (e.g.,
assistive robots), etc.
Networking Equipment Transmission media, network interface cards, network devices
(e.g., hubs, switches, routers, etc.), telephone system, etc.
Interconnected Clinical
Information Systems
Hospital information system (HIS), Laboratory information
system (LIS), Pharmacy information system (PIS), Picture
archiving and communication system (PACS), blood bank
system, etc.
Mobile Client Devices Mobile clients (e.g., laptops, tablets, smartphones), mobile
applications for smartphones and tablets, alarm, and




Medical equipment for tele-monitoring and tele-diagnosis,
medical equipment for distribution of drugs and telehealth
equipment (cameras, sensors, telehealth computer system for
patients to register their physiological measurements
themselves, etc.)
Data and records Clinical and administrative patient data, financial,
organizational and other hospital data, staff data, vendor
details, tracking logs, etc.
Operating resources Medicinal products, medical consumables, Laundry supply,
Sterile supply, Food supply, etc.
Organizations have a wide range of entities, the assets, which are essential for
their operation. Thus, it is crucial to identify the critical assets in the hospital to
ensure the patients’ safety. Table 8.1 presents the list of critical asset categories.
A cyber-physical attack scenario is a combination of threats, vulnerabilities, and
assets. In the next section, we will describe nine different relevant attack scenarios
against critical health infrastructures.
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8.5 Scenarios of Threat
The definition of the cyber-physical scenarios of threat, to be clearer, should fol-
low a methodology. Several methodologies for risk assessment exist, such as ISO
31000:2018, IEC 31010: 2019, ISO27005, etc. EBIOS methodology is compli-
ant with the standards, as ISO3100, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 15408, etc., and
it is commonly used to describe the scenarios of threat. EBIOS [37] is a French
acronym meaning Expression of Needs and Identification of Security Objectives
(Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité) and was devel-
oped by the French Central Information Systems Security Division. EBIOS is used
to assess and treat risks related to information systems security (ISS). It can also
be used to communicate this information within the organization and to partners
and therefore assists in the ISS risk management process since it is compliant with
major IT security standards. EBIOS can be employed in different fields (using the
appropriate techniques and knowledge bases) [38], even if it was initially designed
for information security. To apply EBIOS in a specific field, it is generally suffi-
cient to adapt the terminology and exploit the techniques and the knowledge bases
specific to that field concerned if the knowledge does not seem to be applicable or
understood (primary assets, considered criteria, potential impacts, etc.).
EBIOS uses a progressive risk management approach (see Figure 8.1): it starts in
the major missions of the object under study (highest level) and goes to the busi-
ness functions and techniques (lowest level), studying possible risk scenarios [39].
It aims to obtain a synergy between compliance and scenarios, positioning these two
complementary concepts in the best way, i.e., where they bring the highest value.
The compliance approach is used to determine the security base of the scenarios,
Figure 8.1. Digital risk management pyramid.
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Figure 8.2. Cyber risk scenario.
particularly to develop targeted or sophisticated scenarios. This assumes that acci-
dental and environmental risks are treated a priori by the compliance approach.
Thus, scenario risk assessment focuses on intentional threats.
The EBIOS method consists of five iterative workshops (Figure 8.2):
• Scope and Security Baseline: the first workshop aims to identify the scope
of the study, the workshop participants and the time frame. During this
workshop, essential and support assets and business values should be listed.
Threat events and their impact should be identified at this stage. The security
baseline should also be defined. This first workshop follows the compliance
approach: it corresponds to the first two stages of the digital risk management
pyramid.
• Risk Sources: in the second workshop, the risk sources and their high-level
objectives should be identified and characterized.
• Strategic Scenarios: in this workshop, it is possible to have a clear vision
of the ecosystem, which allows to build high-level scenarios of threat. They
represent the paths of attack that a risk source can take to achieve its objec-
tive. These scenarios are conceived taking into account the ecosystem and the
business values of the object, and they are evaluated in terms of severity. At
the end of the workshop, it is already possible to define security measures on
the ecosystem.
• Technical Scenarios: the purpose of this workshop is to build scenarios con-
taining the technical procedures that can be used by the risk sources to carry
out the strategic scenarios. This workshop adopts a similar approach of the
previous one but focuses on the critical assets. Then, the likelihood of the
technical scenarios should be evaluated.
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Figure 8.3. Example of a technical scenario description using attack graphs.
• Risk Treatment: in the last workshop, all the risks studied in the previous
workshops are considered to define the risk treatment strategy. Then, a set
of safety measures are defined and included in a continuous improvement
plan. In this workshop the residual risks are also summarized and the risk
monitoring framework is defined.
Therefore, we can summarize the construction of a cyber risk scenario as
described in Figure 8.3.
A technical scenario can be represented in the form of an attack graph to visualize
the operational modes planned by the attacker to achieve its objective. An example
of an operational scenario is given in Figure 8.3.
The proposed model consists of 4 phases:
• KNOW: set of targeting, reconnaissance, and external discovery activities
conducted by the attacker to prepare his attack and to increase his chances
of success (ecosystem mapping, information on key people and systems,
search and evaluation of vulnerabilities, etc.). Such information shall be col-
lected according to the determination and resources of the attacker: intel-
ligence, economic intelligence, exploitation of socio-professional networks,
direct approaches, specialized meetings for information inaccessible in open
source, etc.
• GET IN: all activities carried out by the attacker to digitally or physically
introduce either directly and frontally into the target information system or
in its ecosystem for a rebound attack. The intrusion is usually carried out
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through “border” goods that serve as the entry points due to their exposure,
for example, user post connected to the Internet, maintenance tablet of a
provider, TV-maintained printer, etc.
• FIND: internal recognition of networks and systems, localization, elevation,
and persistence, which allows the attacker to locate the desired data and mate-
rial. During this phase, the attacker usually seeks to remain discreet and erase
his traces.
• CONTROL: all the data and media activities found in the previous stage.
For example, in the case of sabotage, this phase includes the activation of the
active load, for example, ransom; in the case of an espionage operation aimed
at ex-filtering emails, it may be necessary to establish and maintain discrete
capacity for data collection and exfiltration.
After the definition of the technical scenario, it is important to evaluate its over-
all likelihood, which reflects its probability of success or feasibility. To begin, the
elemental likelihood of each action in the scenario should be assessed. This can be
estimated by the judgment of an expert or using metrics. Then, the overall likeli-
hood of the scenario is evaluated from the elementary likelihoods.
Three different approaches can be considered to rate the likelihood of the oper-
ational scenarios:
• Express method: direct quotation of the likelihood of the scenario;
• Standard method: rating of the “probability of success” of each elemental
action of the scenario, from the point of view of the attacker;
• Advanced method: in addition to the “probability of success,” rating of the
“technical difficulty” of each elementary action of the scenario, from the point
of view of the attacker.
We will consider the standard method. The following scale will be used to deter-
mine the probability of success of each elementary actions (Pr(EA)) [40]:
• 4 – Almost certain: Probability of near-certainty >90%;
• 3 – Very High: Very high probability of success >60%;
• 2 – Significant: Probability of significant success >20%;
• 1 – Low: Success probability low <20%;
• 0 – Very Low: Success probability very low <3%.
The overall likelihood score of the scenario can be evaluated using the following
rule:
Index_Pr(EAn) = Min{Pr(EAn), Max(Index_Pr(EAn−1))}
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Figure 8.4. Medical devices attack: sketch.
The idea is to evaluate step by step an intermediate cumulative probability index
from the elementary action “EAn” of a node n and the cumulative indices of the
previous node n−1. The overall probability of success index (final step) is obtained
by taking the highest intermediate cumulative probability index among the proce-
dures that lead to the final step. It corresponds to the mode(s) operating(s) whose
chance of success seems the highest.
8.5.1 Scenario Example 1: Cyber-physical Attack to on Medical
Devices
Medical devices are an important asset in healthcare infrastructure. They improve
the quality of life of the patients, but they are also a source of threat due to the
increasing connectivity to all parts of the hospital. Several attacks on medical devices
have been reported during the last years. For example, in 2018, security researchers
demonstrated that they have founded security weaknesses in Medtronic pacemakers
that leaves the life-saving device vulnerable to hackers and puts patients at risk.6
Figure 8.4 shows an example of medical devices attack.
An attacker, in order to influence treatment outcome or for financial gain, can
obtain physical or remote access to medical device and use reverse engineering to
identify a vulnerability and exploits it. Then, the attacker can take advantage of the
exploit of the medical device to alter its software and/or cause a disruption in health
systems, which can potentially harm patients and/or staff (see Figure 8.5).
Thus, in this case, after the vulnerability scanning, the medical device system is
changed or a denial of service is launched to interrupt the health system (Figure 8.6).
6. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/17/security-researchers-say-they-can-hack-medtronic-pacemakers.html
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Figure 8.5. Medical devices attack: strategic scenario.
Figure 8.6. Medical devices attack: technical scenario.
The attacker can also steal the device. This will cause a disclosure, modification,
and/or disruption of the medical device which will impact patient and/or staff
safety. This attack has a very high probability of success (Pr 3).
Several assets are compromised in this type of scenario, for example: Buildings
and Facilities, e.g., technical room; Identification Systems, e.g., badge (physical),
credentials (cyber); Networked Medical Devices, e.g., Wearable Medical IoT; Net-
working Equipment, e.g., Router; Interconnected Clinical Information Systems,
e.g., PACS; and Data and records, e.g., patient data.
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Some practices can be considered to minimize the impact of this attack,
which are:
• Establish and maintain communication with vendors security teams;
• Implement access controls for vendor support staff;
• Implement security operations practices for devices;
• Develop and implement security measures for a devices network.
8.5.2 Scenario Example 2: Cyber-physical Attack to Cause
a Hardware Fault
As any critical infrastructure, the interruption of services in healthcare facilities has
a huge impact on patients. Attackers can take advantage of this feature of hospitals
for financial gain, or for attention or other motives. A sketch of an attack that can
cause a hardware fault is represented in Figure 8.7.
The usual aims of this kind of attack are extortion, sabotage, or even intimida-
tion. Therefore, the attacker is only concerned with finding a way to cause system
unavailability, damaging the system permanently (or not) and without worrying
whether the patient will be at risk or not (Figure 8.8).
The attacker can use social engineering to obtain information about the hospital
infrastructure. With this knowledge, he/she could exploit the system’s vulnerabil-
ity, gain administrator privileges, and cause a hardware failure (Figure 8.9). The
unavailability of the healthcare system can cause death or serious injury to patients,
because the assistance services cannot work properly with hardware failures.
Some of the affected assets in this scenario are: Networked Medical Devices, e.g.,
medical devices that communicate with central system; Networking Equipment,
e.g., externally accessible server; Interconnected Clinical Information Systems,
Figure 8.7. Hardware fault attack: sketch.
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Figure 8.8. Hardware fault attack: strategic scenario.
Figure 8.9. Hardware fault attack: technical scenario.
e.g., PACS; Mobile Client Devices, e.g., mobile applications for smartphones and
tablets; Remote Care System Assets, e.g., medical equipment for tele-monitoring;
Data and records, e.g., health records.
It is important to note this attack could be, at least partially, mitigated if:
• An appropriate intrusion detection system had been deployed to detect early
the attack;
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• Exists an endpoint security system that prevents the connection of unknown
devices;
• The staff had been trained to understand the threat, recognize suspicious
emails, and never open email attachments from unknown senders;
• Privileged access management tools to report access to critical infrastructures
had been deployed;
• Devices have been patched after the patches have been validated and dis-
tributed by medical device manufacturer;
• A restricted and rigid access controls policy for clinical and vendor support
staff (including remote access and monitoring of vendor access) had been
implemented.
8.6 Conclusion
Healthcare organizations are a fruitful target for crime. The increasing integration
of cyber and physical systems and connected devices in its environment brings new
challenges to these organizations, especially from a security perspective. To com-
bat the threats that emerge from this healthcare technology era, hospitals need to
implement cyber and physical controls, reducing the risks that can cause harm to
people, property, and environment.
In this chapter, we have presented the main security challenges in the healthcare
environment, not only from a structure management point of view but also from
a legal perspective. A survey about the recent security incidents was performed in
order to understand the type of vulnerabilities exploited by the attackers in the
health sector. Inspired by this research, five main groups of threats and a critical
assets categorization were defined. Finally, using EBIOS methodology, that is also
briefly described, two combined cyber and physical scenarios of threat are described.
All this information should clarify and alert the reader to the security issues faced
by healthcare facilities in this smart hospital’s era.
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Security Systems in the Healthcare Sector
By Mathias Normann, George Suciu, Vasiliki Mantzana, Ilias Gkotsis,
Mari-Anais Sachian, Gabriel Petrescu, Hussain Ijaz and Barry Norton
To efficiently protect the healthcare sector is a major task. Healthcare is a highly
specialized sector where the physical facilities are a mix of publicly-available, semi-
private, private, and areas housing critical infrastructure. The healthcare sector
spans many types of buildings, some open to the public with zones restricted only to
staff and some completely restricted to the public. Some of the buildings will have
patients all the time, some only during daytime, some will have important and
expensive medical devices, and some will contain servers. The buildings can have
physical medical records, computers used by the staff can have access to personal
data, and the servers that store huge amounts of personal data, critical information,
and critical software for the healthcare sector. Besides the normal software used for
an office building, the healthcare sector’s internal software is used to handle the
medical data of patients and to run and control medical equipment and machines.
To protect all this, the healthcare sector keeps expanding the security systems
within their facilities, so it is common to have several security systems to handle
different security areas, as no system covers everything. This chapter will present
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an overview of how a video management system, an access control system, a fire
detection system, SCADA, ICS, and smart building sensors, as well as a Cyber-
security protection system works to make the healthcare sector a more secure
environment.
9.1 Video Management Systems
With regard to physical security, camera surveillance is the most common way of
getting an overview of what is happening. In years past, when analogue cameras
were the only type available, large hardware set-ups were needed to record the video
feeds from the cameras and store them on physical tapes. With such set-ups, one
could not combine cameras from different manufacturers, as they only worked with
their own management systems. In the 1990s the Internet Protocol camera (IP)
was invented. IP-cameras can be connected to the internal network using ethernet
cables, instead of being directly hooked up to specific hardware, as analog cameras
must. It is easy to view video feeds, given further standardization in this sector, from
an IP that is connected to the internal network, and this does not require a large
hardware set-up. These days the video can even be viewed using a Web browser,
or some of the commonly available media players, by accessing the IP using these
networking protocols, which have now spread from the Internet to almost every
corporate, and indeed home, computer network. The switch to IP-enabled digital
cameras came to revolutionize the world of Video Management Systems (VMSs),
as it is now a lot easier and cheaper to install new cameras, and VMSs can manage
video from cameras across many manufacturers.
In the healthcare sector large installations of IPs are common, given the profu-
sion of assets to protect—both people, medical devices and data—so to sufficiently
protect everything, installations may require hundreds or thousands of cameras.
For a human to keep track of all these cameras manually, using a browser or video
players is completely impossible, and this is where a VMS comes into the picture, to
help manage all cameras, to record and store their feeds when relevant, and to help
retrieve or show live the most relevant segments of video streams to the operator.
In general, a modern VMS is constructed to have a central Video Management
Server with the responsibility of handling all cameras, the data they create, enabling
reactions to the data and enabling the user to interact with it. The general architec-
ture of a VMS can be viewed in Figure 9.1, and the parts of the VMS is described
in detail below:
• Storing the configurations and information of all registered cameras in the
Device Management Database;
































Figure 9.1. VMS architecture.
• Recording and storing the video streams from all cameras registered with
the VMS into the Media Database;
• Enable searching for cameras and relevant video streams stored in the Media
Database;
• Enable Video Analytics to be run on video streams, such as motion detection
which can be used to only store video frames in the Media Database when
there is motion in the view or to prioritize which video stream the human
should watch;
• Handling of events happening within the system, upon which rules can be
defined to react to conditions that can happen within the system and through
which alarms can be raised by the system for the human operator to consider.
As mentioned above, cameras are manufactured by different companies, and
even though the mission of the ONVIF standard (ONVIF, 2020) is to “provide and
promote standardized interfaces for effective interoperability of IP-based physical
security products,” camera manufacturers are not obliged to use this standard, and
even if they do, cameras can allow the configuration of features that the standard
does not cover. Therefore, for a camera to work with a given VMS, in general a
driver has to be developed for the camera, or for that series of cameras. Most VMSs
today have drivers for at least the most common cameras in use.
In order for the operator to be able to view the live and recorded video streams,
to review the alarms and to search, VMSs often provide both a desktop client and
a mobile client. The desktop client can either be native to its host operating system
or developed using Web interfaces to be used in the browser. Desktop clients can
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also enable display in a video wall, wherein the application displays across several
windows, with one or more video streams in each window, where each window is
mapped to an entire monitor within a bank of such.
Alongside VMSs, there are a number of other software-based systems used in
physical security, such as access control of doors within the buildings covered.
In recent years, there has been a demand from users to integrate these systems
together with the VMS. This integration enables a better understanding of what
happens at the installation site and better alarm handling.
9.2 Integrations with Video-based Security Systems
Many security systems in an installation are managed by a single central system,
which is used to set up the devices and configure the system to run without further
human interaction. Take, for example, an access control system: after the system
has been set up to allow the right people through the right doors, the system will
run without human interaction to the management system, unless something goes
wrong or some access rights have to be changed. This section describes the integra-
tion of some of such building security systems and sensors that can help improve
the security in the healthcare sector.
9.2.1 Access Control Systems
An access control system restricts access to areas within a building, by having one
or more door controllers connected to locking mechanisms on important doors,
together with card/PIN readers and request-to-exit (REX) systems, as illustrated in
Figure 9.2 and described below.
Door controller The central system that receives input from the lock, reader, and
REX, stores or forwards the events, as well as applying defined rules, and
thereby communicating: to the lock whether it should open and, to the reader
what state to display.
Lock Inside the door, and potentially the door frame, is a mechanism by which
the door can be held in a locked state. One important characteristic of this
mechanism is that the locking can be “fail safe”, i.e., unlocked if the power is
removed, or “fail secure”, i.e., locked if the power is removed.
Reader Any system that gives permission to pass through an access control point
if the correct credentials are provided, such as card readers, PIN pads, and
finger print readers.




Figure 9.2. Access control system.
REX Any system that gives permission to pass through an access control point
without providing credentials, such as a push button, an asymmetric door
handle mechanism, or a motion sensor.
In an office building, restricting door access, and sometimes lift access, to
employees and invited guests only is often a simple and easily-defined problem.
This access regime can be effected by installing an access control point at every
entrance of the outer perimeter of the building and only allowing the public into
the reception area, until invited further in.
In the healthcare sector, however, defining those areas where the public may
enter can be a much more complicated problem. There might be a lot of areas that
are restricted to staff only, but that are still physically accessible to the public, as
it would disrupt the hospital workflow too much to have too many access control
points. To ensure adequate surveillance of such restricted areas, more intelligent
solutions are required in addition to basic access control, such as integration with
the video-based security systems.
When an access control point is used, if the access control system is integrated
with a VMS, then the VMS can be informed of authentication and door open/-
close events, in order to capture the relevant video feed covering the access control
point and associate this video with the access control events produced. It is a fea-
ture of such integration that the video preserved and associated with the access
control event precedes the triggering event by several seconds, requiring buffering.
By knowing the video feeds covering the access control point, the VMS may fur-
ther apply analytics to determine and classify malicious uses. One example is to
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automatically detect “tailgating,” by determining if more than one person passes
through the access control point, while access through the access controller only
grants one authorization.
9.2.2 Fire Detection System
The fire detection system in a hospital is vital for the safety of the personnel and
patients. Fire is not uncommon in a hospital environment, either malicious or acci-
dental, and false alarms are even more common.
The main components in such a system are the sensors and the control panel
which supervises the whole building. In providing physical security to the health-
care sector, there is often a larger monitoring system, which allows operators to
inspect and detect various attacks which could affect equipment and put the person-
nel of the hospital in harm’s way. In installing a fire detection system, it is necessary
that each room should have specialist sensors to detect both heat and smoke. Each
fire incident detected will directly be forwarded as an alert to the control panel, and
so on to the people which are in charge of the monitoring, can act fast, and call the
firefighters.
In case of fires, integrated physical security systems can be used to diagnose causal
or contributory factors such as:
1. The bad wiring of a power socket;
2. Inflammable substances left unattended in certain operations rooms;
3. An arson started by a malicious intended person;
4. A bombing attack;
5. Mishandling of electrical equipment.
As regards the use of video in fire detection, lately various convolutional neural
networks (CNN)-based methods have been applied in specific environments with
reasonable accuracy and execution time. However, those approaches failed to detect
fire in uncertain environments, for instance, those having excessive smoke, fog,
fire, and snow. Furthermore, achieving efficiency with reduced running time and
model size is quite challenging for resource-constrained devices, such as edge-based
analytics, i.e., within cameras, motivating the centralized approach of VMS-based
video analytics.
A CNN-based method, illustrated in Figure 9.3, can thereby be used for fire
detection in videos of health facility. The approach can be extended for the extrac-
tion of detailed contextual information from fire scenes such as an object on fire,
burning degree, and fire growth rate, etc. Furthermore, a hybrid system can be
developed by integrating smoke detection methods with the current work for
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Figure 9.3. Efficient deep CNN for fire detection in video captured in uncertain environ-
ment C1, C2, and C3.
intelligent management of fire disasters. Finally, such an approach can be combined
with industrial systems, 5G IoT, traffic, and robotics for more safe automation,
traveling, more vibrant, and trustworthy experience (Muhammad et al., 2018).
9.2.3 SCADA, ICS, and Smart Building Sensors
SCADA is a control systems architecture, based in both software and hardware,
that has many benefits for the industry. SCADA’s features include to process real-
time data, record specification into a log document, control mechanical procedures,
and connect further devices. The architecture consists of several interconnected ele-
ments, each with a different purpose and design, varying from a Remote Telemetry
Unit (RTU) that interacts with the physical environment to an Human Machine
Interface (HMI) that connects with the users (Rodofile et al., 2017). An Industrial
Control System (ICS) is one of the various kinds of control systems used to mon-
itor industrial processes. Depending on the size, it can be made up of several con-
trollers or a complex network of interactive control systems. These systems obtain
data from remote sensors that monitor and measure process variables that will be
compared with set-points. Hence, SCADA and ICS infrastructure capture data rel-
evant to security issues which can affect the well-being of the personal and patients
in a hospital environment.
A SCADA system can be used to connect to sensors and actuators which are in
charge of collecting various parameters from devices on the field. The signal sent
by SCADA devices is stored in an analogue format, and it is converted by a RTU,
a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), or a Intelligent Electronic Device (IED).
After this process is done, the converted data is sent via a communication channel
to the respective SCADA presentation and the control unit, whereas the sent data is
analyzed, and each operation is sent back to each sensor (Mobolarinwa, 2017). The
communication between devices and the SCADA host can be classified as dial-up,
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satellite, telephone, radio, and Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). Within a
SCADA system exists four layers, such as a collection, conversion, communication,
and control layer. Each of these layers can be used as an attack entry point into the
system, because protocols such as WLAN do not have authenticity and encryption
from the manufacturing phase. Subsequently, the data sent to end-devices can be
intercepted by an attacker and also operational errors can lead to a vulnerability in
a HMI, and this can be exploited by the malicious intended attacker.
A recent approach called “Tactile Internet” involves gathering multiple technolo-
gies by permitting intelligence through mobile edge computing and data transmis-
sion over a 5G network, though time will tell whether this approach gains traction
in the healthcare space.
Major classes of security vulnerabilities (Mobolarinwa, 2017) in the Industrial
SCADA IoT Infrastructure are:
• Human Machine Interface (HMI) vulnerabilities: Hard-coded Creden-




• Inadequate Physical Security
• SCADA Protocol Vulnerabilities
• Connection with the Corporate Network
9.3 Cyber-security in Healthcare Contexts
As introduced previously, the healthcare sector faces unprecedented risks and
compounding regulatory compliance requirements. It is usual that health-
care organizations have many assets that are essential for their operation
and should be protected. Assets that can be attacked include the facilities
and buildings themselves, data, interconnected clinical information systems,
mobile devices, networking equipment, identification systems, networked medi-
cal devices, and remote care systems, with the two most critical hospital’s assets
being the interconnected clinical information systems and networked medical
devices (Independent Security Evaluators, 2016). Patient records contain valuable
information, such as Personal Identifiable Information (PII) and Protected Health
Information (PHI), that can be the most attractive information for attackers.
Healthcare organizations and their assets suffer from vulnerabilities that can be
technical (application & OS, control gaps and design flaws, unpatched devices,
unprotected networks, weak credentials, lack of cyber threat prevention and
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detection, lack of smart sensors, remote access policies, lack of employee training
and awareness, etc.) or organizational and social (behavior of users, human errors,
etc.).
These vulnerabilities can be exploited in different ways by attackers that use dif-
ferent types of malicious actions (e.g., virus, ransomware, hijack). The probability
of these attacks can increase as healthcare organizations suffer also from system fail-
ures (e.g., software, hardware and network failure, inadequate firmware); human
errors (users systems’ misuse, unauthorized access, absence of audits and logs, etc.);
and natural phenomena. Attackers have different goals, as they might wish to cause
damage, obtain a ransom, cause the interruption of service, or collect data to pre-
pare future attacks.
As such, health infrastructure is identified as a significant potential target of
cyberattacks, which highlights the need to enhance protection from them. In order
for healthcare organizations to prevent, or at least reduce, unauthorized access, use,
disruption, deletion, and corruption, to respond effectively, quickly, and efficiently,
and to minimize the impact of attacks to their networks and systems, it is important
to take organizational and technical measures, such as those nominated below.
With regard to organizational measures that will enhance cybersecurity in health-
care organizations, it has been widely claimed that it is important for healthcare
organizations to assess cyber risks. Cyber risk assessments are used to identify, esti-
mate, and prioritize risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, indi-
viduals, other organizations, and national concerns, resulting from the operation
and use of information systems (NIST, 2019b).
In addition, healthcare organizations should develop and incorporate both
generic and case-specific laws, standards, plans, and policies that outline cyber-
security measures and crisis management procedures, such as the NIS direc-
tive (EU, 2016) and ISO 27001 (ISO, 2019), security procedures application in
order to protect the venue and other sensitive, critical, or valuable assets and areas
(e.g., computer room, central servers, clinical information systems, and electronic
healthcare records) from attacks.
Since the human factor is one of the major security threats in the health domain,
it is important that personnel are aware of the basic cybersecurity-related issues
and their skills—both technical and behavioral—are improved (ECSO, 2018).
Moreover, healthcare staff (including researchers, administrators, front desk work-
ers, medics, transcriptionists, handlers of medical claims to IT, and technical
staffs) should be properly trained on cybersecurity protection and crisis man-
agement issues, standards, plans, and protocols (Martin et al., 2017). In doing
this, stakeholders that find themselves affected by, or actively seek involvement
in crisis management processes, can manage and cooperate effectively and in
timely fashion on security planning, preparedness, response, recovery, and impact
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mitigation. With regard to technical measures, it has been reported that healthcare
organizations should adopt and implement different practices that will enhance
data, systems, devices, and networks security, such as the following, according
to ISO (2018) and NIST (2019a):
Authentication ensures the validity of the claimed identities of the entities partic-
ipating in communication (e.g., person, sensors, service or application) and
provides assurance that an entity is not attempting an unauthorized replay of
a previous communication.
Access control (authorization)—much like physical access control, described
above—guarantees that only individuals, as well as software and IT infras-
tructure, can only gain access to, and perform operations on, stored infor-
mation and flows that they are authorized for. Unlike physical access control,
different access levels can be granted to systems, devices, and networks.
Availability describes a security dimension that ensures there is no denial of autho-
rized access to network elements, stored information, information flows, ser-
vices, and applications due to events impacting the network.
Reliability has been defined as the ability of the system to perform its functions for
a period of time. This is a high-level security requirement and to be achieved
different mechanisms should be implemented (e.g., availability, communica-
tion security), as described in the respective sections above.
Non-reputation refers to the ability to prevent an individual or entity from deny-
ing having performed a particular action related to data, by making available
proof of various network-related actions (such as proof of obligation, intent,
or commitment; proof of data origin; proof of ownership; proof of resource
use).
Data confidentiality ensures that the data content cannot be understood by unau-
thorized entities.
Data integrity is a security dimension that ensures the correctness or accuracy of
data. Data should be protected against unauthorized modification, deletion,
creation, and replication and provide an indication of these unauthorized
activities.
Backup is the process of backing up the operational state, architecture and stored
data of database software.
Tracing systems should log access and errors to the collected and stored data (e.g.
time, date, users’ accessing the system, fails, wrong password).
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Log files are automatically produced files, recording events, messages from certain
software and operating systems.
Communication security is the security dimension that ensures that information
flows only between the authorized end points; i.e., the information is not
diverted or intercepted as it flows between these end points. To obtain com-
munication security, mechanisms such as encryption through Secure Sock-
ets Layer (SSL), Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), timestamps, auditing and
restricting access per-user-group should be implemented.
To secure networked devices and assets in the healthcare, it has been reported
that: (a) inventories should be created and maintained, as they can ensure a sound
understanding of the systems and their components, support configuration, and
automated remediation management processes (Independent Security Evaluators,
2016); and (b) software should be regularly patched and updated.
In addition, the network can be protected through the implementation of a fire-
wall and thereby segmentation and segregation techniques. Moreover, monitoring
mechanisms should be employed, so as to support: (a) network protection from
attacks, e.g., Intrusion Prevention Systems that detect threats over the network by
examining communications and scanning ports for anomalies and can execute a
real-time response to stop an immediate threat, detection of attacks, i.e., Intrusion
Detection Systems that monitor systems, network traffic, data, and files access, etc.
and detect attacks; and (c) response to attacks (Intrusion Response systems that
choose the necessary action to take to respond to attacks and ensure the security of
networks and computational system.
Finally, a security-by-design approach would complete the above countermea-
sures, focusing on the cybersecurity concerns with respect to new devices or sys-
tems that need to be planned and implemented from the start of the procurement,
design, development, and maintenance phases.
9.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented how security systems can be applied within the health-
care sector. The SAFECARE1 project2 is working to provide an integrated solution
for both physical and cybersecurity in the healthcare domain. In terms of physical
security, video surveillance, access control, fire detection, and building management
1. The SAFECARE project has received funding from the European Union’s H2020 research and innovation
programme under Grant Agreement no. 787002.
2. https://www.safecare-project.eu/
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sensors are combined with video analytics and novel rule support across the various
modalities of input data from all of these systems. In this way, integrated systems are
made capable of signaling security incidents via intrusion detection; fire detection;
detection of attacks on building management systems, such as power and heating,
ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC); and suspicious behavior detection. Fur-
ther, this approach to security sits alongside state-of-the-art cybersecurity provisions
and, for both, SAFECARE provides sophisticated analyses of impact propagation,
as described in a later chapter.
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10.1 Introduction
Modern societies are strongly dependent on the continuous function of Critical
Infrastructures (CI) that ensure the supply of crucial goods and services such as
power, Information and Communication Technologies, or drinking water. Critical
Infrastructures are essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, such
as health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, etcetera. These
aspects are also relevant with regard to the healthcare sector, where any interruption,
damage, or unavailability of healthcare services may provoke economic and non-
economic damages for individuals, organizations, States, and society as a whole.
The healthcare sector is among the most critical sectors in Critical Infrastruc-
ture Protection (CIP). Healthcare services considered “critical” are, for instance,
emergency healthcare; hospital care (inpatient & outpatient); the supply of
pharmaceuticals, vaccines, blood, medical supplies; and infection/epidemic control,
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to name but a few. The disruption of one of these critical healthcare services
could imply several damages for society. This happened, for instance, after the
Wannacry ransomware attack on the National Healthcare Services (NHS), in the
UK (Ghafur et al., 2010). According to NHS England, the ransomware affected at
least 80 out of 236 trusts across England, because they were infected by the ran-
somware or turned off their devices or systems as a precaution. Furthermore, 603
primary care and other NHS organizations were infected, including 595 GP prac-
tices. Thousands of appointments and operations were cancelled, and in five areas,
patients had to travel further to reach accident and emergency departments.
Having recognized the increasing role of CIP, the EU legislator and majority
of the EU Member States have adopted national strategies to increase the level of
protection of critical infrastructures in the EU. Concerning CIP, in the last few
years, many of the Member States adopted national CIP strategies and consider
healthcare as one of the sectors requiring protection.
Nevertheless, to protect Critical Infrastructures such as a hospital is a huge and
very complex task that requires particular attention and knowledge of defense and
prevention strategies, as well as of vulnerabilities and potential attacks that may
occur.
Critical Infrastructures such as hospitals are constantly threatened by different
kinds of potential attackers with different resources available. Some could be simply
motivated by visibility. Others could be driven by profit gain (Sultan et al., 2018;
Tonutti, 2016). The last few decades have also seen an increase of state-sponsored
attacks, which can be motivated by espionage, retaliation, intimidation or as a
stealth way to create disruption in case of escalating conflicts (Geers et al., 2013).
Dangerous threats are also presented by increasing terrorist activities in recent
years. While, traditionally, terrorist attacks have mostly targeted the physical world,
cyberattacks are getting more and more popular, for financing purposes, to collect
intelligence information or to cause disruption. When expertise is not available
internally, other people can be persuaded to do the job without knowing the real
objective (Mitnick and Simon, 2010).
Nowadays, physical and cyber systems are more and more interconnected, in
some cases being so integrated to be indivisible. From a security point of view, this
greatly enhances the attack surface and the possibility for remote actors to reach
their goals. Moreover, physical intrusions are still possible and currently used by
criminals.
Let us consider the motivation for a generic attacker to access confidential infor-
mation stored in local servers inside a hospital. This could be achieved by various
means and exploiting different levels of physical and cyber intrusions.
A more “traditional” attack would be to enter the hospital’s premises and collect
the desired information manually. An evolved remote attacker would rather look
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for a chain of vulnerabilities in the “cyber” services exposed by the hospital and
get the data from a completely different country. In the middle, there are many
different mixes of physical and cyber steps that can allow the accomplishment of
the same goal. Social engineering techniques could be used to trick hospital staff
in order to gain access to the systems (Medlin et al., 2008). Alternatively, a USB
drive infected with malware could be given as a gift to a doctor during a conference
(De Falco, 2012; Cluley, 2010).
It is therefore clear that physical and cyber threats should be considered, ana-
lyzed, and treated together, as cyber-physical threats. An integrated approach that
considers both physical and cyber worlds is therefore required.
This chapter presents the description of threats, potential incidents, and issues
regarding the protection of the critical infrastructures like hospitals, and it presents
the first results of the SAFECARE project, describing the internal architecture of
the whole system.
10.2 Safecare Approach
The idea behind the SAFECARE project is to respond to the growing demand for
an integrated cyber-physical security solution for Critical Infrastructures, in partic-
ular hospitals. The challenge is to bring together the most advanced technologies
from the physical and cyber security spheres, to achieve a global optimum for sys-
temic security and for the management of combined cyber and physical threats and
incidents, their interconnections and potential cascading effects. Indeed, the main
objective of the SAFECARE project is to increase the protection and resilience of
Healthcare facilities and services, allowing for a better response in case of emergen-
cies. This is done using a holistic approach that considers the physical and cyber
worlds in a single integrated system.
In addition, innovative services enable first responders and other relevant actors
to get real-time updated information about the availability of healthcare services.
This is useful both in case of incidents inside the facility itself, so that the informa-
tion about unavailable services is easily accessible, and in case of large-scale emer-
gencies such as earthquakes that can require the involvement of many facilities and
an efficient routing of patients.
Within the SAFECARE project, a global architecture schema that includes all
the physical, cyber, and cyber-physical module has been designed. This architecture
can be broken down into 3 parts, as shown in Figure 10.1:
• Physical security solutions
• Cybersecurity solutions
• Integrated cyber-physical security solutions
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Figure 10.1. SAFECARE global architecture.
The physical and cybersecurity solutions consist of smart modules and efficient
integrated technologies to, respectively, improve physical security and cybersecurity.
More specifically, physical security solutions embed integrated intelligent video
monitoring and interconnect building monitoring systems as well as management
systems. Meanwhile, cybersecurity solutions consist of cyber monitoring systems as
well as threat detection systems related to Information Technology (IT), Building
Management Systems (BMS), and e-health systems.
Both physical and cybersecurity monitoring tools are interconnected thanks to
the integrated cyber-physical security solutions. They consist of intelligent modules
whose role is to integrate different data sources and better take into account the
combination of physical and cybersecurity threats.
In order to fulfill their role, each solution ensemble is composed of several ded-
icated systems.
The physical security solutions rely on:
• The Suspicious Behavior Detection System;
• The Intrusion and Fire Detection System;
• The Data Collection System;
• The Mobile Alerting System;
• The Building Threat Monitoring System.
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The Building Threat Monitoring System (BTMS) is the aggregation point for
physical security and makes the link between physical systems and the rest of the
architecture. The Mobile Alerting System (MAS) is intended for local security oper-
ators, providing them with a quick way to report physical security events and visu-
alize contextual information.
The cybersecurity solutions rely on:
• The IT Threat Detection System;
• The BMS Threat Detection System;
• The Advanced File Analysis System;
• The E-health Devices Security Analytics;
• The Cyber Threat Monitoring System.
Just like the BTMS, the Cyber Threat Monitoring System (CTMS) connects the
cyber systems to the rest of the architecture and is the central point for cybersecurity.
Finally, the integrated cyber-physical security solutions rely on:
• The Data eXchange Layer;
• The Impact Propagation and Decision Support Model;
• The Threat Response and Alert System;
• The Hospital Availability Management System;
• The E-health Security Risk Management Model.
The Data eXchange Layer (DXL) enables communication between all of the
SAFECARE subsystems. It works in pairs with the central database which stores
static and dynamic data characterizing the whole system. The Impact Propaga-
tion and Decision Support Model (IPDSM), the Threat Response and Alert Sys-
tem (TRAS), along with the Hospital Availability Management System (HAMS)
are three decision-making modules. They respectively enable inferring cascading
impacts of physical and/or cybersecurity incidents, alerting internal and external
practitioners (or any other appropriate defined response) upon reception of an
“impact” message from the IPDSM, and providing information about health ser-
vices availability.
10.2.1 Intercommunication Layer and Central Database
In order to cope with such a combined approach for the management of cyber
and physical security, the SAFECARE project implements a central database and a
common data exchange layer to connect the different modules of the SAFECARE
platform.
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Dentral Database
The SAFECARE Central Database is a single, unique repository that stores multi-
ple types of data needed for the other modules in the platform. In particular, two
different categories of data have been identified and modeled in the database:
• Static data, all the information related to assets, facilities, buildings, and ser-
vices inside the hospital. Furthermore, this category includes interconnec-
tions and relations among the assets.
• Dynamic data, all the information that is generated by SAFECARE modules,
such as incidents, impacts, and all the other responses/messages. Relations
among incidents, impacts, etc. are also represented in the database and can
be used for further analysis.
Data eXchange Layer
The Data eXchange Layer constitutes the core of the communication layer in the
SAFECARE architecture. It allows all the other modules to communicate with each
other in near real time and provides relevant interfaces to extract data stored in the
database. Five types of dynamic-data messages are defined:
• Incident: message generated by the monitoring tools; it reports information
related to the incident, it is validated by human operators, and it triggers
decision-making modules.
• Impact: reports the potential impacts after an incident occurs allowing pre-
vention of potential cascading effects.
• Threat response: provides a predefined reaction plan to mitigate the effects
of incidents and improve time to response.
• Notification: exchange the communication between Threat Response and
Alerting System and Mobile Alerting System.
• Availability: reports the updated availability of assets involved in the incident.
10.2.2 Cyber and Physical Security Solutions
In order to detect possible incidents, some monitoring systems are required.
This section describes the set of tools that are integrated in SAFECARE for this
kind of job, logically subdivided between physical and cybersecurity.
Building Threat Monitoring System
The Building Threat Monitoring System is the module in charge of monitoring the
physical assets. BTMS is an event-based server that tracks physical events coming
from different subsystems, such as: the Suspicious Behavior Detection System, that
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analyzes the video surveillance detecting irregular movements or behavior such as
loitering or tailgating; the Intrusion and Fire Detection System, that is connected
to the access control system and to the fire alarm system of the hospital; the Data
Collection System, that collects data from many different type of sensors and con-
trollers; and the Mobile Alerting System. The BTMS is the central point for com-
municating physical incidents, which are alerts that have been judged to require a
security response by operators in charge.
Finally, the BTMS is also responsible for receiving and relaying the incident
handling responses elaborated by the Impact Propagation and Decision Support
Model.
Mobile Alerting System
Smartphones and tablets are powerful network-connected devices, constantly avail-
able and low cost; therefore, they are perfect tools for widespread use by human
operators.
Through the MAS, coupled with the mobile app specifically developed in SAFE-
CARE, a building security officer via a smartphone has the ability to quickly report
specific categories of security threats or alerts (system failure, natural hazard, terror-
ist attack, etc.), as depicted in Figure 10.2(left). On the other side, automatic alerts
generated by detection systems can be validated or cancelled by the operator as can
be seen in Figure 10.2(right), where a false fire alarm is shown.
Figure 10.2. Incident reporting (left) and alert validation (right).
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Cyber Threat Monitoring System
The objective of the Cyber Threat Monitoring System is to collect and centralize
security events from the cyber threat detection systems, organize the information,
and provide user-friendly interfaces to SOC1 operators so that they can visualize
the threats and have an overview of the potentially impacted assets.
The CTMS receives security events from the following systems: the IT Threat
Detection System (ITDS) that monitors the IT network and receives log messages
from the different components in order to detect threats targeting the IT infras-
tructures; the BMS Threat Detection System (BMSTDS) that analyzes the Oper-
ational Technologies (OT) protocols used in building automation systems (such
as SCADA systems and PLC controllers); the advanced file analysis system that
performs in-depth analysis of files extracted by the ITDS or the BMSTDS, thus
allowing malware detection; the e-health devices security analytics that monitors
medical devices by collecting their log messages and rely on an e-health security
risk management model to identify any related risk.
Rules are implemented within the CTMS to automatically generate alerts from
the received security events. The CTMS is the entry point for SOC operators to
monitor in real time all incoming alerts regarding cyber threats as it centralizes
them. After a first analysis phase, the SOC operators must confirm the alerts as
either incidents or false-positive alerts. From there, the CTMS enables tracking of
incidents and coordination of incident responses.
Finally, the CTMS receives potential impacts, which are computed from both
physical and cyber incidents by the Impact Propagation and Decision Support
Model, in order to provide SOC operators with a clear understanding of poten-
tial impacted assets and services.
10.2.3 Integrated Cyber-physical Security Solutions
and Decision Support
This section provides a brief description of the SAFECARE subsystems that han-
dle incidents that generate potential impact and cascading effects, alerting relevant
recipients following predefined reaction plans and providing updated information
related to the hospital status.
Impact Propagation and Decision Support Model
The ability to simulate the propagation of impacts caused by incidents and
to mitigate risk is the cornerstone of the SAFECARE project. The module in
1. Security Operation Centre.
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charge of these functionalities is the Impact Propagation and Decision Support
Model.
The objectives of the IPDSM are:
• Combine physical and cyber incidents that occur on assets
• Infer cascading effects as impacts that could potentially affect the same or
related assets
• Alert other modules about the potential impacts and severity.
In order to reason about incidents and their potential impacts, the IPDSM needs
to know detailed information about physical and cyber assets and their relations.
This information is collected in a custom ontology defined for the project. Follow-
ing incidents, the IPDSM simulates a set of potential impacts on directly or indi-
rectly involved assets. This is done by employing a set of rules derived by domain
knowledge.
Threat Response and Alert System
The Threat Response and Alert System is a specific module devoted to alerting
relevant recipients by providing information about incidents, potential impacts and
sharing the predefined reaction plan, according to incident type and severity. It is
activated by an “impact” message received from the IPDSM through the DXL.
Once triggered, the module runs the corresponding predefined response plan and
alerts internal and external practitioners via different media (SMS, emails, phone
calls,…) and possibly also by using the MAS.
Hospital Availability Management System
The Hospital Availability Management System service aims to improve the
resilience of health services and the communication of availability information
among hospital staff and first responders. The HAMS is an integral part of the inci-
dent management process in SAFECARE. Based on incidents that are received from
monitoring modules, it updates the availability of assets involved, considering the
incident nature and the asset category. Once the impacts are reported, HAMS can
examine them, updating the availability of assets that are involved (even indirectly)
in the incident. Furthermore, HAMS provides a web interface with which users can
check the status of the hospital and eventually manually update resources/availabil-
ity status. Finally, HAMS provides an interface to export hospital status/informa-
tion compliant with the EDXL-HAVE standard.2
2. http://docs.oasis-open.org/emergency/edxl-have/v2.0/edxl-have-v2.0.html
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10.3 Ensuring Security, Privacy, and Data Protection
within the EU Legal Requirements
Security and confidentiality are key factors when it comes to privacy and data pro-
tection. In that regard, healthcare infrastructures process on a daily basis personal
health-related data of vulnerable individuals (i.e., patients), due to the nature of
the services they provide. These kinds of activities are likely to result in a high risk,
especially when they are performed on a large scale. If a healthcare infrastructure
falls victim to an attack and a security incident occurs, appropriate steps should be
taken. To do so, it is important to follow procedures determined by the relevant
legal frameworks on incident reporting and notification.
The paragraphs that follow provide a brief overview of the applicable EU secu-
rity, privacy, and data protection legal requirements that may be considered when
dealing with reporting and notification of incidents.
10.3.1 Security of Networks and Information Systems
Network and information system security is a matter that has been regulated at
European level in 2016 with the NIS Directive. This legislative instrument has pro-
vided a minimum set of rules (“harmonization”) with the aim of achieving a com-
mon level of security resilience across the European Union. Every Member State has
to transpose the Directive via national legislation. The NIS Directive requires enti-
ties providing services considered “essential” (i.e., “Operators of Essential Services”
or “OES”—e.g., healthcare providers such as hospitals and private clinics) to ensure
the security of their network and information systems and to adopt a risk-based
approach.3 OES must put in place technical and organizational measures appro-
priate to the risk posed to their networks and information systems. Among these,
OES/healthcare providers should enact measures aimed at preventing, detecting,
and handling incidents4 and at mitigating their impact.
(Security) Incident: prevention, detection and notification under
the NIS Directive
The NIS Directive has established the duty for operators to notify, without undue
delay, to the competent authorities or Computer Security Incident Response Teams
3. See art. 5(2) NIS Directive for the definition and criteria of identification of OES, which have to be identified
by the Member States.
4. Incidents are defined by the NIS Directive as “any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of
network and information systems” (art. 4(1)(7)).
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(CSIRTs) incidents having a significant impact5 to the continuity of the essen-
tial services they provide. This requirement implies that OES/healthcare providers
must set up measures to detect incidents as they have to be prepared to gather
key information on incidents to be notified to the competent authorities. Fur-
thermore, OES/healthcare providers should notify incidents as soon as they can. As
cybersecurity incidents are dynamic and the situation can change rapidly, operators
should first send an immediate alert notification to the national competent author-
ity and/or CSIRTs in order to allow them, for instance, to offer support concerning
the handling of the incidents or to assess the potential impact for essential services,
individuals, society, economy, etc. An incident notification may happen via dif-
ferent means, such as a phone call, a plain email, a web service, an online paper.
Procedures regarding modalities of incident reporting and the information that has
to be provided (which may concern the nature of the incident, the impact of the
incident, operational information such as time or status, etc.) may vary between
Member States, as they must be determined by each MS individually.
10.3.2 Security of Personal Data
Integration of security architecture in hospital’s infrastructure in order to prevent
security incidents from happening entails the application of EU privacy and data
protection laws (i.e., GDPR). Unlike the NIS Directive, the GDPR is directly
applicable in all EU Member States. Healthcare organizations, healthcare profes-
sionals, and healthcare staff are bound by the requirements of the GDPR. The
Regulation requires all persons and legal entities (e.g., healthcare providers) acting
as controllers6 to abide by the key principles of data protection laws and shall be
responsible for and be able to demonstrate compliance with the law. With regard
to security, the integrity and confidentiality principles require from the healthcare
providers to process personal data securely. This shall include protection against
unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction, or
damage; and it must imply the use of appropriate technical and organizational mea-
sures according to the risk inherent to the processing.
5. Parameters to determine the “significance” of the impact of an incident are listed under art. 14 NIS Directive,
i.e.: (a) the number of users affected by the disruption of the essential service; (b) the duration of the incident;
(c) the geographical spread with regard to the area affected by the incident. The NIS Coordination Group
provided further guidance in this regard. See: Reference document on Incident Notification for Operators
of Essential Services (February 2018); Guidelines on notification of Operators of Essential Services incidents
(May 2018).
6. The ‘controller’ is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly
with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data; where the purposes and
means of such processing are determined by Union or Member State law, the controller or the specific criteria
for its nomination may be provided for by Union or Member State law” (art 4(1)(7) GDPR).
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Personal data breaches: prevention, detection and notification under
the GDPR
The GDPR also requires healthcare infrastructures, when acting as controllers, to
notify the supervisory authority in case a personal data breach7 occurs. The concept
of “personal data breach” is close to the NIS Directive concept of “incident” ana-
lyzed above. However, it differs significantly in scope: the former concerns personal
data only, whereas the latter concerns any kind of security incidents. In other words,
every personal data breach is a security incident, but not every security incident is
necessarily a personal data breach.
As the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party puts it, a key element of any
data security policy is being able, where possible, to prevent a breach and, where
it nevertheless occurs, to react to it in a timely manner. Personal data breaches
must be notified to competent authorities without undue delay, and no later
than 72 hours after becoming aware of it. The notification should describe the
nature of the personal data breach including the categories and approximate num-
ber of data subjects concerned as well as the categories and approximate num-
ber of personal data records concerned. Data breaches must also be notified to
data subjects when the breach is likely to result in a high risk for their rights and
freedoms.
10.3.3 Relevance of the NIS and Privacy and Data Protection
Requirements within the SAFECARE Framework
The solutions presented within the SAFECARE architecture are aimed at estab-
lishing monitoring mechanisms and internal incident detection mechanisms. By
monitoring and preventing incidents, these solutions may thus represent a security
measure with which healthcare providers may manage the risks posed to security of
their network and information systems, including to the risk posed to the process-
ing of patients’ data concerning health. By doing so, healthcare providers may be
facilitated in their process of compliance with prevention, detection, and notifica-
tion requirements set by the NIS Directive and the GDPR.
10.4 Conclusions
The threats that target critical infrastructures, in particular the healthcare sector, are
multiple and manifold. The actors that can act against critical infrastructure, their
7. A personal data beach consists in “a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss,
alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to personal data” (art. 4(1)(12) GDPR).
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motivations, and means of operating can also be varied and involve either physical
and cyber assets, or a combination of them. These reasons explain the motivation
behind the need for an integrated cyber-physical security solution.
The SAFECARE project conceived an integrated cyber-physical security
approach and designed an architecture that combines together different monitor-
ing and management tools, each considering a specific aspect of the global solution.
Assets, vulnerabilities, threats, incidents, and impacts are all considered together
with their dependencies, forming a shared intelligence that greatly enhances the
value of each single piece of data. This approach allows us to extract much more
information and uncover possible menaces previously unseen.
Finally, an important aspect to consider while implementing an organization’s
security plan is the compliance with relevant legislation. For this reason, security,
privacy, and data protection requirements have been analyzed from a legal point
of view, giving a brief overview of the relevant legislation concerning SAFECARE
framework.
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Vulnerability and Incident Propagation
in Cyber-physical Systems
By Faten Atigui, Fayçal Hamdi, Nadira Lammari
and Samira Si-said Cherfi
11.1 Introduction
Hospitals are cyber-physical systems that are vulnerable by nature to a multitude
of attacks that can occur at their communication, networking, and physical entry
points. Such cyber-physical attacks can have detrimental effects on their opera-
tion and the safety of their patients. Thus, to properly secure these systems, it is
of utmost importance to: (i) understand their underlying assets with related vul-
nerabilities and associated threats, (ii) quantify their effects, and (iii) prevent the
potential impacts of these attacks. This implies addressing a challenging objective
of understanding the tight relationships between the asset’s characteristics and the
propagation of attack’s effects to better prevent the impacts and consequences of
incidents. Such an approach needs a detailed knowledge of intrinsic and contex-
tual assets properties. However, hospitals host a variety of medical and IT assets
with very different characteristics. The next section reports on the state of the art
of assets and assets interdependencies modeling as well as on incidents propagation
approaches.
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11.2 Related Work
This section presents existing work on impact propagation of incidents and the
methods used to assess the severity of incidents and risks.
11.2.1 Characterization of Dependencies Between and Within
Critical Infrastructures
Although the terms “dependency” and “inter-dependency” are commonly used
interchangeably, some research work distinguish them. The consensual distinction
is this of Rinaldi et al., 2001. The authors define a dependency as a relationship
between two infrastructures in a single direction, whereas inter-dependency is bidi-
rectional (implicitly multi-directional) with two (implicitly more) infrastructures
influencing each other. This definition is also shared by Stapelberg (2008). A more
precise definition of the dependency concept is given by Schmitz et al. (2007). The
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) proposes to consider depen-
dencies within critical infrastructures (CIs) and dependencies between CIs. These
kinds of dependencies are qualified as upstream, internal, or downstream depen-
dencies in Petit et al. (2015). An upstream dependency expresses the fact that the
products or services provided to one infrastructure by another external infrastruc-
ture are necessary to support its operations and functions. Downstream depen-
dencies are the consequences to a critical infrastructure’s consumers or recipients
from the degradation of the resources provided by a critical infrastructure. Inter-
nal dependencies represent the internal links among the assets constituting a criti-
cal infrastructure. Therefore, upstream and downstream dependencies are between
CIs, whereas internal ones are within CIs. Several works have focused on the charac-
terization of dependencies between CIs. Zimmerman (2008) distinguishes spatial
dependencies from functional ones. Rinaldi et al., 2001 and Schmitz et al. (2007)
propose a categorization of dependencies into physical, cyber, geographic, and
logical ones. Dudenhoeffer et al. (2006) and Clemente (2013) consider physical,
informational, geo-spatial, policy/procedural, and societal dependency. For reason-
ing purposes, Adetoye et al. (2011) propose another taxonomy of dependencies.
They suggest considering five types of dependencies: generic, indirect, inter, co,
and redundant dependency.
11.2.2 Models Serving the Incidents’ Impact Propagation
In addition to the existing inter-dependencies between infrastructures, to deal
with the impact of cascading effects that a disruption of an asset may have on
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the internal and external context of a critical infrastructure, one must also have,
for each asset, a clear knowledge of the kinds of threats that could affect this
asset, its vulnerabilities, and its relation to the other assets. These three aspects
have been the subject of several research studies. From a threat perspective, to
our knowledge, there is no research work that provides a high-level ontology of
threats for CI. However, let us note that the European Commission reported
a generic classification of threats for CI in which natural hazards are distin-
guished from non-malicious man-made hazards and malicious man-made hazards
(Theocharidou and Giannopoulos, 2015). The HITRUST alliance have also pub-
lished a threat taxonomy where at the top level logical, physical, and organizational
threats are distinguished (HITRUST, 2019). Other works concentrate on specific
threats. In ENISA (2016a) the most common threats affecting ICS/SCADA sys-
tems are shown. The top 10 threats affecting these systems have been published by
CTED and UNOCT (2018). In the context of physical security risk assessments,
Liu et al. (2012) propose a list of threats from terrorism. We can also find in “Com-
mon Criteria” and ANSSI portals security protection profiles for some software and
physical equipment of CI where threats affecting these components are listed. In the
context of the healthcare sector, ENISA (2016b) provided an overview of the cyber
threats faced by smart hospitals. Taxonomies of threats for healthcare infrastructures
are also proposed by Almohri et al. (2017) and Agrafiotis et al. (2018). Regarding
the links between assets, we can consider research works that give much attention
to the hierarchical links between assets (Silva and Jacob, 2018; Brocke et al., 2014;
Jakobson, 2011; Tong and Ban, 2014; Breier and Schindler, 2014). They model
an infrastructure into levels to which the assets belong. The contributions dif-
fer in terms of kind and number of layers. The representation models used are
also varied, ranging from simple oriented graphs to light ontologies. To define
models that consider the hierarchical dependency between assets while empha-
sizing the links between assets within the hierarchical layers, one can rely on
Enterprise Architecture (EA) modeling languages and standards or methodolog-
ical guides existing in the industrial world. These tools are not specifically dedi-
cated to critical infrastructures. As an example, we can mention ArchiMate 2.1, an
open and independent EA modeling language within TOGAF Framework 9.2. We
can also mention the CIM standard produced by DMTF (formerly known as the
Distributed Management Task Force) that is internationally recognized by ANSI
(American National Standards Institute) and ISO (International Organization for
Standardization). There also exists several security risk analysis methodologies that
give descriptions of assets, most of which are based on standards. These descrip-
tions are very often informal and sometimes accompanied by catalogues. This is
the case of EBIOS RM (EBIOS, 2019) and MAGERIT 3.0 (Amutio et al., 2014)
methodologies.
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11.2.3 Incidents Propagation
Several approaches have dealt with the incidents propagation issue. We can classify
these approaches into three categories: empirical, agent-based, and network-based
approaches.
Empirical approaches analyze asset’s interdependencies according to experts’
opinions and past incidents traces. The underlying assumption is that it is difficult
to identify assets’ interdependencies in normal situations. Thus, analyzing the inci-
dents helps rising intangible relationships among assets under extreme situations
such as disasters, failures, or attacks. Laefer et al. (2006) defined accuracy, com-
prehensibility, timeliness, and accessibility of data as key characteristics to store,
analyze, query, and visualize critical incident. This data could then be analyzed to
mine records of frequent failure patterns as presented in Chou and Tseng (2010).
To highlight the relationship between interdependencies and incident propagation,
Mendonça and Wallace (2006) studied the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks and
their impact on critical infrastructures and their services. The study showed that
20% of reported disruptions involved interdependency. Considering CI as “sys-
tems of systems” may improve response to incidents. Kotzanikolaou et al. (2013)
combine common-cause and cascading events to assess the potential risk caused by
complex situations. They considered the cumulative dependency risk of cascading
chains.
Agent-based approaches consider a CIS as a complex adaptive system that
could be analyzed as a complex phenomenon emerging from individual and
autonomous agents. This kind of approaches captures all types of interdependencies
among CIS by event simulations. It also provides scenario-based what-if analysis
and the effectiveness assessment of different control strategies. Barrett et al. (2010)
investigated cascading effects in three closely coupled systems: cellular networks,
transportation networks and phone call networks. They studied the interaction
between these systems and the challenges raised by their co-evolution and reaction
to incidents. Gómez et al. (2014) proposed a method for clustering a network into
agents called decision units. This method deals with the complexity by exploring
relationships between agents’ local decisions and their impact at the global level.
Network-based approaches represent the connected infrastructures interdepen-
dencies as a graph to show paths for incidents propagation. Shah and Babiceanu
(2015) propose to evaluate the resilience of a system under attacks. The infras-
tructures are modeled using networks of interdependent processes. Based on this
model, the authors provide simulations to predict the network behavior to face
different attacks.
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11.3 Impact Propagation and Decision Support Model
This part describes the impact propagation model and decision support model solu-
tion that includes the specification of the IPM ontology (SafecareOnto) and the
IPM rules.
11.3.1 SAFECARE Ontology
The Safecare ontology, called SafecareOnto, describes both cyber and physical
assets, their vulnerabilities, and their interdependence, as well as the risks and
threats. It is the cornerstone of the knowledge graph used by the Impact Propa-
gation and Decision Support Model module to infer the propagation of impacts
over cyber and physical assets. In the following sections, we will describe the con-
struction process of this ontology and its modular structure.
Overview of the ontology building process
For the determination of the approach to build SafecareOnto described in
Figure 11.1, we have been inspired by NeOn methodological framework
Suárez-Figueroa et al. (2012).
In the first phase, we provided information about the scope of the ontology (its
purpose, the language to be used during its implementation, the target users for
which it is intended, its requirements expressed under competency questions).
In the second phase, we started by studying the available resources (ontolog-
ical and non-ontological) favoring the elaboration of SafecareOnto. The lack of
ontological resources that perfectly meet our requirements led us to choose the
option of building a first draft of the ontology from portions of non-ontological
resources through an abstraction process. The objective is to identify a core of
Figure 11.1. Construction process of SafecareOnto.
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Figure 11.2. Excerpt of the SafecareOnto.
basic concepts and relationships that must be part of our ontology. As an exam-
ple of non-ontological resources, we can mention the description of EBIOS RM
methodology (EBIOS, 2019) and the description of medical devices of the MITRE
(Connolly et al., 2019). The conceptualization activity consisted of summarizing,
organizing, and structuring the required knowledge into a meaningful model. In
our case, for representing knowledge modeling, we opted for the UML class dia-
gram. The benefits of such a model for ontology conceptualization have been
acknowledged in several studies. One of its main advantages is that it is widely
used. Furthermore, users are likely to be more familiar with a class diagram repre-
sentation of the ontology (since it is a semi-formal model) than with OWL which
representation is purely textual. Thus, it is more relevant for the verification of the
ontology scope.
The resulting conceptual model (the first draft of SafecareOnto) has been trans-
lated, during the formalization phase, into a formal model using OWL2 that offers
a highly expressive language and inference capabilities. Figure 11.2 represents an
excerpt of the SafecareOnto.
The last phase consists of evaluating SafecareOnto regarding the ability of the
impact propagation module to deal with the threat scenarios defined in the SAFE-
CARE project. The validation step will lead to a refinement and enrichment of the
ontology.
SafecareOnto, a modular ontology
The impact propagation and decision support model relies on both structural infor-
mation about the assets and their intrinsic properties and structural relationship
and on knowledge about the incidents that they suffered from. It also holds knowl-
edge about how to infer and propagate impacts. This second knowledge evolves
continuously and is more dynamic than the structural knowledge. For example,
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Figure 11.3. The modular structure of SafecareOnto.
the software of a medical asset could be updated to correct a known vulnerability.
This kind of operation is less dynamic and more predictable that the occurrence of
incidents.
To cope with the static and dynamic knowledge and to confer more stability to
the IPM module, we have adopted a modular vision of the ontology. At a high level
of abstraction, we could view the whole picture as depicted in Figure 11.3.
The core ontology captures essentially the static and is centered essentially on
three concepts that are Asset, Vulnerability, and Threat.
An asset is any “thing” that has value. Within the SAFECARE projects assets
could be business assets such as personal data about patients and personnel or the
patients themselves or support assets such as medical or IT devices or medical staff.
Assets are related to other assets through several kinds of relationships. A vulnerabil-
ity is any weakness of an asset that could be used to generate a threat. A vulnerability
assesses the protection of an asset against attacks. A threat could be accidental or
malicious. As an example for “a radiology room” could have as vulnerability “likely
to be subject to unauthorised access” and a “patient report” could have as vulnera-
bility “lack of encryption.”
A threat is the operationalization or a materialization of a vulnerability. An asset
could be exposed to several vulnerabilities that are known or that could emerge after
incident occurrence. The information about vulnerabilities is updated consequently
to regular maintenance operations or after incident analysis. “Unauthorized access”
or “personal data disclosure” are examples of threats. The more we know about the
threats that relate to an asset, the more efficient its protection can be and the better
we can react when incidents occur. These basic concepts are further refined and
characterized. An excerpt is formalized in the next section. This formalization is
done in such a way that it can easily be extended to meet emerging requirements.
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The impact management module is an extension to the core ontology that relies
on the previous concepts. It allows defining the concepts that are essential to the
computation of impact propagation and provide indicators to help decide about the
suitable countermeasures to face attacks consequences. It relies on concepts such as
Incident, Risk, and Impact.
An incident, according to NIST (Stouffer et al., 2011), is “an occurrence that
actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a
system or the information the system processes, stores, or transmits or that con-
stitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security policies, security
procedures, or acceptable use policies.” An incident could be an attack against one
or several assets by exploiting vulnerabilities. In SAFECARE, we handle both phys-
ical and cyber incidents. We also have to assess the severity of an incident to better
compute its propagation. An incident could be the expression of a known risk or
completely unexpected. Indeed, a risk is the probability that a threat will exploit
a vulnerability. When an incident occurs, it is likely to have impacts on assets. An
impact needs to be qualified and/or quantified to efficiently help decide about the
mitigation plans.
11.3.2 IPM Rules Specification
There are several approaches for impact propagation management such as agent-
based and graph-based approaches that are mainly structure oriented. However,
from our investigations, it appears that an added value that the project may produce
is to combine cyber and physical incidents and to take into account the variety
of interdependencies to provide a semantic oriented approach based on semantic
web technologies. A first solution is consequently based on the exploitation of the
ontologies’ expressiveness expanded by the usage of inference rules. Indeed, the
idea of the IPM module is to use axioms describing the concept and properties
of SafecareOnto as well as a set of rules to deal with different threat scenarios.
The creation of these rules follows the steps below (cf. Figure 11.4):
• Knowledge elicitation: in this phase, threat scenarios are analyzed and discussed
with domain experts to identify, on the one hand, all the assets that could be
impacted in each scenario, and on the other hand, the relationships between
assets that lead to the propagation of impacts. Moreover, all the situations of a
given scenario are analyzed to see if it is possible to generalize common parts.
The objective is to avoid redundant rules.
• Formalization: in this phase, the concepts and properties of SafecareOnto that
can be used to write rules are identified. A rule-engine (e.g., SWRL, JENA) is
then used to implement these rules in the form of premises and conclusions.
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Figure 11.4. IPM rules construction process.
Figure 11.5. Architecture of the IPM prototype.
As existing rule-engine are often equipped with semantic reasoners, the imple-
mented rules can be applied to automatically infer impact propagation.
• Validation and refining : in this phase, implemented rules are tested on differ-
ent scenarios, and inferred impacts on different assets are evaluated by domain
experts. At the end of the validation, IPM rules could be refined to better meet
the expected results.
A first version of a prototype that simulates impacts propagation was imple-
mented on a near-real scenario (cf. Figure 11.5). Based on the knowledge graph
and on IPM rules, a reasoner is used to infer impacts propagation on assets. In this
prototype, the IPM rules were expressed in terms of OWL concepts (classes, prop-
erties, individuals) using the JENA rule engine. Each rule is composed of a list of
body terms (premises), a list of head terms (conclusions).
The following example presents a JENA rule that propagates warnings in case
of assets located in the same places:
(?asset ipm:hasLocation ?place), (?warning ipm:attachedTo ?place),
(?warning ipm:hasCause ?incident), makeSkolem(?new_warning, ?warning) =>
(?new_warning rdf:type isid:Warning), (?new_warning ipm:hasCause ?incident),
(?new_warning ipm:attachedTo ?asset), (?asset ipm:hasWarning ?new_warning)]
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The premise of this rule instantiates all the assets having a place, the warnings
triggered in this place and the incidents causing these warnings. The conclusion
attaches warnings to all assets located in the same place. An application of this rule
may be a fire detection incident in a server room that could affect all the materials
inside this room.
11.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents a focused view on how to handle incidents and their prop-
agation from an assets point of view in a healthcare environment. It presents an
overview of work conducted within the Safecare project. The state of the art shows
that dealing with incidents and their propagation requires a detailed knowledge on
assets, their context and an as precise as possible vision of the historical data about
the assets, their real time state and the incidents that impacted them. From our
experience within the Safecare project, it appears that collecting such data is not
an easy task. It requires an additional effort from health actors, whose priority is
care, although they are aware that safety is also a major issue. Consequently, we
could not adopt one of the existing approaches for incidents propagation as they
rely on either detailed traces, in case of empirical approaches, or a quasi-complete
structure knowledge of systems as required by network-based approaches. The pro-
posed solution is semantics based. It relies on an evolving knowledge captured by a
modular ontology. The propagation is managed by rules that exploit assets states,
incidents, and domain knowledge which all evolve continuously.
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Innovative Toolkit to Assess and Mitigate
Cyber Threats in the Healthcare Sector
By Marco Manso, Bárbara Guerra, George Doukas
and Vasiliki Moumtzi
Cybersecurity is an increasingly critical aspect of healthcare information technology
infrastructure. Nowadays, the rapid digitization of healthcare delivery, from elec-
tronic health records and telehealth (eHealth services) to mobile health (mHealth)
and network-enabled medical devices, introduces risks related to cybersecurity
vulnerabilities that are particularly worrisome because cyberattacks in a healthcare
setting may result in the exposure of highly sensitive personal information, cause
disruptions in clinical care, or affect the safety of patients, for example, by compro-
mising the integrity of data or impairing medical device functionality. The threat
is real and growing in tandem with the pace of the healthcare industry digitiza-
tion [1]. Yet, cybersecurity capacities currently remain behind the pressing needs,
lagging the robust pace of adoption of digital networks by threat actors. This dis-
continuity places the multitrillion-euro healthcare sector at risk of even more sig-
nificant cyberattacks. A new generation of cybersecurity tools, specifically designed
for the healthcare domain, takes on the challenge of surpassing that discontinuity
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and setting higher standards on cybersecurity for healthcare organizations. The pro-
posed architecture combines a smart and robust security awareness layer, equipped
with a wide range of tools that build a personalized data security management
platform. The combined use of state-of-the-art technologies to effectively prevent,
respond, and recover from cyberattacks, while managing to raise awareness and
provide timely actionable information, is a promising compound for enhancing
cybersecurity within the healthcare IT ecosystem.
12.1 Introduction
Over the past ten years, adversaries around the world have been constantly using
more sophisticated methods to attack organizations’ digital surfaces. There used
to be a clear distinction between the inside and outside of an organization, and
infrastructures had clearly defined boundaries. However, with the rise of mobile
computing and cloud services, that endpoint has expanded and there is no clear,
easily protected line that can keep data secured. Now that the Internet of Things
(IoT) has also been adopted and has entered the mainstream, the perimeter and
number of vulnerabilities are set to expand yet again.
There are few industries that need strong cybersecurity as much as the health-
care industry. Healthcare technology is prevalent around the world and creates huge
potential to improve clinical outcomes and transform care delivery, but there are
also increasing concerns relating to the security of healthcare data and devices.
With the healthcare sector’s rapid adoption of digital systems and the spending
in technology growing, so does the sector’s cybersecurity attack surface. Today,
healthcare networks not only include hospitals, clinics, and doctor’s offices but also
start to accommodate Internet-based medical consulting with remote healthcare
providers or patients, multi-cloud Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Software-
as-a-Service (SaaS) environments and connected medical devices both inside hos-
pitals and deployed at the patients’ homes.
In the past five years, healthcare has been plagued by a myriad of cyber threats,
with weaponized ransomware, misconfigured cloud storage buckets, and phishing
emails dominating [2]. And, indeed, the healthcare sector experiences twice the
number of cyberattacks as other industries [3]. A global study by NetDiligence
of cyber insurance claims in 2017 found that healthcare accounted for 18% of
breaches across all sectors and that 63% of healthcare breaches were caused by
criminal or malicious activity [4]. Healthcare data breaches grew in both size and
frequency, with the largest breaches impacting as many as 80 million individuals,
exposing highly sensitive information, from personally identifiable information to
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health insurance information and patients’ medical histories [5]. Cybercriminals
seem to display more creativity and adopt faster new technologies, as healthcare
organizations strive to develop better awareness of cyber threats and adequate secu-
rity strategies.
While almost every healthcare provider is committed to secure patient privacy,
most of them are behind in terms of cybersecurity adoption and advancement.
Healthcare providers are highly attractive targets, because they can provide access
to a huge amount of valuable data. In order to secure the available information,
when adversaries are relentlessly in pursuit of weaknesses, the only way is trying to
be always one step ahead. In order to achieve this, sufficient levels of cybersecurity
awareness must be ensured. However, healthcare providers are usually focused on
upgrading their medical technology and investing on employing the best medical
staff to ensure they save lives faster and provide better overall care. Therefore, this
approach overlooks the importance of cybersecurity and its complementarity to
core provided services.
Apart from the awareness, the existence of enforced consistent security stan-
dards and procedures seems to be a crucial factor that impacts the levels of cyber-
security. Standards such as the ISO/IEC 27000 family or the NIST Cybersecu-
rity Framework encourage the implementation and adoption of clear and com-
prehensible structures that define procedures, techniques, and measures, highly
important for both cyber and information security, especially when it comes
to areas such as healthcare. Towards this end, several worldwide initiatives and
agencies try to specify rules and necessary measures under a common cyber-
security strategy and, in parallel, introduce a common cybersecurity certifica-
tion scheme. Most healthcare providers acknowledge that such guidelines can
strengthen their cybersecurity, but they try to tackle the problem with simpler
procedures.
Despite the current selection of defensive measures, healthcare providers should
always take into serious consideration that the attacks tend to be more opportunis-
tic and difficult to detect or predict. Threats are getting more potent because sys-
tems are more interconnected; and people, business, and government will have
a greater reliance on Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) to
function. Defenders should prepare to face self-propagating network-based threats
that can even be disguised in encrypted traffic, or hidden threat actors in popu-
lar cloud services which cannot be dealt with traditional security tools, or even
orchestrated attacks using several tools to induce confusion and make attacks
undetected for long periods of time. Developing at this pace, cybercrime threat-
ens to become even more devastating for all types of businesses in years to fol-
low, and the only certainty is that in order to effectively address all emerging
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threats, every possible combination of available innovative technologies will be
required.
12.2 The Challenge
Hospitals and care centers have adopted ICT to handle, store, and exchange large
amounts of sensitive patient data from medical devices, but also wearables and IoT
devices, like smart watches and sensors, which are not categorized as medical devices
but still produce sensitive data of patient’s health and wellness status.
Digital health service providers are improving their efforts to reduce inefficien-
cies, improve access, reduce costs, increase quality, and make medicine more person-
alized for patients [6]. In the meantime, patients use digital health to better manage
and monitor their health and wellness-related activities [7]. This increasing mar-
ket, which is becoming more open and accessible, raises the volume of potential
vulnerability risks that may lead to cyber threats and incidents.
The operating system and medical devices’ firmware of hospitals and care centers
typically consists of legacy hardware or software without a systematic patch man-
agement procedure which leads to vulnerabilities that cyberattackers may exploit, in
addition to the many vulnerabilities of the increasing healthcare ecosystem brought
by IoT devices. As a result, hospitals and care centers are prime targets for cyber
criminals, especially concerning data theft: a FortiGuard Labs study states that
almost half of the top 10 threats in healthcare were triggered by botnets, some
of which leveraged through compromised IoT medical devices.
Moreover, several security aspects such as the vulnerability assessment of exist-
ing and newly added devices and the real-time alerting and mitigation of security
threats are not addressed, rendering those solutions unable to cope with state-of-
the-art cybersecurity threats. The security posture of IoT providers should con-
stantly adapt to the ever-evolving cybersecurity risks imposed by multiple sources.
Turning to commercial solutions, the traditional penetration testing is still very
much a point-in-time assessment, dealing with specific tasks, and thus, most solu-
tions cannot manage new sophisticated advanced attacks. This may cause major
disruptions of healthcare services and the loss of patient data for hospitals and
care centers, since it is almost impossible for them to maintain and administer a
widespread heterogeneous infrastructure across the region or even the nation, thus
becoming prone to cyberattacks.
The healthcare ecosystem is therefore missing a tailored cybersecurity vulnera-
bility assessment toolkit, able to proactively assess and mitigate cyber threats, either
known or unknown, imposed by mobile and IoT-based devices and eHealth and
mHealth services.
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12.3 The Solution
This challenge has been identified in the EU-funded Research and Innovation
Action SPHINX [8] that aims to develop a health-tailored universal Cyber Security
Toolkit to enhance the cyber protection of the healthcare information technology
(IT) ecosystem and ensure patient data privacy and integrity.
The vision is to build a transparent cybersecurity environment to be effortlessly
tailored to the specifications (addressing infrastructure, devices, and software) of
different hospitals and care centers. This environment offers the professionals in
healthcare organizations the opportunity to identify cybersecurity risks when they
occur and take decisions to safeguard their cybersecurity and privacy. As a result,
the innovative Cyber Security Toolkit transforms today’s cybersecurity practices in
healthcare organizations, by offering reliable automated cybersecurity services and
enhanced transparency. In this respect, the Toolkit adopts a strong human-centered
design that:
• Alleviates healthcare IT personnel from the burden of unnecessary decisions
by offering them extensive automated security.
• Prioritizes the human factor to the advantage of security, by exploiting
security-friendly behavioral patterns of users (healthcare organization’s pro-
fessionals) and beneficiaries (patients).
• Adheres to applicable legislation in order to increase trust in case of a security
or data protection breach, facilitating the overall recovery process.
The SPHINX Cyber Security Toolkit provides the IT personnel at hospitals and
care centers with highly comprehensive visual analytics that depict the cybersecurity
situation on near real-time basis, in an intuitive and user-friendly way. In addition,
the Toolkit is fully adaptable to the individual user’s profile characteristics.
Concerning IoT devices, manufacturers are also able to use the SPHINX Toolkit
security services and certify that their devices respect the security and privacy needs
of their beneficiaries and users. Concerning patients, these benefit greatly from
the increased security of their IoT devices brought by the SPHINX Toolkit that,
in an automated manner, monitors and controls potential cyber risks, known or
unknown cyber threats and incidents. As a result, patients are easily prompted
to customize personalized data privacy policies, distinguishing between work and
home-related data among different IoT devices in use.
The SPHINX Cyber Security Toolkit concentrates data of both real and
cyber situation awareness within the healthcare IT ecosystem to analyze poten-
tial, imminent, and forecasted cyber vulnerabilities. An automated zero-touch
device and service verification solution is adapted to or embedded in existing
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infrastructures, facilitating the IT personnel’s work through the selection of a num-
ber of available security services capable of enhancing the IT ecosystem’s self-defense
countermeasures and increase the effectiveness of cybersecurity services’ automa-
tion. These innovative technologies amplify the cybersecurity for healthcare ecosys-
tems, building a certified trust between IT personnel and the remaining healthcare
professionals.
The Toolkit is built upon an interoperable architecture that concentrates and
handles data from multiple devices and services, covering thus a wide range of use
cases to be demonstrated in SPHINX’s at advanced testbeds.
12.4 The Technical Architecture
SPHINX introduces a universal Cyber Security Toolkit for the Healthcare domain
that enhances the cyber protection of the healthcare IT ecosystem and ensures the
patients’ data privacy and integrity. The SPHINX Toolkit offers an embedded,
smart, and robust security awareness layer, able to identify modern and advanced
cyber threats, enhanced with a personalized data security management tool.
The SPHINX architecture [9] has the capability to concentrate and handle the
data of many devices or services, thus covering a wide range of use-case scenarios.
The SPHINX users are kept informed at any time via highly comprehensive dash-
boards and visual analytics, while being able to interact with the services and func-
tions of the proposed solution in an intuitive and user-friendly way. Furthermore,
the SPHINX Toolkit provides automated intrusion prevention and data filtering
algorithms, fully adaptable to the individual user’s profile characteristics.
The SPHINX Toolkit is designed to facilitate the operation of the SPHINX
cybersecurity tools in real-life conditions, allowing regular technology users (not
limited to cybersecurity experts) to operate the system. Advanced data flow analysis
is applied on a packet and session basis to build the context of communication.
From this context, data are classified into user and device profiles, in line with
appropriate categorization methodologies. User and device profiles are used for
automated real-time risk assessment, based on evaluation, comparison, and match-
ing with safe data flow patterns, utilizing a self-learning approach performed at
application layer. Data analytics and visualization techniques are deployed to ensure
enhanced user awareness and understanding of the security status, potential threats,
risks, and associated impacts.
The SPHINX main building blocks are depicted in Figure 12.1. The figure illus-
trates the SPHINX Toolkit in a healthcare IT operational environment (involv-
ing users, workstations, servers, medical devices) in which the SPHINX tools are
deployed as part of the SPHINX operational environment. The device verification
and certification tool is isolated in SPHINX’s sandboxed environment.
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Figure 12.1. SPHINX platform high-level architecture.
At the core of the SPHINX solution lies the Common Integration Platform,
providing the necessary integration framework and infrastructure for all SPHINX
tools and services. It is built upon the basic concepts of virtualization and con-
tainerization, allowing each tool and service to be deployed independently and to
concurrently support the aggregation of heterogeneous external services, making
use of various data exchange protocols.
The Device Verification and Certification building block provides function-
alities for the verification of the cybersecurity level of software applications and
devices, including assessment of vulnerabilities. It is provided through a sandboxed
environment and provides a safe and isolated testing environment where deploy-
ment and cybersecurity testing can be performed. It also delivers a certification
report concerning the compliance of third-party software applications and devices
with SPHINX standards.
The Automated Cyber Security building block is the smart and robust secu-
rity awareness layer of SPHINX, encompassing a wide range of cutting-edge
cyber protection technologies and innovative tools focusing on the detection of
anomalous behavior, security event handling, intrusion detection, vulnerability,
and risk assessment. The SPHINX Cyber Situational Awareness Framework com-
bines every available information, generated by the SPHINX tools, to provide effec-
tive and efficient identification, investigation, mitigation, and reporting of realistic
multi-dimensional attacks and advanced persistent threats within the healthcare IT
ecosystem and its interconnected cyber assets.
The SPHINX Toolkit: contributing tools and their key
functionalities
The SPHINX Toolkit displays advanced cybersecurity capabilities that embrace the
identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover functions of the NIST Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [10].
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On the monitoring of the IT ecosystem and the building of a cyber situational
awareness, several tools allow a beyond state-of-the-art cyber protection to the criti-
cal assets in the healthcare IT ecosystem. The Data Traffic Monitoring and Anomaly
Detection tools track information regarding the connected devices in the network
and the data they access, the transfer loads, and the transmitted packets’ in order to
detect suspicious programs’ network traffic, unexpected events, and any other activ-
ity or observation that raise suspicion by differing significantly from the normal
infrastructure/component/user behavior. The Security Information and Event Man-
agement tool implements a query interface where other components or users can
distinguish between normal and abnormal operations. The tool’s log management
capabilities facilitate the collection, aggregation, retention, analysis, searching, and
reporting of high volumes of computer-generated log messages that allow the end
user to provide real-time analysis of security alerts generated by network hardware
and applications. The Vulnerability Assessment as a Service tool dynamically assesses
network entities against certain vulnerabilities and outputs a Common Vulnerabil-
ity Scoring System score that reflects the level of security of that particular entity.
The Real-time Cyber Risk Assessment tool deals with advanced and automated fea-
tures to assess the level of risk associated with cybersecurity incidents, determine
their probable consequences, and present warning levels and alerts to the users of the
healthcare IT operational environment. The Artificial Intelligence Honeypots are part
of the cyber defense arsenal and are used to prevent, detect, and respond to cyberat-
tacks. Their value resides on luring the adversaries to attack them instead of the real
production IT systems, by emulating services or even complete systems that may
be considered targets from an adversary. In SPHINX, the Honeypot tool provides
data dynamically to the Artificial Intelligence algorithms designed to detect anoma-
lies. The Machine Learning-empowered Intrusion Detection tool operates in conjunc-
tion with Honeypots to gather attack information from intruders and supervised
machine learning and/or deep learning algorithms for dynamic learning of both
registered and unregistered data. Outperforming current solutions that are typically
capable of coping with known threats, SPHINX makes a step forward developing
an intelligent defensive system capable of either detecting existing threats or learn-
ing new uncategorized ones. The Forensic Data Collection Engine tool provides the
basis required for supporting the processing and storage of data gathered from var-
ious sources into a unified structure in order to discover the relationships between
devices and the related evidence and produce a timeline of cybersecurity incidents,
including a map of affected devices and a meaningful chain of evidence.
On the exploitation of acquired knowledge to establish an enhanced cyberse-
curity awareness, two SPHINX tools come into play. The Knowledge Base aims to
represent domain-specific knowledge in a form that can be used by both computers
and humans to effectively operate on the knowledge acquired by SPHINX. Towards
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forming knowledge, it collects anonymized security intelligence and insights from
external repository sources (autonomous agents search and mine reliable web
resources), as well as from SPHINX tools. This information is translated into
security rules and shared among the network by updating the respective advanced
threats registries. The Knowledge Base gathers security incentives for a collective
wisdom creation, as well as interconnects/integrates with third parties threat intelli-
gence. On its turn, the Blockchain Based Threats Registry acts as a background infras-
tructure that safely stores different logs from different sources within the healthcare
domain. It can also be used to store any kind of interesting information, such as
critical logs or thread information. The main advantage of using Blockchain is to
have a distributed ledger with unalterable information, synchronized between all
parties.
A key aspect of the SPHINX Toolkit deals with privacy assurance and testing
features. In this context, the Homomorphic Encryption tool serves as a backbone for
the SPHINX Toolkit and ensures user data privacy and security by storing all sen-
sitive data in an encrypted format. Also the Anonymization and Privacy tool assists
in this endeavor, delivering a dataflow with high throughput for processing large
text datasets in unstructured formats and performing user-defined transformations
to clean, structure, anonymize, and/or encrypt. Further, the Attack and Behavior
Simulators deliver a reliable ground for testing SPHINX tools: by providing routi-
nes/scripts of already documented cyberattacks, with known effects, outcomes, and
consequences, the simulators allow for the operational capability of the SPHINX
Toolkit to be tested.
Overall, the Cyber Security Toolbox enables SPHINX users to select the cyber-
security services that best match their needs, to use within the SPHINX ecosys-
tem. It allows users to plug cybersecurity services into their existing connectivity
services and configure/adapt them according to their security needs. In this con-
text, the SPHINX Decision Support and Interactive Dashboards target a panoply of
user-centered functionalities related with decision support, providing recommen-
dations on the suitable courses of action following upcoming, ongoing, or fore-
casted cyberattacks or incidents. The decision-making process is supported by an
analytic engine for the visualization of data in near real time that delivers a first
insight into users’ behaviors, as well as by customizable dashboards that interac-
tively display and share trends, forecasts, and answers to business questions on the
cybersecurity and protection levels of the healthcare IT ecosystem.
Finally, the SPHINX Toolkit also considers the interaction with third parties:
the Application Programming Interface for Third Parties is a tool specifically designed
to enable third-party solution providers to access and interact with the SPHINX
Toolkit and its tools. Subject to authentication and using end-to-end encryption,
it exposes advanced cybersecurity functionalities implemented by SPHINX, from
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device/application certification and verification to threat registry notifications and
the detection of anomalies.
12.5 Application Scenarios for SPHINX Cybersecurity
Tools
The innovative SPHINX cybersecurity tools are designed and developed to address
a set of application scenarios specific to the healthcare domain, based on a report by
the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) con-
cerning security challenges and risks in eHealth [11]. In SPHINX, five application
scenarios were defined focusing on the adoption of novel information and commu-
nication technologies by healthcare stakeholders, giving way to national eHealth
strategies and a common EU eHealth policy, including healthcare data capture
(secure collection of patient data from multiple sources), analysis (data process-
ing and analytics to extract actionable information from captured healthcare data),
and sharing (deployment of healthcare information networks that securely retrieve
patient data from multiple sources and make it available to the patient and the
responsible healthcare professional), in order to improve significantly the delivery
of high-quality cost-efficient healthcare via informed decision-making.
12.5.1 Scenario 1: Digital Transformation in Healthcare
Healthcare is still new to digitization, with the vast majority of related invest-
ments on software and services in frontline clinical and administrative healthcare
occurring in the last decade. Throughout the years, rendering administrative pro-
cesses, clinical pathways, and patient data into digital realities has driven a focus on
data standardization, integration, and security that holds together disparate system
workflows. Adding new computers, servers, and devices and creating more dedi-
cated networks has led to a panoply of different operating systems, applications,
and databases that resulted in unique IT architectures and specialist cybersecurity
needs. In the mix, outdated and legacy firmware with unaddressed bugs and known
vulnerabilities compound the difficulty to maintain up-to-date security policies and
systems, increasing the number of vulnerabilities or risks. Moreover, with increased
digitization, new privacy regulations and more integration between different sys-
tems bring new risks and an increased burden of regulatory compliance.
Indeed, the current pace, scale, and complexity of technology adoption is putting
healthcare organizations at a significant risk of multiplying its cyber vulnerabilities.
When it comes to data as sensitive as private health information, the potential for
an attack is surmountable for healthcare data has become one of the most desirable
premium commodities for sale on black market sites. Not only do multiple sites
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require access to patient information across a spectrum of health facilities—such
as local clinics, physician offices, hospitals, laboratories, and pharmacies—but the
information also needs to be readily available to support open new healthcare ser-
vices, such as allocation of medical practices, second opinion consultation services,
comparison of diagnostic protocols, or participatory healthcare. Add to this the
organizations’ willingness to allow their employees to bring their own devices, and
it is understandable how extremely challenging it is to implement network-wide
security practices and data protection.
This application scenario illustrates several challenges in healthcare delivery that
the SPHINX tools are designed to address:
• The digitized healthcare databases and services;
• The outdated (legacy) operating systems, applications, and databases;
• The integration of healthcare and patient data from multiple databases;
• The availability, integrity, and confidentiality of healthcare and patient data;
• The users’ authentication and profile management;
• The integration of Bring Your Own Devices (BYOD), including profession-
als’ and patients’ tablets and smartphones, in healthcare organizations’ net-
works.
The Digital Transformation in Healthcare is a common application scenario
across Europe. For healthcare ecosystems to remain safe from cyber exploitation,
cybersecurity strategies need to move beyond servers and desktops to reflect a world
of interconnected networks, equipment, devices, and users.
12.5.2 Scenario 2: eHealth Services
EU Member States (MS) are working on an eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure
under the aegis of the eHealth Network, the network of national authorities respon-
sible for eHealth (2011/890/EU) [12]. In addition to Finland, Greece, Italy, Por-
tugal, Spain, France, Denmark, Estonia, and Czech Republic, 18 MS are expected
to exchange Electronic patient summaries and ePrescription by the end of 2021.
Healthcare organizations are gradually adopting new technologies to deliver
nation-wide healthcare services online (eHealth), such as ePrescription/eDispensa-
tion, Electronic patient summary, eReferrals, and eBilling, that significantly facil-
itate the interaction of citizens and patients with healthcare organizations, as well
as the daily work of thousands of healthcare professionals and employees. The
added-value eHealth services are adopting widely used Internet-based technologies
(e.g., IP and web services) and open standards (e.g., HL7) allowing access from
commodity devices (e.g., mobile phones and web browsers) for users and services
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(intra- and extra-organization). Herein, organizations expose resources to external
entities where security controls cannot be enforced.
As healthcare systems increasingly rely on web-enabled eHealth services and
online transactions for care delivery, they also become more vulnerable to cyberat-
tacks, requiring appropriate cybersecurity policies and solutions. An array of vulner-
abilities is exposed and brings heightened concerns regarding privacy and security
about third-parties’ risks, inappropriate releases of sensitive and private informa-
tion from healthcare records, and the systemic flows of information throughout
healthcare organizations.
This application scenario addresses a set of challenges in healthcare delivery that
the SPHINX tools are designed to address:
• Untrusted environments and devices;
• Web-based online healthcare services;
• Exposition of web services to external entities;
• The availability, integrity, and confidentiality of healthcare and patient data;
• The users’ authentication and profile management.
With healthcare data breaches on the rise, healthcare organizations are com-
mitted to understand the perceived risks of eHealth services and the security and
privacy measures patients expect, so they can begin to diagnose and overcome the
barriers to adopting and embracing eHealth services.
12.5.3 Scenario 3: mHealth and Remote Patient Monitoring
Platforms
Mobile health (mHealth) supports the delivery of healthcare via remote access med-
ical devices, IoT-based health devices (the Internet of Medical Things or IoMT),
and mobile applications that connect to healthcare IT systems through computer
networks, empowering the sharing of health and well-being information, enabling
the shifting of healthcare to a more preventative care outside of the hospital envi-
ronment, giving rise to services such as telehealth (video appointments and con-
sultation) and remote patient monitoring platforms, and delivering high-quality
healthcare.
Experts estimate that there will be more than 64 billion IoT devices by 2025 [13],
and a significant portion of these will be medical devices, from heart monitor-
ing implants and pacemakers to infusion pumps, mobile medical workstations,
in-home monitors and personal fitness devices or wearables. According to a study
conducted by the McKinsey Global Institute, spending on the Healthcare IoT solu-
tions will reach $1 trillion by 2025 [14]. Currently, 3 million patients worldwide
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are connected to a remote monitoring device that performs routine tests—such
as checking glucose levels for patients with diabetes or checking blood pressure for
patients receiving cardiac care—and sends personal medical data to their healthcare
provider [15].
The use of personal health monitoring devices and smartphone applications
(Apps) is also on the rise. Most of these devices are connected to patient remote
monitoring Apps that focus on the collection of patient-generated health data from
home, through devices and mobile health platforms that connect via the patient’s
home network or cellular network, to the primary care provider or care team. With
mHealth tools and platforms, telehealth and remote patient monitoring platforms,
healthcare organizations not only seize the potential to extend care management
and coordination into the patient’s home but also take the opportunity to deliver
highly personalized, accessible, and on-time healthcare services; reduce the num-
ber of visits and hospitalizations; eliminate unnecessary waste; contain healthcare
costs; and save lives. At the same time, the boundaries of cybersecurity are stretched,
creating new, often insecure, entry points for hackers and rising data security and
liability risks.
As healthcare systems become interconnected, especially as numerous wireless
medical devices start connecting to web-enabled IT systems, they become increas-
ingly vulnerable. Not only medical and health remote monitoring devices may be
vulnerable to viruses and malware that can compromise the effectiveness of the
devices (device failure or malfunction), patients’ privacy, and the healthcare orga-
nization’s IT ecosystem, but also the transmission of patient data enabled by those
devices represents a risk of data breach if the information is not properly secure. In
addition, the increasing use of BYOD is a potential issue as they may have devel-
oped networks and connectivity glitches and may very easily provide an on-ramp
for attackers to healthcare networks. Moreover, they are prone to be lost or stolen,
which could lead to identity theft and loss of privacy. Since these devices are outside
the healthcare organization’s control, there is also a lack of visibility and control over
personal devices, as well as the absence of awareness of these devices’ vulnerabilities
that attackers could take advantage of. From a cybersecurity perspective, healthcare
organizations need to rethink medical and health device management and consider
all the variables this mobile technology introduces, compared to traditional work-
stations and laptops.
This application scenario especially illustrates the challenges in healthcare deliv-
ery that the SPHINX tools are designed to address:
• Untrusted environments and devices;
• Remote healthcare services (in-home care), such as telehealth consultations
and remote patient monitoring platforms;
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• Integration of IoT-enabled medical and health devices in the healthcare orga-
nizations’ networks;
• Integration of patients’ BYOD devices in the healthcare organizations’ net-
works;
• The availability, integrity, and confidentiality of healthcare and patient data;
• The users’ authentication and profile management.
With the development of the smart home concept, the IoMT and the advent
of better mHealth technology, telehealth and remote patient monitoring platforms
stand to become an accepted standard of high-quality healthcare delivery for the
21st century.
12.5.4 Scenario 4: Sharing and Exchange of Healthcare
Information
Before the wide-scale adoption of Electronic Health Records/Personal Health
Records (EHRs/PHRs), access to healthcare information entailed paper records, in-
person requests to health information management offices, and the payment of fees.
The increasing digitization of health records has improved access to health infor-
mation, with healthcare professionals being able to easily access and view diagnosis,
medication history, clinical decision support notes, lab results, imaging, treatment
plans, and post-treatment monitoring. In this context, EHRs/PHRs act as pillars of
point of care information systems, facilitating the sharing and exchange of health
information among healthcare stakeholders, such as healthcare providers, pharma-
cies, insurance companies, and researchers. Currently, the ability of European citi-
zens to access their electronic medical records across the EU varies from one country
to another: such services are either operational (for example, in Luxembourg, Den-
mark, Finland, Estonia, France, Romania, and Portugal) or under development (for
example, in Greece, Cyprus, and Italy). Thus, the European Commission is work-
ing to facilitate access across borders to healthcare data, namely to laboratory tests,
medical discharge reports and images, and imaging reports, in full compliance with
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Healthcare data interoperability
and security are top priorities to ensure patient data protection and prevent data
breaches.
Highly important for the EHRs/PHRs operations are interoperability standards
and well-established integration profiles (adopted as EU standard specifications
under the 1025/2012 EU regulation [16]), allowing the services to be provided
to the appropriate users, across a variety of IT systems, diverse levels of sophistica-
tion and interoperable capabilities, a legal landscape of varying degrees, and vari-
ous levels of privacy and rules, ensuring data availability, integrity, non-repudiation,
resilience, and privacy. Healthcare organizations need to be knowledgeable of the
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EU and national regulations and requirements with regard to healthcare interop-
erability, ensuring that they remain compliant to further healthcare data sharing
and exchange so that the clinical or operational purpose and meaning of the data is
preserved and unaltered. Data security is also a top interoperability priority. Ensur-
ing privacy and the security of the health information throughout the entire data
exchange process is a key component to building the trust required to realize the
benefits of health information sharing and exchange. As such, access to data needs
to be well defined and controlled (e.g., who can access, for how long), and per-
formed operations (e.g., read, modify, delete) and support detailed auditing. It is
also paramount to ensure data integrity throughout the complete workflow and
data lifetime, clearly generating alerts if otherwise.
Along with improving health data security, it is important to consider patient
preferences in how their data is handled, allowing them to understand how their
information is used and how they could assert more control over which information
is shared. Also, healthcare professionals should be aware of the security measures
needed to protect their patient data.
This application scenario encapsulates specific challenges in healthcare delivery
that the SPHINX tools are designed to address:
• Standardization and common data exchange formats, complying with EU
and national regulations on interoperability;
• Availability, integrity, and confidentiality of patient records and healthcare
information across the complete workflow and data lifetime;
• Detailed auditing on every data operation;
• The users’ authentication and profile management.
The national push for healthcare interoperability continues to gain strength,
as a common set of rules for trusted and secure exchange is established between
networks across multiple jurisdictions, taking into account applicable legislation,
including intellectual property rights, and supporting healthcare organizations in
the process.
12.5.5 Scenario 5: Cross-border Healthcare Service Delivery
Cross-border healthcare has been introduced in the EU as required to secure uni-
versal quality of service delivered across the Member States, by allowing the flow of
healthcare data across borders. Enabling citizens to securely access and share their
healthcare data across borders is one of the priorities of the Communication on
enabling the digital transformation of health and care in the Digital Single Market.
Moreover, the GDPR underlines that citizens have the right to access their per-
sonal data and provides the legal framework for its protection, setting out directly
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applicable rules for the processing of the individuals’ personal data, including their
health data. And rules for facilitating the access to safe and high-quality cross-border
healthcare are specifically provided for by the Directive on patients’ rights in cross-
border healthcare. Technical specifications for healthcare information exchange
were defined, focusing on two sets of health data: Electronic patient summaries and
ePrescription. The first exchanges took place between Estonia and Finland in Jan-
uary 2019 [17] and their example will be followed by another 22 EU MS by 2021.
With the development and implementation of several EU-funded projects involv-
ing standardization and the exchange of healthcare data in Europe (projects epSOS,
EXPAND, Antilope, and HITCH), the Refined eHealth European Interoperabil-
ity Framework (ReEIF) is instrumental to the facilitation of EU-wide healthcare
service delivery.
Currently, healthcare information on specific cases is exchanged among EU MS
and Norway through the 24 thematic European Reference Networks (ERNs) that
virtually connect 900 highly specialized healthcare units located in 300 hospitals
and gather panels of clinicians to diagnose and treat suffering from rare, complex,
and low prevalence diseases. Healthcare organizations refer patients to the relevant
Network, with their consent and upholding existing national regulations, so citizens
do not have a direct access to these networks. On the contrary, the digital trans-
formation of healthcare, the creation of eHealth services, the leverage of mHealth
and Remote Patient Monitoring platforms and the exchange and sharing of health-
care information, based on the cross-border interoperability of EHRs, PHRs, and
ePrescription, is focused on the citizen. It will ensure that EU citizens can securely
access and exchange their healthcare data wherever they are in the EU.
On February 6, 2019, the European Commission’s Recommendation on a Euro-
pean Electronic Health Record exchange format (C(2019)800) [18] sets the frame-
work to further develop a European EHR exchange format that will enable citizens
to securely access and exchange their health data across borders in the EU. Fur-
ther, it underlines the importance of ensuring data protection and security, in line
with the GDPR, and full compliance with the cybersecurity framework. A joint
coordination process involving the EU MS and the European Commission (EC) is
envisaged to conduct this process, engaging relevant stakeholders, including health-
care professional organizations, national competence centers, industry actors, and
patients’ groups, as well as other EU and national authorities.
This application scenario encompasses broad challenges in healthcare delivery
that the SPHINX tools are designed to address:
• A common vision for EU healthcare service delivery;
• The trusted chain of transactions that ensures data confidentiality;
• Authentication of all involved individuals and IT components (residing in
different states);
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• Availability, integrity, and confidentiality of healthcare and patient data;
• Standardization, interoperability, and common data exchange formats;
• Different national legislation frameworks on healthcare data.
Built on adequate technical expertise and open standards, the European elec-
tronic health record exchange format is set to become the future de facto standard for
secure cross-border healthcare service delivery across Europe, taking into account
full compliance with data protection legislation and ethical principles and abiding
to a rigorous cybersecurity framework.
The five application scenarios identified in SPHINX enable the construction of
the environment or context for the common identification of challenges, problems,
needs, gaps, and opportunities and for the broaden debate of the SPHINX tools’
added-value for the cybersecurity of healthcare organizations.
12.6 Conclusions
Building upon the exploitation of system and network vulnerabilities, the types of
cyberattacks are rapidly increasing and constantly evolving. From individuals’ per-
sonal information to confidential healthcare data, the field is vast, and the conse-
quences can be devastating: impersonation, sensitive data fraudulent use, blackmail,
ransom demand.
Healthcare providers should consider adopting new technologies to protect
patient information and prevent their systems from being compromised. Artifi-
cial Intelligence to monitor shared networks, encryption techniques to further
protect shared information, advanced systems for identifying in near real-time
vulnerabilities and risks, and intuitive dashboards that provide rapid situational
awareness are needed to promptly identify and respond to existing and new cyber
threats. Importantly, SPHINX delivers actionable information related with cyber-
security to users within the Healthcare domain, contributing to increase the degree
of cybersecurity awareness within the organization and put in place appropriate
policies and practices. Like with any other transition, improving the levels of
cybersecurity in Healthcare organizations is not going to be achieved instantly.
It will be an ongoing process that shall require the commitment of all related
stakeholders.
To fight existing and emerging cyber threats in the healthcare domain, a holistic
approach to cybersecurity needs to be developed, enabling cybersecurity to become
an integral part of patient safety. New legislation and regulations are in place to
facilitate change, which applies to human behavior, technology, and processes.
The SPHINX Toolkit allows healthcare organizations to understand and adapt to
threats as they evolve while creating a layered security framework that promotes
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technological innovation to better protect patient data, minimize threats to patient
health and safety, and ensure the privacy and confidentiality of sensitive informa-
tion shared through mobile, cloud, or IoT-enabled environments. All users become
aware of how cybersecurity works, the cyber vulnerabilities and threats that exist,
and how they may be better managed. SPHINX technologies offer cutting-edge
visualization with the risk radar method to ease awareness and decision-making in
critical cases, including when human intervention is required.
Overall, SPHINX increases cybersecurity protection levels in the healthcare
domain, tackling three main barriers of limited awareness and understanding on
cybersecurity: (a) knowledge on cybersecurity issues and processes, (b) low usability
of cybersecurity solutions at hospitals and care centers, and (c) the current vulner-
abilities of cybersecurity solutions.
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Security Challenges for the Critical
Infrastructures of the Energy Sector
By Dušan Gabrijelčič, Denis Čaleta, Theodore Zahariadis,
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13.1 Introduction
Security is of key importance for the development of an individual and the society.
Particularly the means for and the forms of an organized provision of security
have changed dramatically throughout history, influenced significantly by con-
stantly new technologies and scientific evidence. The globalization of the world,
and thus indirectly of security, poses serious dilemmas to the modern society about
how to continue basing its development on the fundamental requirements related
to the free movement of goods, services, and people, and, on the other hand,
about how to keep threats at an acceptable risk level. The emergence of asymmet-
ric threats to national and international security is based on completely different
assumptions and perceptions which we were used in the past based on the static
approach of managing conventional threats. The changing social conditions and
tensions caused by the rapid technological development found particular social
environments totally unprepared for confronting the new global security situa-
tion and, above all, the newly-emerging complex security threats. Dynamic changes
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and unexpected technological development have contributed to even greater com-
plexity of this dimension. The fact that the modern society depends entirely on
the functioning of technology makes this society even more vulnerable in terms
of security. Energy and especial electricity are in this respect even more impor-
tant for normal functioning of modern society based on technology. Moreover, it
makes individual threats and risks related to the proper functioning of infrastruc-
ture even more uncontrollable. Certain infrastructure segments, especially sector
of electrical power, are so important for the functioning of the society that their
non-functioning or limited functioning could have serious consequences or cause
serious trouble for that society [1].
Critical infrastructure and business-core applications can be attacked by means
of many different vectors. Expanding on the previous analysis, it should be kept in
mind that CI is, at an operative level, ordinary business with all the typical weak-
nesses that this implies.
Electrical grids offer a wide range of targets that can impart a great deal of dam-
age on an entire system. Small-scale attacks can affect much greater systems because
the entire grid is interconnected. Project participants warned that once one com-
ponent is compromised, an entire system could be subject to a cascading failure,
thus impacting far more than the initial target [2].
13.2 Energy Sector as a Critical Infrastructure
A critical infrastructure is often identified as that infrastructure whose incorrect
functioning, even for a limited time period, may negatively affect the economy of
individual subjects or groups, involving economic losses and/or even expose people
and things to a safety and security risk [3]. Within the European Union, a Critical
Infrastructure is defined as “an asset, system or part thereof located in member states
which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety,
security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction
of which would have a significant impact in a member state as a result of the failure
to maintain those functions” [4]. While a European Critical Infrastructure (ECI)
is defined as a “critical infrastructure located in Member States the disruption or
destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two Member States.
The significance of the impact shall be assessed in terms of crosscutting criteria.
This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of
infrastructure”. The designation of a critical infrastructure as an ECI is the result of
a complex technical-political process, which arises from the potential impact that
can be caused by a failure/destruction of an infrastructure in terms of sectoral and
inter-sectoral relevance.
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13.3 CEI Basic Concepts, From Threats to Risk
In this section, basic concepts addressed and discussed in the paper will be defined.
A threat is core concept. Following from standards and attack perspective, as
defined in Internet Security Glossary RFC4949 [5], threats are related to threat
agents and actions against system resources, exposed by vulnerabilities and pro-
tected by countermeasures. Common Criteria [6] defines similar concepts, namely
threat actions that give rise to threats which increase risks to assets protected by
countermeasures. In the discussion below, both standards concepts will be used
interchangeably.
A threat can be defined as “Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversary
impact an asset resulting in unauthorized disclosure, deception, disruption or usurpa-
tion as a threat consequence.” A study of threats has been performed based on broad
cyber oriented “ENISA Threat Taxonomy – A tool for structuring threat informa-
tion” [7] and complementary, more physically oriented characterization of hazards
and triggered events in CEI defined by OSCE [8]. Both has been used as a basis to
study the threats that indirectly and directly affect the continuous functioning of
CEI and are not limited only to the physical and cyber risks but cover the entire
segment of risks.
An asset is “An entity of a value for its owner.” Smart Grid Coordination Group
Smart Grid Architectural Model (SGAM) [9] defines the smart grid scope accord-
ing to use cases studied in the group. The scope is defined in 3D cube model,
namely (1) domain, from generation, transmission, distribution, distributed energy
resources to customer; (2) zones, from process to market; and (3) interoperability
layers, from components, communication, information, function to business layer.
In all dimensions, various assets can be identified, like generators, transformers,
poles, lines, communication links, information, processes, etc.
Threat agent, according to ENISA Threat Landscape report [10], is defined as
follows: “A threat agent is any person or thing that acts (or has the power to act) to
cause, carry, transmit, or support a threat.” The document exposes cyber-criminals,
insiders, nation states, corporations, hacktivists, cyber-terrorists, and script kiddies
as most visible agents. The taxonomy covers only cyber threats. Additional agents
can be added to the selection, like nature and environment, hooligans, vandals,
military, or even AI.
Threat agents exploit vulnerabilities to realize a threat. A vulnerability is
defined [5] as “A weakness in a system’s design, implementation, or operation and
management that could be exploited to violate the system’s security policy.” All sys-
tems have weaknesses, but they don’t get always exploited. For example, in energy
domain, a well-known weakness is separation in organizational silos; every silo
implements technical and security solutions for itself; policies are often misaligned;
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and organizations communicate in case of crisis mainly through unformal channels.
The vulnerability exists but seems to be rarely exploited.
Risk combines vulnerabilities and threats with probabilities of loss: “An expecta-
tion of loss expressed as the probability that a particular threat will exploit a particular
vulnerability with a particular harmful result.” Risk is important for threat analysis
to be able to assess an impact of a threat or vulnerability.
13.4 CEI Threats Analysis and Evaluation Methodology
Threats to CEI systems are broad and varying, from very simple to complex and
cascading as has been presented in introduction. A depth of threats space is further
stretched due to a number of stakeholder domains, from generation, large-scale
renewables, transmission to distribution. The space needs to be addressed holis-
tically, allowing for continuous exploration and evaluation. Proposed methodol-
ogy, evaluated through the DEFENDER project, is presented in Figure 13.1. The
methodology interweaves studies, analysis, and evaluation with real stakeholder
environments. In the figure, three flows are presented: analysis and evaluation flow
denoted with full, requirements capturing; feedback flow denoted with dashed; and
unknown threats flow denoted with dotted lines.
Figure 13.1. CEI threats methodology.
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The analysis and evaluation flow starts with a review of current threats, state of
the art, and status of standardization in the field. The current threats are of utmost
importance since they indicate what kind of challenges needs to be addressed in
threat mitigation. The threats examples are further summarized in Section 13.5.
The flow continues with stakeholder domains investigation. CEI assets need to be
determined, specific threats to the domains identified, and threat agents named and
analyzed.
Current threats and domain-specific inventory are analyzed through threat sce-
narios. A threat scenario is a template allowing to collect threat-specific concerns,
main assets involved, relevant vulnerabilities the attacker can exploit, consequences
if the attack is successful, and initial detection and mitigation possibilities. Threat
scenarios are a basis for attack tree modeling where the attacker steps are laid down
and analyzed. The mitigation possibilities are further detailed in controls speci-
fication as design time countermeasures and run-time mitigations besides detec-
tion capabilities. Attack tree modeling and threat scenarios are further detailed in
Section 13.6.
All steps so far form an input to a risk modeling phase as well evaluation phase of
the methodology. The risk modeling aims at evaluation of risk rate per attack tree
step and combined risk value of an asset looking from human, social, and economic
point of view. The combined risk value is used to classify the assets into secure tiers.
Risk modeling is further explained in Section 13.7.
In the evaluation phase, the threat scenarios and modeled attacks are transformed
to evaluation scenarios. The evaluation scenarios adapt the threat scenarios to the
pilots, define success and failure outcomes of the evaluation, and specify evaluation
characteristics that will be evaluated during evaluation. Detailed configurations are
prepared for DEFENDER Platform components, including with detectors, com-
plex event processing, co-simulator, impact assessment, and mitigations configura-
tions. Evaluation phase is continued with evaluation in pilots, in real environment,
in trial sites related to stakeholder domains. Evaluation modeling is explained in
brief in Section 13.8 and the piloting in Section 13.9.
All analysis and evaluation flow steps provide requirements for a DEFENDER
Platform and Incident Information Sharing Platform (I2SP). On other hand, the
development of the platforms needs to be in tight sync with the steps impacting the
specification, feedback from the development phase in form of updates to attack
modeling phase and evaluation specification phase is required. In particular, the
attack trees and configurations of the components are tightly connected to the plat-
form implementation, see (reference to other two articles).
Finally, all analysis and evaluation flow, and requirements and feedback flow
steps need to be continuously evaluated to address a challenge of unknown threats.
Threats need to be continuously managed in their lifecycle for the system and
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its administrators to be able to anticipate and be prepared for unknowns. Brief
overview of unknown threats dimensions is presented in Section 13.10.
13.5 Challenging CEI Threats
Overview of current CEI threats can give insights what are top challenges for CEI
protection. The overview is of crucial importance for selection of threat scenarios,
assets, risks, and controls to be evaluated in the CEI threats analysis and evaluation
process. The focus of the process is both physical and cyber threats and combina-
tion of them both. Asset and organization span are cross entire CEI sector. The
threats are summarized and grouped below in few distinct and most challenging
categories, namely physical threats, cyber threats, organizational threats, and tech-
nology threats. Any combination of such threats is possible, due to modernization
and decentralization of the grid attack possibilities will be only larger.
Physical threats can be divided in two large groups, physical attacks and forces
of nature. Physical attacks on the infrastructure are not rare at all [11]. Attacks are
directed at all electrical grid segments and elements. Gun usage is often reported
near power lines, substations get broke in and vandalized, switching fields are visited
by people or animals, generation facilities like PV plants are targeted by thieves [12].
Targeted attacks on transformers can have huge and long-lasting impact on entire
grid energy services provisioning as well on the environment.
Forces of nature threat the infrastructure, in particular the power lines. Strong
wind, landslides, fires, and, especially, glazed ice can have strong and broad impact
on both transmission and distribution services. For example, because of glazed ice
in Slovenia in 2014 more than 15% of population was without electricity for several
days [13]. The situation was close to disaster, a 400 KV line put in test operation
just a month before was the only reason for a third of the nation not to be out of
electricity for extended period of time [14]. The primary vulnerability of the energy
infrastructure lies in its spread distribution all-over populated areas, exposed and
long interconnections between grid segments and fragility of the infrastructure not
designed to sustain all scope of nowadays threats.
Cybersecurity main concern is preservation of confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability properties of the CEI information system [15]. Confidentiality is related to
personal or customer data, industrial processes, confidential information, financial
data, or sensitive data used to build up cyberattacks. Social attacks, espionage, atten-
tional or unintentional disclosure, malware exfiltration, or unauthorized network
access are primary ways to realize threats to confidentiality.
Integrity loss of industrial control systems can have far-reaching consequences
if the attack moves the industrial process beyond controllable levels, tampers the
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possibility of the system trigger emergency procedures, or modifies sensitive infor-
mation related to, for example, to billing which leads to financial loss or fraud.
Typical example of integrity loss incident is the Stuxnet [16]. Loss of availability
refers to loss of provisioning of electricity services; all segments of the electricity
grid need to be resilient in provisioning to be able to guarantee the service. Most
eminent cyberattacks causing loss of availability in the domain were carried out in
Ukraine in 2015. It is easy to generalize such attacks to other parts of the world [17].
Electrical grid companies face many challenges that could be understood as
organizational threats. The security services are provided by different parts of the
organization, physical security is separated from cybersecurity, cybersecurity for
a technical network is provided separately from business network. Information
silos lead to inadequate security and risk management, unaligned and dependency
weak inventory management, poor cooperation between departments and ineffi-
cient incident response procedures.
Modern technology advances expose novel technology threats to the CEI infras-
tructure beyond cyber. Drones are nowadays easily accessible off the shelf. They can
carry a load of few kilos, fly fast, and at distance. Off-the-shelf drones were used
for drug smuggling [18] and in Syrian war [19]. A distributed and overly exposed
energy grid infrastructure is very hard to protect. Power lines, transformers, and
switching fields could be an easy target with huge consequences.
13.6 Threat Modeling
Threat modeling starts with collection of threat scenarios. A threat scenario has
a number of definitions in literature. The Canadian government Threat and risk
assessment working guide has specified the threat scenario as: “A threat scenario
consists of one or more threat events, carried out by a threat agent, that could result in
the compromise of an asset” [20]. The definition hasn’t changed much latter; NIST
has added in its Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments [21] a notion of ordering
of the events in time: “A threat scenario is a set of discrete threat events, attributed to
a specific threat source or multiple threat sources, ordered in time, that result in adverse
effects.”
The definitions tell already a lot. There is a need to know what are the threat
events, threat agents, threat sources, and assets and how are the events of the scenario
ordered in time. Based on the definitions, the following threat scenario template is
proposed to collect the threats, tying the threat analysis to a pilot site:
• Pilot site: defines the assets of the pilot site and main configuration site details
that can affect any threat scenario essential components. The information
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helps to focus the scenario towards the site and report on realistic environ-
ment where the scenario and consequent detection and mitigation can hap-
pen.
• Main scenario concern: lays out the main scenario concern, what will go really
wrong if the scenario happens? The concern allows multiple variations of the
scenario to happen. The concern helps to keep the focus on main issues the
scenario addresses. If the concern is not clear, the scenario should be split in
smaller, more focused parts.
• Description: specifies the steps of the scenario, how the scenario is imple-
mented, refers to pilot site description and elements when relevant. Here the
template asks for the events and possibly for the time order of the events,
but the description serves more as an illustration of possible threat scenario
realization.
• Relevant vulnerabilities: describes the vulnerabilities the scenario assumes to
be used/misused. The vulnerabilities here are not detailed vulnerabilities as
are reported by CERTS or similar organizations, but general vulnerabilities
that can be further specified towards the detailed during the analysis.
• Threat consequences: the threat consequences of the scenario, strongly related
to main concern. Multiple diverse consequences are possible. The conse-
quences can have important impact on the further scenario evaluation and
their categorization. More detailed, more precise the categorization can be.
• Related scenarios: for documentation purposes, primary for similar scenarios
already discussed in research and scientific literature.
The threat scenarios give needed information for the next step, modeling the
threats through attack trees.
13.6.1 Attack Trees
Threat and attack modeling have been widely used by security experts as means to
identify how an attack agent or group is able to exploit the vulnerabilities of a sys-
tem to compromise its security, attack trees being one of the most popular relevant
techniques. Though attack trees have been used for years under various forms and
names, it was not until 2000 [22] that they were clearly described as a systematic
method to characterize system security against attacks of various types and mani-
festation [23]. An attack tree defines a collection of possible attacks, simply called
attack suite, against a given system. Usually, attack trees represent the end result
(e.g., compromise of the system security or survivability) as the root of the tree,
whereas the ways that the attackers can cause such compromise are represented as
lower-level tree nodes. In this sense, each attack tree presents the full range of actions
that an attacker could take to compromise the system; each path through the attack
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tree represents a unique attack on the system, the set of all available attacks being
called attack surface. Typically, a complete system comprises a large set of attack
trees (called forest) that pertain to its operational features.
Modeling via attack trees has been mainly employed in cybersecurity contexts,
primarily in the field of information and communication technology (ICT), most
often to deliberately present the security of software systems and applications. How-
ever, attack trees have been also employed in the framework of modeling the cyber-
security of smart energy systems. Indicatively, NESCOR (the U.S. National Electric
Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource initiative) has performed substantial
research on the cybersecurity failures for energy grids and has published scenarios,
relevant impact analysis, as well as proposed mitigation actions [24, 25]. How-
ever, in contrast to the goals presented in this chapter, NESCOR only targets at
cybersecurity, neglecting the cyber-physical aspects. Presented attack tree analysis
is extended as well with detection possibilities, and evaluation and risk modeling
phase.
13.6.2 Attack Tree Example
In Figure 13.2, an attack tree representing a cascading threat of cutting water supply
through electrical grid is presented. The following notations are used in the tree:
octagons present attack tree nodes; dashed lines, OR relationship; and full lines,
AND relationship. Double octagons present common attack tree nodes as being
composed from many nodes and relationships. For example, “Getting into substa-
tion” is based on a common node “Getting into building.” Triple octagons present
other threat scenario, in our example “Damage power line or pole.” The attack tree
indicates that the power supply can be cut if the water pumps are stopped and the
water reservoir is drained. The water pump can stop working if the power supply is
cut and the backup power supply has been disabled or is not available. The power
supply service can be loss because of power line failure or it is maliciously controlled
through powering substation. Powering substation can be attacked either physically
or through cyber means.
13.6.3 Attack Tree Analysis Complementary Information
In analysis phase, each attack tree node is complemented with information describ-
ing means of specific attack node detection and mitigation. The detection part
describes node-specific details of detection together with rough indication of
information needed to implement the detection. The mitigation part describes
design-time mitigations and run-time mitigations. The design-time mitigations are
countermeasures that can prevent a tree node attack step by design, for example, by
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Figure 13.2. Attack tree representing a cascading threat of cutting water supply through
electrical grid.
introducing a redundancy or additional fortifications in the system. The run-time
mitigations are one that can be applied dynamically during the system operation.
The analysis is further extended with system response to threat realization as well
to run-time mitigation triggering. In both cases, the consequences for the system
and services the system provides are studied and noted.
13.7 Modeling Risks
The primary objective of risk modeling is to define a process for analyzing and
assessing the attack trees in terms of their risk exposure, which is expressed as Risk
Rate and ultimately to result in a CEI secure tier classification.
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13.7.1 Risk Management Process
The Risk management process selected to be followed is based on ISO/IEC
27005 [26]. The process consists of the following steps: Context Establishment,
where the scope and the boundaries of the effort are defined; Risk Assessment, where
risks are identified, analyzed, and evaluated; Risk Treatment, where a risk treatment
plan is prepared and any residual risks are identified; Risk Acceptance, where the risk
treatment plan and related residual risks are accepted; Risk Communication, which
involves the exchange and/or sharing of information about the identified risks with
the relevant stakeholders; and Risk Monitoring and Review, where actions are taken
to monitor the overall process and to review it for improvements.
13.7.2 Context Establishment
To define the impact of a threat scenario, one should consider a number of param-
eters: cost of equipment and maintenance, and cost of losses, namely material, rep-
utation, availability, or confidentiality. For every site, examples will be given for
piloting sites in DEFENDER project, the assets need to be identified, threats to
the assets need to be analyzed, threats mapped to the assets, vulnerabilities of the
assets listed, consequences of the threats identified, and existing controls recog-
nized. All basic relationships are indicated in Figure 13.1.
13.7.3 Risk Estimation and Classification
For the estimation of the risk, as parameters the human, economic, and social
impact and the risk likelihood has been used. Following the approach proposed by
ANSSI [27], in the risk estimation and assessment process, a qualitative approach
has been selected. The selection has assumed that the qualitative approach can be
easily converted to a quantitative one, by assigning to each level a range of specific
values.
Impact categories selected were from minimal to severe in five levels from 1
to 5. Risk likelihood was defined in five levels as well, from rare to almost certain,
from 1% to 80% probability. Calculation of the likelihood and impact has been
performed on each attack tree node as suggested by Edge [28].
For the attack tree, in case of OR relationship, it is necessary that at least one of
the ancestor nodes is accomplished in order for the child node to be accomplished,
too. In order to calculate the probability for the child node, we need to find out
the probability of NOT accomplishing any of the parent nodes. If this probability
is subsequently subtracted from 1, then the outcome is the probability of having
the child node accomplished. As far as the impact is concerned, the impact of the
child node is calculated as the maximum impact of any of the ancestors.
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In case of an AND relationship, all of the ancestor nodes must be accomplished
in order for the child node to be accomplished, too. This lead, logically, to the
conclusion that the probability of the child node is calculated as the product of the
probabilities of its ancestors. As far as the impact is concerned, the logic is similar to
the logic used for the calculation of the probability in the case of an OR relationship,
in combination with a normalization operator.
Combining the risk impact and the risk likelihood, by actually producing their
product, we are able to determine the risk rating that refers to the level of the risk
exposure for a particular threat scenario. There exist 25 combinations of risk impact
and likelihood which give combined a risk rating matrix. The matrix can be divided
into security tires, where the green tire represents most secure (low likelihood and
impact) to red tire (high likelihood and impact) as is presented in Figure 13.1.
13.8 Modeling Evaluation
Evaluation is organized around two concepts: scenarios and characteristics.
The evaluation scenarios are a simple concept allowing organizing the evaluations
of controls and procedures developed for threat mitigation into manageable units.
The evaluation characteristics allow to assess features and qualities of the solutions
in a unified and standardized way.
The evaluation scenario presents a single testing unit which can be meaningfully
evaluated on its own. It is intended that the single unit would allow testing of a
single component, solution, or feature of the developed technologies. The scenarios
can be interrelated to each other. Therefore, one successful scenario evaluation can
require previous scenarios to be successful as well. Main components of a scenario
are scenario steps, which define what is the scenario’s basic purpose. For these steps,
within the same evaluation scenario, the testing steps are proposed. The evaluation
of testing steps results in success or failure state of the system. Each evaluation
scenario is evaluated according to its scenario test success or failure, and evaluation
characteristics as are specified below.
The standard way to evaluate a product provides a series of ISO/IEC standards
known as SQuaRE (System and Software Quality Requirements and Evaluation).
From five ISO/IEC standard divisions, the threat mitigation evaluation can mostly
benefit from quality model, quality measurements, and quality evaluation division.
The ISO/IEC 25010 [29] standard quality model is defined with a number of char-
acteristics and sub-characteristics in product quality and quality of use categories.
From the model, the following characteristics are most suitable for common, cross
evaluation scenarios quality assessment: functional, performance, usability, relia-
bility, security, and reusability from product quality perspective and efficiency and
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dissatisfaction from quality of use perspective. ISO/IEC 25023 on “Measurement
of system and software product quality” [30] provides some great insights how to
assess the product quality characteristics. The standard defines simple and appli-
cable measurement functions for functional completeness based on proportions
estimation, performance measures based on mean response time, response time
adequacy, mean turnaround time, throughput, resources utilization, and capacity
adequacy, etc.
Some other characteristics should be evaluated beyond ones defined in ISO/IEC
25000 family, for example:
• Threat mitigation: how well did the controls and procedures address the threat
scenario that has been evaluated?
• Risk mitigation: how well did the controls and procedures address the risks
originating in the threat scenario?
• Ethic and privacy: per threat scenario handling of ethical and privacy aspects
needs to be evaluated.
13.9 Pilot Evaluation
The threats analysis and evaluation methodology has been evaluated in the
DEFENDER project.1 The project has developed a Defender Platform, an imple-
mentation of controls for cyber-physical security provisioning process. The plat-
form is accompanied by an Incident Information Sharing Platform (I2SP) allowing
to exchange attack-specific indicators among Defender Platform systems.
13.9.1 Defender Platform Configuration
The Defender Platform provides a complete system for data fusion, attack detec-
tion, situation awareness enrichment, optimized attack mitigation selection, and
visualization and control. All the methodology steps described in previous sections
have contributed to requirements of the platform. Attack trees, controls, detectors,
and mitigations give the platform a skeleton, sensors, and actuators. The risk analy-
sis as presented in Section 13.7 enable a co-simulator to estimate future states of the
system according to the attack tree and to calculate impacts of attacker next steps
as well of the system response as part of the situation enrichment. All the elements
were bind together with a configuration of the Defender Platform and external
1. DEFENDER project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Innovation Programme
under grant agreement No 740898, see the project home page for details: https://defender-project.eu/
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components—detectors, controls, mitigations, like their geolocation, orientation,
angles, timings, etc.
13.9.2 Pilots
The described methodology and the DEFENDER Platform have been evaluated
in DEFENDER project pilots. The project has implemented four pilots in France,
Italy, and Slovenia. The French pilot operated by ENGIE was in a Combigolfe
power plant (France), focused on drone attacks, drone video detection and miti-
gation by jamming, protection of the perimeter by laser detection and automated
drone inspection.
Italian trials were at ASM Terni (Italy), a Distribution System Operator (DSO),
and at BFP large-scale renewable, wind farm in Erchie (Italy). In Terni, a Phasor
Measurement Unit (PMU)-based fault detection and localization was experimented
together with evaluation of the attack on a substation powering a water system of
Terni, as is presented in Figure 13.2. In Erchie, a laser-based drone detection and
protection of the windmills by a hunting drone was experimented, as well cyber-
physical protection of the windmills and substation.
In Slovenia, the trials were led by ELES, a Transmission System Operator (TSO).
The Slovenian trials have focused on electrical network fault location by utiliz-
ing collocated optical network properties and cross cyber-physical access control
improvements.
13.9.3 Result Replication
For the project pilots, more than 20 threat scenarios were described and analyzed.
The threat scenarios attack trees were complemented by 28 common attack trees
that could be utilized across all the pilots and situations. Experience from the field
has shown that it easy to merge and extend the attack trees. Configurations require
some time to be adapted to new installation and deployment but allow adaptation
and fine tuning. Replicating detectors and controls from pilot site to pilot site was
possible and was even considered as a part of development process resulting in
components and configurations improvements.
13.10 Unknown Threats
Unknown threats are threats previously unknown to the observed system. Accord-
ing to the definition of threats as is specified in Section 13.3, one can make two
observations regarding the definition of the unknown: security needs to be defined
and there are many views the unknown can be related to.
240 Security Challenges for CIs of the Energy Sector
Addressing the unknown threats, a number of views have been explored. Most
common is a threat space, when new threats continuously emerge due to newly
discovered vulnerabilities. A threat scenario space allows defining and exploring
new scenarios as well identifying possible missing ones. An attack space views the
unknown from an attacker perspective and can give answers to where attack tools
are coming from and how they are used for target purpose. A domain space lights the
issues pertinent to domains like energy, water, finance, etc. Every domain opens new
unknown possibilities; threats from one domain can be meaningfully transferred
to other domains. A technology space introduces novel threats by just either emer-
gence of new technology, for example, drones, automation systems, etc., or open-
ing administrative boundaries of existing technologies. On the end, a research space
could be used to identify gaps and possible alternative usage of existing techniques.
Methodology as presented in Figure 13.1 indicates the unknown threat spaces
and a need to continuously follow the information in entire process of threat anal-
ysis and evaluation. In this way, the process becomes permanent and requires a
lifecycle management of identification, detection, evaluation, and mitigation of
unknown threats.
13.11 Energy Sector Challenges
In this section, major energy sector challenges will be summarized based on the
experience of threat modeling and evaluation as were laid out in the previous
sections. The energy sector challenges can be roughly divided into three groups:
political, organizational, and techno-social. In cross-group dimension, one par-
ticular property of the sector can be identified—general disconnection or lack of
cooperation—between diverse layers, segments, sectors, organizational units, orga-
nizations, stakeholders, etc., resulting in major sector weaknesses and vulnerabili-
ties.
From the political point of view, more determination, regulation, and will to sup-
port development of sector cyber-physical threats resistance is needed. In Europe,
the NIS directive has initiated a framework for addressing the cyber-security chal-
lenges. Operators of essential services have been identified and tasked with needed
set of security services to be provided for secure operation. List of services, on the
end per country specific, is often not comprehensive or complete. The reason for
this could be that a comprehensive and complete list would be very demanding to
implement in cost and effort needed. Smaller entities in the sector find any demands
form regulation already very challenging.
While the NIS directive provides needed scope and vertical structure to the
cybersecurity services facilitation, a need to strengthen cooperation of the entities in
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the field in depth is only partially covered by the directive. The actors, TSOs, DSOs,
GEN, Renewables, Aggregators, etc., should cooperate closely at least in best-
practice exchanges, attack information, and indicators of compromises exchange
and common planning for incident response and consequences mitigation. The
regulators and countries policy-makers should foresee and encourage such cooper-
ation not only in the sector but in cross CI sectors as well. It has to be noted that
physical threats are selectively covered by regulation, cooperation within sector and
cross CI sectors is on discretionary basis only.
Organizational challenges are pertinent to the organizations in the sector. Orga-
nizations vary from large to small, so the level of cyber-physical security readiness
is diverse as well. What seems to be still common to most of them are silos, divid-
ing operation in technical and business information systems, corresponding two
cybersecurity systems governance is disconnected from physical security, etc. Orga-
nizations don’t have top security policies governing a general direction of security in
organization, sometimes even silo policies are missing. The silos challenge overall
risk management, dependencies between silos are weakly defined, risks do get biased
towards more expensive physical equipment, while the services are what matters.
For dynamic threat management systems, a lack of coherent inventory and service
dependency management is of crucial concern.
Technological challenges are supercharged by diversity of equipment and stan-
dards in the sector, fast digitization, innovative use cases, and novel technologies.
They lead to decentralization of the grid, introduction of off-the-shelf technolo-
gies, and activation of even the smallest actors, making the grid on one hand more
vulnerable and on the other hand more resilient to failure. While the attack sur-
face of the digitized grid has been significantly enlarged, the physical infrastructure
has remained almost the same, including with long amortization time. The main
vulnerability of physical equipment has remained the same: open exposure, e.g.,
transformers, and large geographic dispersion, as in case of power lines. While novel
technologies development, e.g., drones, enable easier attack of the infrastructure,
countermeasures are not yet fully ready for its protection.
Another face of the techno-social challenges are targeted attacks. The targeted
attacks are most challenging to prevent and can have vast consequences. They
often combine multiple types of threats, from social, physical to cyber. Techniques
like social engineering, advanced persistent threats (APT), combination of cyber-
physical attacks, cascading attacks, and destructive assets attack are so diverse that
are hard to detect and mitigate with a single system. The attack life cycle can span
from years in case of APT to seconds in case of destructive assets attack. Detec-
tion techniques face challenges of minimal data available for detection and very
long time spans. On the other hand, the mitigations would need to be available at
all geographically disperse locations to be able to be triggered in few seconds time
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span for meaning full action. The fact also introduces a requirement for full threat
management automation which can be a challenge by itself.
13.12 Conclusions
Presented threat modeling and evaluation methodology, together with the process
of its implementation, have shown a number of benefits for involved stakeholders.
Through the implementation of the methodology in the pilots, pilot-specific threat
scenarios have been developed to address the most feared concerns of the pilot own-
ers. The methodology has been able to expose many of the organizational and tech-
nology challenges discussed in Section 13.11. Systematic work and improvements
of the pilot owner systems has enabled the Defender Platform to successfully fuse
sensors data, detect attacks, assess impact through co-simulation, propose mitiga-
tion actions, and start the countermeasures. Nevertheless, the methodology could
only indicate and expose the challenges as a requirements, threat scenarios, attack
trees, attack steps risks, and probabilities. In this way, it can fuel a techniological
solution to address some of the challenges. The political and organizational chal-
lenges need to be addressed separately requiring all stakeholders’ cooperation.
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14.1 Resilience and Vulnerability of CEI
Critical Energy Infrastructures (CEI) do not only consist of the power grid and
electrical equipment, but also of the communication infrastructure, measurement
devices, and control functionalities, which are networks in different domains and
at different scale. Dependencies between these networks include power supply of
communication infrastructure by the power grid and the dependence of compo-
nents in the power grid on Control Centre commands. In combination, the net-
works and their interdependencies form a complex system where a small initial set
of component failures has the potential to cause cascading failures leading to partial
or complete breakdown of the system. Consequently, for a comprehensive analysis
of the vulnerability and resilience of such a system, all the relevant domains and
their interdependencies must be included and modeled.
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For distributed systems with many components, such as the transmission or dis-
tribution grids, a graph-theoretic approach can be applied to perform an analysis
of potential cascading in the system. A graph G = 〈V, E〉 is a mathematical object
formed by a set of vertices V and a set of edges E , where each edge e = 〈u, v〉 is con-
necting two vertices u and v. We are using simple graphs to represent the network’s
topology and directed graphs to represent the dependency between components.
Simple graphs do not allow self-loops (edges that are connected to the same vertex)
and duplicate edges (multiple edges that are connected to the same vertices) and its
edges are bidirectional. Self-loops are not required for the modeling, while duplicate
edges could be used to represent redundant lines, cables, or links. However, redun-
dancy can also be expressed as an attribute of an edge in a simple graph. In general,
power grids and communication networks allow the flow of energy and data in
both directions of a line or link, making a simple graph a suitable representation of
the network. Directed graphs, however, as described in [41], consist of arcs as uni-
directional edges, which point from one vertex to another. The dependency graph
represents components as vertices of the graph and arcs as a dependency, pointing
from the dependent component to the supporting component.
14.1.1 Example of use Case and Implementation
The system investigated in this sample use case is based on a generic distribu-
tion grid segment [20], which has been extended by a physical and a logical
communication network and a measurement and control network as described in
Figure 14.1.
The power grid consists of multiple loads at the LV level, supplied by four dif-
ferent substations in a radial configuration. Since the grid is meshed, different paths
are available to supply the loads under normal operating conditions. This redun-
dancy is utilized for network reconfiguration in case of a fault. For the vulnerability
analysis, we simplified the network by aggregating the loads of each section; since
in case of a fault in the grid, we expect either all the load nodes of a section to
function or none of them.
The real physical communication equipment is not known, and we assume that
an optical communication network is used to support measurement and control
of the power grid. The optical cables are parallel to power lines, thus connecting
the same vertices of the graphs; and there is a communication node at each load
node of the power grid.
The logical communication network uses the optical network’s infrastructure
to exchange data between nodes. Each link of this network connects two logical
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Figure 14.1. Network topologies and node and edge dependency graphs for the exam-
ple use case.
communication nodes and requires a path in the optical network between the
respective physical communication nodes.
The grid operation uses a measurement and control network with a central
control node (the control center node), which gathers measurement data, processes
it, and provides control functionality. This control center node is connected to each
of the measurement and control nodes, representing the nodes in the power grid
that are equipped with measurement devices and switching equipment that can be
remote-controlled.
To model the interdependencies, we assume that each node of the power grid
supplies the local communication node with power, which in turn supports the
local node of the logical communication network. Each node in the logical com-
munication network finally supports one or multiple nodes of the measurement
and control network. All the dependencies between nodes are represented in a node
dependency graph, which is shown in Figure 14.1 for the default configuration of
the scenario. Every link in the logical communication network is dependent on
the availability of a path between the respective nodes in the optical communica-
tion network. If there is no path available, the link fails, as data can no longer be
exchanged.
In addition to the interdependencies, there are domain-specific intra-
dependencies in each of the networks. For the power grid, we assume each
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subgraph must include at least one load node as energy consumer and one sub-
station node as energy provider. If this is not the case, all nodes of the subgraph
fail. For the optical and logical communication networks, we assume that isolate
nodes fail, since they are no longer able to send or receive data and thus cannot
fulfill their purpose. For the measurement and control network, we assume each
subgraph must include at least one control center node as measurement data con-
sumer and control command provider and one measurement node as measurement
data provider and control command consumer.
In this example scenario, four different configurations of the system are evaluated
and compared:
• A default configuration, where no by-design measures are implemented
• The DV configuration, where Double Virtualization is applied to virtualize
part of the functionality of the measurement and control network and thus
make it independent from the actual hardware. In this configuration, the con-
trol functionality is virtualized, and we assume that it can be hosted by any of
the communication nodes at the power grid substations. This is represented
in the model by adding dependencies, as “Control_18” is now depending on
“Logical_5,” “Logical_13” and “Logical_14” in addition to the dependence
on “Logical_0.” Consequently, additional logical communication links are
added, to connect any of the logical communication nodes located at loads
to any of the nodes located at substations.
• The SR configuration, where a network reconfiguration algorithm provides
service restoration by design for the power grid, to resupply lost loads after
a failure in the grid. This is represented in the model by adding edges to the
power network, representing the lines with switches that are normally open
and can be used to provide redundant paths. These additional lines are only
used in the reconfiguration after a fault happened, therefore depending on
a control command from the control center. In case the control command
cannot be received, the switches cannot close, and the line will not be put in
operation.
• The DV_SR configuration, where both by-design measures are applied.
To evaluate the performance of the complete system after a fault has occurred,
we choose two performance indicators:
• The number of supplied loads, as a measure of the service level to energy
consumers, is maintained.
• The number of loads that are controllable, as a measure of the reliability of
the final configuration after the cascading sequence has ended. For loads that
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Figure 14.2. Initial and cascading failures of the example use case.
are not controllable, measurements are not available, and targeted reconfigu-
ration is not possible. If the number of controllable loads is smaller than the
number of supplied loads, the capability to react to load changes or additional
failures is impaired.
14.1.2 Results and Conclusion
The results for a failure at load node 1 are explained in detail to show how the
failure is cascading through the system. Initially, as shown in Figure 14.2, load
node 1 is failing, causing the edges to the neighboring nodes to fail. Since nodes 2,
3, 4, and 9 are no longer connected to a substation, they are unsupplied and fail.
The respective communication nodes are no longer supplied and fail, too, isolating
physical communication node 0 and causing it to fail. The cascade proceeds to the
logical and the measurement and control networks, causing in both cases the failure
of some nodes (including the node that supports or provides control, respectively),
then causing all links to fail, and finally also the isolated nodes. In the final state,
a large part of the power grid is still supplied, but the controllability has been lost
completely and the remaining grid can no longer be monitored.
For a comparison of the different by-design measures, the failure scenario
described above has been repeated for each of the nodes in the power grid, rep-
resenting a single fault happening in different parts of the grid. For each fault, the
final state of all networks has been determined via the cascading analysis. The result
is shown as boxplots in Figure 14.3, where the box is marking the upper and lower
quartile and the orange line marking the median, while the whiskers mark the min-
imum and maximum.
Even in the default scenario, most of the loads remained supplied no mat-
ter where the initial fault happened. However, as presented in the example, the
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Figure 14.3. Assessment of cascading for different scenarios of the example use case.
capability to monitor and control the remaining part of the power grid is lost com-
pletely, if the substation hosting the control center is affected by the initial fault.
The DV configuration manages to solve this issue, enabling the other substations
to provide redundancy for supporting the control center functionality. In effect, the
remaining part of the power grid remains controllable due to the DV application.
Yet, it must be noted that DV does not improve the number of supplied loads.
Since a reconfiguration of the power grid is not considered here, it is likely that the
initial fault causes additional load nodes of the subgraph to fail. Due to the radial
topology of the grid, the closer the fault is to the substation, the more load nodes
are failing.
The SR configuration greatly improves this situation and enables more supplied
loads in the final state. Due to the meshed topology of the grid that can be utilized
for reconfiguration, only the initially failed load is lost in the final state, if the initial
fault occurs at a load node. If it occurs at a substation node, there may not be
a load node failure at all. However, if the substation hosting the control center
functionality fails, the ability to reconfigure the grid is lost and the final state of the
system is as in the default configuration.
Only the combination of both by-design measures provides complete contain-
ment of a fault independent from its location. If a load node fails initially, only
this node is failed in the final state. If a substation node fails initially, the power
supply of all load nodes can be maintained. Finally, the capability of monitoring
and control of the grid is secured.
The above results show how the impact on the power supply can be minimized
effectively by applying by-design measures. While each of the investigated measures
improved the resilience of the grid, the combination of both measures provided
additional synergies and can avoid the worst case of a failure at the substation host-
ing the control center. Containing initial failures and reducing cascading to a mini-
mum independent from the location of the initial failure is of increased importance
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in case of targeted attacks on the most critical components of the system, to stop
attackers exploiting vulnerabilities of the system.
14.2 Double Virtualization
Recently, critical infrastructures have been evolving into more complex networks
of Cyber-physical Systems (CPS), creating several challenges in the monitoring and
controlling of these systems [24]. Double Virtualization (DV) is a specific strategy
capable of addressing this, by providing a solution based on the cloud computing
paradigm, while enabling a certain degree of decentralization.
For realizing DV, it works on two logical layers: the Functional Layer which
abstracts the computational resources for management, control, and monitoring
functionalities of an asset, and the Data Layer, where the logic and features of the
deployed applications, such as connectivity and computational operation, are virtu-
ally represented. The former offers the remote connectivity, leveraging the control
features of the device (while possibly including self-awareness features), while the
latter encompasses, in the virtualization process, the set of applications running of
the given devices (e.g., logic and configuration for acquiring data, pre-processing,
and database query).
By keeping the Functional and the Data Layers decoupled from one another,
but acquiring their virtualizations, the DV opens the path on installed devices in
a given network to enable real-time reconfiguration and to control running appli-
cations and move them from one device to another. This is particularly useful to
facilitate the monitoring and control of the Critical Energy Infrastructures (CEI)
domain, which comprises a wide variety of dispersed and heterogeneous assets. As
matter of fact, in modern power system, the challenge of these types of systems has
moved from networking and hardware (such as connection protocols, CPU power
and consumption, etc.) to how to connect this amount of different data sources
into the specific demands of the hosting platforms and applications. In this con-
text, virtualizations of physical assets—such as the ones offered by DV—and their
delivery as services over the network ensure the separation of the functionalities
from the specific runtime, protocols, and communication in order to construct
highly dynamic, extensible, and flexible environments, as confirmed in [25–28].
The control and monitoring of CEIs deeply rely on the evolvement of the smart
grid concept, which incorporates technologies to enhance and provide a better
“awareness” of the grid state [29], such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) or
Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) systems based on Pha-
sor Measurement Units (PMU) and Phasor Data Concentrators (PDC), aiming at the
provision of the guidelines for collecting, transport, and use of data generated on
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Figure 14.4. Typical WAMPAC system architecture.
the grid. However, these technologies heavily rely on Information & Communica-
tion Technologies (ICT), thus exposing the smart grid to a wide range of possible
cyberattacks [30].
In this sense, the DV applied to the dedicated computational units of the
WAMPAC architecture, as exemplified in Figure 14.4, represents an alternative
solution to mitigate cyberattacks that can possibly jeopardize the complete smart
grid. To this aim, the DV separates the logical control from the hosting computa-
tional hardware into another device and efforts on performing early detection of
cyber-physical attacks while enabling mechanisms that provide a continuous oper-
ation of the CEI by reallocation of application logic into another asset.
14.2.1 Double Virtualization System Model
For accomplishing DV in a system, it is necessary to adopt the relevant set of
assets—DV Assets—with the necessary logic, by either transforming the already
existing and/or adding new devices. Additionally, DV demands the inclusion of
control, monitoring, and management methodology of these DV Assets, which
implies the addition of extra devices in the system—DV Administration & Man-
agement (DVA&M). Although in an ideal implementation, DVA&M should be
also considered a DV Asset (whose running applications are exclusively for manag-
ing and monitoring); in the current implementation, this is not mandatory, since we
focus primarily on the already existing devices of the WAMPAC system for demon-
strating the concept. Considering all this, and taking the WAMPAC architecture
as application model, the system’s transformation is depicted in Figure 14.5.
14.2.2 Double Virtualization Assets
In this type of component, the implemented mechanisms related to the DV provide
the ability to gather the necessary information about its resources and functional-
ities: virtualize the resources/applications running (e.g., bash/Python scripts and
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Figure 14.5. Simple grid-monitor model using PMU measurements and equivalent model
with double virtualization integration.
their network connections configuration), in a structured data format that may
be moved and interpreted on other devices; remote access points that enable the
DVA&M devices to access over an internet connection for performing the DV
monitoring/administration.
The DV Asset must then be provided, among others, with the following speci-
fications and features:
• Virtualization: the DV logic included in the DV Assets must be capable of
representing the device and its logical applications in a defined data format.
• Connectivity: server and client endpoints must be present, in order to inter-
act with the DVA&M for sending and receiving information, as is the virtu-
alization of the applications or control commands.
• Monitoring: the DV Asset must include the necessary services that enable its
monitoring by the DVA&M. Furthermore, it may contain self-awareness fea-
tures that track inner changes that may be also relevant and is able to forward
them to the DVA&M.
14.2.3 Double Virtualization Administration and Management
The pivot point of development of the DVA&M component is the ability to exe-
cute the monitoring and administration of a set of DV Assets which are connected
to it over the network. In this sense, taking in consideration the requirements of
the overall system, the chosen approach envisions the use of diverse software pat-
terns, as for example, Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) for addressing commu-
nication between devices and Service Orchestration in the optic of management
of these same machines, and which was inspired in previously researches, such as
presented in [31]. Moreover, the DVA&M is structured taking as base the Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) pattern, introduced by John Boyd and firstly drafted
in [32], in order to achieve the desired logic. Assisted by the OODA loop, the
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Figure 14.6. Simple OODA loop.
DVA&M entity gathers the abilities to lightly anticipate harmful situations through
the continuous monitoring of the several assets behaviors, making use of incom-
ing sensing information, and use it to perform decisions and actions to mitigate
detected failures.
The four steps of the OODA loop (Figure 14.6) are described as:
• Observe: acquisition of information data, incoming from the detection mod-
ules of the system. This information about the DV Assets and can be obtained
from internal logic or from an external source.
• Orient: in this stage, the received control data is provided with meaning, so
that analyses mechanisms can be applied. For example, matching the data to
the respective DV Asset and respective previous samples for tracking relevant
changes.
• Decide: this is where the gathered data is analyzed with the provided algo-
rithms for discovering or handling the detected failures, and furthermore to
decide what is the next action. That is to say, if and in what terms the system
shall react to the attack detection. This step also provides all output neces-
sary for enforcing the reaction, such as is the case of a migration, where the
virtualized logic of an attacked DV Asset needs to be moved into another one.
• Act: when this step is activated, it uses all the gathered information to trigger
and complete all the mitigation process, while handling the involved DV
Assets, in any way possible, through the established connections implemented
specifically for administration purposes.
The DVA&M must then be implemented in accordance with the following spec-
ifications and features:
• Database/Registry: necessary for storage of the relevant information of the
DV Assets, like the specifications of the device and the respective virtualiza-
tions.
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• Connectivity: The DVA&M provides the necessary server and client end-
points in order to receive and send information to the other components
(DV Assets, external detectors, … ).
• Monitoring: the DVA&M hosts simple monitoring mechanisms (Acknowl-
edge and Heartbeat/Watchdog techniques) dedicated to the connectivity sta-
tus of DV Assets, yet it shall also be able to handle incoming information
from external detectors and forward it into the decision algorithms.
• Decision: the DVA&M must be able to filter the incoming information from
the multiple DV Assets and decide whether any action shall be activated, and
in that case, handle all the consequent process
• Mitigation: the mechanisms to autonomously interact with the faulty DV
Assets, while performing the necessary control commands and exchanging
the necessary information.
14.3 Example use Case and Implementation
14.3.1 Technological Details
Node-Red framework has been selected as the development and deployment tool
for the DV system. Node-Red offers a browser editor for development and deploy-
ment and runs over Node.js runtime environment, which stands as one of the pre-
vailing software for development of applications under the Internet of Things (IoT)
scope. Moreover, Node-Red applications are constructed on a flow-based semantics,
by wiring nodes, and allow an easy creation and setup of computational resources
that provide functions, APIs, and online services supported by a wide number of
protocols usage. Node-Red also enables the creation and integration of custom
nodes (provided by a highly active community), extending its potential for con-
nectivity to, for example, legacy systems.
Another important highlight is the fact that Node.js is supported by a variety of
operating systems and processor architectures, such as ARM processors used in sin-
gle board computers like Raspberry Pi or Odroid. This leverages the cross-platform
implementation and widens the number of possible resources to use.
With respect to the interoperability among the DV components in use, the cre-
ated endpoints that are related to DV functionalities follow the REST pattern, while
most of the inherent data is represented in JSON format.
Regarding the security mechanisms, several options are available, including the
standard authorization schemes for HTTP. However, while adopting the use of
certificates to enable HTTPS for encryption, client certificate authorization, which
is built in the HTTPS handshake, was tested and subsequently included, while
being optionally customized.
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14.3.2 Internal Detectors
The implemented DVA&M comprises built-in detection methods oriented to eval-
uate connectivity status of the DV Assets. Even if not necessarily the lost connection
of a device is caused by some sort of attack, either physical or cyber, it is still plau-
sible to assume it. Moreover, to ensure the resilience of the system, the detection of
such failure is used by the DV to trigger the migration of the faulty DV Asset into
an available one, as a mitigation strategy.
For both Acknowledge and Heartbeat techniques, the DVA&M has a specified
timeout, in which the DV Asset must report to the DVA&M that it is available.
The difference is that in the Acknowledge technique, the DV&AM makes a request
and the timeout refers to the response time, while in the Heartbeat/Watchdog tech-
nique, the DV Asset itself periodically sends acknowledge messages and the timeout
is used within the Watchdog. It must be considered that, in both cases, the period
of the acknowledge messages and the timeout value must be set so that there is no
overlap within the sequence, making it susceptible to induce false failure detections.
14.3.3 External Detectors
Event detection represents the activity of detecting relevant events in (near) real-
time from the stream of raw data observations. Most event detection systems are
generic, where the user must deploy a set of processing rules at design time, which
are used to push observations at run time. The result of the processing is delivered
back to the application in form of events.
The event detection engines can be evaluated according to the following cate-
gories:
• Development platform, representing the programming language used for
event detection applications development
• Event detection language, the operators which can be used to define event
extraction rules
• Development model, representing the flexibility used for defining event
detection patterns
• Advertised event rate
• Out of the box deployment possibilities
• Integration/compatibility with other technologies
• Licensing.
The network and the communication infrastructure represent an important
commodity of an IT system, including the Smart Grid ones. For such a system, it is
important to detect as early as possible any attempt of unauthorized access/usage of
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the network. The network monitoring module has the scope to detect any abnor-
mal behavior of the network.
Regardless of the network assets (routers, switches), the monitoring can be done
using the Remote Network Monitoring (RMON) Protocol [40]. The RMON
protocol can be used to extract real-time information about the device, such as
bandwidth or ports connected/disconnected. Depending of the device type, the
processing logic can be embedded into the switch (if it has enough processing
power) or a field device (like a Raspberry PI) can be located in the nearby area
to execute this activity. In most of the cases, a centralized solution will overload the
network. The list of switch operating parameters can include:
• Network utilization (per each port or overall);
• Error Rate;
• Port connectivity.
In general, the various components of a system generate log data which is used for
monitoring the component status and for debugging. Depending on the architec-
ture, each component can have its own log file or the system can have a centralized
logging infrastructure. In most of the cases, when one component is affected by a
perturbation, several components might report the abnormal behavior in their log
file.
External detectors can be plugged into the DVA&M, by accessing specific end-
points (REST) created for the effect. In the DV case study, this was tested with
the log data pattern matcher implemented by SIEMENS, offering the following
features:
• Merge multiple log files considering the log event timestamp
• Define domain specific log data patterns (at design time)
• Apply the log data pattern on the streams of log events (at run time).
The following example is relevant for high traffic on device interface observation.
The logic of observation pattern is depicted in Figure 14.7.
The observed behavior in case of an attack in the context of this use case is
presented in Figure 14.8.
Figure 14.7. Observation pattern logic.
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Figure 14.8. Observed behavior of the log data pattern matcher in case of an attack.
The messages received from external detectors may lead the DVA&M to take
some decision and possibly trigger some mitigation action, like trying to reconfigure
some DV Asset or perform a migration. In the case of the log data pattern matcher,
the approach is to evaluate if a determined number of warnings related to a given
DV Asset is received during a time window, thus inducing the DVA&M to activate
the mitigation process for the faulty device.
Also, by including this and other detectors that provide a wider panoply of
parameters of the DV Assets (e.g., network interfaces traffic information, CPU
loads, temperatures of the CPUs, response time of the APIs and services, etc.), the
decision algorithms can evolve to more accurate results, like in the case of an occur-
ring migration, where the DVA&M should decide which is the more adequate DV
Asset to receive and start running a new set of applications.
14.3.4 Use Case
For demonstrating the DV functionality, the use-case scenario is based on the pre-
viously shown WAMPAC system, where PDCs are wired up to PMUs for collecting
data. Besides this, a spare development of the PDC consists in hosting small pre-
processing algorithms. These PDCs were adopted with the DV logic, and further-
more, its applications were virtualized in compliance with the DV specifications.
Finally, in order to gather the necessary results, a connection failure was induced
in one PDC, by unplugging the ethernet cable. When doing this, the DVA&M
is able to detect that the unplugged PDC is no longer responding, triggering the
migration process, and consequently, the set of application is launched on another
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Figure 14.9. System state before and after the detection of lost connectivity of a DV asset
and migration strategy applied as mitigation strategy.
PDC which was chosen during the decision algorithm of the DVA&M, as depicted
in Figure 14.9.
The context of the use case is as described below.
The Fault Detection Algorithm (FDA) plays an important role in power grid
observability and is also the first functionality of a self-healing grid. Depending
upon the different grounding schemes of the different grids, the impacts of the fault
currents in the grid varies [33]. Furthermore, with the availability of high accuracy
and high frequency of measurements from PMUs, advanced FDA schemes, based
on PMU data, are being designed [34, 35]. The FDA is deployed in a dedicated
hardware that receives continuously the stream of PMU data corresponding to the
voltages at different nodes and currents flowing through specific branches in the
network. The PMU data is parsed into the FDA after proper protocol translation.
The parsed PMU data is then processed by the FDA which detects the occurrence
of faults based on the changes in the zero sequence components. Given that the
reporting frequency of PMU can be as high as 50 frames per second or more for
power networks with nominal frequency of 50 Hz, the fault inception moment
can be captured with delay of 20 ms at maximum. Since the timestamp of an event
is critical information for correct evaluation of fault location, it is of paramount
importance to ensure the uninterrupted operation of FDA. With introduction of
DV, the availability of FDA can be substantially increased when fault in commu-
nication network or cyberattack occurs, and therefore, the robustness of the fault
detection scheme is ensured.
14.3.5 Conclusion
The DV model implemented in the use-case scenarios have, in general, fulfilled
the stipulated outcomes in terms of functionality and proof of concept. More
specifically, the defined mitigation strategy—migration—was achieved, once a
connectivity failure was detected, by completing the transaction of the running
application from the faulty device into the best suitable device.
260 Securing CEI “By-Design”
It can also be stated that the main requirements were accomplished: the virtu-
alization process of the assets functional and application layers; communication
system for supporting the data transaction inherent to the DV, using REST end-
points; implementation and integration of, respectively, internal and external detec-
tors and corresponding monitoring mechanisms; decision algorithms that can be
shaped according to the monitoring parameters in use; and the processing/manage-
ment of the mitigation actions by either DV Assets and DVA&M components of
the system.
In this sense, the DV is a viable solution to augment the resilience of the system.
However, taking in consideration that the DV application is still in an early stage,
several items that shall be developed and/or improved in the future implementa-
tions have been already identified.
For instance, in such scenarios as the Fault Detection described in the previous
section, where it is of such crucial importance to minimize the downtime caused by
the network failure, some technical choices can be made towards this improvement,
such as minimizing the routes of the network connections (number of intermediary
routers, not using VPN, etc.), opt for a faster alternative to using client certificate
authorization (which takes some time for validation during the HTTPS handshake)
and also refining the detection, decision, and action processes of the DV itself.
Another improvement to be considered, for a more proactive solution, is to
pre-setup DV Assets with one another’s logic, for minimizing the amount of data
to be passed to trigger the mitigation and, consequently, the time of the process.
Of course, this comes at the cost of more storage and CPU load, but depending on
the use case, it may be profitable.
Regarding the critical Single Point of Failure (SPoF) paradigm, the current DV
system is not yet completely capable to solve this thematic. In a more close-up
glance, it can be noticed that the SPoF was removed from the “functional” area
of the system (where DV Assets co-exist); however, the introduction of DVA&M
device results in a new SPoF. One possible solution that was put on the table is to
create a cluster of DVA&M devices in the system and apply also the DV solution
to them, with the respective nuances. For example, in order to avoid the hierarchi-
cal structure that induces SPoFs, one can adopt monitoring patterns such as the
circular pattern. Furthermore, the Blockchain technology may directly offer a solu-
tion for decentralization, but from the performed investigation, we found that the
requirements for implementing Blockchain (e.g., high-performance CPUs, big data
storage) for very demanding time requirements, this may be a challenge and other




The basic functionality of a self-healing power grid is to restore the loads that were
de-energized either due to natural disasters or targeted attacks on the grid. There
are two kinds of events that create outages in the grid. One that occurs frequently
but have lower magnitude of outage, like tripping of lines due to faults in the lines
due to ageing of the cables. The other type of events are the ones that have High
Impact but occur with Low Probability (HILP events). A HILP event introduces
severe and rapidly changing circumstances that may have never been experienced
before, causing multiple outages in the network and creating large de-energized
sections [1].
A typical Service Restoration (SR) scheme for distribution grids, after successful
fault detection and isolation, should be able to perform the following:
• Restore as much out-of-service customers as possible in a minimum time,
by providing a sequence of operations to the switches. Preference in use of
tele-controlled switches in re-powering process should be given, to reduce
the restoration time.
• Consider the priority of the loads and restore the most crucial customers
(hospitals, devices controlling the gas network pumps, cellular base stations,
and other critical infrastructures) first.
• Preserve radiality of the grid with every switching operation prescribed in the
sequence.
• Maintain the voltage of the grid as per the limits imposed in the grid codes
of the specific country.
• Satisfy loading constraints of the lines and substation loading.
For the outages caused by the non-HILP events, different approaches are pro-
posed in the literature for optimal selection of the tie switches (normally open
switches, generally connecting different feeders or segments of the same feeder)
to be closed. These can be classified into expert systems [3–5], Multi-Objective
Evolutionary Algorithm (MOEA) [6–8], heuristic-based systems [9–12], meta-
heuristics and mathematical programming based [2]. Though the MOEA methods
and heuristic methods for SR are popular, they have longer running times and are
sensitive to the accuracy of generating the feasible topologies, from which the opti-
mal solution would be deduced. Furthermore, Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)-
based methods have also been proposed [13–15]. The mathematical programming
methods, especially the MIP based, prove to be computationally expensive.
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Hence, they would not be suitable for real-time application with stringent time
constraints. One of the major challenges in designing a service restoration scheme
to cope with the HILP events is that, in addition to the aforementioned attributes,
the SR scheme should also react to rapidly changing system condition. It should
be able to consider, in real time, the uncertainties in the power generation and
load demand so that possible network congestion is avoided while grid restoration.
Furthermore, it should adapt to changes in grid topology as subsequent multiple
faults may occur due to the propagation of the HILP events. Unlike the heuristic,
meta-heuristic, and mathematical programming-based SR schemes, the rule-based
algorithms have been found better suited for real-time applications. They can pro-
vide sub-optimal, interim solutions to cater to emergency situations [5], due to their
lower computational complexity. Nevertheless, the Rule Based Service Restoration
Algorithm (RB-SRA) should also incorporate distribution grid operator preferences
in selecting the optimal service restoration option. This is vital as grid operators in
different countries have to follow different operational norms and adhere to spe-
cific grid codes. Thus, for designing a universal service restoration, the RB-SRA has
to be extended with a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) algorithm. The
MCDM approach facilitates optimal selection of solution from the set of possible
solutions considering the dynamic preferences of the decision-maker [16–18]. In
this case, the set of solutions are the choice of optimal restoration sequence consid-
ering the preferences of the network operator. It should be noted that the MCDM
enabled RB-SRA would not be the most optimal service restoration (considering
the cost of operation, power losses, etc.) but would be a best effort solution catering
to dynamic outages caused by propagation of the HILP events.
14.4.1 MCDM-Enabled Rule-Based Service Restoration
Algorithm (RB-SRA)
The MCDM-enabled RB-SRA has 4 major sequential steps, Namely:
(1) Identification of loads to be restored;
(2) Determination of alternative reconfigurable paths;
(3) Network security assessment with state estimation;
(4) MCDM-based selection of optimal restoration path.
Identification of loads to be restored
When multiple faults occur or the continuous load growth is not promptly com-
bined with substation reinforcement, the reconnection of all de-energized loads
cannot be achieved [36]. Hence, it is necessary to identify the most critical load
and quickly restore it. The RB-SRA selects, among the de-energized nodes that are
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outside the fault-zone, the one with the highest priority index. This parameter is an
independent characteristic of each load, assigned by the grid operator to indicate
its criticality. If multiple loads have the same index, the algorithm selects the one
consuming (or generating) the highest active power. The chosen node is taken as
target for the restoration plan.
Determination of alternative reconfigurable paths
Once the load to be restored, named b, has been identified as described above,
the best reconfiguration topology to re-energize it has to be computed. Firstly, the
proposed algorithm inspects all the n primary substations present in the network.
For each substation, it determines the most suitable path towards the load by using
Dijkstra’s algorithm. Considering two nodes a and b in a weighted graph G, Dijk-
stra’s algorithm calculates the shortest path that connects them, named G ′a,b. In this
case, a is the selected substation, b is the load to be restored, and the weight of each
edge is the series impedance of the line. Hence, considering |Z x,y| as the magni-
tude of complex series impedance |Z x,y| = Rx,y + j Xx,y between adjacent nodes






|Z x,y|. With respect to total impedances of other paths that
can connect a to b, Zba has the minimum value for graph G
′
a,b. If the shortest path
exists, it includes at least one bus tie which is currently open and, by closing it,
allows to energize load b from substation a. With the switches now closed and the
path made electrically continuous, the whole network topology has changed, rep-
resented by the graph Ga,b for which G ′a,b ⊂ Ga,b (G
′
a,b is a subset of Ga,b). This
procedure is repeated for each substation present in the grid. If multiple faults occur
or the continuous load growth is not promptly combined with substation reinforce-
ment, the reconnection of all de-energized loads could not be achieved [36].
Network security assessment with state estimation
Each network configuration proposed by the RB-SRA is to be checked versus
line congestion and voltage security limits via State Estimation (SE) [37]. Many
methods are available for SE but among them the Weighted Least Square (WLS)
approach is most popular [37, 38]. It is based on the minimization of the square of
the measurement residual vector. With input as the set of measurements, the uncer-
tainty class of the measurement devices, network topology and its parameters, the
WLS based SE is able to provide the estimate of the state of the grid that may be
magnitude and angle of node voltage (for node voltage-based SE) or the magnitude
and angle of the branch current (for branch current-based SE). Furthermore, from
the estimated states all the power flows in the grid, loading of the network lines,
and the power losses can be calculated.
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For each proposed grid topology, represented with graph Ga,b, the following
constraints should be respected:
• Radiality of the network: if a path exists between nodes a and b, the closing
of the tie switches in this restoration scheme must maintain each substation
electrically disconnected from the others.
• Voltage limits: at each node of the grid, the voltage magnitude must remain
in the range of ±10% of the nominal value [39].
• Respect of loading limits: the current flowing in each edge must comply
with the cable/conductor or substation transformer specification |I x,y| ±
3µ
|I x,y | < Imax x,y .
Where |I x,y| is the line current magnitude at the generic edge (x,y) and its
uncertainty µ
|I x,y |; Imax x,y indicates the continuous current carrying capacity of
the line or the overcurrent limit of the transformer at the primary substation, and
in emergency situation, a certain percentage of overloading is acceptable for limited
amount of time. If the proposed configuration Ga,b does not fulfill the require-
ments, it is discarded and the restoration of load b cannot be achieved by the sub-
station a.
MCDM-based selection of optimal restoration path
Once the set of secure reconfiguration paths has been determined, the optimal solu-
tion has to be identified. To do this, the proposed algorithm combines two criteria
dependent upon settings predefined by the user, namely the power losses and the
utilization of the lines, as described below.
• Total power losses in the network (Px,y): The power loss Px,y , between two
generic nodes x and y, is estimated by the following formula, using the esti-
mated line-to-ground node voltages by the SE algorithm and the electrical

















(V x − V y)
(
(V x − V y)
R+ + j X+
))]
Where R+, X+,G+, B+ are the positive sequence line resistance, reactance,
conductance, and susceptance, respectively. The power losses are added for
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each line of the network (edges of graph Ga,b ) to obtain the total power loss
Pa of the candidate topology restored through substation a.
• The utilization of electrical lines (θx,y): It is a measure of overloading of the
lines in the grid. The different service restoration options can be ranked on
the basis of their relative network loading. The higher the value of θx,y , the
better is the distribution of power flow in the specific network configuration
θx,y =
Imax x,y − |I x,y|
Imax x,y
(14.1)
Where x, y are two nodes between which the current I x,y flows and
the line connecting the nodes x and y has the maximum current carrying
capacity of Imax x,y . For each network topology that is analyzed, three min-
imum values of θx,y are recorded in descending order. In the case of graph




3 , for which θ
a
1
is related to the electrical line having the current most close to its specific
ampacity. The selection of the optimal solution requires the combination





using the MCDM technique, the optimal restoration path is selected. The
MCDM technique is a two-step algorithm. In the first step depending upon
the relative pairwise weight of the criteria, an absolute weight for each crite-
rion is deduced. In the second step, these weights are used to determine the
relative closeness of the available solution to the ideal solution. For the first
step, the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) is implemented to determine
the absolute weights of criteria with the pairwise weights of the criteria. The
pairwise weights are assumed to be provided by the network operator. The




1 ωPθ1 ωPθ2 ωP3
1/ωPθ1 1 ωθ1θ2 ωθ1θ3
1/ωPθ2 1/ωθ1θ2 1 ωθ2θ3
1/ωPθ3 1/ωθ1θ3 1/ωθ2θ3 1
 (14.2)
In which ω is the comparison value between the attributes indicated by the sub-
scripts, which ranges from 1/9 (attribute of second subscript is extremely important
with respect to the first one) to 9 (attribute of first subscript is extremely impor-
tant with respect to second one) according to the AHP scale. A detailed possible
AHP weights and their interpretation is provided in Table 14.1. The subscripts
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Table 14.1. AHP weight interpretation.
Intensity of
Importance
(ωPθ) 1 3 5 7 9 2, 4, 6, 8






































3 represent the power losses and the line utilization of the three most
consumed lines, respectively. The priority vector is obtained, which ranks the four
criteria and shows relative weights among them. The approximate calculation of





where p jk =
0( j, k)∑m
l=1 0(l, k)
and m: number of criteria
(14.3)
Then, these relative weights are combined with the power losses and line utiliza-
tions of each feasible solutions, indicated by the different values of a as reference
substation, according to the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to
Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) [23]. A generic set of equations that govern the TOPSIS-
based ranking of the alternatives are given below. For t alternatives and m number
of criteria, the decision matrixD can be created as shown below in Equation (14.4):
D =
d11 . . . d1m... . . . ...
dt1 . . . dtm
 (14.4)
The weighted normalized decision matrix integrating the Priority Vector calcu-
lated in Equation (14.3) can then be derived as in Equation (14.5):






The next step in the TOPSIS-based ranking is to calculate the positive ideal
solution (A+) and the negative ideal solution (A−) where B is a set of Benefit
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criteria and C is a set of Cost criteria:
A+ = {v+1 , . . . v
+
m } where v
+
j = {max(vi j ) if j ∈ B;min(vi j ) if j ∈ C}
(14.6)
A− = {v−1 , . . . v
−
m } where v
−
j = {min(vi j ) if j ∈ B;max(vi j ) if j ∈ C}
(14.7)
The purpose to calculate the A+ and A− is to measure the distance of the
alternatives from the positive ideal solution and negative ideal solution. The best
alternative would be the one that is as close to the positive ideal solution and as far
as from the negative ideal solution. In order to rank the alternatives, the relative






















For the service restoration process, the TOPSIS allows us to compute the close-
ness of each candidate solution to the ideal one, which is composed by the min-




3 . Among the
possible solutions, indicated by the different values of a as reference substation, the
one having the highest closeness Ca+ is chosen to reconnect the load b. Then, a
closing signal is sent to the open tie switch related to this configuration.
The selected optimal solution is, then, a trade-off between the minimization of
power losses in the line and the avoidance of lines having the current close to its
limit. The comparison parameters ω are defined by the grid operator before the
service restoration is started; they are set depending on whether more importance
is assigned to power losses or line utilization aspect. For example, in case of aged
cables, one can place greater emphasis on line utilization (by decreasing ωPθ1 , ωPθ2
and ωPθ3) in order to avoid the excessive worsening of line condition.
Test case
The test grid used to validate the MCDM-based RB-SRA is a medium voltage
distribution grid at 13.8 kV with four primary substations. Figure 14.3 represents
its single line diagram and includes the elements naming used below [20]. Its 37
nodes connect loads that range from 100 kW to 1 MW; the length of the electrical
lines varies from 800 m to 2200 m. Nodes I2 and L1 host DERs of 200 kW and
250 kW, respectively. Complete data of the grid can be found in [21]. The black
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Table 14.2. AHP pairwise priorities.
Pair of criteria ωPθ1 ωPθ2 ωPθ3 ωθ1θ2 ωθ1θ3 ωθ2θ3
AHP pairwise weights 7 8 9 2 2 2
Figure 14.10. Location of the fault for test case.
squares indicate the normally closed switches, whereas the normally open ones are
shown with white squares.
This scenario inspects the occurrence of a single fault and the presence of mul-
tiple loads having the same priority index, for which the nominal active power is
considered to determine the restoration target. In this test case, the most impor-
tant criterion of the service restoration is the minimization of the power losses,
with marginal relevance of lines utilization in the decision process. The compari-
son parameters ω are reported in Table 14.2.
The single electrical fault occurs at node A1; the protection system opens the
upstream circuit breaker indicated by number 1 and, in order to isolate the fault
area, the downstream circuit breakers 2, 3, and 19 (which is already open). These
four switches, indicated with red frames in Figure 14.10, remain in a tripped con-
dition and cannot be reclosed until the fault has been repaired.
The MCDM-enabled RB-SRA receives the status of the tripped breakers, and
it first identifies the faulty zone; hence, it excludes the nodes A1, A2, and A3 from
the restoration process.
The de-energized loads are downstream of the switches 2 and 3; they are marked
with green circles in Figure 14.8, whereas their priority indexes and nominal active
power are reported in Table 14.3. Both the loads B2 and C2 have the highest pri-
ority index; since the nominal active power of B2 is higher, it is selected as target
for the restoration process.
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Table 14.3. De-energized Loads and their critical index.
Loads B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 F1 F2 F3
Priority Index 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 4
Active Power [MW] 0.37 0.70 0.27 0.46 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.35
Table 14.4. Computational performance of MCDM-enabled RB-SRA.
Test Case Test Case 1
Loads B2 C2
Min (Seconds) 2.15 2.97
Average (Seconds) 2.29 3.16
Max (Seconds) 2.97 3.84
In the next step, the algorithm evaluates the possible reconfiguration paths asso-
ciated to each substation. The substation SE 1 is not suitable, since the switches in
the fault zone cannot be operated. Moreover, SE 4 is excluded too, because the radial
topology cannot be maintained (SE 4 and SE 2 would be electrically connected).
The power loss related to SE 2 is 4.5% larger (corresponding to 30.7 kW) than
SE 3, making SE 3 solution the closest to the ideal one (C+SE2 = 0 and C
+
SE3 = 1).
Hence, the closing command to switch 10 is sent. Once the database updates the
switch status and the closing command is sent to field device, the SR algorithm
restarts; the loads B1 and B2 are now energized by SE 3; hence, the algorithm eval-
uates the restoration of the loads in the branch downstream of switch 3, selecting
the node C2 as first target. Only SE 2 or SE 4 could restore the selected load (and,
consequently, all the nodes in the same branch) by maintaining the radial struc-
ture. The restoration is achieved by closing the switch 6, for which P SE2 is smaller
of 36% than P SE4 making the closenesses to ideal solution C+SE2 = 0.82 and
C+SE4 = 0.18. All the de-energized loads outside the fault zone are reconnected;
then, the algorithm is concluded. The algorithm always checks for the real-time
switch position data before it closes the tie switch to reenergize the loads, by doing
so it detects if a subsequent fault had occurred that triggered other switches/circuit
breaker position. If it detects a change, then it stops the current operation and re-
runs the complete MCDM-enabled RB-SRA for the new topology of the grid and
lost load configuration. This functionality helps in handling multiple sequential
failures introduced by the HILP events.
The performance of the MCDM-enabled RB-SRA is tabulated in Table 14.4.
The restoration of grid for the same fault locations have been performed 100 times
for a stochastic evaluation.
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Conclusion
Self-healing or automated service restoration of the power grids is one of the impor-
tant functionalities of resilient smart grids. With increasing frequency of occur-
rence of natural disasters and targeted cyber-physical attacks on the power grids,
the automated service restoration becomes a vital functionality of the electrical
energy infrastructure. Furthermore, with higher dependence on the Information
and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure for the operation of the
power grid, the automatic service restoration becomes a complex problem as the
ICT infrastructure might also fail due to power network failures thus jeopardizing
the automatic service restoration procedure. Therefore, in addition to the afore-
mentioned algorithm for emergency service restoration, mechanisms should also
be included to optimally restore the grid considering the availability of ICT infras-
tructure. The proposed methodology enables to restore the grid considering the
criticality of the load and the preferences of the network operator for single and
multiple faults. However, it should also be extended to also optimize the life of
each switch or circuit breaker thus making sure that switches and breakers are not
stressed by extremely high number of switching made during the restoration process
over a period of time.
14.5 Conclusion of the Chapter
In the first part of this chapter, we have shown that applying by-design measures, the
resilience of CEI can be increased. Utilizing additional redundancies and enabling
the physical and communication and control networks to autonomously adapt in
case of incidents enables the infrastructure to self-heal and to either minimize the
impact or recover from it. While applying by-design measures individually can
already improve the service level, combining different by-design measures (includ-
ing different domains as power, communication and control) provides synergies
since this approach recognizes the interdependencies between different domains of
CEI.
Double Virtualization has been introduced as by-design measure to avoid single
points of failure in the functional layer of grid monitoring and control, represented
by centralized monitoring and control functionalities that are dependent on a spe-
cific device. Virtualizing these functionalities enables utilization of redundancies
provided by the availability of various devices in the infrastructure that are able to
host respective functionalities. DV has been applied to Fault Detection Algorithm
as example use case to showcase the principle. Restrictions and recommendation
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for applying DV as well as the potential for future improvements of the principle
have been given in the conclusions.
Service Restoration has been introduced as by-design measure to reconfigure
the electrical grid after occurrence of one or multiple faults. It has been described
how a multi-criteria approach can be implemented with the help of MCDM and
TOPSIS, enabling distribution system operators to configure the reconfiguration
strategy based on predefined priorities assigned to a set of criteria as restoration of
power supply to critical loads as well as complying to voltage limitations of the grid.
The principle has been demonstrated based on test cases covering faults in test grid
that represents a part of a distribution system. Based on relevant criteria, the prior-
ities for restoring the grid after faults can be refined and a suitable reconfiguration
strategy can be derived.
Although the comparison of cascading effects in a test system indicates that
resilience can be increased by applying by-design measures as DV and SR, require-
ments of a specific CEI must be considered before implementing the proposed
or other by-design measures. Applicability of DV, for example, might depend on
requirements of the functionality, which is to be virtualized. Applicability of SR
might depend on the capability of the electrical equipment to perform flexible
reconfiguration as well as regulatory constraints for system operation.
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Antonello Corsi, Artemis Voulkidis and Nikos Drosos
15.1 Introduction
In this chapter, CEI Security solutions for situation awareness are described.
We show how the adoption of innovative processes and leading-edge technolo-
gies can improve evaluation of threats scenarios in an automated manner. We also
show how it can lead to evaluate the occurrence of potential attacks and to apply
proper countermeasures to mitigate them while not sacrificing operational task for
security.
In DEFENDER, the situational awareness is an iterative process; it starts with the
detection of simple events performed by the cyber-physical detectors at the sensor
level. The latter are then correlated, according to a time/space dimension, to provide
complex events that represent the CEI’s state of the environment.
Subsequently, the complex events are compared with a model—the attack tree
model—that formalizes the structure of well-known cyber-physical attacks. It allows
to compute and simulate the probability on future complex events, based on the
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current knowledge—complex event that have already occurred—and the com-
mon knowledge—the attack trees. This step is performed by the DEFENDER
Co-simulator. Its output, consisting of the set of the most likely attack subtrees,
is then evaluated looking at the impact of each of these subtrees with regard to
various dimensions of the situation, such as economical and societal, so as to
have a complete view and a full understanding of what is occurring in the CEI
assets (situation comprehension). Finally, after calculating a risk score for each attack
subtree, the most appropriate countermeasures or mitigations (i.e., measures able
to stop the attack without severe damages) to the ongoing attack is determined
and suggested to the end user through a human-friendly interface for the security
decision-making. In DEFENDER, these tasks have been assigned to the CEI Inci-
dent Detection Framework (IDF), the CEI Incident Mitigation Framework (IMF)
and the Security Control Center (SCC).
In order to formalize the notion of threat scenario, the DEFENDER consortium
relies on a high-level description of the attacks—attack trees—that have already
been presented in Section 12.4. This representation has the advantage to preserve
genericity in the downstream analyses, which is quite important in a project like
DEFENDER that must be applicable to any kind of CEI. In this chapter, we show
how these trees can be used to deal with incoming attacks. It is first necessary to
enrich the trees with attributes representing the link between the attack tree node
and the CEI assets targeted by the threat. This process allows to quantify the impact
of a malicious action based on the importance of the underlined asset. For example,
it can represent the difference between a risky situation where a drone fly over a
secondary electrical substation and a less risky one where the same drone flying
over a general CEI perimeter zone.
In addition to the nodes to CEI assets association, attack trees can also be
enriched by adding other elements among which: the response of the system after
a successful attack; the consequences of the attack; alternative relationship between
alternative root nodes, and/or system response. Before going through the best strat-
egy evaluation process, it is worth describing the information flow through IDF,
IMF, and SCC.
Figure 15.1 describes the processing path in and around the detection and mit-
igation tasks. In this description, the DEFENDER Co-simulator essentially plays
the role of event probability estimator for the threat evaluation module—which
propagates them as impacts and risks to the aggregation and mitigation mod-
ules. The mitigation module output is then pushed to the Security Control Cen-
ter, where interactions with the end user take place. The next subsections of this
chapter successively describe the detection task (Section 15.2), the mitigation task
(Section 15.3), and the human-centric Control Center (Section 15.4).





























Figure 15.1. Information flow and processing in the situation awareness modules.
15.2 Detecting Ongoing Incidents
With the rapid growth and the increasing complexity of new digital objects, CEI
are subject to more evolved cyber-physical threats. For this reason, identifying and
preventing attack against critical infrastructure is getting more and more strategic,
and it is difficult to ensure an adequate degree of protection from the multiple
sources of attacks. In this situation, numerous procedures are put in place to at least
lower the risk of an attack when it is not directly possible to mitigate immediately
any attack on the infrastructure normal operation mode.
For this reason, we approached the problem about detection of ongoing threats,
previously mentioned, with the modeling provided by the attack graph model
developed in DEFENDER that illustrates possible multi-stage attacks in a CEI
network, typically by presenting the logical causality relations among multiple
exploitable vulnerabilities and infrastructure.
To understand the difficulty of this kind of detection, it is important to underline
the concept of detection as a process that lasts in time, instead of detection as a
punctual event.
In fact, as reported in Figure 15.2, if an attacker compromises the asset by gaining
access to p1, they have to fulfill at least one other condition (p2 or p3), in order to
move towards the attack and to cause severe damage. Suppose we want to use this
piece of information in real-time security analysis. When we suspect the p1 node
has been compromised, with how much confidence can we say that the information
related to p4 have been compromised? The appropriate response is far less sure than
278 Securing CEI “by-innovation”
Figure 15.2. General attack tree with 6 nodes {p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6}.
the analysis of the attack tree can give. How might we know whether the attacker
has decided to launch this assault? Regardless of whether he did as such, how might
we realize that the assault will proceed by steps ahead in time?
We do not know the attacker’s choices once that one node has been violated;
thus, there is the uncertainty from unknown attacker behaviors. The defender’s
observations on potential attack activities are limited, at least with a finite amount
of resources to be used in cybersecurity; and as a result, we have the uncertainty
from false positives and false negatives of intrusion detection system (IDS) sensors.
For this reason, it is useful to equip the different nodes of the attack tree with a
list of metrics that can allow us to rank, by risk, the different evolutions in time of
the attack path once that a node has been detected.
The first information needed is then the probability that a node will be exploited
across the tree in a certain direction, and this is the main functionality developed
by the Co-Simulator component of the DEFENDER platform. The second infor-
mation is the one provided by the Incident Detection Framework, and it consists in
a given metric related to the domain under attack/protection. In the DEFENDER
platform, we used the impact measure to provide to the mitigation part a list of
possible threats ordered by means of risk, defined as the product of probability by
impact.
Attack graphs produced by DEFENDER and related threat models allow us to
specify the different ways that a CEI can be compromised. For a given attacker,
in the attack tree, the root represents the goal of the attacker and the leaves depict
initial entry points for the attacker that are necessary to achieve their goals. It is also
useful to underline the fact that in DEFENDER, each node can be associated to a
given asset (in the case of a smart grid, we can have a heat pump, a wind-turbine, a
smart meter, or a perimeter fence that protect the CEI premises), and therefore, the
impact calculated exploiting its vulnerabilities can change depending on the asset.
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This DEFENDER IDF can be further detailed describing the different modules
that are in charge of deploying the main functionalities for threat detection. The
IDF is directly connected with the Co-simulator, and it receives from it attack pat-
tern subtree with confidence interval (probability). The result of the incident pro-
cessing is to assess the impact of each prognosed subtrees and evaluate the related
risk based on the results of threat analysis available in literature. The IDF provides
to the mitigation part a ranked list based on a set of predefined rules enabling the
alert on incidents. The IDF’s main elements are the following:
• Monitor and analytic modules: these two functions implement the base
functionalities of a data analytics tool that allows for multi-criteria analysis
and detection of spatio-temporal patterns playing a very important role for
the threats identification and related countermeasure selection. In case the
IDF is used to quantify the impact of possible time evolution of an attack tree,
these functionalities are deployed in two modules that receive information
from the Co-simulator and move it, as is, to the semantically enhanced threat
module that is able to evaluate the impact of the forecasted part of the attack
tree providing further analysis.
• The Semantically Enhanced Threat Extraction Tool is a component capa-
ble to receive from the monitor and analytic modules a list of attack path—
portion of attack tree—with related probability and has to assess, for each of
this attack vector, an impact based on the loss estimation and the related risk
evaluation. This component will provide the risk evaluation of each forecast
attack path to be shown in the threat identifier, leaving to the mitigation com-
ponent the decision of the mitigation action to be taken. It is based also on
historical information contained in the threat model and risk repository that
in turn is populated with the detected threats associated with impact values.
The loss estimation value assesses the losses when an attack actually occurs.
For instance, a secondary electric substation is running many energy related
infrastructure services for a Distribution System Operator (DSO). When it is
unavailable for a day, the company will have a severe impact because the busi-
ness services cannot be provided any more. At this point, estimating the loss
may include the hourly revenue of business, loss of data, and implementing a
mitigation plan. The estimation of loss in DEFENDER is quantified as one
monetary value which should include all types of losses. The DEFENDER
approach for evaluation of techniques can be based on theoretical assumption
to produce loss estimates using theoretical aspects such as statistical distribu-
tions. The risk related to the evaluated impact then follows naturally from
the product of the probability of an attack path with the cumulative impact
calculated across the chosen attacker’s path.
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Table 15.2. KPI libraries.
Name Domain
Mean Time to Breach Time
Mean Time to Recovery Time
Mean Time to First Failure Time




To perform this calculation, the metrics in Table 15.1 are used to propagate the
information along the attack tree [1].
The KPI libraries in Table 15.2 contain the models of security metrics that allow
the monitor of attack vectors and provide information for the characterization of
the forecasted time evolution of the threats linked to the detected complex event.
These metrics are based on the work done in [2] even though adapted to serve the
CEI context.
The KPI libraries enable the “scorecard” functionality containing the set of
general metrics and their definitions. The metrics are general characteristics that
we deemed relevant to the IDF. The metrics have been divided into two classes:
Time and Impact. The former allows evaluation based on the number of events
that happen in time and the latter are fitted for allow the multidimensional impact
evaluation.
15.3 Mitigating Ongoing Incidents
After the detection, the system should determine a suitable set of mitigations or
countermeasures able to stop the attack. However, more criteria should be taken
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into account than simple efficiency—for instance, the countermeasure implemen-
tation cost. Humans are notoriously bad at making decisions with several criteria
on a rational basis, even with expertise. Multi-criteria Decision Aid [3] (MCDA)
is a framework designed to support a decision-maker (DM) in choosing rationally
among several alternatives, when there is no obvious best choice that would satisfy
all criteria and it boils down to user preference. MCDA relies on two elements: a
preference model, which it represents how alternatives compare to each other, and a
process, which defines how the DM applies their knowledge to the model.
The impact of each mitigation, both from material, immaterial, and human per-
spective, must be taken into account, and each set of mitigations must be evaluated
to assess its adequacy. In this section, we provide the description of a tool well suited
to evaluate automatically the sets of mitigations under consideration based on the
knowledge of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) [4].
A classical way of solving the MCDA problem is to rely on MCDA trees [5].
MCDA trees are used to disaggregate and analyze the DM preferences along a
set of criteria. In turn, these criteria can be disaggregated, leading to subcriteria,
until reaching atomic criteria corresponding to measurements. The structure of the
decision tree defines how the DM decomposes his decision. Each internal node of
the tree corresponds to an aggregation function depending on the lower branches.
There are plenty of aggregation functions. Some are very simple; the most common
one is the weighted sum. This function is very simple but cannot take into account
the complexity of some situations, where the criteria interact with each other. More
complex functions can do so—it is the case of the Choquet integral [6]—but they
also require more complex methods to be calibrated. The MCDA approach must
therefore be divided in two parts: a disaggregation phase and an aggregation phase.
During the disaggregation phase, the DM is first interviewed in order to struc-
ture the information and build a decision tree; and for each criterion, partial utility
functions are built. Then comes the calibration of the aggregation functions for each
of the aggregating nodes. To do so, the DM is asked her preferences among sev-
eral alternatives. The overall methodology to calibrate the partial utility functions
and the aggregation functions is called MACBETH [7] and has proven reliable for
various study cases [5, 8].
Finally, the second part of the process is the aggregation part, which consists in
applying the model obtained in the first part to alternatives in order to score them.
The Choquet integral
The Choquet integral [9] is a much more complete function and can express inter-
actions, such as a veto. It is also monotonous, which means that if a first alternative
is better than a second one on all criteria, then the Choquet integral of the first
alternative is higher than the second. The Choquet integral is a function built on
so-called capacities, a set of functions with properties described in Definition 15.1.
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Definition 15.1 (Capacity). A capacity (also called fuzzy measure) on N = {1, . . . , n}
is a set function µ: 2N → [0, 1] such that µ(φ) = 0, µ(N ) = 1 (boundary
conditions) and ∀A ⊆ B ⊆ N , µ(A) = µ(B) (monotonicity)
The Choquet integral is both symmetric and additive:
Definition 15.2 (Symmetric and additive capacities). A capacity is said to be additive
if µ(A ∪ B) = µ(A)+ µ(B) for every pair (A, B) of disjoint coalitions.
A capacity is said to be symmetric if µ(A) depends only on |A|, the cardinality
of A.
Finally, the Choquet integral itself is defined as:
Definition 15.3 (Choquet Integral.). The Choquet integral of a = (a1, . . . , an) ∈
Rn defined with regard to a capacity µ can be expressed as:




aσ (i)× [µ({σ(i), . . . , σ (n)})− µ({σ(i + 1), . . . , σ (n)})]
where σ is a permutation on N such that aσ(1) ≤ aσ(2) ≤ · · · ≤ aσ(n), and
µ({σ(i + 1), . . . , σ (n)}) = 0 when i = n.
Disaggregation phase
The first phase of the MCDA process is to disaggregate the preferences of the DM,
in order to produce the decision tree. This part can be divided into three:
• The structuring stage, used to determine the structure of the tree, i.e., how
the criteria relate to each other;
• The calibration of the partial utility function, used to get partial utility func-
tions from the universes on which the measures are made;
• The calibration of the aggregation function in the aggregation nodes.
Note that all the stages of disaggregation systematically involve the DM, who
can express her expertise on the topic in her interview. Ultimately, the decision tree
is composed of:
• The universe nodes: attributes from which the decision is made, and leaves of
the MCDA tree. These values are not bounded by the model and depend on
what is measured. It may be a qualitative or a quantitative value.
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• The utility nodes, present directly above each universe node: associates a par-
tial utility in [0, 1] to the measures of universe nodes.
• The aggregation nodes, used to aggregate criteria—these criteria being them-
selves either utility nodes or aggregation nodes. In particular, the root of a
MCDA tree is an aggregation node which represents the overall utility of an
alternative.
The second stage of the disaggregation phase deals with the calibration of the
partial utility function. To do that, we can rely on the MACBETH approach [6, 7].
This approach can be divided into three steps: defining perfectly satisfactory 1 and
inacceptable level 0 on the attribute universe, define key values in the universe,
and finally define the difference between consecutive key values using an interval
scale. When the utility function is monotonous, the totally satisfactory value in the
attribute universe defines the point from which getting a “better” value will not
increase the utility of the DM. More formally, let u be the partial utility function
of an attribute for which the utility is increasing. Then: ∀x ≤ 0, u(x) = 0, and
∀ x ≥ 1 u(x) = 1. The case of a decreasing partial utility function is similar.
It is then necessary to define several key values. They represent inflection points
of the utility function. For the DM, it represents points between which she can
define the intensity of the difference and the levels of difference between consecutive
points—taking, e.g., the values very weak, weak, mean, strong, very strong, extreme.
Finally, the aggregation functions must be set. Here again, we use the MAC-
BETH methodology to set the value of the coefficient associated to each subcrite-
rion and the one associated to each interaction. First step: determine a set of option
that the DM is able to order, which must be sufficient to determine all the coeffi-
cients. A good way to get such a set is to provide to the DM the options for which
all the attributes are set to either 0 or 1, order these options, and ask the DM to
provide information on the level of preference between the options.
Aggregation phase
The second phase of the algorithm is the aggregation phase. During this phase, the
model designed in the disaggregation phase is applied to one or more alternatives.
This alternative must be formalized on the aforementioned attributes. Note that the
system can support and adapt to undefined values among the attributes. In this case,
the user must define whether the undefined values correspond to non-applicable
attributes or to missing values. Another element is computed during this phase. As
the 2-additive Choquet integral is more complete than the weighted sum, it may
also be more difficult to interpret what criteria have more influence on the result.
Moreover, this value depends on the values of the criteria. During the aggregation
phase, a value is computed that represents the sensitivity of the result with regard
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to each of the criteria. This sensitivity index indicates the change on an aggregation
node when one criterion is modified, and the other ones are kept at the same value.
Feedback on DM interviews
In theory, the tree structure must reflect the concerns of the end users. However,
it had proven complicated for an operator to directly provide the tree structure.
In order to help them, some proxies can be used. For instance, providing a sample
tree with several criteria/metrics and aggregations, then asking them to extend these
using the criteria they may use in the eventuality of an attack. This can typically lead
to them suggesting new nodes in the tree, but also the deletion of less relevant nodes.
Computation of mitigation impact
Mitigation relevance is typically computed using the notions of attack probability
and attack impact; however, these values must be balanced with by the impact of
the mitigation itself. This is related to the fact that, for an attack with a very low
impact, there may be a mitigation that is very effective, but at the same time has a
very high impact, possibly even worse than the initial attack. In this case, it would
be better either to choose a mitigation with lower impact or even do nothing in
some situations. The impact of the mitigation is computed considering:
• The human resources (i.e., engagement of security teams). This criterion is
in turn divided into two subcriteria, physical security and cybersecurity. The
corresponding metrics are computed in percentages. For trial sites without
physical security team, this criterion is replaced by a police intervention;
• The material resources that correspond to the usage of tools either provided
in the context of the project or owned by the end users themselves;
• The non-functional infrastructure, involving network infrastructure, access
to the offices, etc. It is subdivided into two subcriteria: the criticality of the
impacted non-functional infrastructure and the disruption time.
• The outage, also computed on two subcriteria: first, the amplitude of the out-
age, which can either be computed in terms of number of impacted customers
or in terms of missed gains, in currency. Second, the duration of the outage
importance of non-relevant criteria is set to 0, so that it has no influence on
the computations.
Computation of the overall mitigation score
The root of the tree is the global utility (“grade”) of the mitigation. It is this value
that will be considered when deciding whether the mitigation should be proposed
to the end user. In addition, with the attack risks and probabilities, the deci-
sion must take into account the mitigation impact (see above) and its efficiency.
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This efficiency corresponds to the reduction of risk of the attack once the mitiga-
tion has been applied.
The whole computation therefore stems from a co-computation with the Co-
simulator and the IDF, before sending the result to the SCC as represented on
Figure 15.1:
1. Complex events are transmitted to the Co-Simulator. It computes attack
probability and time for possible attacks paths;
2. The Incident Detection Framework receives the attack paths and com-
putes the corresponding attack impacts;
3. The impacts and probability are sent to the Incident Mitigation Framework;
4. The Incident Mitigation Framework computes the relevant mitigations,
making the supposition that the attack is blocked by the mitigation;
5. The most promising mitigations are sent back to the Co-Simulator so that
it computes the new risk level if this mitigation was implemented. Note that
the most probable attack may have changed: if the initially planned attack is
blocked by the mitigation, the attackers may try another attack path;
6. The Incident Detection Framework computes the new impact;
7. The new impact is sent back to the Incident Mitigation Framework. If one
of the computed mitigations is still optimal in the Incident Mitigation
Framework, the process stops and the most promising mitigations that have
been evaluated twice are sent to the Security Control Center. If not, the
most promising mitigations not yet evaluated twice are sent back to the
Co-Simulator.
The process ends anyway if all the mitigations have been evaluated twice.
Explaining the model
When provided with the possible mitigations, the DM can have the following
needs:
• Interpretability: what are the most important attributes on average?
• Explicability: why is the preference higher for this mitigation option than
the other? why has the relevance of a given mitigation option significantly
increased over last minutes?
• Sensitivity Analysis: what changes in the attributes would most increase the
relevance?
An index that achieves this [10] is an extension of the Shapley and Owen val-
ues (defined in Cooperative Game Theory) on trees. Note that the use of the
values has recently gained interest for interpretability in Classification [11, 12].
Formally, the goal is to construct an easily understandable indicator Ii (x, y, T, U )
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Figure 15.3. Example of a decision tree with transformation.
that measures the influence of factor i , when comparing two options x, y, in
a preference model with criteria represented in a tree T , quantified by a utility
model U .
We want to impose certain properties on the index (the indices refer to
Figure 15.3):
• Restricted Value: Ii depends only on combinations of x and y.
• Consistency with Restricted Game: I2 is equal for the original tree and for the
derived subtree where 9 becomes a leaf.
• Null Attribute: If changing xi to yi never changes U , then Ii = 0
• Additivity: Ii(U +U ′) = Ii(U )+ Ii(U ′)
• Restricted Equal Treatment: All attributes are treated symmetrically.
• Generalized Efficiency: I10 = U (y)−U (x) and, e.g., I9 = I6 + I8.
These properties ensure a good “behavior” of the explanation, such as stability
towards a slight change to the underlying attributes. Furthermore, note that we can
demonstrate that there exists only one influence index fulfilling these properties.
This index computation has exponential complexity, like the Shapley value,
making its computation intractable, even for small numbers of criteria. How-
ever, taking profit of symmetries among permutations can drastically speed-up
the computation time. This idea was proposed by Owen for his value [13] and
is extendable to any tree. First, the hierarchical structure of the tree makes some
interactions between criteria null by design, which reduces the number of permu-
tations required to compute the index. Then, using the Consistency with Restricted
Game property allows to “trim” the tree dynamically when computing the index.
The computational complexity is still exponential but on a much smaller tree.
15.4 Control Center Tools for Better Incident Monitoring
Assisting the operation of the CEI owners and operators, DEFENDER offers a
rich graphical user interface served in the form of a control center web dashboard
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(Security Control Center—SCC) that allows the users to get useful information
on the security status of the managed CEI and quickly act to mitigate an iden-
tified, previously uncovered vulnerability, a security event or a validated security
breach (attack). Notably, SCC acts as an integration point for the majority of the
DEFENDER components and processes, including the IMF and the Human In
The Loop (HITL) framework, detailed in the following paragraphs. In short, the
key features of the SCC are listed below:
• Ability to visually overview of the CEI security state in real time as well as in
historical terms;
• Ability to overview a countermeasure strategy as proposed by the IMF com-
ponent, including the valuated risk mitigation impact as described in eco-
nomic, human, and social terms and, if needed, execute it;
• Ability to register HITL targets in coordination with the HITL backend
infrastructure and the blockchain, view their messages, and respond with fur-
ther notices;
• Integrate with the DEFENDER Pan-European I2SP in order to send
information over local CEI attacks and countermeasures and retrieve infor-
mation regarding pan-European attacks against CEI. The DEFENDER Pan-
European I2SP is a global monitoring entity responsible for analyzing attack
patterns at European level and deducing coordinated or, possibly, cascaded
attacks;
• Allow SCC operators to configure the CEI data sources, elements, and avail-
able mitigation mechanisms.
In the following, a quick presentation of the HITL concept and framework is
given, followed by the SCC architecture and core interactions.
15.4.1 Building a Culture of Security: The Human in the Loop
Framework
The final aim of DEFENDER is to build a culture of CEI security in a controllable
manner, starting from small teams of first responders and, via the well-defined com-
munication strategy of DEFENDER, eventually considering public masses. These
teams of first responders will be gradually integrated into the DEFENDER CEI
security framework in the form of virtual security sensors, effectively materializing
crowd sensing and giving rise to the DEFENDER HITL concept. According to the
latter, people living in the vicinity of CEI will be empowered to providing feedback
(free or structured text, photographs, and video) from the CEI locations. This will
be made possible via (a) trained employees implementing the best security policies
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tailored to CEI operational environment and (b) social networking and trusted
information exchange between volunteers, while preserving by design the privacy
and the security of the citizens involved in the process.
In the context of DEFENDER, HITL holds a special role since it constitutes
an invaluable source of information that actively engages real human interac-
tion with the DEFENDER system. Granted this remark, the security and privacy
requirements are explicitly hardened; the real identity of the humans is abso-
lutely protected, and all data exchanges are traceable to prevent intended or unin-
tended misuses. At the same time, the information flows are bidirectional since
the HITL targets are able to send plain text messages, images, and videos to
the CEI operators and Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), whereas the latter
are also able to either send commands as a response to the initial HITL targets
reportings.
In the context of DEFENDER, the HITL targets are equipped with an Android
messaging application that enables end-to-end encryption and that is tightly inte-
grated with the Ethereum blockchain infrastructure so that:
• All message exchanges are kept encrypted at all times;
• The digital identity of the users is validated and managed by the BC
infrastructure and is guaranteed to be decoupled by the physical one;
• All large files are stored in the IPFS distributed filesystem, encrypted;
• All information exchanges are permanent, immutable, and traceable;
• No individual’s special categories of personal data are processed
(GDPR art. 9);
• Messages containing text, images, and video collected through the HITL app
will be deleted on individuals’ devices immediately after sending them to the
CI system.
To satisfy the stringent privacy requirements of the overall HITL concept, the
DEFENDER HITL solution bases its functionality on the orchestrated operation
of an Ethereum Blockchain to store basic information and perform user identity
management, a distributed filesystem for storing larger files (text, photographs, and
videos) as well as secured Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) to facilitate
interactions at application level.
Notably, the DEFENDER HITL framework may be seen as both a monitoring
and an actuation component, depending on the communication flow direction,
Humans→ CEI standing for the former and CEI→ HITL corresponding to the
second one. Figure 15.4, below, depicts the framework flow regarding the unidi-
rectional human-to-CEI communication.
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Figure 15.4. Overview of the bidirectional human-to-CEI communication.
Figure 15.5. DEFENDER SCC high-level architecture and interactions.
15.4.2 Control Center Architecture and Interface
with other Modules
An integration point for the vast majority of DEFENDER operations, the
DEFENDER SCC is a complete system featuring multiple sub-components,
orchestrated in a distributed manner, so that possibly failing functionalities do
not affect the operational status of the rest of the sub-components; effectively, the
DEFENDER SCC has been designed featuring a microservices-oriented architec-
ture, as may be seen in Figure 15.5, below.
The following table overviews the SCC dashboard-composing entities along with
their functionality.
From a process perspective, whenever a compound attack vector and mitigation
strategy is being sent to the SCC core by the IMF, it gets passed via a reverse proxy
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server (mask the various functionalities of the SCC) to the SCC API server and later
via the cache server. In this context, the SCC acts as server and the IMF as client.
In turn, the API server notifies the UI service using a web socket service of the new
attack and the mitigation strategy proposed by the IMF are presented to the CEI
operator. Next, the CEI operator selects whether to activate the countermeasures
or not. In any case, regardless of whether the CEI operator chooses to activate the
countermeasure or not, an event is being sent to a DEFENDER Pan-European
platform instance for further processing under a more general perspective.1
The following figures briefly present the functionalities identified in Table 15.3.
In particular, Figure 15.6 depicts the SCC view when a new attack gets detected
and mitigations are notified by the IMF, whereas Figure 15.7 highlights a view of
the DEFENDER SCC HITL integration.
Finally, the DEFENDER SCC can act as a comprehensive toolbox offer-
ing Decision Support Systems (DSS) services to CEI operators. Coupled with the
Table 15.3. Core services of the DEFENDER SCC.
Component Cause
Proxy Server Consolidates the various services access to reduce the open web
ports of the system and facilitate integration
API Server The core API service handling REST requests from the various
components of the system
Cache Server In-memory database used for caching parts of the UI and API
services for speeding up access to commonly used resources
UI Service Core dashboard user interface-implementing component
Dashboard Service Implements mapping and charting functionality for overview-
ing the security state of the CEI as well as for displaying the
complex events received from the SMF F3 interface
SCC CEP API Server The core API service handling the F3 requests, validating and
pushing them to the underlying database structures
HITL Backend The API exposed to the HITL Android devices, responsible for
retrieving the HITL reports
HITL Ethereum nodes The blockchain node(s) of the DEFENDER instance
HITL IPFS nodes The distributed storage node(s) of the DEFENDER instance
HITL Pub/Sub A publish/subscribe mechanism, enabling the CEI-to-human
unidirectional communication flow
1. In fact, this information is used to uncover attacks at pan-European level, or, possibly, attacks that could
cascade to other infrastructures as well.
Conclusion 291
Figure 15.6. DEFENDER SCC view highlighting an identified attack.
Figure 15.7. Integration of SCC with HITL.
sophisticated mitigation strategy extraction services exposed by the IMF and the
trusted communication flows offered by HITL, the SCC can radically change the
way CEI operators perceive the security of their infrastructures, allowing them not
only to better monitor them but also optimally secure them against a large variety
of cyber-physical threats.
15.5 Conclusion
15.5.1 The Big Picture
Innovation is a key element in the protection of Critical Energy Infrastructures.
Going from a model of an ongoing attack to the explanation of all the elements,
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including the incident detection and its mitigation, is absolutely necessary, espe-
cially given the criticality of the infrastructure dealt with. In this chapter, we pre-
sented a methodology to handle these incidents. The first step is to evaluate the
ongoing attack, which relies on two key components: the use of data analytics to
determine the possible time evolution of an attack within an attack tree; and the
proposition of a semantically enhanced threat extraction tool, able to provide the
risk evaluation of each forecast attack path, based on historical information of
the threat model and risk repository. The second component of our approach is
an innovative incident mitigation framework that is able, based on the detection
module, to score mitigations against detected attack and provide explanation about
the selected ones. This module is based on a solid mathematical framework, Cho-
quet integral, and information provided by subject matter experts through a formal
methodology. The result of these two elements is finally provided to the control
center. We presented the capabilities of the latter: visualization of the situation in
real time and historical terms, interaction with the user for countermeasures strat-
egy, configuration and information—the whole operation being secured through
blockchain technology.
15.5.2 Extending the Architecture to Other Settings
The architecture presented here is aimed at situations where the possible attack
paths are known—but in some cases, it may not be the case. In particular, in a cyber-
security setting, the security loopholes may not be identified. In this case, building
an attack tree as we did may not be possible. Some other methods can then be used
to detect incoming events, for instance, machine learning. These attacks, and all the
formalism related to them, are being investigated in other research projects, such
as the H2020 PHOENIX (832989) project. Though the setting of that project is
different, some of the elements presented in this chapter can be reused. It is, for
instance, the case of the evaluation of the mitigation through an MCDA approach,
as well as the technical elements of the Security Control Center, which make it
possible for the operator to visualize the situation and the ongoing attack. Some
requirements also stay identical, for instance, the need to provide explicability to
the end users. Only minor changes are therefore necessary to utilize and adapt the
elements of this chapter to this type of new settings.
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This chapter introduces the main challenges for critical infrastructures in the com-
munication sector. Specifically, the chapter will review the current threats that arise
upon cyber and physical systems interconnection. At the same time, security strate-
gies exploiting both the features (cyber and physical) of critical infrastructures will
be introduced.
16.1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) (Lin et al., 2017) revolution has brought the pres-
ence of the Internet in almost everything and has changed several aspects of our
daily lives. The IoT technology, indeed, allows the massive introduction of Cyber-
physical Systems (CPS) (Bordel et al., 2017), that provide embedded intelligence,
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smart actuation, monitoring, and control to the peripheral nodes at the network
edge. Relevant examples of CPS are represented by Critical Infrastructures (CIs),
such as water distribution systems, smart grids, or telecommunication systems. CIs
are of paramount importance in economy and social-being of citizens; therefore,
they ask for protection against threats able to affect their operating level and, sub-
sequently, the quality of our lives (Massel, 2018).
Threats for CIs are commonly divided into two classes (i.e., planned and
unplanned), according to the possibility of forecasting them. Unplanned threats
are represented by non-intentional human errors or natural disasters. In the
last few years, the prevention of failure induced by extreme weather events is
becoming more challenging, since climate changes make them more frequent and
intense (Labelle et al., 2008). Planned threats are mainly represented by cyberat-
tacks. CIs have been the predominant target of several attacks that propagated due
to domino effects.
Regardless the type of threat, the design and the development of resilience
strategies are fundamental for protecting CIs. Specifically, CIs should be able to
recover quickly from failures: they should be able to cope with either known or
unknown threats according to the well-known paradigm detect, absorb, recover,
and adapt (Sterbenz et al., 2014). To this aim, CIs need to be equipped with detec-
tion tools to successfully identify a threat and reduce its impact. Moreover, a CI
should react to the system performance degradation provoked by the threat guar-
anteeing a certain Quality of Service (QoS).
Among CIs, a key role is played by telecommunication networks: they are essen-
tial to support and maintain public and private services. Private businesses, govern-
ment agencies, and other bodies rely on phone and Internet services provided by
telecommunications networks to carry out daily operations. Telecommunication
networks also supply services to health and social life. Since telecommunications
are pivotal infrastructures, their protection requires more concern. This feature
is becoming even more critical facing the 5G revolution. The extensive use of
programmable platforms and exponential growth of connected devices require
paradigms and tools to protect complex and flexible architectures.
Although since 2002 Universal Service Directive requires telecom companies
to maintain the security and resilience of their networks (European Commis-
sion, 2002), there is no security and resilience standard for this CI. Com-
monly, the resiliency is addressed by using redundancy: most critical segments
of the infrastructure are duplicated, and back-up power supplies are installed.
Moreover, cyber and physical security issues are considered as independent,
while recent events demonstrate that cyber-physical can affect the physical sys-
tems (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020; Computer Emergency
Response Team-Coordination Center, 2020).
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In this chapter, we address the security and resilience challenges for telecom-
munication infrastructure. To this aim, we provide an overview of the current and
future structure of the telecommunication networks in Section 16.2; we classify the
threats for telecommunication systems in Section 16.3 in order to understand the
challenges in building a resilient system as detailed in Section 16.4. Finally, we draw
some conclusive remarks in Section 16.5.
16.2 Current Telecommunication Infrastructures
Telecommunication networks exploit physical infrastructure for connecting users.
They can be decomposed into two main components:
• The core (backbone) networks;
• The access networks.
The core network provides connectivity between sub-networks carrying a large
amount of data. Core networks of different countries are implemented mainly by
fiber infrastructure and the satellite links. Radio signals from satellite are used to
connect remote communities, oil rigs, ships, and airplanes. The used radio fre-
quency spectrum and the paths of their orbits are registered by the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). Telecommunication networks rely on informa-
tion from global positioning system (GPS) satellites to synchronize with each other.
Recently, several concerns have been raised about the cyber and physical security of
both the undersea and the satellite links that carry a large number of global commu-
nications (Rishi Sunak, 2017): this aspect needs to be addressed when designing a
security and resilience strategy. The access network is the component supplying the
user with access to services. According to the type of access provided by telecommu-
nication operators to users, traditionally networks have been further classified as:
• Fixed-line networks;
• Mobile networks.
The fixed-line network provides the connection to end customer by means of
cables, through which a user can make phone calls, receive TV signals, or connect to
the Internet. Its core network is composed of copper and fiber optic cables, having
high bandwidth to connect switches and route communication. The access network
is mainly composed by copper paired wires connecting the users; however, in the
last few years, the use of fiber optic lines for the last mile is increased.
Mobile networks connect users to the network via wireless transmission
technologies. Therefore, a mobile access network consists of base stations that
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communicate with the user handsets by using radio signals. Base stations provide
access to the network over a limited area (i.e., the cell). The access network is con-
nected to a backbone infrastructure composed of mobile switching centers using
fixed-line (fiber optic cables) or radio links.
Fixed and mobile networks have mostly been developed separately. However, the
rapid evolution of 5G mobile technologies leads to higher fiber demand, thus boost-
ing the convergence of networks. Indeed, the new mobile technologies allow the
development of a novel set of applications (Agiwal et al., 2016), mainly focused on
the fulfillment of user requirements. To this aim, the Quality of Experience (QoE)
is replacing the QoS in the management of the networks. According to Qualinet
(Brunnström et al., 2013), QoE can be defined as: “The degree of delight or annoy-
ance of the user of an application or service. It results from the fulfillment of his or
her expectations with respect to the utility and/or enjoyment of the application or ser-
vice in the light of the user’s personality and current state.” As can be noticed, the
fulfillment of the QoE requirement is much more demanding than that of QoS.
From the telecommunication point of view, the main challenge is the develop-
ment of optimized self-organized networks able to timely provide services. Soft-
ware Defined Network and cloud technologies may represent appropriate tools to
allocate the available resources. However, the increasing demand for connectivity
enables the antenna densification process, i.e., the deployment of cells covering
a small area. Concerning the security issue, the novel architectures provide redun-
dancy by design; however, novel CPS threats will emerge due to the increased num-
ber of attack surfaces.
16.3 Classification of Threats in Telecommunication
Infrastructures
In Euchner et al. (2015), the requirements, that need to be taken into account when
facing the challenge of securing a telecommunication system, are:
• The parties involved ;
• The assets that need to be protected;
• The threats against which those assets must be protected;
• The vulnerabilities associated with the assets and the environment;
• The overall risk to the assets from those threats and vulnerabilities.
Concerning the parties involved, the main role is played by customers/
subscribers: they expect that the network is available and that the services offered
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are reachable, especially in emergency scenarios. Public authorities ask for security
by directive and legislation to guarantee service availability, privacy protection, and
fair competition. Network operators and services providers need to preserve their
operating level and business so that to meet the demand of customers, business
partners, and the requirements of public authorities.
The assets are represented by the personnel, the infrastructure (communication
and computing devices, equipment, and facilities), the information and data, and
the services provided.
A security threat is defined as a potential violation of security, that is: a pos-
sible danger that might exploit a vulnerability or weaknesses of the system to
breach security and, therefore, to lead to risky impact. As stated previously,
threats can be regarded either as unplanned/accidental or planned/intentional
(Jones et al., 2012). Moreover, they can be either active or passive; active threats
significantly affect information and/or operation in the system, while the passive
ones do not provide any change in the information and/or operation of the corre-
sponding systems.
About the telecommunication security threats and related risks, different clas-
sification can be drawn according to different purposes. Therefore, in the liter-
ature, several threat classification schemes have been proposed, upon the basis
of a variety of criteria. Understanding the potential threats is of paramount
importance to deeply get insights on the security and resilient challenges for the
telecommunication systems. To this aim, we consider the Recommendation ITU-T
X.1205 (ITU-T, 2008) that provides a taxonomy of security threats from an orga-
nizational point of view, along with a discussion of the threats at the various layers
of a network. Specifically, we consider three different types of threats, according to




The physical threats affect the physical assets (i.e., communication and comput-
ing devices, equipment, and facilities), the cyber threats exploit vulnerabilities in
the cyber space to harm the digital assets, and the cyber-physical threats exploit
vulnerabilities in the cyber space to disrupt the physical assets. Moreover, we also
analyze Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), that is considered the most demanding
threat to detect and defend against to date.
In the following, these types of threats and APT for telecommunication infras-
tructure are reviewed to further understand the security challenges.
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16.3.1 Physical Threats
Physical threats damage the physical infrastructure of telecommunication networks
and can be either planned or unplanned (Jones et al., 2012; Electronic Communi-
cations Resilience and Response Group, 2004).
The planned threats are related to intentional events, motivated by financial gain,
internal sabotage, terrorism, and vandalism. Example of planned physical threats
are damages to the transmission equipment (telecom pillars, antenna, buildings,
etc.), by using weapons or drones, copper or fiber optics cables theft to interrupt
network services, or signal jamming to disrupt wireless networks.
Unplanned threats can be roughly divided into two main categories. The first
one is related to hardware and/or software failure due to unintentional human
actions; the second one concerns natural hazards. The most common cause of
telecommunication failure, as reported by ENISA (European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security) every year since 2012 (ENISA, 2019), is asso-
ciated with power breakdown: lack of fuel for backup generators, excavators shear-
ing through cables, anchors damaging undersea cable are examples of this type of
threat. It is worth noticing that power and telecommunication infrastructures rely
on each other: on the one hand, the telecommunication infrastructures depend on
continuous supply of power and, on the other hand, the electrical power industry
depends on telecoms to run their extensive network of generators and grid distri-
bution. Although the intentional damages can seriously harm telecommunication
networks, according to ENISA reports the most prolonged disrupts are caused by
natural hazards (i.e., weather events, seismic activity, fire, and explosions). Flooding,
strong winds, lightning, cold weather, and heatwaves can affect telecommunication
physical assets either directly or indirectly by damaging the power infrastructures.
Furthermore, changes in the near-Earth space environment can influence the per-
formances of the telecommunication systems.
Concerning the planned events, some prevention actions need to be set-up, by
applying suitable frameworks and related measures. Concerning unplanned events,
only mitigation strategies could be applied due to the unpredictable characteristics
of the incidents. It is worth mentioning that due to climate change, natural hazards
are becoming more frequent.
16.3.2 Cyber Threats
Cyber threats affect the telecommunication operation, software system, and ser-
vices. They can be divided into intentional and accidental, like the physical ones.
The unplanned threats are represented by system and software failures. Sys-
tem failures occur when the performances of a telecommunication system are
downgraded due to system errors. The challenge is to avoid the single points of
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failure by enhancing resilience strategies. However, not all parts of the network can
be made redundant and, in these cases, the complementary restore and repair pro-
cedures need to be strengthened. The software failures are usually related to bugs in
the algorithms that control the equipment. Although errors in software are accept-
able for personal computers, a telecommunication network cannot bear crashes and
delays in services. The most challenging software issue is represented by the systemic
or common-mode failure; in this case, a software error in one network node causes
the same fault to occur in other connected nodes, leading to a runaway failure of
the whole network.
The planned cyber threats are related to hacking activities and attacks. They
include both typical cyberattacks and specific ones, tailored to the specific infras-
tructure(s). The eavesdropping aims at breaching the system or service, to spoof
the user identity, to disclose information (privacy breach or data leak), and to gain
knowledge on the system. The man in the middle attack covertly intercepts the
communication between two nodes, records the information, and even alters it.
The denial of service (DoS) targets at making a resource unavailable to the users by
temporarily or indefinitely disrupting services of a host connected to the Internet.
A denial-of-service attack floods systems, servers, or networks with traffic to spill
over resources and bandwidth; as a result, the system is unable to fulfill legitimate
requests. Attackers can also use multiple compromised devices to launch this sort of
attack. A semantic attack is devoted to change and disseminate correct and/or incor-
rect information to cover tracks of malicious activities. Attacks launched by mali-
cious codes include the execution of viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and active Web
scripts aiming at destroying or stealing information. They represent well-known
computer security threats, since a computer virus is a program written to alter the
way a computer operates, without the permission or knowledge of the user. A virus
replicates and executes itself, usually doing damage to the computer in the pro-
cess. Cyber threats most connected with infrastructure are related to vulnerabilities
in system security procedures, hardware design, internal controls, or software code.
They could be exploited to gain unauthorized access, to manipulate the integrity or
to affect the availability of both classified or sensitive information and non-sensitive
information of protocols, procedures, and equipment. One of the main weakness
is represented by the legacy protocols: some protocols, indeed, are old and were
designed without considering future security issues. Concerning equipment, back-
door attacks and device compromise are mighty threats. Regarding the first, it is set
up by software development companies or hardware providers that leave a single
point of failure in order to obtain access to a system or application found in pro-
duction. The second one hits the devices used in telecommunication networks (e.g.,
home routers): once they are compromised, malicious attackers can anonymously
access services. The zero-day exploit is a cyberattack that occurs on the same day
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a weakness is announced in software, just before a patch or a solution is provided.
A Structured Query Language (SQL) injection targets SQL servers by introducing
malicious code into vulnerable website and retrieving data and information. The
most challenging attack, however, is represented by phishing, since it includes the
human in the attack loop. Phishing is an example of social engineering techniques,
based on email spoofing and instant messages. It is the fraudulent attempt to gain
sensitive information (usernames, password, personal identification number, credit
card numbers, etc.) by appearing as a request from reputable sources.
16.3.3 Cyber-physical Threats
Cyber-physical threats encompass attacks to information systems that have an
impact on physical assets (cyber to physical threats) and vice versa (physical to cyber
threats), i.e., physical threats that disrupt the information systems. The physical to
cyber threats can be accidental, whereas the cyber to physical attacks are always
intentional.
According to Paridari et al. (2018), physical threats are represented by both
physical intrusion and attacks to sensors and actuators resulting in system failure.
The physical intrusion refers to an intruder that circumvents the physical security of
an infrastructure in order to harm the cyber domain. The sensor or actuator attacks
refers to a physical damage that brings to a system fault. In Paridari et al. (2018)
also, cyber to physical threats are considered. Specifically, the most common attacks
are network disruption to harm physical assets and electronic jamming to deliber-
ate cause losses in physical assets. For a telecommunication system, the first cyber
to physical threats is related to remote action in the cyber domain that cause fail-
ure in providing services due to physical issue (i.e., power shutdown). The sec-
ond cause denial of service due to traffic overloads and can cause damages in the
interconnected critical infrastructures (e.g., control systems of power distribution
networks).
The main approach adopted to prevent cyber-physical threats in a CPS is by
controlling its vulnerability; however, it constitutes a challenge. CPS, indeed, are
composed by heterogeneous building blocks. From a hardware perspective, they are
composed by different components (i.e., sensors, actuators, controllers, physical
structures, and embedded systems). CPS also include firmware, communication
channel, proprietary, and commercial software for controlling and monitoring the
systems. Every single component as the whole integrated system represents an attack
surface. Therefore, a fundamental task is to get insights on the vulnerability risk in
order to identify missing pieces, gaps, and weak links. Another challenge is related
to privacy preserving issues in the CPS: in a CPS, indeed, it is difficult to identify,
trace, and examine the attacks, which may originate from, move between, and target
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at multiple CPS components. An in-depth understanding of the vulnerabilities,
threats, and attacks is essential to the development of defence mechanisms.
Telecommunication infrastructures are rarely regarded as a CPS, although the
exponential growth in the development and deployment of networked systems has
brought impacts to almost all aspects of daily life. It is worth noticing, however, that
telecommunication systems provide and manage the communication channels of
all the other critical infrastructures (e.g., power distribution systems, water distri-
bution systems, transportation networks, etc.); therefore, they are tightly related
and interconnected with CPS. Moreover, the facilities of a telecommunication sys-
tem, as well as all the physical devices (i.e., antenna pillars, network control systems
or wireless sensor networks) that the emerging 5G technologies foresee, make the
telecommunication system itself a CPS (Hutchison and Sterbenz, 2018).
16.3.4 Advanced Persistent Threats
The most challenging threat to detect and defend against is considered the APT.
An APT is a set of stealthy and continuous computer hacking processes, which
gain unauthorized access to a computer network and remain undetected for an
extended period. It is set up by group driven by political and/or economic motiva-
tions; the actors behind an APT have the capability and determination to achieve a
specific target. An APT usually targets either private organizations, states or both,
and requires a high degree of covertness over a long period of time.
As suggested by the name, it consists of three main components, namely
advanced, persistent, and threat. The advanced component implies that sophis-
ticated techniques are adopted: traditional espionage vectors, social engineering,
human intelligence, and infiltration are used to gain access to a physical location
to enable network attacks. Commonly, the main target is to place custom mali-
cious code on one or multiple computers in order to accomplish a specific task.
The persistent component implies that an external command and control system
is continuously monitoring and extracting data from a specific target during the
dwell time (i.e., the time an APT attack goes undetected). This provides to the
attackers a significant amount of time to go through the attack cycle, propagate,
and achieve the objective. The threat component involves human in orchestrating
the attack (Alshamrani et al., 2019).
APTs exploit Internet and/or infected media to breach the target system. Internet
connections are used to send malicious payload via email attachments, peer-to-peer
file sharing, or spear-phishing. Media infection may consist of infected Universal
Serial Bus (USB) memory sticks, infected memory cards, or infected appliances.
Furthermore, cyber threats (i.e., zero day attack, man in the middle, etc.) can be
applied.
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To date, every major business sector has recorded instances of attacks by
advanced actors with specific goals seeking to steal, spy, or disrupt. The most famous
APT for industrial control system is considered Stuxnet (Albright et al., 2010),
while the world’s first global ransomware attack, Wannacry (Ghafur et al., 2019),
was shown to be based on code produced by a known APT.
ENISA’s threat landscape report predicts that high-capability agents will special-
ize in the future on more off-the-shelf campaigns rather than custom techniques, so
as to enhance stealthiness and further improve APT effectiveness (ENISA, 2019),
showing that APTs exemplify the advanced cyber threat due to increasing frequency,
importance, and complexity in countering.
16.4 Resilience in Telecommunication Systems
Resilience for a telecommunication system is defined as the capability of a network
to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover against a challenge by maintain-
ing an acceptable quality of service (Thoma et al., 2016). Resilience is regarded as a
major requirement as well as a design objective for CIs; however, it is of paramount
importance for Internet that is the “critical infrastructure used by citizens, govern-
ments, and businesses” [as described ENISA (2019)].
Resilience represents a cross-cutting edge between information and net-
work security, fault-tolerance, dependability (Avižienis et al., 2004), performabil-
ity (Meyer, 1992), and network survivability (Ellison et al., 1997; Sterbenz et al.,
2002). It is useful to underline that engineering resilience has a monetary cost: to
this aim, it is critical to maximize the effectiveness of committed resources.
In telecommunication systems foreseen by the 5G architecture, the main
resilience challenges are related to software-based networks. The radio access
network allows to add/remove nodes by easily reconfiguring the network in an
automated way. This capability enables the set-up of automatic redundant con-
figuration, while introduces new security and resilience challenges, namely the risk
of accepting a malicious node. Software-based networks, indeed, rely on centralized
control that can represent a single point of failure. The key challenge is to make
the control level resilient and secure in order to avoid the propagation of attack and
failure from this level to the data and application ones.
In the literature, two mitigating strategies are considered: the cross-layer fault
management and the learning dynamic resource dependencies. The cross-layer fault
management aims at timely diagnosing faults and attacks in order to set up recov-
ery strategies to guarantee a suitable level of service. To achieve this goal, proper
metrics to detect and identify system malfunctioning need to be defined: they are
represented by the key performance indicators that may give relevant insights on
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the behavior of the system. By learning dynamic resource dependencies, it is possi-
ble to build a run-time model for the software-based network that allows to track
faults and alarms.
Another challenge that arises considering software-based networks is related to
network slicing that enables the coverage of different use cases (NGMN Members,
2015) by mapping virtual resources into physical infrastructure. In this case, the
network resilience depends on the resilience of the slicing service and of the phys-
ical infrastructure. A fault on the physical layer, indeed, propagates into virtual
resources.
16.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes the security and resilience of telecommunication systems
considering the challenges that an improved connectivity may induce in CPS. Fur-
thermore, the telecommunication infrastructure is regarded itself as a CPS. We
investigated the novel challenges and the security issues arising when the next gen-
eration of telecommunication systems is considered. The main concerns are related
with the convergence between fixed and mobile networks, the exploitation of cyber
threats to damage the physical layer, and the novel network technologies used by
the 5G generation of mobile networks.
The challenges in security, however, can be considered also as opportunities.
Resilient systems, indeed, can be easily set up by using the network functions vir-
tualization, as foreseen by the ETSI (the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute) (NFV ETSI Industry Specification Group, 2017). The future telecom-
munication systems, indeed, will be composed of Physical Network Functions that
cannot be virtualized and Virtual Network Functions that run in commodity hard-
ware. These two components will realize network services and /or application coor-
dinated by an orchestrator, able to implement the appropriate policy. Here, the
opportunity is to exploit the orchestrator also for security purposes. Finally, the
networks virtualization and the software defined networking can be synergetically
used to set up automatic network.
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and Risk Control Platform for
Communication infraSTructure Operators
By Alberto Neri and Alessandro Neri
17.1 Introduction
Communications play a fundamental role in the economic and social well-being of
the citizens and on operations of most of the Critical Infrastructures (CIs). Thus,
they are a primary target for criminals having a multiplier effect on the power
of attacks and providing enormous resonance and gains. Also extreme weather
events and natural disasters represents a challenge due to their increase in frequency
and intensity requiring smarter resilience of the Communication CIs, which are
extremely vulnerable due to the ever-increasing complexity of the architecture also
in light of the evolution towards 5G, the extensive use of programmable platforms,
and exponential growth of connected devices. The fact that most enterprises still
manage physical and cybersecurity independently represents a further challenge.
RESISTO platform is an innovative solution for Communication CIs to increase
situation awareness and enhance CIs resilience. An integrated Risk and Resilience
analysis management and improvement process is in charge to identify threats and
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prevent impacts as well as RESISTO implements an innovative Decision Support
System to protect communication infrastructures able to detect negative events,
respond, and recover from physical, cyber, and combined cyber-physical threat-
ening events. A suite of state-of-the-art cyber/physical threat detectors (Machine
Learning based, IoT security, Airborne threat detection, holistic audio-video ana-
lytics) complete the platform. Through RESISTO, Communications Operators
will be able to implement a set of recovery actions and countermeasures that signif-
icantly reduce the impact of negative events in terms of performance losses, social
consequences, and cascading effects in particular by bouncing efficiently back to
original and forward to operational states of operation. RESISTO adopts a uni-
fied approach to face physical as well as cyber threats as well as a double and
integrated approach between offline and run-time activities applicable to different
kinds of CIs.
17.2 RESISTO Architecture
The logical architecture of RESISTO integrates two control loops both running
on top of the Communication Infrastructure and interlinked with each other
(Figure 17.1) that implement the five core security functionalities introduced by
the USA National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the “Frame-
work for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” namely Identify, Protect,
Detect, Respond, and Recover.
Figure 17.1. RESISTO logical architecture.
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The Long-term Control Loop (LTCL) is an offline activity, following a well-
defined methodology and supported by advanced tools, aimed to identify infras-
tructure vulnerabilities and cyber and physical security threats and, consequently,
to define assets configuration and interventions in order to improve CI’s resilience
and robustness. For each loop cycle, a set of Resilience Indicators (RIs), relevant to
critical threat event typologies, are estimated and stored in a Knowledge Base (KB)
as described in detail in Section 17.5. An LTCL cycle is performed on a periodic
basis or when particular events take place (new threats or discovery of previously
undetected vulnerabilities). It is typically conducted annually, quarterly, or even
monthly.
The Short-term Control Loop (STCL) is the runtime component of the plat-
form. It promptly responds to detected cyber/physical attacks and events that may
impact the operational life of the system. It enhances situation awareness and pro-
vides operators with a Decision Support System cockpit able to implement the best
response to an identified adverse event with the aim of mitigating the event’s effects
and recovering standard operating conditions. While facing adverse cyber/physical
events, some actual RIs values are measured and stored in the KB (see Section 17.5).
Moreover, LTCL and STCL are strongly interlinked with each other. In fact,
comparison between target RIs estimated by the LTCL and their actual values mea-
sured by the STCL facing run-time threat events establishes a higher level global
control loop able to continuously review and improve infrastructure resilience and
methods.
17.3 The Long-term Control Loop
The RESISTO LTCL is in charge of the configuration of the Communication’s
Critical Infrastructure according to the security assessment.
While STCL provides tools for immediate reaction against attacks in real time,
LTCL leads to the identification of criticalities and definition of long-term strate-
gies. Therefore, it is conducted on a periodic basis as well as in case of specific
events, e.g., detection of new types of vulnerabilities, expectation of new threats, or
after significant CI changes that may impact on security.
The LTCL implementation is based on a sophisticated risk and resilience man-
agement process, aimed at identifying and evaluating risks and suggesting treatment
and mitigation strategies, that extends the ISO 31000 standard.
Each cycle is structured into the following nine sequential steps (Figure 17.2):
1. Context analysis: it is devoted to the general description of the system,
including societal, economic, legal, and ethical context, and includes the
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Figure 17.2. Risk and resilience management process.
identification of key stakeholders, resilience objectives, restrictions, and eval-
uation criteria.
2. System analysis: it is aimed at the analysis of the system environment and
interfaces, including boundary definitions, static and dynamic analysis, and
(graphical) modeling/representation.
3. System performance function identification: it is targeted to the definition
of (non)performance (service) functions of the system, including qualitative
and quantitative descriptions. The system (non)performance functions in
combination should cover the expected system behavior and its assessment.
4. Disruptions identification: it identifies threats, hazards, and disruptions
(classical risk events) that might affect system (non)performance, as well as
potentially affected system functions, system layers, and resilience capabili-
ties.
5. Pre-assessment of combinations of functions and disruptions: it analy-
ses all combinations of system functions (step 3) and potential disruptions
(step 4), in order to identify critical combinations which need to be further
evaluated (in step 6). Step 5 is typically conducted analytically using a semi-
quantitative approach. Step 5 and step 6 take account of all resilience cycle
phases.
6. Overall resilience quantification: based on system modeling and simula-
tion, it is aimed at determining resilience quantities, i.e., at quantification of
the resilience of the system (non)performance functions regarding the iden-
tified threats based on the criticalities identified in the previous step 5. Step
6 covers advanced (overall) resilience quantification approaches.
7. Resilience and cost evaluation: it is devoted to the comparison of resilience
performance, illustration of the performance loss, and evaluation of the
acceptance level for all threats. Step 7 evaluates the results of steps 5 and 6.
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8. Selection of options for modifying resilience: it selects the best options
for resilience improvement based on a preselected decision-making method.
Step 8 includes the re-execution of all previous steps that affect the resilience
(semi) quantification to assess the resilience gain taking into account the
planned improvement methods.
9. Implementation of options for modifying resilience: development and
implementation of those options for improving resilience select at Step 8,
based on domain-specific standards as far as possible and efficient methods
corresponding to determined resilience levels for all subsystems.
In principle, the methodology employed in RESISTO is applicable to any kind
of CI subjected to both physical and cyber threats. However, some elements and
tools have been adapted or added in order to exploit specific aspects of the Com-
munications domain.
Specific data concerning CI characteristics, potential threats, vulnerabilities, and
their exploitation, and countermeasures required by LTCL are stored in a dedicated
Data and Knowledge Base. However, a web application supporting fast and easy
browsing through its content and further information inference, such as critical
combinations of system functions and threats and threat ranking (Step 5), which
serve as additional input to other steps of the resilience management process, has
been realized. This application is based on the Shiny package of the free program-
ming language R for statistical computing and allows a semi-quantitative assess-
ment of critical risks. Tabular Excel templates for data import/export complement
the tool.
Quantification of the resilience Matrix of the critical risks based on CI sim-
ulations is further supported. At present, two simulation tools have been inte-
grated in RESISTO: the platform-integrated CISIApro simulator, also employed
in real-time by the STCL, and the offline CaESAR simulator. CISIApro (Crit-
ical Infrastructure Simulation by Interdependent Agents) is a software engine,
developed by the University of Roma Tre, able to calculate complex cascading
effects, taking into account (inter)dependencies and faults propagation among the
involved complex systems. CISIApro has been developed in the framework of the
H2020 ATENA Project and in RESISTO has been updated to version 2.0, adding
some important functionalities related with the modeling of telecommunication
infrastructures.
In addition to the RIs computation, the simulators allow to assess and rank pos-
sible mitigation strategies. It should be noted that these simulations are not per-
formed on an event basis, as a consequence of a detected attack, like in STLC,
but rather on a periodic basis to identify weak points of the current setup of the
infrastructure.
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In Figure 17.2, the tools supporting the different steps of the risk and resilience
management are indicated.
Among the methodologies and tools adopted in RESISTO in order to improve
the knowledge about possible threats and their consequences (Figure 17.2, Step 4
from the Risk and resilience management process), we cite:
1. Attack Trees: Attack trees are a way to describe an attack. In the LTCL, they
can be used to identify situations that the organization has no defense process
in place. Each attack should have countermeasures in place.
2. Honeypots: A honeypot is a set of physical, HW, and/or SW modules simu-
lating legitimate interactions with external users while they are instead sep-
arate entities not performing any real operation and/or handling real data.
Post-processing of honeypot logs is a long time used technique to detect and
analyze sophisticated intrusions while keeping the real system safe. Moreover,
it provides the possibility to observe an attack over time, then enabling both:
learning about new threats and assessment of known ones. Since it collects
detailed historical information, the technique is particularly useful for the
LTCL purposes.
3. Penetration tests: A penetration testing (PENTEST) is a combination of tech-
niques that considers various issues of the systems and tests, analyses, and
gives solutions. It is based on a structured procedure that performs penetra-
tion testing step-by-step. Undertaking a series of penetration tests helps test
security arrangements and identifies improvements. When carried out and
reported properly, a penetration test can give knowledge of nearly all techni-
cal security weaknesses and provides the information and support required
to remove or reduce those vulnerabilities.
4. “MITRE ATT&CK ”: it consists in the constant monitoring of the informa-
tion in the “MITRE ATT&CK” knowledge base on potential attacks in order
to develop and update threat models for risk assessment of their networks.
17.4 The Short-term Control Loop
The RESISTO Short-term Control Loop (STCL) is a typical run-time control
loop. It is in charge of detecting potential physical, cyber, and physical/cyber com-
bined threat events that may impact on the operational life of the system and react
promptly.
The STCL:
• Monitors the physical and cybersecurity status of the infrastructures, corre-
lating physical and cyber domain events, and monitoring communication
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Figure 17.3. Short-term Control Loop functional flow.
infrastructure data in order to collect and/or detect anomalies and provide
early warnings on security attacks or events adversely impacting security;
• Evaluates the performance degradation causes related to detected anoma-
lies and security attacks on the Communication CI and interlinked CIs, if
known, based on the cascading effect;
• Supports decision-making providing a qualitative and quantitative What-If
analysis tool in order to evaluate the best mitigation strategy;
• Drives response and recovery by means of action workflows (composed of
directives to intervention teams, physical protection devices activation) and,
mainly, of orchestrated Communication Network reconfiguration and pro-
tection function activation.
The STCL functional control flow is reported in Figure 17.3.
Input data to the STCL can be grouped into the following categories:
1. Physical events related to attacks (e.g., intrusions, damage) or to potentially
dangerous events (e.g., unauthorized UAV flights);
2. Cyberattacks;
3. Communication infrastructure physical layer/HW monitoring data (e.g.,
power and energy consumption and HW faults);
4. Communication network QoS monitoring data (e.g., offered traffic,
throughput, latencies, error statistics, …).
The sources of such data and information could be:
• Legacy Physical Security Information Management (PSIM) systems or other
physical attack detectors made available by the telecommunication operator,
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Figure 17.4. Correlator architecture.
• Legacy Security Operating Centers (SOCs) or other cyberattack detectors
made available by the telecommunication operator,
• RESISTO additional physical/cyber threat detectors [e.g., airborne threats
detection systems, smart spectrum surveillance, OSINT (Open-Source
Intelligence)-based] described in the following.
From a functional point of view, input data are collected by the Cyber/Physical
Events Correlator. The Events Correlator not only propagates, as alarms, externally
detected and collected attack/anomaly events, but it also generates alarms on its
own from apparently harmless events and monitoring data. This latter action is
performed by using several event correlation techniques, such as logical, causal,
and temporal correlation based on event timing.
The Cyber/Physical Events Correlator is composed by the following main com-
ponents, as depicted in Figure 17.4:
• Correlator Engine: component correlating data source events and identifying
potential threats based on a list of rules set by skilled operators;
• Machine Learning (ML)-based module: a component based on the applica-
tion of ML algorithms for the identification of standard/anomalous behav-
ioral models for the traffic originating from network data sources.
The Correlator Engine is mainly based on Apache Storm and Esper technologies.
Apache Storm is a free open source software for distributed computing of real-time
processes. Esper is a Complex Event Processing (CEP) component able to perform
Event Stream Processing. This feature allows real-time or quasi-real-time detection
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of those events that match the stored rules. In RESISTO, rules can be updated in
real time without the need of a Correlator Engine restart.
The Esper engine operates in a different manner compared to a database man-
agement system. Instead of storing data and performing queries on the stored data,
it allows applications to store their own queries and directly launch them on the
data. The processing mode is continuous and a reply is in real-time whenever the
conditions contained within the query are met.
Esper provides two principal methods for processing events:
1. Event pattern,
2. Event stream query.
The first method is based on a language allowing specification of expression-
based patterns for event matching. It analyses event sequences or a combination of
event sequences based on timing factors. On the contrary, the second method offers
the possibility to define queries allowing filtering, aggregation, and correlation
(through join operators) as well as to analyze event streams. These queries follow
the EPL (Event Processing Language) syntax. EPL is a declarative language imple-
menting and extending the SQL-standard allowing rich expressions over events
and time.
The Machine Learning (ML)-based module allows the detection of anomalous
traffic situations compared with the daily recorded ordinary traffic intensity. Con-
trol flow historical data retrieved from past records are used as first baseline for
training the learning procedure. Historical data repository can be increased contin-
uously in order to tune the machine learning-based detector with respect to evolving
data traffic curves.
More in details, the engine exploits a profile-based anomaly detection approach.
This technique exploits the history of the normal network behavior, thus creating
a normal network profile. Following this principle, “anomaly” is defined as a net-
work behavior that is significantly different from the modeled one. One of the main
advantages of profile-based approaches is that they do not require a model for the
anomalous behaviors, thus allowing the detection of new and unforeseen anoma-
lies. Moreover, the approach aims at designing an anomaly detection method which
takes as input only control flow quantitative indicators such as the number of pack-
ets and bits. Let us note that this restriction on the kind of attributes exploited by
the anomaly detection method is needed to fulfill the privacy preserving require-
ments.
Anomalies detected by the Events Correlator trigger the Risk (Impact)
Predictor. The Risk Predictor evaluates and highlights the impacts of the poten-
tial exploit detected by the Correlator on the communication infrastructure and,
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mainly, on the services provided by the infrastructure. The Risk Predictor Engine
is based on CISIApro 2.0 and acts at run-time on a CI model built according to
different offline interlacing points of view:
• Under a reductionist perspective, each infrastructure is decomposed into a
network of interconnected physical elementary entities and their behavior
depends on the (mutual or not) interactions with the other reductionist ele-
ments;
• Applying a holistic approach, each infrastructure is modeled as a (logical) real-
ity with its own identity, functional properties, and recognizable boundaries.
It interacts with other similar entities according to reduced identifiable set of
relationships. With such a perspective, it is easy to identify the roles that each
infrastructure plays in a specific context;
• From a Service point of view, a Service Entity represents a logical element,
conceptual or real, that provides an aggregate resource such as a QoS (Quality
of Service) level.
Moreover, the Risk Predictor supports the decision-making process allowing a
“What-If analysis” and thus simulating the application of countermeasures and
reconfiguration and their impact on system resilience.
In parallel with the Risk (Impact) Predictor, the Correlator also triggers the
Workflow Manager software engine in charge to guide the operator during the
reaction and recovery phases. On the basis of the alarm type, the most appropriate
workflow is selected and executed. A workflow is a conditional sequence of steps.
Each step can specify a procedural action such as:
• Alert a security or technical team with an emergency message sent through
the EWCF,
• Drive one or more physical actuators (e.g., lock physical gate),
• Carry out a complex O&M action on the Communication Network
(e.g., activate a Virtual Network Security Function, isolate a faulty or attacked
component, reconfigure a part of the network, disable a 5G slice, etc.).
The Workflow Manager inside RESISTO platform is an extremely effective tool
for managing critical infrastructure security. It is based on a Business Process Model
(BPM) engine for the configuration and execution of automatic or semi-automatic
processes, consisting of sequences of actions and reactions, which can be triggered
by a defined event. Given a certain alarm/event, it allows selecting and executing
the most appropriate workflow, i.e., a conditional sequence of tasks.
The workflow execution is carried out via Activiti, an open-source workflow
engine written in Java that can execute business processes described in standard
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BPMN (Business Process Model and Notation) 2.0. The workflow is represented
by an xml file, which is managed by the Activiti engine through its deployment in
a dedicated database.
Complex actions on the Communication Infrastructure are performed by the
Orchestration Controller. The Orchestration Controller is built around the con-
cept of Software Defined Security (SDS) taking advantage of the Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV) and Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigms
of the underlying communication network. The Orchestrator Controller imple-
ments complex security functions and services composing less complex/primitive
security mechanisms/functions acting on physical resources (i.e., network physical
equipment) as well as on Virtual Network Functions in a NFV/5G perspective.
The Orchestration Controller operates on a communication infrastructure already
controlled by a telecommunication operator, so it works on top of a simple SDN
Controller, on the northbound side, or on top of a more complex network Opera-
tional Support System (OSS).
The Emergency Warning Communication (EWC) function is activated when
it is needed to send instant messages, targeted alerts, and operating instructions to
specific categories of users that are present in a certain area where events like natural
disasters, physical, or cyberattacks are occurring. In particular, rescue teams called to
execute actions on the infrastructure can leverage on the received information. The
EWC module includes a server application and either an Android one. The server
exposes an interface towards the other modules of the RESISTO framework need-
ing to communicate information concerning a physical-cyberattack to the inter-
vention team that operates where the telecom infrastructure is located. The rescue
team will leverage on the application information, both textual and visual. In par-
ticular, the position of points of interest or of the other team members is collected
and visualized. The app is available on Android devices, including smartphones.
The EWCF service is implemented in a microservice architecture using Docker
containers. The service has its own persistent storage and database where informa-
tion regarding teams, users, and events are registered. The server is connected with
an Android app installed on the user terminals of the team members. The same app
can be connected to an IoT platform and will relay sensor values to the platform.
In particular, the GPS position of the terminal will be collected in the IoT platform
and in this way will be shared among the team members. A messaging platform is
used instead to connect the terminals among themselves and with the main service
that in turn receives specific messages from the Workflow Manager.
Nevertheless, the architecture is modular and can be adapted to use other exter-
nal platforms.
As already explained before, RESISTO platform also include some state-of-the-
art physical/cyber threat detectors.
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Considering the emerging use of unmanned devices, UAVs (Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles) or drones are nowadays more and more regarded as potential, human-
driven, physical threats. Within RESISTO, mixed techniques involving low-cost
radars combined with acoustic sensors are implemented to detect small airborne
objects and moving targets. The specific airborne threat detection system con-
sists of a set of tools designed and developed to detect the presence of small UAVs
that may constitute airborne threats and provide alarm signals. The system can
be also deployed in small unprotected areas, such as antenna telecom parks, pro-
viding additional situational awareness and perimeter defense against low-flying
aircrafts.
The radar sensor currently adopted in RESISTO is a Doppler radar able to detect
and track fast moving, small targets even in harsh conditions (dusk, rain or snow)
at a range of several kilometers.
Detection based on the acoustic signal emitted by the UAV is based on a low cost,
low power array of high sensitivity dynamic microphones. Acoustic sensors have
many advantages that include non-line-of-sight, omni-directionality, passiveness,
low-cost, and low-power, and play a potential key role in situational awareness.
Moreover, while the equivalent radar cross section of UAVs can be rather small,
due to both their small size and the electromagnetic properties of their constituent
materials, their acoustic signature is directly related to the acoustic wave originating
from both the engine and the propeller rotation. The acoustic microphone arrays
are used as a second sensor modality to detect broadband acoustic emissions from
approaching targets. In particular, rotary wing UAVs can be detected by exploiting
the tonal components of the spectrum of the incoming acoustic wave related to the
propellers’ rotations (in the 20 Hz–2 kHz range).
Target’s detection and angle of arrival estimation adopt advanced signal pro-
cessing and machine learning techniques making use of radar and acoustic signal
features in both the time-domain and the frequency-domain. The above sensors
and tools can be either used separately or in combination, through a multiplexing
console and a computer, physically connected to the sensors, that performs signal
and data processing.
Video and Audio sensors are widely used in surveillance operations and pro-
tection of critical infrastructures. Intelligence algorithms are applied in audio and
video streams for the real-time detection of events for the early identification of
illicit activity. Pattern recognition and machine learning techniques are used to
extract acoustic events (i.e., gunshot, screaming, glass breaking) or to classify per-
sons, vehicles, and other objects that are moving within the surveilled area. Both
the audio and video analytics modules form an intelligence surveillance system
where the security operator is notified with an alert about the suspicious activity
accompanied with important information such as location (source) and type of the
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event, detected objects, etc. This intelligent process reduces the effort of the oper-
ator by monitoring in a 24/7 base a huge number of sensors.
The Intelligent Audio Analytics Component (AAC) allows the detection of
abnormal behavior regardless of the field of view, while also allowing the triggering
of the system with the occurrence of predefined keywords. The solution imple-
ments well-established methods from the fields of audio coding, machine learning,
and speech recognition and allows efficient operation on low-cost power-limited
devices (or embedded systems) for the detection of screaming, glass breaking, and
gunshots within the environment. The Video Analytics Component (VAC) pro-
vides the necessary functionalities for visual surveillance analytics, aiming to iden-
tify and provide methods that abstract the information of interest contained in
video surveillance streams.
The design of Intelligence Surveillance System including both the AAC and VAC
is based on two different processing levels, one with reduced processing capabil-
ity (infrastructure based on embedded system, i.e., Raspberry PI 3) and one with
enhanced processing capability (i.e. GPU-enabled computers or servers). Based on
the application, audio or video, several components will be deployed on each level
of processing.
Additionally, within RESISTO project, audio and video analytics modules are
enhanced with some other components in order to support the smooth operation,
logging, and correlation of the events.
Smart Spectrum Surveillance is a set of tools, like RADIOFILTER and RAN
(Radio Access Network) MONITOR, being developed in the context of RESISTO
project, which makes use of IoT Radio Frequency (RF) sensors for the detection of
physical events/threats in telecom critical infrastructures.
RADIOFILTER is a stand-alone system used for the detection of non-authorized
Access Points (AP), Bluetooth, and WiFi devices as well as connections in manned
facilities as well as intrusion detection in unmanned facilities.
RANMONITOR is a stand-alone system used for the detection of IMSI-
catchers/rogue base stations, misconfigured small cells, and interferences to the cel-
lular network (intentional and non-intentional).
IoT Sensor networks may gather sensitive data or be used by a malicious adver-
sary to conduct attacks. Therefore, security is a key concern for such networks,
and for that reason, particular attention is paid to secure the sensors themselves. In
RESISTO, the solution proposed for securing sensors is based on the premise of
having a secure boot and up-to-date software in the hardware platform of each used
sensor through secure periodic firmware updates. In order to secure an IoT Sensor
Network, the sensors periodically poll a Firmware Update Server to query if there
are secure firmware updates available. In case there are, after mutual authentication
(involving an Auxiliary Authentication Server), a digitally signed firmware image
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is downloaded from the Firmware Update Server and its integrity and authenticity
verified. To strengthen integrity verification, blockchain technology is applied. If
integrity and authenticity tests are passed, the sensor can install the new firmware
version. The sensor-server connection is further secured through the use of two-
factor authentication.
The use of Open Source INTelligence (OSINT) techniques can help better
understand potential threats surrounding a telecom organization or a specific sec-
tor, by crawling and learning from publicly available sources. The main features of
the crawler are:
• Identification of Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) that could
be found on devices that can be exposed on the operator network;
• Detection of potential misconfigurations and known vulnerabilities.
The crawler stores the information concerning the type of device, the software
running on it, the potential misconfigurations/vulnerabilities based on the knowl-
edge of the operator network.
Within RESISTO, several threat intelligence sources and OSINT platforms are
considered and crawled:
• The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL), a Malware
Information Sharing Platform framework-based OSINT that collects threat
intelligence events;
• The Instrument de Veille sur les Réseaux Extérieurs (IVRE), also known as
Dynamic Recon of UNKnown networks (DRUNK), open-source framework
for network recon;
• Other sources of data about vulnerabilities that can be found on Twitter;
• A machine learning platform to process the events collected by the crawlers.
17.5 Long- and Short-term Control Loops Interaction
Long- and Short-term Control Loops interact with each other by means of
Resilience Indicators (RIs). The RIs have been selected in order to describe the
main features of the typical resilience curve (Figure 17.5) describing the evolution
of a system function performance (or provided service) vs. Time when facing a
specific event type.
The selected RIs are:
1. RI1: maximum function performance loss expressed in percentage;
2. RI2: elapsed time between the event occurring and the recovery action
beginning;
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Figure 17.5. Resilience curve and Resilience Indicators.
Figure 17.6. Long- and Short-term Control Loops interaction.
3. RI3: elapsed time between the recovery action beginning and the complete
performance recovery;
4. RI4: total performance loss from event to complete recovery (colored area in
Figure 17.5).
The interaction between Long- and Short-term Control Loops can be explained
in 4 steps as explained in Figure 17.6.
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Step 1: RIs estimation
During the last LTCL steps, the process:
• Characterizes (quantifies) CI «as is» resilience (step 6);
• Identifies the most critical couples [function; (threatening) event] showing
RIs not in line with required Service Level Agreement (step 7);
• Selects interventions on CI in order to improve resilience for most critical
couples (function; event) estimating RIs in the new «to be» configuration
(step 8);
• Implements interventions (step 9).
So, at the end of each LTCL cycle, Estimated RIs are stored in a Knowledge
Base (KB).
Step 2: RIs measurement
STCL operators, facing Event<i> type, measure actual RIs and store them in
the KB.
Step 3: Estimated vs. Measured RIs comparison
Estimated and Measured RIs are compared to verify if the expected resilience is
actually in place (no significant deviations) or not.
Step 4: Estimated vs. Measured RIs comparison
Detected significant deviations provide feedback for a next LTCL cycle to improve
Critical Infrastructure resilience or estimation methods if needed.
17.6 Conclusions
RESISTO proposes a complete and integrated framework to cover offline Iden-
tification and Prevention activities as well as Detection, Response, and Recovery
on-line activities. RESISTO promotes a unified approach to face physical, cyber, as
well as combined physical/cyber threats to Communication CIs in order to provide
a complete situation awareness and impacts evaluation allowing resources optimiza-
tion and improving recovery actions efficiency.
RESISTO encompasses security analysis in a wider Risk and also Resilience
analysis and management integrating both physical and cyber aspects.
RESISTO approach is scalable, developed in the context of Communications
but easily applicable to different kinds of CIs.
The proposed framework is modular and based on very versatile technologies so
easily adaptable to face the continuous evolution of physical and cyber threats and
continuously improve the CI resilience.
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RESISTO also includes a wide set of physical and cyber threatening events detec-
tors based on state-of-the-art technologies (Machine Learning, blockchain, etc.);
they could be employed in different contexts as stand-alone components as well as
in integrated configurations.
Acknowledgments
The current work has in parts been supported by the EU projects RESISTO
(Grant No. 786409) on cyber-physical security of telecommunication critical
infrastructure.
References
L. Carlson, B. Haffenden, G. Bassett, W. Buehring, M. Collins, S. Folga, F. Petit,
J. Phillips, D. Verner and R. Whitfield, 2012, “Resilience: Theory and Appli-
cation,” Argonne National Lab (ANL), Argonne, IL (United States).
W. Chang et al. (2019): Shiny: web application framework for R. Version 1.4.0.
Available online at https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/shiny/index.html.
ETSI OSM Northbound API—https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/NFV-SOL/
001_099/005/02.05.01_60/gs_nfv-sol005v020501p.pdf .
C. Foglietta, C. Palazzo, R. Santini, S. Panzieri, “Assessing Cyber Risk Using the
CISIApro Simulator,” in Critical Infrastructure Protection IX : 9th IFIP 11.10
International Conference, ICCIP 2015, Arlington, VA, USA, March 16–18,
2015 (pp. 315–331).
Fehling-Kaschek, Mirjam; Faist, Katja; Miller, Natalie; Finger, Jörg; Häring, Ivo;
Carli, Marco et al. (2019): A systematic tabular approach for risk and resilience
assessment and Improvement in the telecommunication industry. In Michael
Beer, Enrico Zio (Eds.): Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliabil-
ity Conference (ESREL 2019). ESREL. Hannover, Germany, 22–26 Septem-
ber 2019. European Safety and Reliability Association (ESRA). Singapore:
Research Publishing Services, pp. 1312–1319. Available online at https://
esrel2019.org/files/proceedings.zip.
Häring, Ivo (2015): Risk Analysis and Management: Engineering Resilience. 1st
ed. 2015. s.l.: Springer-Verlag. Available online at http://ebooks.ciando.com/
book/index.cfm/bok_id/2008091.
Häring, Ivo; Ebenhöch, Stefan; Stolz, Alexander (2016a): Quantifying Resilience
for Resilience Engineering of Socio Technical Systems. In European Journal for
Security Research 1 (1), pp. 21–58. DOI: 10.1007/s41125-015-0001-x.
References 327
Häring, Ivo; Gelhausen, Patrick (2018): Technical safety and reliability meth-
ods for resilience engineering: Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 1253–1260.
Available online at https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351174664, https://www.
taylorfrancis.com/books/e/9781351174664, checked on 10/17/2019.
ISO 31000, 2018-02: Risk management – Guidelines. Available online at https:
//www.iso.org/standard/65694.html.
ISO 31010, 2019-06: Risk management – Risk assessment techniques. Available
online at https://www.iso.org/standard/72140.html.
Nadjaran Toosi, R. Mahmud, Qinghua Chi, R. Buyya, “Management and Orches-
tration of Network Slices in 5G,” Fog, Edge and Clouds.
OMG (Object Management Group), Business Process Model and Notation
(BPMN) Version 2.0.2, https://www.omg.org/spec/BPMN/2.0.2/PDF.
RESISTO (2020): Resilience enhancement and risk control platform for commu-
nication infrastructure operators. EC Grant agreement ID: 786409. Available
online at https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/786409.
USA NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology), Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1, April 16, 2018.
DOI: 10.1561/9781680836875.ch18
Chapter 18
Manage Security on 5G Communication
Networks: The Software Defined
Security Paradigm
By Luca Baldini, Marco Carli, Giuseppe Celozzi, Federico Colangelo,
Alessandro Neri, Cosimo Zotti and Federica Battisti
This chapter is devoted to the description of the interaction between the new
communication system (the 5G framework) and the emerging security paradigm,
known as Software-defined Security. It can be considered as a new security model
to be applied for the management of communication networks, in which secu-
rity aspects are implemented, controlled, and managed at software level. The main
objective is providing a clear-cut, understandable, and upgradable security model,
in which novel algorithms and solutions can be integrated and optimized.
18.1 Introduction
The next generation of mobile communications, also known as 5G, is nowadays
at the developmental phase and is expected to be on the market in the upcoming
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years. It is expected to be faster, more flexible, and secure than the existing technolo-
gies, allowing a full use of mobile network for interconnecting machines, objects,
and devices. From a general point of view, the quality of a communication-based
service nowadays is strongly connected (limited) to the available resources of the
used telecommunication infrastructure. With 5G, the quality of the service will
drive the amount of resources devoted to that service [1]. Those resources, thanks
to several architectural novel concepts (e.g., network slicing), could be given by dif-
ferent Telecommunication (TLC) providers. The new architecture will allow up to
10 Gbps of data rate, latency of 1 ms, and up to 100× in the number of connected
devices per unit area compared with the 4G LTE. However, the potentiality of 5G
will be fully exploited only if security will be achieved.
On one hand, the security solutions adopted in the previous generations of
wireless communications will be adopted and improved. On the other hand, new
challenges will arise, and they must be addressed with 5G-specific security mech-
anisms. In this chapter, the novel building blocks of 5G are revised and the secu-
rity challenges described. In particular, the concepts of Software-defined Network
(SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) are introduced, since they are
enabling technologies for 5G and thus critical to understanding the security land-
scape, SDN, NFV, and 5G.
18.1.1 Sotfware-Defined Network
SDN is a network paradigm aiming to allow agility and flexibility to Communica-
tion Networks (CN). The goal of SDN is to improve network control by enabling
enterprises and service providers to quickly adapt to novel requirements modifica-
tion: this is obtained by decoupling network control and forwarding functions, that
is, by enabling programmable network control and the underlying infrastructure to
be abstracted from applications and Network Services (NS).
The features of SDN are based on the following principles [4]:
1. Separation of control and data planes:
The removal of the control plane from network devices and its implementation in
an external SDN controller significantly reduces the complexity of network devices,
making them simpler and cheaper than devices used in actual CN whose distributed
control plane functionalities require prone-to-errors long software implementation
and are defined by many RFCs.
2. Logically centralized control:
Control decisions are made on an up-to-date global view of the network state
rather than distributed in isolated behavior at each network hop. With SDN,
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the control plane acts as a single, logically centralized, network operating system
in terms of both scheduling and resolving resource conflicts, as well as abstracting
away low-level device details (e.g., electrical vs. optical transmission). The SDN
Controller summarizes the network state for applications and translates applica-
tion requirements to low-level rules. The controller may not be physically placed
in one element. For coping with performance, scalability, and/or reliability issues,
the logically centralized SDN Controller can be distributed so that several physi-
cal controller instances cooperate for controlling the network state and supplying
applications.
3. Programmability of NS:
With programmable control, a client may exchange information with an SDN
controller, either by discovery or negotiation prior to the establishment of a ser-
vice, or during the lifetime of a service. The network is programmable through
software applications running on top of the Controller [communicating via North-
bound Application Programming Interfaces (API)], which in turn interacts with the
underlying data plane devices. The SDN controller, having the complete knowledge
of the network topology, may control a wide range of network devices within its
administrative domain. By providing APIs, SDN enables the deployment of novel
networking applications, e.g., traffic engineering. As is well known, CN devices are
proprietary and closed, making it hard or impossible to develop innovative network
applications.
4. Open interface:
The concept of open interface relies on the separation between functions and inter-
faces requiring the interfaces to be public and open to community definition. One
value of SDN lies in the expectation that the Control to Data-Plane Interface
(Southbound Interface) is implemented in an open, vendor-neutral, and interop-
erable way. In the absence of a standard open interface, one of the main SDN
advantages—the interchangeability of network devices and control planes—would
be taken away. In an SDN environment, the SDN controller plays a pivotal role by
managing data flows into the switches/routers “below” (via southbound APIs) based
on the policies and rules defined by the applications and business logic “above” (via
northbound APIs). The SDN Controller translates instructions or requirements
from the SDN Application layer into commands to be delivered to networking
components. Conversely, the SDN controller extracts information about the net-
work from devices and shares back an abstract view of the network to the SDN
Applications, also including information about events and statistics.
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18.1.2 NFV
A peculiarity of 5G infrastructure is the adoption of a virtualized network infras-
tructure, that is, the use of software for implementing network functions usually
provided by dedicated hardware devices or components. The softwarization of these
functions allows their deployment in cloud architectures and their relocation to the
network edge. In this way, it is possible to cope with the severe low latency require-
ments required by critical 5G applications.
NFV started in 2012 as an industry initiative to virtualize network functions,
thus allowing to add, move, or change network functions at the server level in a
simplified provisioning process. Among others, ETSI has been a strong support
and driver of the NFV standardization.
• In more details, the ETSI NFV MANO (Management & Orchestration)
model [13], represented in Figure 18.1, defines as main functional blocks:
NFV Orchestrator (NFVO) On-boarding of new NS, Virtual Network Func-
tion Forwarding Graph (VNF-FG), and Virtual Network Function (VNF)
Packages.
• NS life-cycle management (including instantiation, scale-out/in, perfor-
mance measurements, event correlation, and termination).
• Global resource management, validation, and authorization of NFVI
resource requests.
• Policy management for NS instances.
VNF Manager (VNFM):
• Life-cycle management of VNF instances.
• Overall coordination and adaptation role for configuration and event
reporting between NFVI and the Element Management System (EMS).
Virtualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM):
• Controlling and managing the NFVI computing, storage, and network
resources, within one operator infrastructure sub-domain.
• Collection and forwarding of performance measurements and events.
The ETSI MANO model provides the framework for provisioning VNFs and
managing the NFV infrastructure. It also supports components within NFV infras-
tructure communicate with existing OSS/BSS systems. In fact, MANO systems
oversee managing virtualized infrastructure, such as cloud systems, communication
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Figure 18.1. ETSI NFV MANO architecture.
and network infrastructure, VNF (implemented as virtual machine or container
images), and the full life cycle of all these components.
The following list describes the interfaces that a VIM uses it to allocate, manage,
and control the NFVI resources:
• Or-VNFM defines the communication procedures between NFVO and
VNFM (i.e., VNF instantiation or other VNF life-cycle-related information
flow).
• Or-Vi is a reference point used for exchanges between NFV Orchestrator and
VIM and supports the interfaces Software Image Management and Virtual-
ized Resources Information Management.
• Vi-VNFM defines the communication procedures between VIM and
VNFM, such as resource update request for VM running a VNF.
• Vn-Nf is the only reference point not having a management functional block
as boundary. This reference point is meant to communicate performance and
portability needs of the VNF to the infrastructure block.
As can be noticed, even if the NFV framework identifies reference points
between the NFVO and the VIM and between the VNFM and VIM, the ETSI
model does not provide API specifications for the corresponding interfaces. The
assumption is that the overwhelming majority of VIM implementation is based on
OpenStack, and thus, the APIs exposed by a VIM are those specified by this open
source community [8].
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Use of RESTful APIs for management and orchestration is specified by ETSI,
except for the VIM northbound interfaces where use of OpenStack APIs is assumed,
as noted before. ETSI APIs specifications are available both as Text and Tables and
in OpenAPI format.
18.2 Security of 5G
18.2.1 Core 5G Security Topics
The fact that 5G is designed to be a platform for a wide range of new user groups
and applications does not automatically mean that it is necessary (or even desir-
able) for the 5G network to carry all security responsibility and related costs.
On the other hand, 5G networks clearly can provide some highly valuable secu-
rity services. Besides the isolation/slicing itself, many other examples of network-
enabled security as a service will be attractive to multiple user groups, includ-
ing network-enforced security policies, authentication, key management, and data
security services [9].
Technological developments in the configuration and deployment of 5G use
cases to be deployed in commercial networks are needed from an economic, com-
petitive, and performance perspective in order to realizing critical machine-type
communication or applications which belong to latency-sensitive autonomous
systems 5G use cases. Which means that it shall become the reliable and trusted
innovation platform for businesses and organizations to build and deliver new
added-value services, but not limited to, in fact the aim is to be an enabler for
digitizing and modernizing critical national infrastructures such as energy, trans-
port, etc. In order to achieve this greater availability and improved assurances of
secure communication, services must be achieved.
Protection of the privacy of 5G users based on that data sent over the system
is always confidentiality and integrity protected. This complex task is achieved by
combining and coordinating security controls across different domains in telecom-
munication networks, including radio access (e.g., radio unit, baseband units,
antennas), transport networks (e.g., optical equipment, Ethernet bridges, IP/MPLS
routers, SDN controller), packet core (e.g., MME, S-GW, PGW, HSS), net-
work support services (e.g., DNS, DHCP), cloud infrastructure, and various man-
agement systems (e.g., network management, customer experience management,
security management). Telecommunication networks consist of four main logical
network parts: radio access network, core network, transport network, and inter-
connect network.
The Radio Access Network (RAN) is an instance of access network and a major
part of modern telecommunications. There are many types of access networks, such
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as the 3GPP access networks: GSM/GPRS, UMTS, EUTRAN, NG RAN (5G),
satellite, and non-3GPP access networks: WiFi or fixed (wired) access network.
The core network can provide several services to subscribers that are connected
via the access network into the core, such as telephone calls and data connections.
The transport network keeps the access network connected with the core, and the
base stations within the radio access network connected with each other. The inter-
connect network connects different core networks with each other. Telecommu-
nication networks transfer voice and data across the globe with high quality and
consistency [10].
Each network part can be subdivided further into network planes, each carrying
different class of traffic: signaling traffic, user payload traffic, and management traf-
fic. The signaling plane transports messages that are used to control user sessions.
For instance, the contents of a call or web page is referred to as user plane or user
payload. The management plane provides functions for monitoring, troubleshoot-
ing, configuration, and optimization of networks.
5G core resilience concepts are, for example, related to network slicing that
can isolate groups of network functions from other functions, in fact an organiza-
tion with high security constraints can use a dedicated complete mobile network.
Another example can be to differentiate and isolate low-priority IoT devices coming
in high numbers to avoid interference.
SBA is another architectural concept that enhances resilience by means of
software and cloud-based technologies that improve on the more static and node-
centric designs of mobile networks. Thanks to this new paradigm functions can eas-
ily be scaled depending on traffic load and can be independently replaced, restarted,
or isolated when failing or under attack.
Transport networks provide high-speed low-latency connectivity services
between all 5G network functions. Consequently, the availability of transport net-
works is directly related to the availability of the 5G system and the services it
provides. To ensure availability of transport services during node failure, cable or
fiber breaks, or overload events, transport networks can employ various technical
solutions as well as considerations during network design, including geo-redundant
paths, link redundancy solutions, path redundancy mechanisms, high-availability
configuration, traffic segmentation mechanisms (e.g., VLAN and MPLS), DDoS
detection and mitigation, IPsec- or MACsec-based tunnels.
5G system provides secure communication for devices and for its own infras-
tructure including links such as front haul between distributed and central units
of base stations, backhaul between access and core network, and network domain
links between core network nodes. The security design principles of 4G system has
been evolved to better meet the needs of new use cases. In particular, the new SBA
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for core network communication takes threats from the interconnect network into
account from the start.
The 5G system includes eavesdropping and modification attacks protection. Sig-
naling traffic is encrypted and integrity protected. User plane traffic is encrypted
and can be integrity protected.
18.2.2 5G Security Standardization
5G RAN will have a significant impact on security, such as SDN, NFV, and
edge computing as telecommunication networks are evolving towards virtualiza-
tion, IoT, and Industry 4.0. The 5G 3GPP standard is agnostic, in that it is flexible
enough to allow for different types of physical and virtual overlap between the radio
access network (RAN) and core network, for example, from a remote device to the
Core network. The separation of functions between RAN and core raises questions
about competitiveness and performance.
3GPP does not typically standardize application services (such as Internet appli-
cations) since they are out of scope of 3GPP’s connectivity focus. There are, how-
ever, a few exceptions: telecommunication networks have traditionally provided
the possibility for two devices to connect to each other with the support of the net-
work (e.g., to set up voice calls). In 4G networks, voice calls are set up using voice
over LTE (VoLTE) service on top of the connectivity service. VoLTE uses the IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) also standardized in 3GPP; similar voice service is
also planned for 5G. Furthermore, 3GPP standardizes the security to support these
services.
3GPP standards also cover some aspects of machine type communications and
IoT. Here, the focus is to provide the devices with connectivity. Consequently, the
3GPP standards cover efficient means to provide these devices with an IP point
of presence. Any security issues related to the actual application is considered out
of scope and needs to be taken care of over the top. For example, 3GPP’s 5G sys-
tem can provide a temperature controller in a refrigerated goods wagon of a train
with IP connectivity, but seen from the general 5G view, the authentication of the
management traffic to the controller must be addressed over the top, since the IP
address may be accessible via the Internet, so anyone could send messages to the
controller.
The most important security services provided by 3GPP standard are aiming to
safeguard the connectivity for users, and the service availability and charging by the
operator of the network.
3GPP does not standardize how 5G system functions are implemented but
defines security assurance specifications to secure interoperability between the
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functions required to provide network connectivity. The choice to use single phys-
ical servers (physically isolated and separated) or implemented as virtual machines
(VMs) in a cloud or virtualized environment (shared hardware) is up to imple-
mentation and operator deployment choices (economics). Virtualization and cloud
deployments are only lightly touched in the 3GPP specifications although their
security is crucial for 5G services. Virtualization and cloud though are handled
in ETSI ISG NFV (European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Industry
Specification Group, Network Functions Virtualization) and ONAP (Open Net-
work Automation Platform). Furthermore, several details are not taken into consid-
eration and standardized, but are left for implementations and deployments. The
same is true for digitized society and industrial IoT aspects that are not related to
the radio access connectivity and are considered out of scope for 3GPP.
3GPP standards don’t strictly specify how RAN and Core functions should be
separately deployed which means that within a single physical network, different
configurations for different 5G use cases are possible and that all logical networks
are running over one physical network can have different configurations. For func-
tions implemented in a traditional non-virtualized fashion, 3GPP, in cooperation
with GSMA, develops security assurance specifications, which sets requirements for
some implementation aspects [11].
3GPP’s security standardization group (SA WG3) has completed the first version
of 5G security standard in March 2018 (3GPP TS 33.501). Ericsson has been one
of the main drivers and contributors to the 3GPP (SA WG3). 5G security study
(3GPP TR 33.899) which ran from June 2016 to August 2017 is a highly relevant
reference.
Assume that in some use cases, vehicle/road safety would be dependent on 5G
network security. What does this imply? Today, safety-related car systems need to
follow very comprehensive standards, such as ISO 26262. This is a 10-part stan-
dard, where, for example, part six covers safety related to software. Similarly, the
healthcare sector is governed by standards such as ISO 27799 and, in the US, the
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). For smart grids,
demonstrated compliance with standards from the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers), the IEC, and the NIST (National Institute of Standards and
Technology) may apply. If 5G security becomes a critical link in the control loop
of all of these applications, would it imply that 5G networks need to be certified
against (parts of ) all these standards?
3GPP’s 5G system standards security mechanisms are based on former 4G secu-
rity mechanisms, but nevertheless include enhancements regarding encryption,
authentication, and user privacy. 3GPP security mechanisms provide reliable links
for non-malicious bad radio conditions. DDoS and radio jamming are not part of
the standard, and protection is left for implementation and deployment, example of
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solution to those issues are re-route traffic to other base stations in case of jammed
based station or selective dropping/throttling in case of DDoS. This means that 5G
standards will only be part of a much bigger picture.
The problem of securing of mobile networks has been studied thoroughly
through the years. Thus, 5G will inherit some of the work that has been done
in securing the first four generations of mobile networks [2]. There are, however,
novel, 5G-specific challenges that arise due to some of the key technologies and
services that will be included in the 5G network.
A threat in the 5G network vision is tied to IoT devices and their impact on
DDoS attacks. The volume of DDoS attacks has already been dramatically increas-
ing in recent years, with attacks peaking at 70 GB/s. This trend has been ascribed to
the rising popularity of IoT devices. Such devices often have poor security, due to
either constraints of the platform, performance limits or simply a lack of focus on
security. This scenario enables the creation of large botnets, which in turn enable
massive DDoS attacks. Massive Machine Type Communication is one of the key
use cases of 5G, and its implementation will foreseeably cause a large growth in the
number of IoT devices connected to the network.
SDN and NFV also play a fundamental role in the threat landscape since they
are both central part of the 5G architecture and not yet fully mature.
Concerning SDN, the softwarization of the network architecture can be consid-
ered a double-edged sword: if, on the one hand, many architectural problems that
plagued network security (e.g., security network function placement) can now be
addressed effectively, on the other hand, the whole network stack is now exposed
to software attacks. Specifically, vulnerabilities in the software stack of the data
and control plane can be exploited by malicious users with detrimental effects on
the whole network. This is especially true if the attacker manages to compromise
an SDN controller, as this effectively grants full control over the relative network
segment.
Perhaps even more impactful from the 5G point of view are security issues of
NFV. More specifically, virtualization of different services is enabled by the soft iso-
lation (i.e., software isolation) provided by hypervisors. Vulnerabilities that enable
evasion (i.e., breaking soft isolation) are thus critical and relevant for 5G, given
its strong reliance on virtualized network services. Even when best practices are
followed, soft isolation can be inherently insecure, as recent discoveries in the secu-
rity of CPUs, such as the Specter and Meltdown vulnerabilities, have demonstrated.
These vulnerabilities have meaningful impact on 5G security and especially on Net-
work Slicing. Network slicing is seen as a key functionality of 5G networks, yet its
implementation is still not completely defined. It is, however, possible to foresee
that slice creation algorithms will be a potential threat surface. More specifically, a
key aspect of slicing security will be avoiding the inclusion of untrusted network
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devices into slices with critical security requirements. Since virtual isolation cannot
be considered secure at the time being, slicing algorithms will need to be able to
provide physical isolation, at least for the most critical network traffic.
However, despite the novel attack surface introduced by SDN and NFV, these
technologies introduce notable opportunities for security. Centralized network con-
trol and virtualized security functions can eliminate some of the biggest flaws in
legacy network security functions. Examples of applications that benefit greatly of
these technologies are anomaly detectors that can leverage a reliable and complete
analysis of network data and DDoS mitigation system that can be deployed adap-
tively based on the attack patterns. However, while this scenario appears appealing,
it should be noticed that these capabilities have no software implementation to
date. Effort is needed in order to leverage these opportunities. More specifically,
how these features are implemented is a critical point. New vulnerabilities could
be introduced, or performances could be degraded, if the development and valida-
tion processes are not properly handled. Currently, multiple proposals of security
mechanisms are available in the literature. While these contributions are helpful to
understand and compare the performances of various algorithms for given prob-
lems (e.g., DDoS mitigation), a coherent framework in which these solutions are
integrated is lacking. On the other hand, a common framework is needed in order
to proceed to the deployment of these technologies into the real world. Without a
proper framework, modern technologies could incur in the same pitfall of legacy
networks: multiple standards that hinder the core advantages of these technologies,
such as upgradability, scalability, etc. Conversely, a clearly defined, common frame-
work allows to integrate and upgrade new security algorithms as they are developed,
enabling better security of the overall system.
18.3 Software-Defined Security
Software-Defined Security (SDS) is a security framework that embraces the princi-
ple on which SDN, NFV, and 5G are based. SDS is based on a clear model of the
security workflow, providing a framework to integrate existing security solutions as
well as integrate novel algorithms to address future security challenges.
SDS is inspired to the approach of SDN, as the name suggests: one of the key
advantages of SDN is the decoupling of the network functional planes. This sep-
aration, together with the softwarization of the control plane, enables the appli-
cation of the classical software development workflow, where a solution can be
developed once and then reused or updated, to networking. SDS shares a similar
vision to develop a clear security workflow, composed of well-defined and separated
logical functions, where security functions can be integrated and orchestrated. SDS
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divides the security workflow in three logical blocks: risk assessment, mitigation,
and orchestration. The key idea is to divide the security workflow into three logical
steps: first, assess the current situation, evaluating the need for intervention based
on the risk associated to a configuration. Second, evaluate possible strategies for
reaction and rank them considering the impact on the system’s Key Performance
Indicators (KPI). The countermeasure is then selected, either by an operator or
by an automated system. Third, apply the countermeasure, translating a high-level
action into a low-level set of commands that are issued to the single apparatuses.
More specifically, three logical entities can be distinguished:
• Risk assessment has the purpose of monitoring and evaluating the current
status of a system, leveraging a variety of data from sensors as well as pro-
cessed output. More specifically, risk is evaluated in terms of impact on the
infrastructure KPI. This includes also the effects of cyberattacks. For example,
DDoS attacks can be understood in terms of its effect on the Availability KPI.
Anomaly detection algorithms can be included in the risk assessment as well.
In this way, risk assessment provides system-wide situational awareness for
complex scenario. Operators can then evaluate the impact of a certain event
(e.g., anomaly, fault of a device, etc.) considering also the potential cascading
effects and the correlation between various other events. This is particularly
useful in case of a multiple-stage attack. Risk assessment also provides an eval-
uation of the impact of a modification of the configuration and thus supports
the mitigation module in evaluating the available actions.
• Mitigation has the purpose of determining actions to mitigate risk and
impact on the infrastructure’s KPI. The idea is that an action that mitigates
the effect of an attack often has a detrimental effect on performances. For
example, during a jamming attack, the radio system could be made to use
a more resilient modulation scheme (e.g., a QAM modulation with smaller
constellation), improving robustness to noise but deteriorating the through-
put. Countermeasures are selected leveraging the Risk assessment module.
Specifically, multi-objective optimization is performed to balance between
impact on KPIs and benefits of an action, submitting the risk associated
with the post-action configuration to the risk assessment framework. A list of
actions (and the correspondent gain in risk and impact on performances) is
then presented to the operator which elects which action is most fitting for
the current situation. Alternatively, meta-heuristics can be specified to fully
automate the process.
• Countermeasure orchestration has the purpose of actuating the actions
selected by the mitigation module, abstracting the high-level action or policy
from the low-level commands that are needed to actuate the action. The main
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Figure 18.2. SDS conceptual architecture.
idea is to enable abstraction in the actuation of mitigation actions, removing
the associated complexities. Furthermore, the orchestrator provides a way to
optimize the application of a countermeasure. As an example, re-routing a
flow (a potential consequence of a mitigation action) in a network topology
can be achieved in many ways, depending on the complexity of the topology.
In this case, multi-objective optimization can be applied to find the optimal
route for every flow, depending on the associated service.
The SDS conceptual architecture is shown in Figure 18.2. The Human Machine
Interface component can be considered optional, as the system can operate in a
completely autonomous fashion by leveraging meta-heuristics.
Key benefits of this approach are:
• Scalability: Scalability is inherited from the underlying networking tech-
nology. Basically, scaling security function and services (e.g., deploy more
instances of anomaly detector to address a traffic burst) can be done seam-
lessly in a virtualized environment.
• Upgradability: Security is a fast-paced field. Novel vulnerabilities are discov-
ered continuously, and defense must be updated and upgraded accordingly
to respond to threats. Anti-virus software offers an example of this problem
since its effectiveness rely on steady database update. While the scenario was
different for legacy networking, given the constraint of being SDS based on
a clearly defined, modular, architecture, it is easy to replace/upgrade any of
the logical functions. This is due to the fact that SDS entities are built with
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modularity in mind, i.e., as a way to integrate different functionalities in a
coherent manner, with clear endpoint.
• Understandability: Making security understandable is crucial. Misconfig-
urations and various errors are a leading cause of security breaches. As an
example, in 2018 approximately 35% of the Healthcare sector breaches were
caused by misconfigurations [36]. This type of incident can be mitigated by
building workflows and systems that are easy to understand and act on, so
operators can have better awareness of the ongoing security status of the
infrastructure. Crucially, the SDS framework does not only detect threats
but allow operators to properly understand actions in terms of their most
important consequences.
• Virtualization and abstraction of the security functions: Being able to vir-
tualize and abstract further reduces the threats coming from misconfigura-
tions. Basically, security actions are expressed as a set of high-level actions
(e.g., separation policies for network traffic or blacklisting). The SDS frame-
work takes care of translating an abstract action into a set of low-level con-
figurations to be applied to the nodes.
It should be noticed that it is possible to apply SDS in a variety of contexts
(e.g., smart grids, physical infrastructures) to develop a unified model. As a
matter of fact, the various security domains (i.e., physical, network, system…)
cannot be treated as independent, as they can interact. SDS is designed
to support a holistic approach to security, focusing on virtualization of
resources.
One of the most important features of SDS is its ability to quickly integrate
innovations in algorithms and models to improve the security of the system. For
example, a better DDoS mitigation algorithm will translate directly into better secu-
rity and resiliency. The same goes for risk models and multi-objective optimization
algorithms.
18.3.1 Case Study: Secure Network Slicing
SDS can be deployed in a variety of scenarios. In the context of 5G, SDS com-
ponents can be adapted to provide a secure slice creation algorithm by leveraging
the multi-objective optimization infrastructure. Defining a network slice implies
translating an abstract specification [i.e., source, destination, Service Level Agree-
ment (SLA), Quality of Service (QoS), etc.] into a slice template, i.e., a low-level
structure that can be understood from a 5G orchestrator such as the OSM MANO.
As previously discussed, this category of actions pertains to the orchestrator.
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The definition of a slice can be understood in terms of a path between two nodes,
with a specified SLA that depends on the type of traffic and a set of network func-
tions that should be deployed strategically along the path. Additional requirements
that must be considered include:
• Energy efficiency: Network nodes may need a considerable amount of elec-
trical energy to function. Optimizing the overall number of switched-on
nodes in a topology may have a considerable impact on power consumption
and thus represents an important indicator to optimize.
• Workload of link and nodes: For each node and link, the maximum work-
load that can be handled is defined. However, equipment reliably operates
only up to a percentage of the maximum workload capacity. From the relia-
bility point of view, redundancy mechanisms (e.g., switching on a secondary
node) should be used when the actual load reaches the limit. This represents
a conflicting objective with the energy efficiency one.
• Isolation constraint: From a security point of view, critical services (e.g.,
mission critical communications during an emergency) should not share the
physical infrastructure with untrusted services. Different services have specific
security requirements that can require various degrees of isolation. This can
impact energy efficiency as well as performances for involved, non-critical
flows.
Clearly, these requirements cannot be optimized jointly. Specifically, the prob-
lem can be framed as a constrained multi-optimization problem and solved by
any fitting algorithm. An example could be leveraging the Non-dominated Sort-
ing Genetic Algorithm II (NGSA-II). It is necessary to specify what requirements
should be coded into loss functions for the algorithm to optimize. Requirements
can then be specified in terms of cost functions and constraints. The algorithms
will in turn produce possible paths that can be ranked according to meta-heuristics
or operator contribution.
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Detection of Innovative Low-rate
Denial of Service Attacks Against
Critical Infrastructures
By Enrico Cambiaso, Ivan Vaccari and Maurizio Aiello
In the cyber security field, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are executed to exhaust
the resources of the victim, by compromising availability of the targeted system,
thus affecting reliability for its intended users. Last-generation threats make use of
low bandwidth to target network services. In virtue of this, they are more difficult
to counter, and efficient detection is still an open issue in the research field. This
chapter focuses on the analysis of the functioning of low-rate DoS attacks targeting
network services, with emphasis on web protocols.
19.1 Introduction
In computing, a denial of service (DoS) attack is an attempt to saturate the resources
of a system, making it unavailable for legitimate users. There are many possible
motivations which can lead the attacker to launch a DoS attack, hence the action
of one or more people to interrupt or suspend the services offered by a generic
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system. The range of potential victims of a DoS attack includes instead each service
connected to a computer network. In practice, the most attacked services are high-
profile web services, such as banks, governments, critical infrastructures, or widely
used services.
The origins of DoS attacks are strictly related to the Internet architecture. In par-
ticular, some design decisions made decades ago played a role in the game. Those
decisions were driven by providing functionality rather than security, defining an
architecture capable to offer a fast and cheap communication mechanism, moving
packets from a source to a destination. Additional functionalities such as packet
loss, reorder, or corruption management have been delegated to higher level trans-
port protocols, deployed both by the sender and the receiver (end-to-end principle).
When one party of the presented model is malicious, it would act to create a
damage on the other party. In this case, the adopted protocols should no longer be
considered reliable. In October 1986, the Internet experienced a series of conges-
tion collapses (Nagle, 1984), caused by the design and deployment of several TCP
congestion control protocols (Floyd, 2000), unable to properly allocate resources
in case of aggressive traffic flows.
In this chapter, we describe first generation of denial of service attacks in Sec-
tion 19.2. Such threats act at the third or fourth layer of the ISO/OSI model, focus-
ing in particular to flooding DoS threats. Hence, we introduce Slow DoS Attacks in
Section 19.3, by describing its functioning and a categorization of known attacks.
Section 19.4 focuses instead on the metrics used to characterize network traffic for
slow DoS detection purposes, while Section 19.5 reports the intrusion detection
framework able to detect malicious slow DoS activities. Finally, Section 21.6 con-
cludes the chapter.
19.2 Old Style DoS Attacks
Concerning denial of service threats, a common pattern of attack consists in saturat-
ing the target host with malicious requests, blocking or slowing down the server’s
responses directed to legitimate users. This attack can lead to a server overload,
causing a DoS.
Considering old-style DoS threats, as shown in Figure 19.1, there are essen-
tially two types of DoS attacks: (i) vulnerability-/exploit-based attacks can exhaust
the resources of a server by exploiting a vulnerability in the software; instead,
(ii) flooding-based attacks simply send to the victim a high volume of data, which
cannot be handled by the target.
Exploit-based attacks (also known as vulnerability, software, or semantic attacks)
may involve a few well-crafted packets in the attack. As they exploit a specific
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Figure 19.1. A first denial of service attacks classification.
vulnerability of the software, they are quite simple to mitigate by patching the vul-
nerability on the victim host or by identifying the packets related to the attack and
handling them separately, or simply dropping them. In general, signature-based
approaches are therefore adopted in this case to counter such threats.
Instead, flooding-based attacks overwhelm the victim’s resources by sending a
large amount of data. If DoS attacks are launched from a single machine, it is pos-
sible to protect from such attacks by equipping the victim with abundant resources.
In this way, the attacker would need a better equipped machine in order to success-
fully perform the attack. In case of a distributed attack, instead, the attacker adopts a
set of machines/bots whose resources overwhelm in total the resources of the server.
We will now describe in detail exploit-based and flooding-based attacks.
Exploit-based attacks
As mentioned above, exploit-based DoS attacks send specially crafted packets to
the victim system, with the aim of targeting a specific software/daemon, exploiting
its vulnerabilities (Tao et al., 2009). These vulnerabilities/bugs may affect elements
such as the operating system, the listening service, or a specific application. The suc-
cess of the exploitation will typically lead to crash the targeted system.
Exploit-based attacks can potentially disable the victim machine with an
extremely limited amount of network packets. Even a single packet may lead a
DoS on the targeted victim (Hussain et al., 2003). A well-known example is repre-
sented by ping of death (PoD), an attack causing a crash on the operating system by
sending a single large ICMP echo packet. Similarly, the land attack sends a single
TCP SYN packet containing the victim’s IP address as both source and destination
address, hence leading to an endless loop in the protocol stack.
An efficient way to protect a system from such threats consists in frequent
software patching and updating. These threats can indeed only be prevented by
properly applying software updates. Although these menaces are important in the
network security field, they are beyond the scope of our work. Indeed, exploit-based
attacks require the attacker to address the malicious activity to the specific targeted
machine, while our aim has been focused instead on analyzing “wider” attacks, able
to indistinctly target different services. In particular, since vulnerability attacks have
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been widely considered in literature, it is stated that software updates (on the host,
but also on the network, if needed) can mitigate them.
Flooding-based attacks
As mentioned above, flooding-based attacks overwhelm the resources of the victim
by sending a large amount of data. Because of this requirement, an attack can be
perpetrated only if the attacking host is equipped with high amount of resources
(network bandwidth, especially). It is therefore clear that, being servers typically
associated to high amount of resources, it is unlikely that a single node leads a
DoS on a corporate server. In virtue of this, single executions of these attacks are
nowadays rarely found, in favor of last-generation threats, characterized by limited
resources requirements. Nevertheless, flooding-based threats are executed nowadays
by organized entities, often controlling and coordinating many attacking nodes.
19.3 Slow DoS Attacks
While most level-4 denial of service attacks need a high quantity of data, this is
not a characteristic of level-7 attacks, which require a low bandwidth rate. The
term Slow DoS Attack (SDA in the following) indicates an attack whose ambition
is denying a network service through a low quantity of data. We focused on such
threats due to their novelty and their ability to behave similarly to a legitimate situa-
tion. Because of these reasons, such attacks are therefore often undetected. Indeed,
although many research works focus on detecting and mitigating them, efficient
protection systems in this context are nowadays still missing (Aiello et al., 2014).
In addition, the low-bandwidth requirements guided us through the exploitation
of such attacks on devices equipped with limited resources.
In this section of the document, we describe in detail the SDA term meaning,
hence describing available threats and their characteristics, providing an appropriate
taxonomy of such kind of attacks.
19.3.1 The Slow DoS Attacks Term
The term Slow DoS Attack refers to a DoS attack which makes use of low bandwidth
rate to accomplish its purpose. An SDA often acts at the application layer of the
network protocol stack. The characteristics of this layer are easier to exploit in order
to successfully attack a victim even by sending few bytes of malicious requests.
Note that the term slow does not necessarily imply that SDAs “send data slowly”:
even if in some cases this can be true, the term slow historically comes from a famous
attack in this context, known as Slowloris, which has been particularly important
during the Iranian protests of 2009 (Giralte et al., 2013).
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In literature, similar definitions have been given to low-rate DoS (LDoS
or LRDoS) (Macia-Fernandez et al., 2008, Guirguis et al., 2006, Liu et al., 2012,
Tang, 2012), application layer DoS (Yu et al., 2007, Xie and Yu, 2009) or (in case
that either HTTP or XML protocols are exploited) HTTP/XML DoS attacks
(Chonka et al., 2011).
Relatively to the purpose of an SDA, this is often to cause unavailability of a
victim host by seizing all the connections available at the application level of the
victim. Under the SDA condition, all service queues are busy and any new incoming
request from legitimate users is discarded, therefore causing a DoS. The attacker
attempts to force the server to process only his own requests by filling the service
queues only with attack message requests.
Assume that somehow the attacker manages to make the server reach its sat-
uration state; in this situation, whenever a position is freed in any of the service
queues, the attacker attempts to take it again, before any other (legitimate) user
can. Thus, the aim of the attacker is to achieve the maximum number of positions
in the service queue, at a high-rate, thus maximizing the probability of seizing all
the positions as quickly as possible. However, it is desirable to use low-rate traffic
instead, for two main reasons: because this approach allows the attack to be car-
ried out with much fewer resources, and also because it can more easily bypass
protection mechanisms that rely on the statistical detection of high-rate traffic
(Siris and Papagalou, 2006, Huang and Pullen, 2001, Gil and Poletto, 2001).
An SDA may also exhibit an ON-OFF nature, which comprises a succession of
consecutive periods composed of an interval of inactivity (called off-time), followed
by an interval of activity (called on-time). This characteristic may play an important
role for the seriousness of the threat, since the attack traffic assumes a form which
is statistically similar to the one of legitimate traffic; moreover, servers implicitly
support users with slow or intermittent connection bandwidth. For instance, let’s
think to a user searching a specific term on Google: in this case, an active query
would be accomplished (ON status), thus interrupting communication activities
for some seconds/minutes for consulting obtained results (OFF state), hence mak-
ing an additional query, if needed (ON state, again).
Once the SDA has seized all available positions in the service queues, the attacker
slows down the connections from or to the victim by exploiting the characteristics of
either a specific protocol (i.e., HTTP, FTP, DNS, etc.) or the application software
(i.e., PHP, SOAP, etc.). The connections are thus kept active as long as possible,
by sending minimum amounts of data per time unit.
19.3.2 Slow DoS Attacks Categorization
We will now report a categorization for Slow DoS Attacks (Cambiaso et al., 2013).
According to (Howard and Longstaff, 1998), “a good classification has to be
Slow DoS Attacks 351
considered as a common language for the research in a particular field,” while
formally a taxonomy can be defined as “the study of the general principles of
scientific classification” (Igure and Williams, 2008). At the beginning of a scien-
tific study relative to a new field, a good taxonomy is considered as an “impor-
tant and necessary prerequisite for systematic study” (Howard and Longstaff,
1998; Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997), Indeed, a mere collection of objects is
not useful for an exhaustive study, unless the objects are properly classified
(Landwehr et al., 1994, Lindqvist and Jonsson, 1997).
As described above, an SDA uses low bandwidth to reach its objectives. To do
that, making the server unavailable for legitimate requests, it should exhaust some
kind of resources. In general, the access to a server can be denied in two differ-
ent ways: either exhausting its internal main resources (CPU, RAM, kernel buffer
space, network capacity of its interface card, available sockets, available process IDs,
etc.) or exhausting resources that are functional to it (bandwidth of the network
where the server is attached or external devices necessary to the server like switches,
routers, gateways, power supply, etc.) In general, these are the targets of the old
style attacks like high bandwidth floods (i.e. ping floods). Old style SYN flood
threat (Safa et al., 2008) affects the kernel buffer space: the attack aims to fill all the
available connections (for each connection a proper structure is created in mem-
ory), whose maximum number is pre-configured. Looking more deeply on the slow
DoS field, the object of the taxonomy, we have analyzed existing as well as potential
attacks.
A first categorization has been focused on distinguish between practical and meta
attacks (Cambiaso et al., 2012): while practical attacks are concrete, implemented
and often released as a software, meta attacks are defined at a higher level, providing
the guidelines to perpetrate a generic threat. In this case, a concrete implementation
is missing, since it depends on the targeted server. During our study, we have ana-
lyzed both the threats, providing and implementing innovative menaces belonging
to both the categories.
Concerning a different categorization we have provided (Cambiaso et al., 2013),
an SDA which affects CPU or memory of the victim aims to force it to do expensive
operations. We have called such attacks Delayed Responses DoS attacks. On the net-
work side, high bandwidth attacks are not SDAs by definition, so they will not be
considered; thus the only options are (i) to directly attack the network infrastructure
(Network Oriented DoS) or (ii) to seize all the available connections of the victim,
at the application layer if this is easier than at the transport layer. The only way to
seize all the connections is to occupy them, keeping them busy (avoiding connec-
tion close that could free-up resources for legitimate client). Once a connection is
open, it is kept busy until it is used; when no more traffic flows in the channel,
it is automatically closed by timeout. The trick is to try and keep the connection
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open for a long period of time by sending the least amount of bytes per time unit.
For this purpose, the attacker could exploit three different entities: (i) the malicious
client, (ii) the victim’s application timeout, or (iii) the server under attack itself.
(i) The client: even if it may seem extravagant, the attacker could deliberately
close an established conversation in order to plan an immediately subse-
quent reoccupation of the same channel. We introduced the Resource Occu-
pation Planning DoS category to include such attacks.
(ii) The timeout: the attacker could postpone indefinitely the expiration of the
timeout used by the daemon application running on the victim host, using
various techniques (analyzed hereinafter). Such threats are commonly cat-
egorized as Timeout Exploiting DoS.
(iii) The server: in some cases, the attacker could trick the server making it
believe that the client resources are different from the reality, in order to
accomplish a DoS. Such category is identified as the Resource Distortion
DoS attacks.
Notice that the categories described above are not mutually exclusive. Hence the
categories can also be mixed, and a single attack may belong to more than one
category. Also, categories may be related among themselves: for instance, Delayed
Responsive threats are also included in the Timeout Exploiting DoS category.
19.4 Detection of Low-rate DoS Attacks
In the last century, communication has evolved and Internet became the most rele-
vant communication medium. As today Internet-connected computer systems play
a vital role in modern society, they are often subject to intrusions and attacks. There-
fore, Internet has to be kept a safe place, providing an appropriate security layer to
its users. Intrusion detection techniques are executed to identify malicious activities
targeting a specific network or host.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can be categorized into anomaly detection and
misuse detection (Cambiaso et al., 2016), while anomaly detection systems, such as
IDES, flag as anomalous each activity that significantly deviates from normal usage
profile, misuse detection systems, such as IDIOT (Kumar and Spafford, 1995) or
STAT (Ilgun et al., 1995), profile well-known menaces extrapolating attack signa-
tures characterizing an intrusion.
Currently, building an effective IDS is no easy task. An anomaly-based approach
may use intuition and experience to identify statistical measures (Lunt, 1993),
while a misuse approach first analyzes and categorizes attacks and vulnerabilities,
thus defining specific rules and patterns to identify a running threat. Once the
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signature of a particular menace is obtained, a potential execution of the same attack
could successfully be detected. Nevertheless, since such signature-based approach
cannot detect novel attacks, it should not be considered a complete solution.
Although there are many Slow DoS Attacks, the possibility to correlate some
specific performance patterns to a given attack or category would be useful in detec-
tion systems (e.g. IDS) for recognizing such menaces. Since intrusive behavior often
shows anomalies from legitimate behavior, we exploit anomalies to detect possible
intrusions in an information system. Indeed, in this paper we adopt a Statistical
Based Intrusion Detection approach (SBID in the following), which belongs to the
anomaly detection category (Ye et al., 2001). This approach works by characteriz-
ing “legitimate activities” based on the analysis of some chosen parameters and then
by investigating unknown traffic. In particular, if the observed traffic falls outside
the scope of the legitimate one, it would be flagged as anomalous (Farshchi, 2003).
A SBID approach provides the ability to detect both known and novel malicious
activities. Through a SBID approach, a statistical characterization of some legiti-
mate activities product (i.e., network traffic, system calls, email sent, socket con-
nections, etc.) is created. An unknown activity product is then compared with the
legitimate one, in order to ascertain its eventual abnormality.
These approaches adopt “parametric” or “non-parametric” techniques: in the
first case, the distribution is assumed as known (for instance, we could assume a
Gaussian distribution of the traffic), while in the latter case there is no knowledge
assumption of the underlying distribution (Chandola et al., 2007). Since SBID
systems report all anomalies as malicious activities, such approaches may signal
false alarms in case the anomaly is caused by a legitimate behavioral irregularity.
Because of this, SBID systems are often used in conjunction with pattern recog-
nition techniques, in order to serve a better working Intrusion Detection System
(Ye et al., 2001).
Analyzing available detection and mitigation methodologies for network attacks,
a protection system may involve hardware or software components. While apply-
ing an hardware protection [such as a load balancer, a network proxy, or an
hardware accelerator, able for instance to protect from specific Slow DoS Attacks
(Aiello et al., 2014)] could successfully mitigate some categories of attacks, it can be
considered a workaround rather than a good solution. Indeed, since such hardware
appliances have not been designed for this purpose, their resources would be allo-
cated for this additional activity. Moreover, such approaches usually do not provide
a built-in functionality aimed at detecting a working attack on the network.
For instance, if we consider the HTTP protocol, which is particularly exploited
by network attacks such as SDAs, current software protections systems are orga-
nized as software modules. Although there are several different modules available,
their functioning is based on two basic principles: (i) limit the maximum number
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of simultaneous connections coming from a particular client and (ii) apply specific
server-side timeouts (Aiello et al., 2014). Even if such solutions represent some sort
of mitigation techniques, in (Aiello et al., 2014) we demonstrate the inefficacy of
the available modules in protecting from particular attacks such as, e.g., distributed
attacks.
If we analyze the design process for building an IDS, following core activities are
usually involved (Cambiaso et al., 2016):
1. First of all, a behavior is observed, usually on the server host or on the server’s
network path. Based on this observation, a network traffic representation
phase is accomplished to select specific parameters to extrapolate, in order
to identify potential network anomalies.
2. Subsequently, an analysis algorithm is applied to the extrapolated data, by
using approaches and metrics deriving from different research fields such as
machine learning, neural network, statistics, game theory, etc…
3. Finally, a characterization phase is accomplished, by defining a proper thresh-
old distinguishing a legitimate situation from an anomalous one. Also in this
case, different research areas may be involved.
After characterization is properly defined, the intrusion detection system is able
to detect anomalies on the network. In this chapter, we focus on the definition of
a representation scheme able to identify Slow DoS Attacks, based on a set of char-
acteristic attack metrics derived by the functioning of the attacks described above.
Hence, we detail the intrusion detection framework by reporting information on
how to retrieve such metrics, also considering a reference protocol like HTTP.
It is worthy mention that our subdivision is driven by a “component-based”
approach (Jifeng, 2005), in which (software) components are reused to build and
to maintain a system. In our context, referring to the activities executed by an IDS
mentioned above, we believe that an intrusion detection system may be built as a
set of components communicating and integrating among themselves. To this end,
we describe an attack representation model/framework for researchers and design-
ers of intrusion detection systems. Although we focus on Slow DoS Attacks, the
framework and detection algorithms can be applied to efficiently protect from other
categories of threats.
19.4.1 Characteristic Attack Metrics
As mentioned above, when building an intrusion detection system, the first activ-
ity which is accomplished is relative to the observation of the phenomenon, with
the aim of represent a possible anomaly. This representation is accomplished by
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accurately selecting parameters which have to be extracted from captured data (i.e.,
a PCAP packet capture file). These parameters have to be potentially able to repre-
sent an anomaly, distinguishing it from a legitimate/accepted behavior.
A first approach is based on selecting parameters characterizing Slow DoS
Attacks exploiting application timeouts with extreme efficiency. In virtue of this,
we describe an intrusion detection framework for application layer threats identifi-
cation. Although particularly suitable to the slow DoS field, we have analyzed that
retrieving these parameters is an expensive task (since they work at the application
layer, thus requiring connections reconstruction), hence making real-time detec-
tion difficult in practice. Therefore, we have focused on reducing retrieval costs, by
working at lower layers of the ISO/OSI model.
1-parameters
After the connection between client and server has been established, the client sends
a request to the server. The request is interpreted by the server in order to generate
a response to send back to the client. After the first request-response exchange, two
possible events could characterize the connection: (i) the connection is closed or
(ii) the connection is kept alive (persistent connection Fielding et al.), in order to
reduce the connection overhead for any additional request-response between the
same client/server pair.
Since each connection potentially is persistent, a first extrapolated parameter is
the Nreq parameter, reporting for each connection the number of requests included
in each connection stream.
We define as connection slot the portion of a connection which refers to the time
passing between the start of a request and the end of the relative response on the
same stream. According to Figure 19.2, let us define tstart_connection the connection
start identified by the 3-way-handshake completion, tstart_req the starting time
of a request, tend_req the ending time of a request, tstart_resp the starting time
of a response, and tend_resp the ending time of a response. From these values we
can extrapolate data relatively to the time passed before sending the first request
(1start ), the duration of a request (1req ), the duration of a response (1resp), and
the time passed between the end of a request and the start of the relative response
(1delay). While the 1start parameter is associated with a single connection, other
parameters are related to each connection slot, which also includes the time passed
between the end of the response and the start of the next request of the same stream
(1next ). In addition, since connections slots are part of a connection, each connec-
tion is uniquely identified by the Cid value (in our case, a sequential integer value),
and each connection slot is associated with the Cid connection it belongs, plus the
slot index Si on the connection.
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Figure 19.2. TCP connection stream for a request-response protocol-based connection.
Fixing a connection stream, let us define i = Si the connection slot index on
the stream. According to Figure 19.2 (where i = 1), which depicts a scheme of the
parameters, we define:
1start = t1start_req − tstart_connection (19.1)
1req = t iend_req − t
i
start_req (19.2)
1delay = t istart_resp − t
i
end_req (19.3)
1resp = t iend_resp − t
i
start_resp (19.4)
1next = t i+1start_req − t
i
end_resp (19.5)
By choosing these parameters, we are able to extrapolate behavioral features
for application layer attacks. For instance, it is known that Slow DoS Attacks
like Slowloris (Giralte et al., 2013) split HTTP requests by sending request pack-
ets delayed during the time, thus being typically characterized by high 1req val-
ues. Instead, the Apache Range Headers (Cambiaso et al., 2013) attack makes the
1delay parameter assume high values, since requests sent to the server need par-
ticularly intensive calculations to produce an appropriate response. Similarly, Slow
Read attack (Shekyan, 2012) simulates a tiny reception buffer to slow down the
responses of the server, thus being characterized by high 1resp and presp values.
Relatively to the 1next parameter, it is instead exploited by the Slow Next attack
(Cambiaso et al., 2015).
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19.4.2 Assumptions
In order to properly define a detection model, we have to define the model behavior
at limit cases. In particular, we make the following assumptions:
• A connection which does not start with a request is ignored until a request is
found on the same connection; this may happen when traffic capture oper-
ation begins after a full request has been sent and the relative response is
captured;
• Due to the nature of elements like network, communication medium, or
response production times, traffic measurements always provide:
1delay > 0 1next 6= 0 (19.6)
19.4.3 Messages Overlapping on the Same Connection Stream
If we focus on the 1next parameter for a single TCP connection stream, in case
1next < 0 a connections slots overlapping occurs. Moreover, in this case connec-
tion persistence is adopted and connections may include more than a single request.
For example, in Figure 19.3, the request next to the current one on the same con-
nection stream is (even partially) received before the full response to the current
request is sent.
Although in Figure 19.3 no overlappings are shown between Request i+1 and
Responsei , since t i+1endreq < t
i
startresp , overlappings may occur. In particular, rela-
tively to a single TCP connection, an overlapping occurs when Equation 19.7 is
satisfied.











Figure 19.3. TCP connection stream in case of 1next < 0.
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For instance, this kind of overlapping may occur in the HTTP protocol: con-
sidering a single TCP connection stream, a client requests to the server a particular
resource such as a web page. After the page content is received and parsed by the
client, a set of resources bounded to the same hosting server (i.e. pictures, scripts,
or stylesheets) may be found in the page. In order to correctly show the web page
such additional resources have to be obtained, hence additional requests have to
be sent to the server. In case a persistent connection (HTTP 1.1) is used, a series
of subsequent requests is usually sent to the server through the already established
TCP connection.1 In this case, the requests sent from the client and next to the first
one may be overlapped to the receiving of the responses to the previous requests.
Our feature selection is based on the fact that each connection is composed
by a sequence of requests and responses. This fact is not always true; as described
above, in case of messages overlapping at the application layer some connections
may adopt a full-duplex communication thus resulting in a simultaneous com-
munication between client and server. The model has therefore to adapt itself to
correctly identify the start/end of a request/response. For instance, in case of an
HTTP 1.1 connection, the client may sequentially send two requests/questions to
the server. In this case, the response/answer to the first request would be overlapped
with the second request sending, on the same TCP connection stream.
In this context, although a first implementation may identify changes in the
packets direction for a common connection stream, such solution may generate
inaccurate data. Indeed, although in this case packet inspection at the application
level is not needed, if message overlapping occurs, improper data would be gen-
erated, due to the (possible) frequent change of direction relative to two different
and overlapping messages on the same channel. Therefore, in order to carefully
extrapolate connection slots data, an external protocol-dependent module may be
needed.
19.4.4 Additional Parameters
Relatively to a single connection slot, described in detail in the previous section,
following parameters could also be extrapolated for detection purposes:
• sreq to identify the request size, in bytes
• preq to identify the amount of TCP packets that compose a request
• sresp to identify the response size, in bytes
• presp to identify the amount of TCP packets that compose a response.
1. Actually, some browsers use multiple connections in order to speed up displaying.
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In particular, let us note that preq and presp values depend on the data-link layer
protocol adopted.
From a combination between these parameters and the 1-parameters, we are
able to retrieve composed parameters. For instance, the amount of bytes per second








Similarly, the ratios representing the amount of packets per second sent during

















19.5 Intrusion Detection Framework
The proposed innovative intrusion detection framework (Cambiaso et al., 2016) is
based on the parameters introduced in Sections 19.4.1 and 19.4.4, and it provides a
representation framework specific for DoS attacks working at the application layer.
Since we believe that a component-based implementation of an IDS is fundamen-
tal, the proposed model not only provides important parameters able to identify
application DoS attacks, but it also simplifies researchers’ work, allowing them to
use an already defined representation system.
The model is based on the concept that each connection is composed by a
sequence of requests and responses. This fact is not always true; as described above,
in case of messages overlapping at the application layer some connections may
adopt a full-duplex communication thus resulting in a simultaneous communica-
tion between client and server. The model has therefore to adapt itself to correctly
identify the start/end of a request/response. For instance, in case of an HTTP 1.1
connection, the client may sequentially send two requests/questions to the server.
In this case, the response/answer to the first request would be overlapped with the
second request sending, on the same TCP connection stream.
In this context, although a first implementation may identify changes in the
packets direction for a common connection stream, such solution may generate
inaccurate data. Indeed, although in this case packet inspection at the application
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level is not needed, if message overlapping occurs improper data would be gener-
ated, due to the (possible) frequent change of direction relative to two different and
overlapping messages on the same channel. Therefore, in order to carefully extrapo-
late connection slots data, an external protocol-dependent module may be needed.
We now describe in detail a module implementation, by using as a reference pro-
tocol the HTTP protocol.
19.5.1 HTTP Model Implementation
The aim is to analyze traffic data, such as a PCAP packet capture file, representing
the rough network packets on a network/host relatively to a time interval. The ana-
lyzed rough data are only relative to the packets directed to the application layer.
From such packets, it is possible to rebuild and extrapolate a list of (captured) con-
nection streams. This choice allows us to easily retrieve needed capture files by
sniffing the network on the server needing protection. Nevertheless, some issues
are related to such approach: due to network traffic dump limits, a request (or sim-
ilarly a response) composed by a single packet leads to:
tend_req = tstart_req H⇒ 1req = 0 (19.11)
since capture files associate a packet to a specific reception time. For instance, this
fact may occur in case of a single packet including the entire request payload.
Although this issue may be considered an important limitation, a more accurate
retrieval is not relevant in this context, since our model focuses on attacks targeting
the application layer, while in case of a single packet composing the request (or sim-
ilarly for a response), we expect potentially long 1req values for attacks targeting
lower layers. In addition, a more accurate data retrieval would operate on the pro-
tected server (for instance, by operating at the kernel level, by intercepting sent and
received messages), thus excluding a central node analyzing an entire subnetwork.
Another important consideration is relative to packets payload. In particular,
the inspection of the messages directed to the application layer is needed for pro-
tocols allowing message overlapping (see Section 19.4.3). Indeed, in this case an
analysis of the payload is needed in order to identify the starting/ending times of
a request/response on a mixed stream. For instance, in case of the HTTP protocol
the end of requests is identified by analyzing packets payloads and looking for the
\r\n\r\n string. Instead, the Content-Length value sent by the server in the
response header is needed to identify the response end. Conversely, in case mes-
sages overlapping is not supported by the protocol, inspection is not needed, and
it is possible to identify requests/responses times by analyzing the direction flow
of the packets. Although the packet inspection requirement is a limitation of the
proposed approach, gaining access to the server needing protection should not be a
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problem, hence messages decryption should be possible (i.e., making use of private
encryption keys).
19.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have analyzed the cyber security topic related to last-generation
threats. We focused on Slow DoS Attacks, emerging denial of service threats mak-
ing use of minimum attack resources to make a network services unavailable. Such
threats are considered particularly dangerous for different domains including criti-
cal infrastructures. We have described in detail how such attacks work, and we have
reported a categorization of such threats, in function of the approach adopted by the
malicious entity. By analyzing Slow DoS Attacks functioning, we have also identi-
fied their weaknesses: in particular, the exploitation of specific server-side timeouts
may expose the attacker for detection purposes. In this context, we have defined
a set of metrics able to characterize legitimate network traffic and providing the
ability to detect slow DoS threats. For metrics retrieval purposes, we have also con-
sidered as a reference protocol the HTTP protocol, widely adopted in different
contexts. The metrics adopted can be adopted on other protocols as well. Similarly,
the application of a wide variety of intrusion detection algorithms can be adopted
to identify running Slow DoS Attacks on the network.
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Chapter 20
Resilience Analysis and Quantification
for Critical Infrastructures
By Natalie Miller, Mirjam Fehling-Kaschek, Gael Haab, Andrea Roland,
Katja Faist, Alexander Stolz and Ivo Häring
The resilience analysis performed in RESISTO follows an enhanced risk and
resilience management process based on the ISO-31000 standard [1]. The main
inputs needed for the resilience quantification are gathered at separate steps of the
management process: a precise understanding of the system context and the sys-
tem itself including all subsystems and components and their interconnections; a
collection of all relevant system functions to quantify the loss of performance due
to a disruptive event; a comprehensive list of potential threats and hazards includ-
ing information about their effect on the system; a list of critical combinations
of system performance functions and threats taking account of relevant resilience
dimensions [2] not explicitly covered by the risk and resilience management pro-
cess; a risk and resilience quantification of combinations found to be critical taking
into account risk and resilience evaluation criteria; and finally a list of potential
counter actions and mitigation strategies for the listed threats.
The resilience quantification is performed via a network simulation based on all
the collected information with the network simulation tool CaESAR [3], which was
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developed to simulate cascading effects in interconnected critical infrastructures.
This allows to identify weak points of the system in terms of a critical resilience
behavior for all combinations of performance functions and threats. In addition,
the resilience improvement by different mitigation options can be tested via the
network simulation.
20.1 Introduction
Telecommunication networks are becoming increasingly complex as connections
with other critical infrastructures increase and the technology becomes more
advanced. Additionally, these networks need to be able to handle certain disrup-
tive events like terrorist attacks or natural disasters such as hurricanes or flooding.
It is important that even as these networks grow and change, often with large legacy
subsystems remaining operational, any risks are mitigated and the networks have a
large resilience against the disruptive events.
Resilience does not yet have a universal definition; however, many of the pro-
posed definitions are similar. For this chapter, resilience is defined as a cyclical pro-
cess (resilience cycle or timeline, similar to the catastrophe management cycle) with
five main phases: prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover [4]. Taking appro-
priate actions in each of these phases for overall risk control creates a more resilient
system or network. Within this context, classical risk management focuses on the
phases before and including the event, whereas resilience defined in a narrow sense
cares about actions during and post event. Resilience as understood in the present
chapter covers all phases before, during, and post disruptive events.
The aim of this chapter is to introduce a risk and resilience management pro-
cess and discuss how it is currently being implemented in the RESISTO project,
a project with the aim of improving the resilience of telecommunication networks
against a variety of threats. This is done by using a resilience management process
and a network simulator software, namely CaESAR.
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 20.2 introduces the risk and
resilience management process used in RESISTO, including a general overview
of the process as well as a more detailed look at how the process is being applied
in RESISTO. Section 20.3 goes into more detail about how certain steps are com-
pleted in RESISTO, focusing on the tabular method used to obtain information
on system components, system performance functions, threats and mitigation mea-
sures. Section 20.4 discusses how resilience is quantified in the project, by introduc-
ing the CaESAR software and the resilience indicators. Section 20.5 concludes the
chapter with a summary of RESISTO’s risk and resilience management process, an
outlook of the next steps for the project and the reach this project and the methods
discussed have on risk and resilience management and quantification.
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20.2 Risk and Resilience Management
20.2.1 Methods
Risk management is the process of handling different risks that may be experienced
by different organizations. There exist various types of risk management standards
and frameworks, which have been developed and applied by organizations through-
out the years. The standards propose how to manage risk and explain the managing
processes regarding the risk. Similarities can be drawn between the risk manage-
ment processes in the most used standards. Some examples of standards are ISO
31000 [5], ISO 31010 [6], COSO ERM, and CoCo [7].
In this chapter, the risk management process that will be discussed is the process
defined by ISO-31000. ISO-31000 is a general risk management approach that is
applicable to any sectors or industries [5]. The standard discusses risk management
principles, a framework as well as the process of risk management.
Resilience management differs slightly from risk management; however, many
of the steps remain similar. Resilience management could be said to be an extension
of risk management, taking the analysis further to obtain a better understanding of
the system, the threats or disruptions that may occur, and modification measures.
An increasing awareness toward resilience management has occurred in the last
years, also in the context of ISO 31000 [8]. Clear guidelines on the resilience man-
agement processes are needed in order to implement resilience in a correct way.
Efforts have been made to construct such guidelines that are applicable to differ-
ent types of systems in various fields. This has resulted in a wide range of con-
cepts, principles, and approaches regarding resilience management [9]. However, a
generic approach is still lacking [1], even if many conceptual approaches have been
formulated, see, e.g., [10] and [11] for the context of the present chapter.
20.2.2 Risk Management
The ISO-31000 standard creates an iterative process for managing risks (see
Figure 20.1) that includes determining the context and scope, completing a risk
assessment, and then treating the risk [12]. It has been used in many civil security
application domains including urban security [13] and major public events such as
football games [14].
Within the risk assessment, three steps are defined: risk identification, risk analy-
sis, and risk evaluation. These in total five steps are complimented by other activities
such as communication and consultation, monitoring and reviewing, and record-
ing and reporting. It has been shown that the overall process can be modeled using
the semiformal Systems Modeling Language (SysML) [15].
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Figure 20.1. The risk management process as defined by ISO31000 (adapted from [5]).
The first step of risk management is determining the context, scope, objectives,
and criteria. This step creates the environment the rest of the process is completed
in. The scope and criteria are defined by the organization and are required for the
management process as they define which and how many risks will be considered
in the process in a given context and how they are evaluated in terms of overall risk
acceptance, respectively [5].
Once the first step is completed, the risk assessment begins. This assessment
consists of three parts: risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation. In the
risk identification step, risks are recorded. Risks that are relevant for the process
are the ones that will hinder the objective defined, i.e., they are risks on objectives.
The last step of the risk assessment is the evaluation step. In this step, it is deter-
mined if the risks need any action to be taken to reduce them. Decisions that can
be made in this step include taking no action, determining treatment options, ana-
lyzing the risk further, using the present controls, or changing the objectives of the
process [5].
The final step is the risk treatment. If risks are deemed too high to be acceptable,
mitigation measures are determined. This step includes determining the mitigation
measures but also implementing and testing to see how well they perform. Some
examples of treatment options defined by the standard include reducing the like-
lihood or consequences, removing the source of the risk, or dividing the risk by
utilizing contracts or insurance [5].
Tools and activities that aid the five-step process include communication and
consultation. These tools are important as they can help stakeholders understand
the process and results [5]. They are completed throughout the entire process.
Communication focuses on understanding risk, while consultation is focused on
decision-making and the information that decision-making requires. Other tools
include monitoring and reviewing, and recording and reporting. Monitoring and
reviewing ensures the assessment is completed to the highest quality. Recording and
reporting helps to communicate outcomes that were determined or found through
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Figure 20.2. The two management processes differ in number of steps but the general
idea remains the same. Resilience as used here covers classical risk control to better pre-
pare for, avoid and protect from damage events as well as resilience to better respond,
recover, learn, and adapt, since it considers all resilience cycle phases as well as (techni-
cal) resilience capabilities. Adapted from [16].
this process. Actions for risk management and decision-making information can
also be reported and recorded [5].
20.2.3 Resilience Management
The resilience management process, initially defined by [1], extends the ISO 31000
standard to be applicable to resilience. Originally created from the ISO 31000 ver-
sion of 2009, it still holds valid for the updated 2018 ISO 31000 version. The
resilience management process is a nine-step process, almost double the number of
steps when compared to the risk management process. A side-by-side comparison
of the two processes can be seen in Figure 20.2 (adapted from [16]).
In the resilience management process, the context and system analysis are sepa-
rate, unlike in the risk management. This is done to make sure a full understanding
of the system, and its subsystems or connections outside the system are identi-
fied [1]. Once the first two steps are completed, the resilience assessment begins.
Like the risk assessment, it is split into three parts: identification, analysis, and eval-
uation. However, within the three parts, there are further steps.
In the identification step, the system performance functions and the disruptions
are determined. Mentioned in [1], when the performance functions are determined,
qualitative and quantitative descriptions should be included. An inventory should
be made to include all the functions found. Performance functions that are found
can be either dynamic or static, allowing for a deeper understanding of the system.
An inventory of disruptions should also be created.
For each disruption or threat that is determined, for each system performance
function, the effects should be determined for all resilience cycle phases, i.e., before,
during, and after events. This means that in particular the losses should be known,
which layers will be affected, and what uncertainty they have.
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To this end, within the resilience analysis steps, the combinations of functions
and disruptions are pre-assessed and the overall resilience is quantified. Within this
pre-assessment, a matrix form may be utilized with the system functions as one
dimension and the disruptions, or threats, as the other. This matrix is explained
in more detail in Section 20.3.5. This can then be utilized to determine the crit-
ical combinations. The overall resilience quantification of these critical combi-
nations is completed in the next step. The resilience quantification takes things
deeper, investigating disruption combinations, cascading effects and the overall
system [1].
After the resilience is quantified, the resilience evaluation can be completed.
This consists of a resilience/cost evaluation and selection of modification options
for improving the resilience. The resilience evaluation has specific steps to follow
including a comparison of resilience performance values to historic values, investi-
gating the performance loss, and determining if the new resilience level is acceptable
or not [1]. The procedure of selecting improvement options is also defined in [1]
and includes creating an inventory of options, and completing the resilience man-
agement process again to determine the benefits. This will lead to the selection of
final measures that can then be implemented while considering potential secondary
(unintended) effects of selected risk control and resilience measures.
Once the resilience assessment is completed, the final step of implementing the
modification options is completed. This step would focus on the development of
the improvement methods and how to implement, operate, and maintain them
with the system.
The resilience management process has the same tools and activities that the
risk management process does: communication and consultation, monitoring and
reviewing, and recording and reporting, within an overall iterative as well as incre-
mental process.
20.2.4 Risk and Resilience Management in RESISTO
RESISTO’s [17] long-term control loop completes this risk and resilience manage-
ment process. Figure 20.3 (adapted from [18]) below shows the resilience manage-
ment process and how RESISTO completes each step. Further, much less detailed
application cases of the resilience analysis and management process for urban trans-
port, coupled critical infrastructure of a region and a national electricity grid can
be found in [1], as well as for an indoor localization system in [19]. The process
has also been proposed to be applied to local electricity distribution grids after the
last transformer [20].
The selection of candidate tabular methods for improving resilience has been
described in [21] by considering several resilience dimensions, including the five
System and Threat List 371
Figure 20.3. The RESISTO resilience management approach (adapted from [18]). This
graphic includes the different collection methods and supporting tools necessary to com-
plete certain steps of the process.
step risk management process, however, not its extension to system performance
function-based resilience assessment.
Steps 2 through 4, and step 8, all use a tabular approach (in Figure 20.3—the
extended threat list) to obtain the necessary information from end users. Steps 2
through 5 also use the Shiny app that helps with visualization of the tables and
connections. Additionally, step 2 uses the testbeds and network representations
to complete the system analysis. Step 4 additionally uses the testbed tools such
as penetration tests and honeypots to identify disruptions. To complete step 6,
the resilience quantification, the network is represented with testbeds, and sim-
ulations are completed to determine the resilience. The resilience modification
options, step 8, utilize all of the steps previously mentioned including the tabular
approach, shiny app, testbed tools and network simulators. More details on each
of these steps and how RESISTO completes them can be found in the following
sections.
20.3 System and Threat List
In this section, a tabular approach used to collect, assess, and interpret the informa-
tion obtained from the resilience management process is introduced (see also [16]).
Four tables were created including system components, system functions, threats
and improvement measures. These tables correspond with a specific step in the
resilience management process. After the tables are completed with all the necessary
information, a Flexible Resilience Analysis Template (FRAT) analysis is completed
utilizing the Shiny package written in the R programming language [22].
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Figure 20.4. Screenshot of the system components table that was filled in by end users.
20.3.1 System Components
Information on system components (SCs) is obtained from process step 2: system
analysis. In this step, end users report the SCs in a table format (see Figure 20.4).
Each component reported includes information such as the ID, name, description,
subsystem, type, quantity, technical characteristics, and interconnections.
Many of the columns allow for any text to be written inside, such as technical
characteristics. This column includes any information that is necessary to inves-
tigate how disruptions affect the component and how the component functions.
For example, this can include the hardware brand or series, how much energy it
consumes or data it needs.
A few columns have drop down options for selection instead of free text. For
example, the subsystem column has seven different options to choose from. The
options include five different networks: radio, optical, satellite, core or internal net-
work, or other subsystems such as the data center, or applications. The type column
has five options to choose from: built structure, mechanical, software tool, inter-
connection, or hardware device. This is done to simplify the columns and allow
these columns to be better organized.
From this list of components, a model of a telecommunication network is cre-
ated. This is necessary for the rest of the risk and resilience management process.
The model needs to be as realistic as possible, including as many components as pos-
sible, allowing for a full picture of the network to be created. However, the increased
number of components also increases the complexity. In RESISTO, it needed to
be decided to which level the analysis will include. To help with this decision, a
column for identifying which subsystems each component belongs to was created.
This table is also an important input for starting to model a quantifiable model for
simulation as described in Section 20.4.
The final list of SCs for RESISTO covers the entire range of types and subsys-
tems. The types and descriptions of the components were filled out by end users in
much detail; however, other columns were missing information. This includes the
quantity of the components. Obtaining a complete set of information regarding
the system analysis is important for the entire resilience management process.
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Figure 20.5. Screenshot of the system functions table filled with end-user input.
20.3.2 System Functions
Step three of the resilience management process is identifying system performance
functions. Similar to the system components table, this was also completed with
end-user input. The system functions (SFs) table consists of eight columns, to get
a general idea of the different SFs. The information reported can be seen in Fig-
ure 20.5 and includes ID, name, description, subsystem, linked components, per-
formance quantification, dependence of other SFs and comments.
Most of the SFs columns are the same as the columns for the SCs. The subsystem
drop-down menu is the same, including all seven options. The linked components
column allows for the identification of SCs that are needed for the function to be
at full performance. This column is a drop-down menu with all of the system com-
ponents previously defined. The performance quantification column helps define
performance rates. The last new column is the dependence to other SFs which is
also a drop-down menu that allows for the selection of other SFs.
The quantification of resilience is possible once the system performance func-
tions are identified. For each SF defined, the performance has a specific and unique
quantification. An example of a system performance function is the L2/3 connec-
tivity, see the last line in Figure 20.5. As stated in the screenshot, this connection
connects different devices together. This describes the congestion of the network.
If packets become stuck in the nodes and cannot reach their destination because
the node or arc capacity is exceeded, the system is said to be congested. This can
occur, of course, also in a fully connected network.
The quantity L2 connectivity is defined with Equation (20.1) according to [23].
In this equation, B∗ is the largest number of paths going through a node in
(betweenness centrality) the network and S is the steps the packet takes before going
missing. The last variable, µ, comes from how the capacity of the nodes is defined.
The exponentially distributed time required for one packet to be fully served is the
capacity. This distribution has a mean of 1/µ. The result of this equation (ρc) is
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Another example of a connectivity is the L1 connectivity. The L1 connectiv-
ity provides L1 radio and fiber optic (FO) links between equipment. It highlights
whether the system is connected or not.
If everything is connected, the components can communicate with each other.
The connectivity can be quantified using:
0 ≤ connectivity =
size of the giant component
size of the network
≤ 1 (20.2)
For RESISTO, the size of the network and giant component is defined by the
number of nodes each has. The giant component is the largest connected cluster of
nodes within the network.
Common SFs for networks that are delivering a service are related to how well
that service is delivered. For telecommunication networks, this can be mobile data
services, fixed data services, or voice services. In RESISTO, the voice service is
used as a SF. To calculate the performance of the voice service, the L1 connec-
tivity was used. Nodes inside the largest connected component are investigated
to determine if they are required for voice service. The number of nodes that
are required that are in the largest connected component is divided by the total
voice service nodes. Besides this, a SF can simply be the percentage of working
components.
To quantify this performance, the percentage of undamaged components needed
for the service can be used. Other quantifications can be used including standards
or Quality of Service (QoS) as defined by the RESISTO partners or literature. For
the voice service, the QoS is defined as having less than 150 ms for one way delay,
less than 4 s for request/response delay, having a loss of less than 3 percent and
jitter less than 50 ms [24]. Each service can have a QoS, which would need to be
integrated into the model.
20.3.3 Threats
Step four of the resilience management process identifies different disruptions. End
users report threats that make up the third table, see Figure 20.6 for an example. The
information reported with the threat is more extensive than the other tables, includ-
ing the hazard type, cause, frequency, duration, economic impact, societal impact,
SCs that are affected either directly or indirectly, SFs that are affected, affected sub-
systems, and impacts on other CIs.
Drop-down menus in the threats table include the hazard type, hazard cause, fre-
quency, economic impact, and the SCs, SFs, and subsystems expected to be affected.
The hazard type can be defined as physical, cyber, or cyber-physical (including
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Figure 20.6. Screenshot of the threats collected by end-user input.
both physical-cyber and cyber-physical) due to the focus and aim of the RESISTO
project.
Hazard causes can be defined as man-made (accidental), man-made (attack),
technical/system failure or natural. The frequency can be defined as Equa-
tion (20.3).
1/year ≤ frequency ≤ 10/week (20.3)
The economic impact has four different options: high, medium, low, or none.
The SCs and SFs columns allow users to select options from the previously filled
in tables. The subsystems remain the same as the previous tables.
Methods to determine threats include preliminary hazard analysis (PHA), his-
toric event analysis (e.g., using databases of historic terroristic events with a high
resolution of targets and tactics, see, e.g., [25]), expert opinion gather [26], or root
cause analysis (fault tree analysis).
There are different categories for the threats. Some threats that are known on
the level of (partial) performance function loss for telecommunication networks
include loss or disruption of services, quality degradation, and data loss or leakage.
This includes link problems as well as service problems. Threats that are specific to
the service include problems with access, authentication or authorization.
The advantage of considering such types of threats is that they are to a large
degree independent from the physical or cyber root cause. This allows to take
also account of hitherto unknown disruptions, at least with respect to post-event
resilience improvement and to some degree, i.e., to counter unexampled or black
swan events, see also the discussion in [2].
Other threats that were collected from user input for RESISTO include Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, data exfiltration, physical connectivity
cuts, weather hazards, fires, earthquakes, and power shortages.
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Figure 20.7. Screenshot of the improvement measures table that was filled in by the
end users.
20.3.4 Mitigation Measures
The last table is one for mitigation options and includes columns such as ID, name,
description, subsystem, component, action type, and comments (see Figure 20.7).
The action type clarifies the purpose of mitigation measure and categorizes it
into one of seven different phases (preparation, detection, prevention, protection,
stabilization, recovery and improvement). For each mitigation measure, they are
assigned to a specific threat and associated with different components.
Examples of mitigation measures include anti-DDoS appliances or load bal-
ancers. Determining the effect of the mitigation measures on the resilience can
vary in difficulty. The more technical measures, such as adding batteries to system
components, can be easier to quantify than an improvement measure of increasing
staff training.
20.3.5 FRAT Analysis
Once all four tables have been filled out by end users, the FRAT analysis can begin.
As mentioned, the analysis was completed using R and the shiny package. Using the
shiny package means that a web application can be implemented for the analysis.
The FRAT analysis includes three main parts: connections, threat ranking, and
correlation. The web application allows for easier visuals of the user inputs of the
SCs, SFs, and threats. For the connections in particular, by clicking on one SF, all
of the SCs that are connected to it, and the threats that it is vulnerable too, are
highlighted. This can be seen in Figure 20.8.
The threats can also be ranked as part of the FRAT analysis. The threats are
ranked based on Equation 20.4.
Score = F Q · (E I + SI ) (20.4)
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Figure 20.8. The Flexible Resilience Analysis Template (FRAT) Shiny app will display
the connections between the system components, system functions, and threats. In this
example, the T2 threat (data exfiltration) is highlighted. It has connections to different
system components such as workstations and servers, and the business applications.
It also connects to two system functions: L3 connectivity and security functions and
policies. Improvement measures related to this threat include training, governance, and
alerts.
Figure 20.9. The threat ranking of the different threats as seen in the Shiny web applica-
tion. This is the score of the different threats, calculated with Equation (20.4). The threat
with the largest ranking is a DDoS Attack, and the lowest threat is the data exfiltration.
The values on the x-axis are the scores each threat has.
This equation combines the social impact (SI) and the economic impact (EI) and
multiplies it with the frequency of occurrence (FQ). It should be noted that this
equation can be defined by the user, depending on where the focus is on the analysis.
For each of these factors, the end users selected a value from a scale provided (i.e.,
for frequency values of never, rare, modest, frequent, or very frequent could be
selected). These values need to be converted to numerical values. This is done by the
user. Figure 20.9 shows the final score and thus the threat ranking in the Shiny app.
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Figure 20.10. The correlation matrix from the Shiny app. This matrix has the threat on
one axis and the system function on the other. The larger, darker circles indicate a more
critical correlation.
Lastly, the FRAT analysis is used to complete step five of the resilience manage-
ment process in RESISTO. This step completes a pre-assessment of combinations
of functions and disruptions. This is done by creating and analyzing the correla-
tion matrices of the system functions and threats. The matrix can show how threats
may affect specific functions more than others, see Figure 20.10, where the larger,
darker circles indicate a larger affect. The combinations that result in a large effect
will then be bookmarked for further use in the resilience management cycle, where
the resilience quantification will be completed.
20.4 Resilience Quantification
From the FRAT analysis and Shiny app, steps two through five of the resilience
management process are completed. The next step is therefore the overall resilience
quantification, step six. To complete the resilience quantification, a network scheme
and network simulation is needed, since semi-quantitative tabular assessments start-
ing out, e.g., from Figures 20.9 and 20.10 or similar are not considered as sufficient
due to the highlight non-linear and coupled nature of the CI telecommunication
under consideration.
The network schemes are provided through testbeds from the end users. It was
determined that CaESAR is the simulation tool that fits best with the objectives
of RESISTO, in terms of resilience assessment and quantification. The resilience is
then specifically quantified by using resilience indicators.
20.4.1 CaESAR Simulation Tool
CaESAR (Cascading Effects Simulation in urban Areas to assess and increase
Resilience) was originally created as a tool to determine the resilience of critical
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Figure 20.11. An example performance time curve similar to ones that are an output from
CaESAR. In the figure are also the resilience indicators (see the next section for more
information). The performance function, and the threat, can be chosen during the simu-
lation.
infrastructures against cascading effects and other threats within the EU project
SnowBall [27]. CaESAR works by creating a network model and incorporating
threats and their consequences, the resilience calculations and any improvement
methods [3].
Once the networks have been implemented in the tool, damages can be inserted
and cascading effects can be computed. The recovery of the network can begin once
the damage effects are finished, and no more cascades are occurring, if assuming that
the response and recovery starts after the cascade are completed. In the real world,
there may be a buffer time between a disruptive event’s impact and cascading effects
and the recovery. An example of a reason for this buffer time can be apprehension
about the repair crews’ safety and sending the crews into the environment too early.
Resilience can then be quantified for the entire process.
This approach allows for mitigation measures to be evaluated in terms of the
improvements (or lack thereof ) of resilience. This is a cyclical process where after
each iteration, critical components are identified and mitigation strategies selected,
and then implemented into the networks.
As mentioned, the resilience can be quantified considering the entire process
until the end of the recovery phase. The final result of this is a resilience performance
time curve (Figure 20.11). This curve then gives the resilience indicators, explained
in the following section, that are used to validate the simulation results.
The performance measure can be any of the mentioned system functions, such
as L1 connectivity, the percentage of working components, or a function related
to any of the services provided to consumers. The curve covers the entire resilience
process, from before the event occurs to the response during the event and the
recovery after the disruptive event ends.
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The curves are also specific to a threat. At the moment, threats that are modeled
in CaESAR include a failure of 20 percent of the nodes, failures of specific nodes,
or assigning a probability of failure for nodes at different times to see a time-based
attack.
20.4.2 Resilience Indicators
Resilience indicators (RIs) are used to link the two control loops, one offline and one
online, in RESISTO. These indicators can be defined at different points through-
out the process, occurring at different resilience phases. Four main resilience indi-
cators can be defined as seen in Figure 20.11, see, e.g., the figures and terminology
provided for performance and non-performance system functions in [2].
The point where the performance loss is the largest can be defined as RI1. The
time it takes for recovery to start after the event has occurred is defined as RI2. RI3
is the recovery time and RI4 is the performance loss spanning the time since the
event began to the time recovery was completed, assuming that full recovery has
been reached (this can be calculated using integration of the curve). Many such
similar quantities are accessible, see, e.g., [28].
These resilience indicators are specific to the event that was modeled and the SF.
Once the RIs are known, a matrix structure is used to store them. This matrix of
values can then be used to compare to the real-time RIs and validate the model.
20.5 Conclusion
The chapter gave a summary of a well-defined stepwise approach to analyze and
manage jointly risk and resilience of critical infrastructure systems resorting to sys-
tem performance functions and by considering all resilience cycle phases before and
during disruption.
For the approach, a minimum set of tables and matrices to be used for success-
ful implementation was discussed. The focus was on an overall tabular and matrix
approach that allows to determine in an efficient way which parts of the resilience
quantification needs more careful consideration, modeling, and quantitative simu-
lation. It was shown how to realize such an approach within a web-based application
software.
The FRAT approach allowed in particular to identify critical combinations of
single threats and performance functions, for which sample quantitative simula-
tions were provided. The performance function quantification can be analyzed
with a set of appropriate resilience indicators, including, e.g., time till maximum
loss after start of disruption, time to recovery, maximum decay of performance,
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overall loss or improvement of performance post recovery and learning. Such
resilience indicator quantities can be used single and in combination for quan-
titate assessments by considering the system without risk control and resilience
improvements and with selected improvement measures to select the best options
for implementation.
The approach was applied to telecommunication infrastructures, but is suited
more generally for socio-technical systems, including smaller technical systems.
Within the presented approach, a semi-quantitative overall risk control and
resilience quantity was presented taking account of superposition of risks.
In future work, besides using the network computation as input for the over-
all system risk sum, also further network effects could be simulated going beyond
assessing the effect of single events till full recovery. An example includes to com-
pute a stationary balance between threats and ongoing counter and improvements
measures to simulate the ongoing real-time efforts that make networks operational
already today. Further potential improvements of future work include the consid-
eration of dependencies on other networks already within simulations.
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Modeling Technique for an Effective
Decision-Making Support
By Chiara Foglietta and Stefano Panzieri
Modeling critical infrastructure interdependencies is mandatory to assess the con-
sequences of adverse events such as natural disasters, failures, and also cyberattacks.
However, interdependencies can be exploited during the recovery phase for increas-
ing the effect of the countermeasures. In this chapter, we present CISIApro 2.0, an
agent-based simulator that assesses the consequences of negative events on intercon-
nected infrastructures, describes as devices and services. The output of CISIApro
2.0 is the set of possible devices and services which are affected by an adverse event.
The simulator has been tested using a telecommunication network.
21.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructure concept (or essential services, following the European
law) has changed during the last 40 years: critical infrastructures are large and
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geographically extended systems that are a fundamental part of our lives. The actual
definition of critical infrastructures is defined in terms of national security, leading
to 17 sectors, including also agriculture and food systems, national monuments
and icons, commercial and government facilities. We prefer the concept of “lifeline
systems,” (O’Rourke, 2007), defined for evaluating the performance of large, geo-
graphically distributed networks during the crisis caused by adverse events, such as
natural events or cyberattacks. Lifelines are grouped into six principal systems: elec-
tric power, gas and liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, waste disposal,
and water supply. Those systems are tightly linked with the economic well-being,
security, and safety of our lives.
Lifeline systems all influence each other. Lifeline systems are dependent one to
the others, primarily by physical proximity and operational interaction. However,
the pervasive introduction of telecommunications leads to the introduction of the
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) and 5G also in critical infrastructures. Telecom-
munications are mandatory for remotely telecontrolling sites and devices through
SCADA (Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) networks. SCADA networks
are now connected to Ethernet-based networks, thanks to open-source protocols.
Assessing risk in critical infrastructure is a well-known problem. The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) defines risk as “the potential for an unwanted
outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its
likelihood and the associated consequences” (Committee et al., 2013). Risk is thus
traditionally defined as a function of three elements: the threats to which an asset
is susceptible, the vulnerabilities of the asset to the threat, and the consequences
potentially generated by the degradation of the asset. Risk management involves
knowing the threats and hazards that could affect an asset, assessing the vulnera-
bilities of the asset and then evaluating the impacts on the asset. Based on these
characteristics, it is possible to develop specific indicators and metrics to assess the
risk to critical infrastructure.
Also, the concept of resilience (Bruneau and Reinhorn, 2007), like the concept
of critical infrastructure, is evolving: the resilience of an organization reflects the
degree of preparedness and the ability to respond to and recover from a disas-
ter or, in general, a negative event. Because lifeline systems are intimately linked
to the economic well-being, security, and social fabric of a community, the initial
strength and rapid recovery of lifelines are closely related to community resilience
(Bruneau et al., 2003).
The concepts of risk and resilience are similar and they are tight connected:
improving the resilience of the system means decreasing risk. Risk is usually orga-
nized in terms of preparedness, mitigation measures, response capabilities, and
recovery mechanisms; the traditional components of resilience are anticipation,
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absorption, adaptation, and recovery. Risk is usually related to a possible met-
ric for understanding the consequences of adverse events; resilience is the ability
to decreasing the effects of adverse events. In this chapter, the two concepts are
exploited for understanding the consequences of adverse events (such as natural
disasters, cyber-attacks or faults) and the consequences of restoration or mitigation
actions.
21.1.1 Contributions
The modeling approach exploited in this chapter is based on the Mixed Holistic
Reductionist (MHR) approach, where each infrastructure is divided into compo-
nents (reductionist layer), services (service layer) and holistic nodes (holistic layer).
This approach is then applied using an agent-based simulator, called CISIApro 2.0.
This simulator can represent the consequences of adverse and positive events in an
interdependent scenario. This simulator runs in real time connected to a SCADA
control center to acquire updated information on faults and connected to an Intru-
sion Detection System (IDS) to acquire actual threats and on-going cyber-attacks.
CISIApro 2.0 can integrate heterogeneous data to improve the situational aware-
ness of operators and their decision-making process.
21.1.2 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. Section 21.2 reviews the literature on modeling
activities for critical infrastructure interdependencies; in Section 21.3, the Mixed
Holistic-Reductionist (MHR) approach is presented, with Section 21.4 presenting
the agent-based simulator called CISIApro 2.0; the case study is detailed in Sec-
tion 21.5, in terms of components and results; and, finally, conclusions and future
works are discussed in Section 21.6.
21.2 Literature Review
In literature, there are three main methodologies for the modeling approaches of
critical infrastructures: agent-based simulation, input-output analysis, and network
modeling. In literature, it is also possible to find heterogeneous and/or unclassified
approaches (Gopalakrishnan and Peeta, 2010).
The agent-based simulations consider each infrastructure as complex adaptive
systems, composed of agents representing single aspects in the infrastructure itself.
Different agents can be modeled at different degrees of abstraction based on the pro-
posed level of resolution modeling. The main advantage of agent-based simulation
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is the ability to arise synergistic behaviors when agents are starting to interact
together (Rinaldi et al., 2001).
The second approach is based on the Input-Output economic analysis intro-
duced by Leontief in the early 1930s but then adapted to modeling infrastructures.
Haimes and Jiang developed the linear Input-Output Inoperability Model (IIM)
to study the effect of interdependencies on the inoperability of interconnected net-
worked systems (Haimes and Jiang, 2001). For example, we consider a two-system
model. When a failure of subsystem 1 leads to subsystem 2 to be 80% inoperable,
and a failure of subsystem 2 makes subsystem 1 to be 20% inoperable, the effect of
functionality loss due to an external perturbation can be calculated by solving the
Leontief equations. The main advantage of the IIM and its improvements is related
to the simplicity and flexibility of the proposed approach. Usually, IIM is limited
to the economic costs of interdependencies.
In the last years, researchers explored new approaches for modeling infrastructure
interdependencies. The most promising approach is based on graph and network
theory. In this approach, infrastructures are represented using abstract graphs made
of nodes and arcs, standing for links between components in the infrastructures.
The main advantage is to exploit closed-form expressions and numerical simula-
tions to characterize their topology, performance, and uncertainty.
Several works reviewed the proposed approaches for modeling interdependen-
cies among critical infrastructures; the reader can refer to Eusgeld et al. (2008),
Satumtira and Dueñas-Osorio (2010), and Ouyang (2014) for more details on this
problem.
21.3 Modeling Interdependencies with MHR Approach
In this document, we propose an approach for helping during the modeling phase.
The Mixed Holistic Reductionist (MHR) (Digioia et al., 2012) approach was cre-
ated to exploit the advantages of both methods: holistic and reductionist. The main
aim of the MHR approach is to give a possible guideline to properly model critical
infrastructures and their interdependencies.
In holistic modeling, infrastructures are seen as singular entities with defined
boundaries and functional properties, generating a global and overall analysis. See-
ing an infrastructure as a single element aims at identifying and characterizing the
different infrastructures and their geographical level. At this level, the amount of
data needed for modeling activities is very low and can be found in public databases.
On the other hand, the reductionist model emphasizes the need to fully under-
stand the roles and the behavior of individual components to truly understand the
overall infrastructure. The reductionist approach drills down to each component in
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terms of inputs and outputs. At this level of abstraction is easy to find dependencies
between the equipment and single components.
Different levels of analysis are required in modeled systems and their boundaries
are lost in the event of complex case studies. With the MHR model, relationships
between infrastructures could be seen at different levels through either a top-down
or bottom-up approach. The other main advantage is to model infrastructures at a
different level of abstraction considering the amount of available data.
The connection point between the two levels of abstraction, i.e., holistic and
reductionist approaches, is the quality of service (in the following, abbreviated as
“service”) evaluation which is a key element for operators. This layer describes func-
tional relationships between components and infrastructure at different levels of
granularity. In MHR, services to customers and to other interconnected infrastruc-
tures are explicitly considered as a middle layer between holistic and reductionist
agents.
The MHR allows us to reach the right level of detail with minimal data and
collected information. Some important considerations can be summarized in the
following:
• Each infrastructure is modeled starting from the identification of components
and their interactions.
• Each layer is defined with an appropriate level of abstraction based on infor-
mation coming from end-users, stakeholders and open documents.
• Each component (we called it entity or agent) must be described in a way
to decouple it from other components: the behavior of the component must
depend on the valued explicitly exchanged with the other components.
• The simulator, that implements the MHR approach, must be able to repre-
sent any type of agentâŁ™s behavior for adapting to the specific reference
scenario.
The MHR approach allows defining three different typologies of entities: holistic
entities, service entities, and reductionist entities.
A Holistic Entity (Figure 21.1(a)) represents the infrastructure as a whole (or
its general organizational divisions) in order to have a model that can consider the
global dynamics between infrastructure possibly one might think of representing
behaviors related to policies, strategies, etc.
A Service Entity represents a logical or organizational element, that provides an
aggregate resource as the remote control: the remote control generally refers to a
solution that provides supervision, by means of software and data collection. Data
can be collected through telecommunication network or field equipment in case of
a geographically distributed infrastructure. In Figure 21.1(b), a service component
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Figure 21.1. MHR representation of different entities at different abstraction layers.
is depicted considering the classical model of an agent in CISIApro 2.0. Some exam-
ples of service are:
• The ability to supply customers
• The ability to produce resources
• The ability to change the topology
• The status of some specific and important components.
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Finally, with a Reductionist Entity, we can represent, with the right degree
of abstraction, all physical or aggregated entities of the overall system. In Fig-
ure 21.1(c), the representation of a reductionist component is depicted. The picture
does not explicitly consider a cyber threat: this malicious event can be represented
in the same way as an input failure with a suitable “cyber dynamic.”
The MHR approach allows the developer to represent a complex scenario into
components that have different functionalities. The layers allow to model a complex
scenario, made of several interconnected infrastructures, with different abstraction
levels: an infrastructure can be modeled in all its features (reductionist, service, and
holistic layers), another can be modeled using only the holistic layer, without any
kind of problem apart from the granularity and the precision of the results.
21.4 Dynamic Risk Propagation using CISIApro 2.0
CISIApro 2.0 (Critical Infrastructure Simulation by Interdependent Agents) (Fogli-
etta et al., 2015; Masucci et al., 2016) is a software engine able to calculate
complex cascading effects, considering (inter)dependencies and faults propaga-
tion among the involved complex systems. CISIApro 2.0 can also consider
mitigation and restoration actions to assess their positive consequences. CISI-
Apro has been designed from scratch in 2011 within the H2020 ATENA
project (Adamsky et al., 2018) for improving the modeling process of the inter-
dependencies among infrastructures. During the H2020 RESISTO project
(H2020 RESISTO Project, 2018), CISIApro has been updated to version 2.0
adding some important functionalities related to the modeling of telecommuni-
cation infrastructures.
CISIApro 2.0 is an agent-based simulator, where each agent has the same struc-
ture. In particular, each agent receives resources and failures from the upstream
agents and spreads it to the downstream ones, as depicted in Figure 21.2. The layers
Figure 21.2. CISIApro 2.0 entity representation.
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are obtained from the propagation of a resource or a fault. A resource is a service or
a data produced and/or consumed by the agent, represented in CISIApro 2.0 as an
entity. The entity produces or receives also failures (in general, malfunctions) rep-
resenting a physical failure or a possible cyberattack. The malfunctions are spread
among the agents following different propagation models that take into account
the class of the interdependencies (i.e., layers) and the reliability of the informa-
tion. The considered layers are physical, logical, geographical, and cyber.
The ability to produce resources is summarized by the concept of operational
level, depending on the availability of received resources, on the propagation of
faults, and on the functionality of the entity itself.
The operational level of each agent can be considered as a risk metric. Usually,
the risk is a numeric value, from the impact severity, the likelihood of occurrence or
threat, and the vulnerability analysis. In CISIApro 2.0 applications, the likelihood
of occurrence is usually considered more connected to the concept of the trustwor-
thiness of the information. For each entity, the user can add also a vulnerability
variable, but in the following case study, we suppose that the vulnerability depends
only on the distance from the source and on the persistence of the attack itself. The
operational level of each agent is associated with a risk level: the risk is the amount
of harm due to specific events, such as a cyberattack, and can be evaluated as
Risk = 1− Operational Level (21.1)
where 1 is the maximum value of the operational level. A higher value of the opera-
tional level means a lower risk. Therefore, the operational level represents a dynamic
risk assessment considering the cascading effects of adverse events, i.e., natural dis-
asters, failures or cyber attacks. This value is normalized for each infrastructure
considering the quality of service towards customers and other infrastructures.
CISIApro 2.0 is mainly composed of two modules, as depicted in Figure 21.3.
The first one is the off-line tool known as “CISIApro 2.0 Design” that allows the
design and implementation of complex and highly interdependent scenarios as rep-
resented in Figure 21.4. While the second one is the on-line tool called CISIAmat
(or “CISIApro 2.0 Run”) which exploits Simulink Mathworks for the real-time
engine actually connected to near real-time data sources.
CISIApro 2.0 is a software platform based on a database-centric architecture
in which the database plays a crucial role, called in Figure 21.3 “CISIApro 2.0
DB”. This means a centralized asynchronous design that allows horizontal scalabil-
ity where each element of the risk propagation architecture, independently, inter-
faces with the centralized database to acquire the last data from the field and the
output of CISIApro 2.0.
“CISIApro 2.0 Run” engine provides an impact evaluation of detected anoma-
lies. In order to mitigate the effects, the decision-maker, also supported by a
workflow manager, can choose among different sequences of possible reaction
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Figure 21.3. CISIApro architecture.
Figure 21.4. Graphical user interface of CISIApro 2.0 design.
strategies, taking into account also the output of CISIApro 2.0. CISIApro 2.0, start-
ing from the actual scenario and QoS (Quality of Service) levels of involved devices,
simulates What-If scenarios to provide useful information for the decision-maker
with respect to forthcoming critical situations.
21.5 A Telecommunication Scenario
The proposed scenario is built in a redundant telecommunication architecture:
most resources, both physical equipment and virtual machines are indeed doubled.
This scenario simulates a production network and includes most of the monitoring
capability and capacity of the production networks. We consider two critical ser-
vices in the use case: voice and data communications over 4G and fixed networks.
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Figure 21.5. CISIApro 2.0 User Interface.
The scenario is equipped with various network elements ranging from high-
speed backbone routers to mobile and B2B (Business to Business) access routers.
The devices create a Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) network and are
aggregated using high-speed links on the pair of Nexus switches, see Figure 21.5.
The MPLS layer contains routers from a wide range that are used to deliver back-
bone functionality router (such as CISCO ASR 9006), mobile Router (i.e., CISCO
ASR 903) and B2B Routers (i.e., CISCO ASR 920). MPLS Network will also inte-
grate an OLT (Optical Line Termination) to simulate an attack/outage on the part
of the network.
The security fabric and data-center layer are achieved using a few next-generation
security devices and application controllers as:
• Fortinet FortiGate (URL Filtering, Centralized Antivirus, Intrusion Detec-
tion and Protection System, E-mail filtering, Layer 4 Firewall)
• F5 BIGIP (Web Application Firewall).
The testbed also includes various servers that run VMWare and Open-
Stack hypervisors for virtualized solutions and data-center services emulation. In
Figure 21.5, the User Interface of CISIApro where information is displayed: the
network topology with colors from red (complete unavailability of the device) to
green (device properly working), the values of considered services placed in the
upper side of the picture, and the complete set of state variable for each entity (in
the right bottom side of the picture).
The scenario considers two possible events:
1. An unintentional fiber cut severs the connections between the two core
routers in the scenario. The fiber cut is followed by a large-scale DDoS (Dis-
tributed Denial of Service) attack on one of the border routers.
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2. A human actor enters one of the core network buildings and attempts to
connect to a border router, access its administrative console and maliciously
change a route to one of the servers hosting a critical part of the core network.
The consequences in both cases are related to the risk of connection loss and
service delivery failure. Other consequences are related to the infrastructures that
are connected to the telecommunication to properly deliver commands to the field
devices.
21.6 Conclusions and Future Works
This chapter describes CISIApro 2.0 simulator: CISIApro 2.0 is an agent-based
simulator aiming at assessing the consequences of adverse events in an interdepen-
dent scenario. CISIApro 2.0 has two distinct phases: the first is the modeling activi-
ties and the second is the real-time simulator that evaluates the consequences of the
adverse events connected to heterogeneous data sources. The output of CISIApro
2.0 is exploited in the decision-making process, to improve the operator situation
awareness and to make better decisions knowing which are the consequences of
actual events.
The presented scenario is a small part of a larger case study in which CISIApro
2.0 in under validation with the help of stakeholders and end-users. Actual devel-
opments are related to the modeling activities for 5G networks in terms of network
function virtualization and software-defined networks.
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Chapter 22
Modern Innovative Detectors of Physical
Threats for Critical Infrastructures
By Rodoula Makri, Panos Karaivazoglou, Alexandros Kyritsis,
Michael Skitsas, Nikolaos Koutras, Javier Valera,
and Jose Manuel Sanchez
Nowadays, the types of threats against Critical Infrastructures are becoming more
sophisticated imposing the use of equally modern detection measures. The involved
aspects are too important when considering both direct physical threats and physi-
cal threats that enable malicious impact to the cyber domain as well. The Chapter
begins with an overview of the current situation in Critical Infrastructures in terms
of detecting physical threats, attacks, or hazards and continues by introducing
modern detecting techniques covering a wider range of threats. These vary from
systems with sensors for airborne threats along with audio and visual analytics up
to using the wireless networks themselves as sensing systems by exploiting their
networking features.
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22.1 Introduction
The most common impression when discussing in general terms about physical
security in critical infrastructures (CI) is that of dealing mainly with the protec-
tion of building sites and internal equipment from theft, vandalism, natural dis-
asters (i.e., floods, earthquakes), manmade catastrophes, and accidental damage
(e.g., electrical surges, heavy rains, and lightning) or unintentionally destructive
acts. In this context, physical security requires solid building construction, suit-
able emergency preparedness and procedures, reliable power supplies, adequate cli-
mate control, and appropriate protection from intruders. In order to accomplish
building sites be safeguarded in a way that minimizes the risk of resource theft and
destruction, decision-makers must be also concerned about regulations governing
equipment placement and use, product handling, and relationships with outside
contractors and agencies [1].
However, physical security is often a second thought when it comes to infor-
mation security. Since physical security has technical and administrative elements,
it is often overlooked because most organizations focus on “technology-oriented
security countermeasures” to prevent hacking attacks [2, 3]. Hacking into network
systems is not the only way that sensitive information can be stolen or used against.
Physical security must be implemented correctly to prevent attackers from gaining
physical access and cause physical damages and consequently endanger information
systems. In this context, cyber threats, apart from relative direct actions, can be also
seen as a result of physical security breaches (“cyber-physical threats”). To this end,
the physical element of security is often disregarded; hardware damages or vandal-
ism could occur while working with administrative and technical controls as well,
while organizations often focus on them, and as a result, security breaches may not
be discovered right away [4].
Physical security is often thought as only controlling personnel access to facilities;
however, its relation to achieving data center availability goals is more than crucial.
Physical security professionals are more concerned about the physical entrance of
a building environment and what damages a potential intruder may cause. As new
technologies such as biometric verification and remote management of security data
become more widely available, traditional card-and-guard security is being sup-
planted by security systems that can provide identification and tracking of human
activity in and around the data center. The challenges of implementing physical
security are much more important now than in previous decades; laptops, tablets,
and smartphones all have the ability to store sensitive data that can be lost or stolen.
CI organizations are obliged to safeguard personnel, information, equipment, IT
infrastructure, data, facilities, systems, and company assets (and all information
and software contained therein). Thus, before investing in equipment, they must
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carefully evaluate their specific security needs and determine the most appropriate
and cost-effective security measures for their facility [5].
22.2 Current Mechanisms and Sensors for Physical
Security
A brief overview of the current physical security solutions, mechanisms, and sen-
sors for protecting CI assets is given in this Section. Usually, the most sophisticated
physical security mechanisms are implemented for the protection of central build-
ings and headquarters. In most of the cases, integrated unified security systems are
implemented addressing mainly visual inspection and access control, following a
predefined plan.
The first step in a security plan is to identify the areas, rooms, and entry points
that need different rules of access. Thus, different levels of security are employed
depending on potentially stringent access methods to achieve added protection.
By this way, an inner area is protected both by its own access methods and by
those of the areas that enclose it. In addition, any breach of an outer area can be
met with another access challenge at a perimeter further in. This can be employed
in areas that might have concentric boundaries (i.e., site or building perimeter,
computer area, and computer rooms along with equipment racks) or with side-by-
side boundaries (i.e., visitor areas, offices, utility rooms) [5].
Thus, the strategies used to protect the organization’s assets need to have a lay-
ered approach. It is harder for the attackers to reach their objective when multiple
layers must be bypassed to access a resource. Various access levels and fragmen-
tation/separation of the building in zones are then employed, depending on the
foreseen physical threats and the type of area to be protected so that to prevent
unauthorized people to enter or access the site and use equipment. The main phys-
ical security mechanisms along with related sensors or components currently used
per case are described in the following:
22.2.1 Access Control and Personal Identification
Access control takes place at main entrances (input/output) especially for person-
nel and vehicles and in internal or other critical areas (i.e., data center). For the
organization’s staff and visitors, various methods may be of use involving per-
sonal identities, entrance cards, and, in most sophisticated cases, biometrics and
related measures. For critical or high security areas, simultaneous monitoring by
visual surveillance and closed circuits (CCTV) usually takes place along with checks
of incoming/outgoing people, recording of activities, tamper alarms, etc. Usually,
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guests must be accompanied while entrance may be allowed only to predefined
program-based areas. Almost in all cases, CCTV and Access Control systems are
interconnected. Depending on the desired security level, special measures include
detection of explosives, chemicals, or even of weapons and metal objects. Intercom-
munication of the entrance checkpoints with the control room usually takes place,
while silent panic buttons in all positions are also available.
Concerning entrance cards, a large variety exists on the market including per-
sonal cards with data and photo, limited validity cards for visitors/suppliers, smart
cards with onboard processor, magnetic stripe cards (with a simple magnetic strip
of identifying data) or magnetic spot cards (barium ferrite cards), bar-code cards,
and infrared shadow ones. The types of interaction with the relevant card readers
may be of swipe, insert, flat contact, and even with no contact as in proximity
cards or proximity tokens. Apart from their ability to be reprogrammed, the above
types of cards present resistance to counterfeiting and ability to allow access only in
permitted areas (floors) per employer. The programming process may be separate
for visitors and vendors, while an escort mode may be also used in certain cases in
conjunction with anti-passback mode.
Keypads and coded locks are also in wide use. They are reliable and very user-
friendly, but their security is limited by the sharable and guessable nature of pass-
words as personal access codes (PAC) or personal identification numbers (PIN) are
implied.
The most sophisticated tools are the biometrics sensors, which are used mostly
for verification of the identity rather identification of a person. Biometric scanning
techniques and relevant sensors have been developed for several human features:
fingerprint scanners, iris pattern, face biometrics models, retina pattern, handwrit-
ing, and voice recognition systems. Biometric devices are generally very reliable.
The main sources of unreliability for biometrics is the possibility that a legitimate
user may fail to be recognized (“false rejection”) and the erroneous recognition,
either by confusing one user with another or by accepting an imposter as a legiti-
mate user (“false acceptance”). Nowadays, a wide range of biometric devices exist
on the market, used either independently as stand-alone or in combination to other
measures like smart cards, which is highly likely to become mainstream. The main
considerations when choosing a biometric technique are the equipment cost, the
failure rates, and the user acceptance, especially in cases where specific conditions
should be regarded (i.e., distance from the sensors, light, etc.).
In parking areas and at all entrances, gardens, or facilities that vehicles may
access, the checking is being held by reading of the vehicles’ plates with high def-
inition and surveillance cameras (Vehicles’ plate recognition system). Recording
of the surrounding area and parking management systems can also be applied,
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using license plates databases of employees and access control procedures for trans-
porter/carriers.
Explosives Detectors can also be used in parallel to access control in high security
areas or at the entrances. Different detection systems (i.e., gates) for explosives and
hidden objects (i.e., weapons) are applied with units capable of detecting any such
material or metal within hand-luggage’s or carried by visitors, highlighting also the
material with color. Advanced detectors can be employed guaranteeing minimum
detection time while interconnections with the operator’s security system provide
remote control and silent alarm capabilities.
22.2.2 Perimeter Defense Mechanisms
In demanding situations, sophisticated methods such as perimeter defense are
also applied. These include both internal (headquarters or main buildings) and
external cases (outer area perimeter) incorporating a variety of sensors and com-
bined detection/protection systems.
Building perimeter: This refers mostly to major buildings of the infrastructure and
headquarters. The building perimeter usually includes a combination of the follow-
ing measures: access control on inputs/ outputs of the building and of sensitive criti-
cal areas, surveillance and tracing of interior violations, motion detectors and mag-
netic contacts, webcams around the building, tamper alarm even glass (window)
breaking detection.
Outer perimeter: On the other hand, the outer perimeter defense may incorporate
the whole infrastructure area by employing full monitoring and tracking of the
point of violation, cameras and sirens alert, visual surveillance of the perimeter,
enhanced lighting in dark areas and hidden (i.e., infra-red) illumination along with
electronic fencing systems.
The sensing systems that are usually employed in these detection and protection
mechanisms against physical threats include the following:
Access control systems: With biometrics or card readers as already described earlier.
Optical (Camera-based) surveillance systems: These include the following sensors:
• High-definition IP cameras for outdoor use: capable for day/night operation,
wide zones (i.e., 10 m) coverage, motion detection, enabling parallel monitor-
ing (in control rooms or checkpoints) with automatic recordings and alarm;
• Optical surveillance with high-analysis cameras: Megapixel cameras are
deployed around the building, supervising all surroundings. They offer the
ability to analyze individual images from a single camera, resulting up to
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10 times (and more) larger coverage than a simple camera, with multiple
digital extended zoom;
• Panoramic surveillance of the environment: Pan, tilt, and zoom (PTZ) cam-
eras are installed on the roof featuring high resolution of 520 TVLines, high
sensitivity less than 1 lux, and powerful zoom (×35 or more). They enable
overriding their control from the control room and interface with the perime-
ter tampering system.
Apart from the high-resolution cameras and access control system interconnec-
tions, the perimeter lighting can be also enabled through infrared (IR)/invisible
lighting elements. The camera-based surveillance systems can also accommodate
vehicle license plate recognition, are often combined with silent panic buttons
or with electronic fencing system, and assist to the intercommunication of the
entrance checkpoints with the control room.
Intrusion detection systems: Intrusion detection sensors provide an all-around glaz-
ing at the ground and lowest floors. The functionalities include the surveillance
of openings (doors, windows) and sliding doors, while the relevant sensors include
magnetic contacts, motion detectors, and crystal breaking detectors among others.
Electronic fencing systems: these are more sophisticated and more expensive solutions
which incorporate invisible underground (buried) sensing cables. The fencing sys-
tems create an invisible detection field, not affected by vegetation or the natural
environment. The detection range varies with usual widths of around 3 m and
with accuracy of less than 1 m. Graphic on-line representation can be visible to
the central control, while there is the possibility of partial or total activation of the
fence or interfacing with CCTV.
Associated operation procedures: The above sensing and detection systems are usually
combined with associated operation procedures of the CI’s security staff. Security
Guards patrols take place through specific route and time planning based on patrol
scenarios, crosschecked with CCTV and intrusion detection systems. Evacuation
plans are also being practiced involving specific measures, i.e., automated output
counting units and similar.
22.2.3 Discussion on Current Physical Security Mechanisms —
Identification of Gaps
The above detection and sensing systems are administrated as standalones or within
unified security management systems (SMS), either outsourced to specialized com-
panies or managed inherently by each operator or both. The SMS often involve
central control rooms and are designed to be compatible with International Security
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Standards and the organizations’ procedures, providing functionalities such as inte-
gration with IT applications and TCP/IP LAN networks, client–server remote
monitoring, encryption of network data and data integrity, double routes or dual
flows, checks with internal and external blacklists and provision of direct, through
complex reports. However, it should be noted that usually the SMS, although con-
ducting the orchestration of the sensors and surveillance mechanisms, only indicate
the faults providing alarms, while the faults/alarms’ handling and tackling is being
managed by the operator instead.
It is clear that the abovementioned physical security aspects affect all types of
CIs which in turn also make use of telecom infrastructures. Therefore, large inter-
dependences with the telecom CIs are shown for delivering data or notifications
to the SMS which might not be noticed if the telecom infrastructure is breached.
Security equipment deployed on site can have different levels of integration with
the telecommunication system; many of them rely on the possibility to use the site
LAN and local networks via ethernet or via WiFi. This, however, makes them open
to any attack to the telecom infrastructure and availability.
For the Telecom CIs, the issues of both physical and cyber threats are of major
importance since they greatly affect one another. Nevertheless, although cyber
threats are given the major attention, which is reasonable since data security is a
primary factor and are usually handled by the telecom provider’s Network Opera-
tion Centre (NOC), the physical security threats in telecom CIs are not regarded
evenly. Usually, the most sophisticated physical security mechanisms, as described
earlier, are implemented for the security of the central telecommunication build-
ings and headquarters where large number of the telecom organization’s personnel
is employed and is present on day-to-day basis, along with the core of the telecom
assets (i.e., NOCs and main backhaul fiber optics terminals).
Although the above hierarchy is considered reasonable due to the critical units
involved, it should be noted, however, that this is rather not the case for all the
telecom assets that a telecom provider possesses. Telecom pillars, antenna parks, or
even fiber optics terminals in remote and rural areas are not given equal security
treatment as in large central telecom buildings, since it is more expensive. Sophisti-
cated security methods are rarely observed in decentralized structures; the situation
is even more critical for assets such as antenna parks or facilities at remote islands
or mountainous regions. There, security guards may be employed, while ordinary
wire fencing is the main protection measure.
On the other hand, cost is one of the most important parameters, since the
investment in advanced security mechanisms for the many remote assets could
turn to be high enough, limiting the cost-effectiveness, not considering the needed
resources in time and effort for the relevant implementations. Thus, it is most com-
mon for major telecom organizations to invest in disaster or redundancy centers,
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back-up infrastructure and networks, along with failover techniques for the main
services, facilitating management from a central station to relevant checkpoints all
over the country. In general, redundancy networks, disaster centers, or failover capa-
bilities are common, and almost obligatory, for all types of CIs, tackling not only
issues associated with physical intrusion but also with potential losses due to over-
loads or natural disasters such as floods, lighting, and earthquakes.
It should be highlighted, though, that despite the offered control operations,
the main functionality pursued by current security systems, mechanisms, and sen-
sors apart detection is deterrence. Thus, the principles governing the basic proce-
dures of the usual physical security plans are detection, deterrence, response, and
recovery/re-evaluation. As mentioned earlier, in current CI’s security systems, detec-
tion is seen more as a physical detection of an intruder, attempting to illegally access
premises and facilities. To this end, the overall security measures and sensing systems
employed mainly focus to address the personnel identification and access control
and thus are mainly meant for deterrence purposes. The deterrence principle is con-
ducted through the organization’s policy, operating procedures, and control, and
similarly, the response principle is mostly addressed by the guard staff through the
same procedures. Recovery and re-evaluation mainly affect the operational actions
of the security staff.
However, the procedures used mainly address a rather limited implementation
than a holistic tackling of the principles addressed. Additionally, the use of all the
above security mechanisms depends on their relevant cost which is being regarded
as an important factor. For example, limitations and weaknesses can be noticed
in most of the current cases: i.e., reluctance in employing the newest commercial
models, possibly due to cost reasons, may result in inefficient access management
or poor integration of ambient information. Furthermore, in case of inherently
managed security systems, best practices are difficult to be followed, resulting in
limited protection of entry/exit points or even limited scalability maintaining only
a minimum coverage of the surroundings (i.e., only the main building).
Moreover, newest trends in physical security such as pattern recognition and
machine learning techniques are rarely employed to classify persons, vehicles, and
other objects moving within the controlled area and to extract profiles and rele-
vant semantic information for event processing and further analysis with correla-
tion platforms. Current processes often require large effort of the operator and the
security personnel when monitoring a huge number of sensors on a day-to-day
basis.
Another important issue that needs to be taken into account is that, due to the
increase in malicious actions nowadays and the large amount of services provided,
the threats in modern CIs involve quite more complex aspects than the ordinary
physical security systems can handle. Furthermore, all kinds of issues endangering
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CI facilities, including airborne threats, are on the table for that matter and need
to be confronted. As malicious acts and terrorism threats turn to be more advanced
and sophisticated nowadays, it seems that current approaches should be enhanced
with more flexible solutions that could integrate more advanced mechanisms along
with an increased degree of assessing resilience. Additionally, the impact that phys-
ical threats may have on cyber aspects (cyber-physical threat) seems often to be
disregarded or dealt separately, and this is too important especially for the telecom
CIs. Presently, physical intrusion is not only meant for theft or to cause physi-
cal damages but rather to enable hazards and damages at the cyber domain of a
CI, i.e., to install malicious dormant software or enable hacking actions. To this
respect, modern and novel techniques are needed to address cyber-physical threats
along with holistic solutions to provide suitable correlation of physical and cyber
events.
22.3 Modern Detectors of Physical Threats in CIs
In the previous Sections, an overview of the current security and protection sensors
and mechanisms against physical threats in CIs was described, while the gaps in the
implementation were identified. As discussed, the increased security requirements
nowadays imply the employment of new approaches and solutions. In this context,
modern innovative sensing mechanisms are presented for the detection of physical
and cyber-physical threats. The presentation will focus on the functionalities of
various platforms of active and passive sensors for direct detection (i.e., physical
intrusion, airborne threats, etc.) along with wireless networks acting themselves as
sensing units. All these techniques are implemented within the framework of the
EU H2020 RESISTO project [6].
22.3.1 Audio and Video Analytics Sensor Platforms
and Monitoring Tools
Video and Audio sensors are widely used in surveillance operations and protec-
tion of critical infrastructures. However, the emerging sophisticated types of threats
impose the demand for adding intelligence, resulting in integrated audio and video
analytics tools. In this context, intelligence algorithms are applied in audio and
video streams for the real-time detection of events and for the early identification
of illicit activity. Pattern recognition and machine learning techniques are used to
extract acoustic events (i.e., gunshot, screaming, glass breaking) or to classify per-
sons, vehicles, and other objects that are moving within the controlled area of the
infrastructure.
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A smart surveillance system that constitutes from video sensors (cameras),
embedded on other computational units and video analytics algorithms, consists
the Video Analytics Component (VAC). Video segments of interest are generated
(upon the detection of alert) and stored for further use and notification of security
personnel. Various types of CCTV cameras (i.e., fixed Outdoor IP-based CCTV
camera and a PTZ camera) can be used to provide seamless image of the area of
interest, supporting Pan, Tilt, and Zoom operations so that the camera is moved
to a desired location.
Highly sensitive microphones, such omnidirectional and array ones (micro-
phones operating in tandem), can be used as well for the Audio Analytics Compo-
nent (AAC). The omni type is meant for acoustic event detections, while the array
is meant to locate the source of the sound event. Both types can be attached to an
embedded PC (e.g., Raspberry 3), where the first level of detection algorithms is
executed. Beyond the acoustic event detection, audio analytics are enhanced with
intelligent algorithms capable for localization of the source of the detected event
(estimating the position of the acoustic source). This feature is used as an input for
the steering of the video sensors (i.e., PTZ video sensor) in order to adjust their
position to the source of the acoustic event. The whole tool is developed by Aditess
Ltd, Cyprus within the framework of the RESISTO project.
By this way, the added intelligence transforms the sensors to an integrated
audio/video-based surveillance system; each component can be also used as stan-
dalone or be integrated as an overall sub-system to a holistic integrated platform.
The added value of this integration, between audio and visual sensors, lies in the
ability to provide to the security operator a real-time picture of the field where the
event occurred, through a generated video clip and an alert notification. Further-
more, cross-correlations of audio and video analysis results are developed in order to
provide more accurate and precise alerts. This intelligent process reduces the effort
of the operator by monitoring in a 24/7 base a huge number of sensors. Addition-
ally, the early detection of events and the ability to extract semantic information
(i.e., type and location of event, illegal access in restricted area) can provide useful
data to event processing and correlation platforms for further analysis.
22.3.2 UAV Platform-based Sensors and Mini-UAV Systems
Drones and mini Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (mini-UAV systems) are an emerging
new concept worldwide which, with a relatively low cost, are used in a variety of
applications, commercial to surveillance ones. Apart from existing commercial plat-
forms, customized platforms can be designed, such as of multirotor, helicopter, and
fixed-wind types, as those developed by Aditess Ltd, Cyprus, within the framework
of the RESISTO project.
Modern Detectors of Physical Threats in CIs 407
These UAV platforms can be optimized for certain surveillance and inspection
needs with various payloads such as lightweight miniature cameras and electro-optic
sensors (i.e., daylight, IR, thermal cameras), GPS modules, chemical sensors as well
as intelligent web-based software for the coordination of UAV platforms and sensor
setup in order to fulfill every security requirement. This configuration includes the
selection of the appropriate platform and payload along with the communication
with the ground control station (GCS), based on several criteria including the mis-
sion analysis (path, time, covered distance, range), communication (Air to Ground
and Ground to Infrastructure using LTE/4G or physical network if applicable), and
risk metrics among others.
The Mini-UAV systems can also enable navigation in controlled civilian airspace
according to relevant aviation standards and certification requirements that will
become applicable, addressing homeland security applications and flight opera-
tions. Especially for rural and remote areas, friendly drones and UAVs can enhance
the video surveillance system with aerial images and be used to evaluate the emerg-
ing anti-drone technologies.
22.3.3 Active and Passive Detectors of Airborne Threats
(i.e., UAVs)
The rapidly proliferating use of unmanned devices, in many aspects of commercial
and everyday life, has brought about new and emerging challenges. In many cases,
such as regulating air traffic and security, early detection of such objects is more than
crucial. Furthermore, drones and UAVs can be maliciously used as potential types of
human-driven physical threats against civilian critical infrastructures imposing the
need for relevant detection measures. To this respect, especially for civilian CI cases,
the focus is given specifically in detecting airborne threats as UAVs and drones,
flying at rather short ranges from the targeted CI. The aim is to be able to use
low-cost sensors that can provide early warnings of an airborne threat and potential
intrusion, to a central security platform.
In light of the emerging use of unmanned devices, UAVs or drones are nowadays
more and more considered as potential human-driven physical threats. Anomalies
and airborne threats to CIs or specific telecom ones (i.e., remote antenna parks
and/or telecom pillars on high rooftops) are mainly monitored through visual
methods (i.e., cameras); the threat has to be in rather close proximity to be detected
which leaves less time for reaction. Counter-UAV technology has already seen
extensive use and a continuously growing interest. Main challenges include detec-
tion effectiveness, false negatives/positives, distinguishing legitimate and illegiti-
mate drone use, legal framework, and lack of standards [7].
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The specific airborne threat detection system, developed by the Institute of Com-
munication and Computer Systems (ICCS), Greece, within the framework of the
RESISTO project, is a set of tools designed and developed to detect the presence of
UAVs as airborne threats and to provide alarm signals. The system consists of active
and passive sensors, namely radar and acoustic sensors, respectively [8]. These sys-
tem’s components can be used either separately or in combination. The detectors
are a small lightweight continuous wave Doppler radar combined with acoustic
sensors, such as array of high sensitivity microphones for the reception of signals
emitted by such UAV platforms. Those signals may be in the microwave/RF (e.g.,
remote controls) or the sound/acoustic frequency region (e.g., drones propulsion).
Hence, the focus is on exploiting the combined imprint of UAVs as captured by
microphone and radar systems.
A Doppler radar uses the Doppler Effect to derive velocity data about mov-
ing objects at a distance. An accurate measurement of the original transmitted fre-
quency and the reflected return frequency (echo) determines the Doppler frequency
shift, which is a direct indication of the target’s speed, the radial component of a
target’s velocity relative to the radar. The measured speed is relative to the range
of the target (radial distance) along with the target’s angle of arrival. The Doppler
CW radar is able to detect and track fast-moving targets providing good visibility
in harsh conditions (dusk, rain, or snow). In contrast to optical or infrared sys-
tems, Doppler radars detect more accurately small-sized objects in the (optimal)
3 GHz–30 GHz frequency band with adequate sensing ranges. However, it should
be noted that radar’s detection capability depends on the target’s Radar Cross Sec-
tion (RCS: the effective aperture of the target) and the ability to distinguish between
small objects and clutter that the sensor will also pick up especially for objects
with low RCS as the drones are [9]. Generally, the RCS reflects the degree that
the target can be detected and depends on a variety of parameters such as the rela-
tive position of the target in respect to the radar, the frequency of operation along
with the relative incident and scattering angles, and, most importantly, the target
characteristics, namely the aperture/profile, its material, and dimensions relatively
to the wavelength. Low RCS makes the detection within cluttered environments
very demanding with trade-offs between false alarm rates and detection probabili-
ties [10]. To this respect, low RCS of airborne objects, such as UAVs and drones,
is tackled with advanced signal processing and the combined use of other sensors
such as the acoustic ones.
The acoustic sensors used in the present system are a set of high sensitivity
dynamic microphones forming an array. Acoustic sensors have many advantages
that include non-line-of-sight, omni-directionality, passiveness, low-cost, and low-
power, playing a potential key role in situational awareness; since they do not
depend on the target’s size, but rather on its acoustic signature, i.e., the sound of
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the engine. Nevertheless, acoustic sensing depends on the environmental condi-
tions and related sources of acoustic attenuation (e.g., temperature, wind speed,
and direction). Acoustic microphone arrays are used as a second sensor modality
to detect broadband acoustic emissions from approaching targets, either forming
linear arrays or diagonal (i.e., 4 microphones arranged in a cross format), which
yield to be the most optimal ones. By exploiting the target’s strong emitted sound
harmonics mainly in the 20 Hz–2 kHz range, moving targets can be detected and
tracked regardless of their size by acoustic sensors [11].
Having captured the sound signal of the target, signal detection and processing
methods can be used. For example, time-domain waveform cross correlation of
the captured waveform with a previously recorded sound waveform of the target
as a reference along with performing in parallel Harmonic Line Association in the
frequency domain, in order the necessary results to be extracted. Advanced signal
processing and machine intelligence/machine learning techniques are applied to
the radar and acoustic data, both in the time-domain and the frequency-domain
to achieve detection and to estimate the target’s angle of arrival and range/velocity.
In terms of the detection and tracking, the radar sensors detect the presence of
the small unmanned aircraft by its radar signature (often employing algorithms to
distinguish between other small, low-flying objects), while the acoustic ones detect
drones by recognizing the unique sounds produced by their motors. The system
can detect the target’s movement when the drone is approaching or moves away;
even when the drone is at hover mode, the derived conclusion is that the radar
mainly detects the fast movement of the propellers. Neural network techniques are
expected to increase the ability of distinguishing low RCS targets and to advance
the overall performance.
Combinations of the two methods are beginning to emerge as integrated solu-
tions for monitoring the airspace over critical infrastructures: aligning the results
and theoretical basis with modern system implementations, progressing by this way
the relevant state of the art for a low cost, low power combination. Recent tech-
nology trends show that detecting low RCS moving targets can be made feasible by
implementing mixed techniques [12]; the emission of high-frequency waves (active
methods) may be complemented by receiving the acoustic output (passive) of such
systems to accomplish detection. These emerge as a promising solution also com-
bined with visual methods (i.e., cameras) or electro-optical systems which detect
the UAVs based on their visual signature and infrared (IR) ones based on their heat
signature.
The whole system may act either as stand-alone or as plug-in module in a wider
platform architecture providing alerts and potential intrusion events corresponding
to the presence of potential moving airborne threats. The use of multiple detection
elements is intended to overcome the inherent limitations of each technology and to
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increase the probability of a successful detection, given that no individual method
is entirely failproof. Therefore, the employed combination of active and passive
sensors may provide additionally situational awareness and perimeter CIs defense
against low-flying threat aircrafts.
22.3.4 Wireless Networks as Sensing Systems Against Physical
Threats
Considering the emerging 5G telecom infrastructures, Internet of Things (IoT)
networks are expected to be expanded in the near future and to dominate in every-
day life with the use of wireless networks and wireless sensor networks distributed
in large areas and infrastructures. Thus, it is of great importance that these telecom
facilities are capable of adequately tackling physical as well as cyber-physical threats.
While sensing networks with advanced features are foreseen, it is reasonable that
these networks obtain additional security functionalities, in order to be capable of
detecting and responding to risks and physical threats, being either human driven
or as consequences of natural disasters.
This notion presupposes certain added functionalities both in the hardware and
software/firmware of these wireless networks as current and future parts of CIs so
that to act by themselves as detecting systems. In the following, two examples of
such types of applications are being given, as developed in the framework of the
RESISTO project by Integrasys SA, Spain, also involving features of the Guard-
Time SA KSI Blockchain, Estonia. These applications are the RADIOFILTER and
RANMONITOR ones and are briefly described below:
RADIOFILTER Tool
RADIOFILTER is a tool which offers detection, location, and reporting of WLAN-
based threats and attacks to critical infrastructures protected assets.
The tool is based on a network of N-distributed passive Secured Cyber Sen-
sors, deployed at an infrastructure, which continuously scan the data-link traffic
and relay this information to a central processing node (Central Node). This setup
enables the system to monitor the data-link (layer 2) traffic parameters in 802.11
WLAN networks in order to detect, locate, and report 802.11 WLAN-based threat
events. The events and useful related information can be visualized through an
external Web User Interface for stand-alone use. The integrity of the cyber sen-
sors’ firmware is taken care of by a firmware update server connecting to an exter-
nal Guardtime KSI server for generating KSI-blockchain signatures of the sensor
firmware as a cryptographic timestamp. These firmware security anchors are used
to check that the new firmware version has not been maliciously tampered with.
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The specific RADIOFILTER application is ideal in cases that a CI operator
needs to protect the inner part of a building, whereas a WLAN Network (i.e.,
802.11) is installed, from confidential information stealing and service disruption
risks. In such case, the operator’s internal WLAN network needs to be protected
from unauthorized devices installed. These intrusion devices are not the access
points, devices, and client connections whitelisted by the CI operator, which have
location and connectivity restriction and are allowed inside the infrastructure (cen-
tralized, ad hoc, local, and internet allowed for each WLAN client). In other words,
the WLAN only accepts a specific set of client devices and any unauthorized device
connection is dealt as an unauthorized intrusion.
Following a relevant survey, the RADIOFILTER radio monitoring sensors are
placed within the inner part of the building. Each monitoring cyber sensor is pow-
ered by a small single-board computer (i.e., Raspberry) and is able to monitor the
IEEE 802 b/g/n/ac, (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands) WLAN technologies. The sensor
also includes a secure element used to encrypt and store critical data such as root
certificates and firmware security anchors. The system collects data captured by
the cyber sensors from all the access points, devices, and connections in the infras-
tructure; estimates a specific access point or device location using a fingerprinting
method based on machine learning techniques; checks the different infrastructure
whitelist databases for event detection; and generates events in case that an unau-
thorized device attempts to be connected.
By this way, various cases of unauthorized connections can be detected. For
example, A non-whitelisted mobile phone with WLAN connectivity (Unautho-
rized Device Event Detection) or a non-whitelisted WLAN Access Point (Unautho-
rized Access Point Event Detection) may be a threat event. As soon as the mobile
phone’s WLAN connection or the Access Point’s connection are activated, these
events are detected, as the BSSID (MAC Address) of the device or Access Point are
not in the relevant operator’s whitelists. The same takes place also in the case that a
non-whitelisted WLAN ad hoc connection between authorized clients (Unautho-
rized Connection Event Detection) is used. Thus, a new threat event detect message
is generated and displayed on the RADIOFILTER Web User Interface as a flashing
indicator upon the location’s map.
RANMONITOR Tool
RANMONITOR offers detection and reporting of threats and attacks to LTE
Radio Access Network (RAN). The main RAN attacks that the tool is able to
monitor are the following: full-band or partial interference, protocol-aware jam-
ming, rogue base station, IMSI-catcher (International Mobile Subscriber Identity),
and poorly configured base stations.
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The tool is based on one or several Radio-Cyber RAN Sensors that can be
deployed anywhere, which passively scan the cellular radio spectrum as well as the
downlink control channel information and relay this information to a central pro-
cessing node (Central Node). This setup enables the system to monitor the cell
parameters and status in LTE RAN networks in order to detect, locate, and report
threat and attack events which can be visualized also through a Web User Interface
for stand-alone use.
The RANMONITOR concept of operation is similar to the RADIOFLTER’s
one; however, the sensors are different since they are suitable for LTE RANs net-
works. Each monitoring radio-cyber RAN sensor powered by a standard computer
module allows for appropriate signal acquisition and processing while the monitor-
ing functions are performed by a radio cellular modem and by a Software Defined
Radio (SDR) platform able to scan all surrounding channels. The RANMONI-
TOR tool is suitable for LTE mobile network operators in order to protect the
availability of the service from any degradation in a set of cells located in a specific
area, in other words, to protect the network users against attacks generated from,
i.e., IMSI-catcher devices.
Following a survey to provide an estimation of the proper location, the RAN
sensors are suitably placed as well as the general parameters of the system are con-
figured so that upon operation a set of threats and attack events to be detected
by the tool. These threats include jammer performing a protocol-aware jamming
attack, an unintentional interferer causing full-band or partial interference, as well
as rogue base stations.
In the case that an unauthorized LTE cell (rogue base station) attempts to get
connected and starts broadcasting its physical level information parameters, the
RANMONITOR tool extracts the base station identification parameters checking
with the mobile operators’ network information, cell list, and cell map databases.
Thus, an Unauthorized Cell Event is detected by RANMONITOR tool since this
cell was not in the RAN cell list. The new event and its related information appear
at the tool’s events log table, and also the rogue cell is indicated at the RANMON-
ITOR Web User Interface, including the detected cells and band visualization at
the moment of the intrusion.
22.4 Conclusion
The present chapter describes the status of the sensors and security measures that are
currently used in critical infrastructures while, additionally, presents novel detection
mechanisms to enhance detection, protection, and security against intrusions and
modern sophisticated physical threats. As it is seen, sensors and tools with various
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maturity level are offered in order to fill in the gaps in physical security in existing
CIs and to provide advanced features in detection and protection processes address-
ing the modern needs in confronting risks and attacks. The concept of employing
wireless networks as sensing networks by themselves, using firmware methods is
also presented. The foreseen tools involve applications of emerging technologies in
order to address intrusion events in light of the nowadays situations both in attacks
and in technology trends.
Apart from the detection systems’ description, the aim of the specific chapter,
concerning security, is also to prove the concept that new types of sensing systems
for the detection of modern threats can be successfully integrated to an overall
holistic platform that would address the whole circle from prevention, detection,
protection, response, and mitigation in critical infrastructures enhancing in the end
their overall resilience.
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The Ethical Aspects of Critical
Infrastructure Protection
By Marina Da Bormida
Critical infrastructures across different sectors are being strongly affected by the
introduction of the IoT paradigm, CPS systems, intelligent digitally empowered
devices, Big Data analytics, AI, and machine learning. Alongside an array of bene-
fits, this transformational path also poses not only additional risks to their operation
and security but also legal and ethical challenges and concerns for developers, prac-
titioners, participants, and policy-makers, ranging from data protection and privacy
preservation, to dataveillance, social cooling and dictatorship of data, to data own-
ership and access aspects, to safety, responsibility and liability, algorithmic bias and
others.
The regulatory landscape is fragmented and runs at a much lower pace than
technological development. Novel “soft law” tools, capable of giving granular and
practical guidance, as well as ethics-related standardization initiatives, like the IEEE
Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, provide com-
plementary rules and useful insights to traditional legal instruments to overcome
or mitigate the given challenges raised by these technologies.
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Other driving factors towards legal compliance and ethically-sound design,
development, and operation of such developments are the Privacy and security by
design and ethics & rule of law by design approaches, the regulatory sandboxes,
and the cross-fertilization of law and technology, such as certain forms of auto-
mated compliance tools [6].
23.1 Introduction
Critical infrastructures that support the operation and development of our societies
across several sectors, like finance, healthcare, and energy, are being strongly affected
by the introduction of the IoT paradigm, CPS systems and intelligent digitally
empowered devices, such as sensors, to robots, smart wearables, smartphones, and
drones, as well as by other emerging ICT technologies, like Big Data analytics, AI,
and machine learning. Furthermore, critical infrastructures’ digitalized and inter-
connected operations, business processes, and decision-making imply large collec-
tion and processing of increasingly amount of field data, often exchanged between
relevant stakeholders within the given value chain. The boundaries between the
physical and digital worlds are vanishing, and the digital control of physical pro-
cesses is a reality.
This transformational path has multiple benefits, in terms of increasing the effi-
ciency and sustainability of current practices and better performance gains, for
instance, unfolding a range of possibilities to discover, manage, orchestrate, and
control physical space to realize coordinated behaviors within and across devices.
At the same time, this metamorphosis also poses additional risks to critical infras-
tructures’ operation and security. A novel range of cybersecurity challenges sums up
to the traditional physical security ones faced by critical infrastructure operators,
giving rise to the emergence of integrated approaches for critical infrastructures
security, simultaneously protecting cyber and physical assets.
The introduction of integrated security systems into critical infrastructures poses
ethical and legal challenges for developers, practitioners, participants, and policy-
makers.
In conjunction with the array of expected benefits of these systems, unintended
negative effects might occur and need to be avoided, or at least minimized, by
thinking ahead, while at the same time ensuring that these technologies can benefit
everyone, upholding legal concepts and ethical values, protecting human safety,
physical integrity, dignity, intimacy, autonomy, and self-determination [1, 2].
One of the challenges related to these systems is to maximize security, and
therefore the utility of the overall systems towards this direction, while protecting
human rights, preserving ethical values, and respecting the regulatory framework.
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The ethical dimensions of these systems need to be explored in an attempt to bal-
ance them with the protection of the critical infrastructures against physical and
cyberattacks within the EU. Ethical risks, including data-related risks, have to be
mitigated both at design time and run time, ensuring that architectures are safe and
secure but also adhere to and promote European values (e.g., democracy, privacy
safeguards, equal opportunities). Fair, trustworthy, ethical, and regulatory frame-
works aimed at ensuring the compliance to the legislation enforcing these values
should be perceived, rather than as restrictive, as an opportunity and competitive
advantage, even more if taking place alongside technological developments.
In fact, an adequate ethical and legal framework, properly tackling with human-
centered challenges and which would ensure that the solutions and services are
designed and used in an ethical manner, is therefore critical to ensure trust in the
security ecosystem around critical infrastructures, which, in turn, is essential to the
acceptability of the technological artifacts, offering services and experimentation
opportunities to the whole range of stakeholders across the critical infrastructure
value chain [1].
The next paragraph will focus specifically on some key questions and ethical chal-
lenges, which can provide a basis for the development of an ethical and legal frame-
work on systems relying on holistic approaches for critical infrastructures security
against cyber and physical threats.
23.2 Legal and Ethical Challenges
As underlined in the previous paragraph, the technological changes related to the
Cyber-Physical System (CPS), Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT),
and integrated security systems introduction in the critical infrastructures, while
carrying the potential to yield new solutions and opportunities for business, gov-
ernment, and societies, also generate new risks, concerns, and challenges in multiple
contexts.
IoT, AI, blockchain and Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), collaborative
and intelligent devices, cyber ranges, cyber-physical systems are expected to opti-
mize and make more secure and more efficient the critical infrastructures’ processes.
These processes and the operation of the system are fuelled by digital assets like dig-
ital twins, operational data, and machine learning models. They manifest both in
the cyberspace and in the physical world, depending on underlying cloud-based
infrastructure and other operational and information technology infrastructures,
often geographically spread.
Being such digital assets and infrastructure increasingly interconnected, auto-
mated, and geographically distributed, not only the security challenges are greater
but also ethical concerns and the risk of non-compliance with internationally
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recognized human rights, such as the right to privacy. The same apply to AI-
supported technology with, for instance, facial recognition and emotion detection.
The increasing fragmentation in the legal and regulatory landscape at global,
regional, and national level contributes to make the situation even more complex
and to the emergence of novel accountability challenges.
Without claiming to be complete, the following list provides hints on some of
the most pressing legal and ethical issues and concerns that need to be addressed,
ranging from privacy and data protection rights, to liability, inequality, discrimina-
tion, algorithmic bias and non-transparency, safety, personal autonomy, and iden-
tity [3, 7, 11, 12].
Data protection and privacy
CPS extract, collect, and share vast amounts of data to operate effectively, including
sensitive information, especially in the healthcare and financial sectors. This raises
privacy concerns.
The areas of interest or concern and possible issues and challenges include:
– Data practices in relation to obtaining and ensuring informed consent
– Ensuring transparency of the process by which the tools collect, process, and
make use of personal data, including the terms of use of algorithms
– Materialization of the concept of privacy by design and by default in IoT,
CPS, and AI applications
– Concepts of sensitiveness and vulnerability, especially in case of patients
and/or people under constant direct observation or surveillance
– Sharing of private individual information collected by IoT devices with other
systems and preventing the potential misuse of data
– Data collection and processing during the research, development, and testing
of AI-empowered tools and CPS
– Tackling inverse privacy and safeguarding personal data rights, filling the gap
between the rights enacted by the GDPR (and its 28 national implementa-
tions) and the average understanding of their implications, both from citi-
zens and businesses, as well as their operationalization in IoT and AI settings,
where sticky policies, dynamic user consent, and other developments could
be further explored to to develop legally compliant, smart solutions.
– The awareness of the kind of data that is being collected and processes is often
scarce, and this diminishes an individual’s power and freedom.
– Considering that the human-data relation is asymmetric, individuals can feel
powerless in the relation to data, and there is the risk of leading to a loss of
control over the access to one’s own personal data, including the so-called
right to be forgotten, which is considered in the EU as one of the pillars of
an individual’s control over their personal data.
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Dataveillance, social cooling, and dictatorship of data [5]
The risk of dataveillance and intrusive big data practices, due to the availability
of more and more data sources and the easier and faster data analysis to generate
insights. For instance, for addressing the security challenges posed by the critical
infrastructures protection, one’s position can be tracked over time, through tools
like the ubiquitous use of Closed-circuit Television (CCTV) circuits, coupled with
Global Positioning System (GPS) positioning in mobile devices, as well as the use
of credit cards and Automated Teller Machine (ATM) cards for payments and with-
drawals.
People’s awareness of the possibility of being watched at any moment might
result, as shown by field experiments, in the so-called social cooling, which is a side
effect of Big Data, and refers to the individuals’ attitude to conform to the expected
norm, especially considering that our society makes extensive use of scoring systems,
where critical life changing opportunities are increasingly determined by such scor-
ing systems, often obtained through opaque predictive algorithms applied to data
to determine the value of an individual or social group. This is capable of limit-
ing people’s desire to take risks or exercise free speech. Over the long term, these
self-censorship, risk aversion, and waiver to the exercise of free speech might “cool
down” society and produce increased social rigidity and have an impact on human
ability to evolve as an inclusive society, where minority views and vulnerable people
are still able to flourish.
In strict correlation with dataveillance and social cooling, another ethical con-
cern arises. Despite the undoubted advantages of digital identities, for example,
in terms of possibility to access to online contents and all related services through
them, the widespread use of such identities makes possible retrieving from the web
publicly available information on an individual and generating insights. This might
determine the dictatorship of data, with discriminating effects, based on the rep-
resentation of a person as portrayed by his/her data, as opposed to the real self. In
other words, individuals are treated as mere aggregates of data and are therefore no
longer respected.
Data ownership and access aspects [1, 8, 10]
Data ownership, control, and access aspects need to be investigated, as regards the
claimed property right on data and information, in relation to human data inter-
action and interconnected devices, that is the case of data retrieved by the sensors
of the objects connected to the Internet of Things, with even more complexity
when the information is personal or financial data. Radio-frequency identifica-
tion (RFID), GPS, and Near Field Communication (NFC) technologies allow to
track the geographic place where a person is and his movements from one place to
another, without his knowledge.
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Ubiquitous devices embedded in daily lives in a IoT landscape, primarily collect
data that is about or produced by people, either explicitly produced by themselves
(such as location data in case of sharing location while running through wearable
accessories) or implicitly inferred by the sensing infrastructures, in cases such as
monitoring critical infrastructures. Data collection and processing serves them in
a broad range of purposes in everyday life in connection, for instance, with the
operation of the critical infrastructures in the health, energy and financial sectors,
ranging from personal healthcare to tailored smart city services for energy savings,
processing data on energy footprint of an individual’s home or other situational
context. In relation to the unprecedented amount of data collected by these devices,
the fundamental research questions are who owns this data and who might have
access to it.
The data ownership claims are also related with the risk of data monopolies and
with the theme of asymmetries of powers.
In fact, data ownership might be referred also to proprietary data, not only to
personal data: data producers have the interest to remain in control of their data and
to retain their rights as the original owners and therefore demand for the recognition
of ownership claims. However, the legal framework is uncertain and fragmented,
and it is difficult to apply legal categories: for instance, data is an intangible good
difficult to define, and it is not clear the legal concept itself of data ownership. Many
questions arise, such as if the EU’s existing law provides sufficient protection for data
and, if not, what more is needed; if data is capable of ownership (sui generis right
or copyright law); if and which is the legal basis for claims of ownership of data.
Meanwhile, there are solutions, such as those reflecting the IDSA Data Sovereignty
paradigm, that provide the factual exclusivity of data through flexible and pragmatic
tools, combining agile contracting with enabling technological artifacts, able to
provide certainty and predictability.
Accessibility of information
In relation to accessibility of information, a cyberattack in IoT employed in critical
infrastructures, which makes the system vulnerable, might have a direct influence
on people’s lives, and this might happen in electric heating systems, bank and insur-
ance IT infrastructures, food distribution networks, hospitals, transport networks,
and many others.
Safety, responsibility, and liability [11, 12]
One of the main concerns, especially in relation to AI and human–machine inter-
action, refers to safety aspects, which are especially important as the complex, intel-
ligent, and self-learning CPS increasingly operate in close proximity to humans.
Furthermore, also finding the initial cause and the allocation of liability might
prove complex. In case of malfunctioning, who can we hold accountable and
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responsible for failure? Which is the position of the developer or producer of
the CPS?
The theme of liability, including the identification of who is responsible – and
liable – for failures and insurance instruments for products/users, is a key issue for
CPS systems and their integrated security solutions to reach their full potential,
especially in contexts with multiple stakeholders and decisions being made by arti-
ficial intelligence.
Increase of Digital divide [1]
Another concern regards the difficulty of some individuals in understanding and
accessing services delivered through the use of these new technologies, not being
familiar with them.
Algorithmic bias
Another issue pertains to the risk of algorithmic bias and in general the risk of
discrimination, manipulation, misuse, and technological determinism.
23.3 The Regulatory Landscape
23.3.1 The Legal Context
The legal and regulatory framework relevant in relation to the design, deployment,
and operation of integrated security systems into critical infrastructures character-
ized by the wide use of the IoT paradigm, CPS systems, and intelligent digitally
empowered devices and other emerging ICT technologies, like Big Data analytics,
AI, and machine learning, is complex, fragmented, and significantly different in
each of the domains concerned (financial, energy, and healthcare sectors).
The following notes are intended only to provide an overview of the main general
pieces of legislation applicable across several domains and at EU level and need
to be integrated with sector-specific and national-wide surveys dwelling upon the
legislation underlining the security of the infrastructure employed in each sector.
The main pieces of legislation, partially overlapping among themselves, refer to
Human Rights Law, Data Protection Law, Telecommunications Law, Information
Technology Security Law, Law on Trust Services, Identification, Authentication,
Intellectual Property Law, Critical Infrastructures Law, include:
– Regulation 2016/679/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data;
– Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of
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privacy in the electronic communications sector (ePrivacy Directive), which
is expected to be replaced by a Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Com-
munications, whose proposal is currently following the approval process;
– Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 July 2016 concerning measures for a high common level of security of
network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive);
– Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March
1996 on the legal protection of databases;
– Regulation (EU) 2018/1807 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 14 November 2018 on a framework for the free flow of non-personal data
in the European Union;
– Directive 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of secu-
rity of network and information systems across the Union
– Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic
transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
(eIDAS Directive)
– The set of Communications on Critical Infrastructures, including Communi-
cation 786/2006 on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructures Pro-
tection, the Communication 163/2011 on Critical Information Infrastruc-
ture Protection ‘Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security’
and others;
– Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European
Critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their pro-
tection;
– Set of Communication on data economy and Artificial Intelligence, framing
the issues and discussing the evidence collected through public and targeted
consultations, as well as dedicated support measures, such as the Communi-
cation COM(2017)9 “Building a European data economy,” the Communica-
tion COM (2018) 237 on “Artificial Intelligence for Europe,” COM (2019)
168 “Building Trust in Human-Centric AI” and other;
– The Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union.
23.3.2 The “Soft Law”
In addition to the legislation and official regulatory instruments, complementary
regulatory tools should be explored, shifting from a vision of mere legal compli-
ance towards exploiting the possible benefits of the “soft law,” considering its rela-
tionship with the traditional legal instruments and its possible role in a landscape
of increasingly and dynamic cross-fertilization of regulations and technology. Soft
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law is capable of providing important safeguards on issues like transparency and
accountability, while, due to its flexibility, can be quickly adapted to the rapidly
evolving technological artifacts, thereby ensuring alignment of the current legisla-
tive system, which is developing at a much slower pace.
“Soft law” instrument, in a broader sense, relevant in this context includes the
Big Data Value Associations’ Position Papers, such as “Towards a European Data
Sharing Space. Enabling data exchange and unlocking AI potential,” published on
April 2019; “Data Protection in the era of Artificial Intelligence. Trends, existing
solutions and recommendations for privacy-preserving technologies,” published on
October 2019; and others.
Likewise, the following two works elaborated by expert groups appointed by the
European Commission need to be taken into account:
– The Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, presented on 8
April 2019 by the High-Level Expert Group on AI;
– The Report on Liability for Artificial Intelligence and other emerging tech-
nologies, released by the European Commission’s Expert Group on Liability
and New Technologies—New Technologies Formation (“NTF”).
23.3.3 Ethics-driven Standardization Initiatives [9]
The main ethics-related standardization projects and initiatives to be considered for
materializing EU human factors, ethical principles, and values prioritizing human
well-being in the next generation of critical infrastructures’ integrated security sys-
tems relying on CPS, IoT, and other intelligent and autonomous applications and
devices (in addition to other standardization initiatives, such as for security) are,
besides the Technical Reports elaborated by ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 42, above all the
Standardization projects of the IEEE Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous
and Intelligent Systems, whose mission is “to ensure every stakeholder involved in
the design and development of autonomous and intelligent systems is educated,
trained, and empowered to prioritize ethical considerations so that these technolo-
gies are advanced for the benefit of humanity.”1
By following the indications of these projects, developers and operators will be
guided to create and use the cutting-edge solutions in a way explicitly honoring
the inalienable human rights and the beneficial values of their users, thereby max-
imizing the increase of human well-being as a key metric for progress and social
sustainability.
1. https://standards.ieee.org/industry-connections/ec/autonomous-systems.html
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Among the most relevant, there are:
– IEEE P7000TM—Model Process for Addressing Ethical Concerns During
System Design
– IEEE P7001TM—Transparency of Autonomous Systems
– IEEE P7002TM—Data Privacy Process
– IEEE P7003TM—Algorithmic Bias Considerations
– IEEE P7006TM—Standard on Personal Data AI Agent
– IEEE P7007TM—Ontological Standard for Ethically driven Robotics and
Automation Systems
– IEEE P7008TM—Standard for Ethically Driven Nudging for Robotic, Intel-
ligent and Autonomous Systems
– IEEE P7009TM—Standard for Fail-Safe Design of Autonomous and Semi-
Autonomous Systems
– IEEE P7010TM—Wellbeing Metrics Standard for Ethical Artificial Intelli-
gence and Autonomous Systems
– IEEE P7012TM—Standard for Machine Readable Personal Privacy Terms
23.4 Ethical and Legal Framework and Safeguards
There is the need for a coherent legal and ethical frame to delineate the limits
of legal and ethical compliant behaviors and to provide responses for tackling the
risks of integrated security infrastructures and surrounding technological develop-
ments for the protection of critical infrastructures, rooted in common human values
and multi-stakeholder involvement, and relying on inclusiveness, adaptivity, agility
and fitness for purpose, and thereby functional to the achievement of the sustain-
able development goals, as recently emphasized by the United Nations Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation.
Such a framework should take the form of a code of conduct for
researchers/designers and users and should be based on the principles enshrined
in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (such as human dignity, autonomy and
human rights, non-discrimination and non-stigmatization, the integration of per-
sons with disabilities and of elderly people and other) and on existing ethical prac-
tices and codes.
The values enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights represent the
normative framework on which a common understanding of the ethical risks
associated with the operation of robots could be built. Still, judgments about the
ethical soundness of robotics applications depend significantly on the specific con-
text of application and the findings of the respective risk assessment process.
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The production of realistic and workable codes of conduct for each domain pro-
vides a number of advantages, because they, as a typical “soft law” tool, are capa-
ble of offering practical guidance and tackling in meaningful, flexible, and prac-
tical ways the issues and ethical challenges of CPS, IoT, and AI breakthroughs in
each of such domain. They are also aligned with the legislative support for the
self-regulation and accountability instruments (e.g., General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) Regulation (EU) 2016/679, art. 40). An example of this codes,
though referring only to Data Protection, is the Cloud Security Alliance Code of
Conduct for GDPR Compliance.
The production of these codes and, in general, the ethics reasoning in relation to
integrated security infrastructures for the protection of critical infrastructures need
to be based on a prioritization approach and resulting balancing operations, in order
to let fully reaping the benefits coming from technological progress in conjunction
with the safeguard of human rights and ethical values [5].
In line with the European Group on Ethics (EGE’s) in Science and New Technol-
ogy, aiming at identifying criteria of accountability and oversight in order to protect
the ethical values and the freedom of individuals together with security, without
giving up on any of the rights and interests at stake, there is the need to find a com-
promise and a balance between, on the one hand, the interest in strengthening the
public safety and in protecting critical infrastructures and the set of related human
rights, and, on the other hand, the need to safeguard other human rights, such as
privacy, data protection, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of
movement, due process and non-discrimination [13].
This balance between opposite interests is particularly relevant in case of critical
infrastructure: their protection against physical and cyberattack has a growing role
also in national security issues. Attacks on one of them are able to produce huge
consequences, in terms of damage economies, cause disasters and other possible
serious impacts on health, safety, security, or economic well-being of citizens or
even preventing the effective functioning of governments in the Member States.2
A rich jurisprudence and a long history of scholarship both in ethical and in
legal philosophy confirm the balancing and prioritizing of rights. For instance, in
relation to the fundamental right to the protection of personal data under Article 8
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) stated that “is not, however, an absolute right, but
must be considered in relation to its function in society.”3
2. “Critical infrastructure protection in the fight against terrorism” – COM (2004) 702.
3. Among others, CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut
Eifert v. Land Hessen, November 2010, par. 48.
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In addition to the elaboration of Code of Conducts for a more agile and adap-
tive governance, as well as to the prioritization approach in ethical reasoning and
operations, other driving factors and countermeasures for minimizing ethical risks
and ensuring legal compliance include:
• Ethical and Legal oversight, for instance through the appointment of Ethics
Boards or Ethics and Safety Officers
• Accountability Mechanisms, such as due diligence and certification of ethical
and legal compliance, relying also on ad hoc metrics and on Fundamental
Rights Impact Assessment and mechanisms afterwards to allow for feedback
on any potential infringement of such rights. This impact assessment should
be additional to the Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) regulated
by the GDPR and should be developed according to the set of indications
adopted on it by the EC.
• Privacy and Security by design and Ethics & Rule of law by design
• Adequate redress mechanisms in place in case of damages caused by products
and services
• Regulatory sandboxes, where innovative services and tools can be tested and
experimented in real regulatory conditions (but with possible exceptions from
some rules) in a gradual and controlled way before going to the market,
pursuant to a specific testing plan agreed and monitored by the competent
authority
• Exploiting and further advancing the cross-fertilization of law and technol-
ogy, such as in terms of solutions aiming to translate and automate legal pro-
visions into computer language, and then allow some form of human control
or intervention to slightly modify the parameters in the computer language
translation of legal requirements of compliance: Privacy-enhancing Tech-
nologies (PETs), sticky policies, dynamic user consent, blockchain-enabled
transactions and smart contracts move in this direction, as well as in general,
certain forms of automated compliance tools.
23.5 Conclusion
Beyond the identification of the main areas of potential legal and ethical con-
cern and the associated challenges and the respective relevant pieces of EU
legislation that might need to be reviewed or considered, the analysis leads to these
conclusions:
– Every attempt to conceive and tackle with the legal and ethical challenges
associated with the multifaceted emerging technologies concerned needs to
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be set on each specific sector and, sometimes, fine-tuned on a case-by-case
basis, reflecting on how much security it is reasonable to expect or claim in
any given domain, and what is seen as responsible behavior.
– The ethical and legal framework would not need to take a legally binding form
but, preferably, should take the form of a domain-specific code of conduct,
to be prepared through an holistic, prioritization approach supported by a
multidisciplinary exercises, able capture and shape a pluralist conception of
law, ethics, and technology.
– The code of conducts and the other “soft law” instruments are expected to be
capable of providing granular and practical guidance to all the relevant con-
cerns previously identified, which include privacy and data protection issues,
but also data ownership, certification, safety, liability, and much other.
– By reflecting on such issues and conceiving and implementing adequate
safeguards and mitigating measures, such as the appointment of ethical offi-
cers, the fundamental rights impact assessment, the alignment with ethics-
related standardization outcomes and EC-promoted guidelines, and, overall,
by ensuring legal compliance and upholding ethical values into the new tech-
nological developments at stake, the positive benefits can be reached while
mitigating and the negative side effects potentially eliminated, thereby foster-
ing societal acceptance.
– CPS, IoT, AI, ubiquitous data streams, integrated and holistic security infras-
tructures are neutral even though they can give rise to a more complex world
in which human beings will need to improve their ability to predict and
understand the machines and their risks and effect on well-being and human
rights. Regulatory sandboxes, as safe and controlled environment where inno-
vative services and tools can be tested and experimented in real regulatory
conditions before going to the market, are useful tool empowering a better
understanding of legal and ethical implications of new technological devel-
opments.
– Promising avenues come from the expected advancing of the cross-
fertilization of law and technology, including solutions aiming to translate
and automate legal provisions into computer language: PETs, sticky policies,
dynamic user consent, blockchain-enabled solutions and automated compli-
ance services and techniques.
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Epilogue
The world has recently witnessed large-scale security incidents such as the
WannaCry ransomware attack, the Mirai botnet, and various notorious attacks
against industrial plants. These incidents indicate that despite the ever-increasing
investments in security solutions, industrial organizations and critical infrastruc-
tures remain vulnerable against adversarial attacks. Several of the proclaimed
vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures stem from their complexity and their cyber-
physical nature. Modern critical infrastructures comprise both cyber and physical
assets and, as such, can be considered as large-scale cyber-physical systems. Hence,
the conventional approach of addressing cybersecurity and physical security sep-
arately is no longer effective. On the contrary, more integrated approaches that
address the security of cyber and physical assets at the same time are required. Even
though the merit of such integrated approaches is acknowledged, their implemen-
tation is in its infancy.
This book has presented integrated (i.e., cyber and physical) security approaches
and technologies for some of the most important infrastructures that underpin our
societies. Specifically, it has presented advanced techniques for threat detection,
risk assessment, and security information sharing, based on leading edge technolo-
gies like machine learning, security knowledge modeling, IoT security, and dis-
tributed ledger infrastructures. Likewise, it has introduced how established security
technologies like SIEM, pen-testing, vulnerability assessment, and security data
analytics can be used in the context of integrated Critical Infrastructure Protec-
tion. Moreover, certain chapters of the book have dealt with the ever important
operational, business, and ethical aspects of critical infrastructure protection.
The novel methods and techniques of the book are exemplified in the scope of
case studies involving pragmatic critical infrastructures in four industrial sectors,
namely finance, healthcare, energy, and communications. In this way, the pecu-
liarities of critical infrastructure protection in each one of these sectors have been
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adequately discussed and addressed based on sector-specific solutions. The presen-
tation of security systems and technologies for these four different sectors provides
opportunities for understanding the commonalities and the differences of security
systems in the various sectors.
The advent of the fourth industrial revolution (Industry 4.0) is expected to
increase the cyber-physical nature of critical infrastructures as well as their inter-
connection in the scope of sectorial and cross-sector value chains. Therefore, the
demand for solutions that foster the interplay between cyber and physical security
and enable Cyber-physical Threat Intelligence is likely to explode. In this book, we
have shed light on the structure of such integrated security systems, as well as on the
technologies that will underpin their operation. We hope that Security and Critical
Infrastructure Protection stakeholders will find the book useful in planning their
future security strategies.
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